A collective bargaining agreement between a group of local labor
unions and a group of interstate motor carriers prescribed a wage
scale for truck drivers and, in order to prevent evasion thereof,
provided that drivers who own and drive their own vehicles should
be paid, in addition to the prescribed wage, not less than a
prescribed minimum rental for the use of their vehicles. A suit was
brought in a state court to enjoin certain carriers and a local
union from carrying out the minimum rental provision on the ground
that it violated a state antitrust law.
Held: Since that provision was part of an agreement
resulting from the exercise of collective bargaining rights under
the National Labor Relations Act, the state court was precluded
from applying the state antitrust law to prohibit the parties from
carrying out its terms. Pp.
358 U. S.
284-297.
(1) In the light of its history and its purpose to protect the
negotiated wage scale against evasion through payment to
owner-drivers of rentals insufficient to cover their operating
costs, the minimum rental provision was within the scope of
collective bargaining required of the parties under §§ 7 and 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act. Pp.
358 U. S.
292-295.
(2) The state antitrust law may not be applied to prevent the
contracting parties from carrying out their agreement upon a
subject matter as to which federal law directs them to bargain. Pp.
358 U. S.
295-297.
167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856, reversed.
Page 358 U. S. 284
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
As the result of multiemployer, multistate collective bargaining
with the Central States Drivers Council, comprising local unions of
truck drivers affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, a collective
bargaining agreement, the "Central States Area Over-the-Road Motor
Freight Agreement," effective February 1, 1955, and expiring
January 31, 1961, was entered into by the locals and motor carriers
in interstate commerce who operate under the authority of the
Interstate Commerce Commission [
Footnote 1] in 12 midwestern States, including Ohio.
[
Footnote 2] Article XXXII of
this collective bargaining agreement [
Footnote 3] prescribes terms and conditions which regulate
the minimum rental and certain other terms of lease when a
Page 358 U. S. 285
motor vehicle is leased to a carrier by an owner who drives his
vehicle in the carrier's service. [
Footnote 4] The Ohio courts enjoined the petitioner,
Ohio's Teamsters Local 24 and its president, and the respondent
carriers, A.C.E. Transportation Company, Inc., and Interstate Truck
Service, Inc., Ohio employers, from giving effect to the provisions
of Article XXXII. The Ohio courts held that the Article violates
the Ohio antitrust law, known as the Valentine Act. [
Footnote 5] The question is whether the fact
that the Article
Page 358 U. S. 286
was contained in an agreement which was the fruit of the
exercise of collective bargaining rights under the National Labor
Relations Act [
Footnote 6]
precluded the Ohio courts from applying the Ohio antitrust law to
prohibit the parties from carrying out the terms of the Article
they had agreed upon in bargaining. No claim is made that Article
XXXII violates any provision of federal law.
The Article is in express terms made applicable only to a
lessor-driver when he himself drives his vehicle in the
Page 358 U. S. 287
business of the lessee-carrier. § 1. The Article, at least in
words, constitutes the lessor-driver an employee of the carrier at
such times:
"The employer [the carrier] expressly reserves the right to
control the manner, means and details of, and by which, the
owner-operator performs his services, as well as the ends to be
accomplished."
§ 4. His wages, hours and working conditions are then to be
those applied to the carrier's drivers of carrier-owned vehicles,
and he has "seniority as a driver only." § 2. He must operate his
vehicle at such times "exclusively in . . . [the carrier's] service
and for no other interests." § 1. The carrier "agrees to pay . . .
social security tax, compensation insurance, public liability and
property damage insurance, bridge tolls" and various other fees
imposed on motor freight transportation, except "that the
owner-driver shall pay license fees in the state in which title is
registered." § 10. The lessor-driver must be compensated by
"separate checks . . . for driver's wages and equipment rental." §
6. The wage payment must be in the amount of "the full wage rate
and supplementary allowances" payable to carrier drivers similarly
circumstanced who drive carrier-owned vehicles. § 12(a). The
equipment rental payment must be in an amount not less than "the
minimum rates" specified by the Article which
"result from the joint determination of the parties that such
rates represent only the actual cost of operating such [leased]
equipment. The parties have not attempted to negotiate a profit for
the owner-driver."
§ 12(b). All leases by union members who drive their vehicles
for carriers in effect on the operative date of the collective
bargaining agreement are to "be dissolved or modified within thirty
(30) days" to conform to the terms and conditions of the Article. §
15. The parties declare that
"the intent of this clause [the Article] . . . is to assure the
payment of the Union scale of wages . . . and to prohibit [a
carrier from] the making
Page 358 U. S. 288
and carrying out of any plan, scheme or device to circumvent or
defeat the payment of wage scales provided in this Agreement. . . .
[and] to prevent the continuation of or formation of combinations
or corporations or so-called lease of fleet arrangements whereby
the driver [of his own vehicle] is required to and does
periodically pay losses sustained by the corporation or fleet
arrangement, or is required to accept less than the actual cost of
the running of his equipment, thus, in fact, reducing his scale of
pay."
§ 16.
The respondent, Revel Oliver, a member of the union, is the
owner of motor equipment [
Footnote
7] which, at the time the collective bargaining agreement was
negotiated, was subject to written lease agreements with the
carrier respondents, A.C.E. Transportation Company, Inc., and
Interstate Truck Service, Inc. The terms and conditions of the
leases, particularly in regard to rental compensation, differ
substantially from those provided in Article XXXII. [
Footnote 8]
Oliver brought this action on January 20, 1955, in the Court of
Common Pleas, Summit County, Ohio, for an injunction restraining
the petitioners and the respondent carriers from carrying out the
terms of Article XXXII.
Page 358 U. S. 289
He obtained a temporary restraining order upon sworn
allegations. At the trial, the respondent carriers joined with
Oliver in making the attack on the Article. The petitioners
defended on the ground that the State could not lawfully exercise
power to apply its antitrust law to cause a forfeiture of the
product of the exercise of federally sanctioned collective
bargaining rights. The union justified the Article as necessary to
prevent undermining of the negotiated drivers' wage scale said to
result from a practice of carriers of leasing a vehicle from an
owner-driver at a rental which returned to the owner-driver less
than his actual costs of operation, so that the driver's wage
received by him, although nominally the negotiated wage, was
actually a wage reduced by the excess of his operating expenses
over the rental he received. The Court of Common Pleas held in
Oliver v. All-States Freight, 156 N.E.2d 176, that the
National Labor Relations Act could not "be reasonably construed to
permit this remote and indirect approach to the subject of wages,"
and that Article XXXII was in violation of the State's antitrust
law because
"there are restrictions and restraints imposed upon articles
[the leased vehicles] that are widely used in trade and commerce. .
. . [and] preclude an owner of property from reasonable freedom of
action in dealing with it."
On the petitioners' appeal to Ohio's Ninth Judicial District
Court of Appeals that court heard the case
de novo and
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, adopting its
opinion. 156 N.E.2d 190. The Court of Appeals entered a permanent
injunction perpetually restraining the petitioners and the
respondent carriers (1) "from entering into any agreements . . . or
carrying out the . . . requirements . . . of any such agreement,
which will require the alteration" of Revel Oliver's "existing
lease or leasing agreement"; (2) "from entering into any . . .
agreement or stipulation in the future, or
Page 358 U. S. 290
the negotiation therefor, the . . . tendency of which is to . .
. determine in any manner the rate to be charged for the use of"
Revel Oliver's equipment; (3) "from giving force and effect to
Section 32 [
sic] of the Contract . . . or any modification
. . . thereof, the . . . tendency of which shall attempt to fix the
rates" for the use of Revel Oliver's equipment. [
Footnote 9] Petitioners' appeal
Page 358 U. S. 291
to the Ohio Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a debatable
constitutional question. 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856. We
granted certiorari to consider the important question raised of the
interaction of state and federal power arising from the
petitioners' claim that the Ohio regulation abridges rights
protected by federal statute. 356 U.S. 966.
Article XXXII did not originate with the 1955 agreement. The
carriers and the union have disputed since 1938 the terms of a
carrier's hire of a lessor's driving services with his leased
vehicle. The usual lease is by the owner of a single vehicle who
hires out his services as driver with his vehicle. A carrier's
representative who has participated in all contract negotiations
since those leading to the 1938 agreement testified to the history.
According to him, the nub of the union's position over the two
decades has been that the carriers abuse the leasing practice,
particularly by paying inadequate rentals for the use of leased
vehicles, with the result
"that part of the men's wages for driving was being used for the
upkeep of their vehicles. . . . They [the union] claimed that the
leased people were breaking down the rate structure. . . ."
The union's demands for contract provisions to safeguard against
the alleged abuse were designed also to "secure a living wage [for
the lessor] plus an adequate rental for his equipment." A minimum
rental clause first appeared in the 1938 agreement which also
contained provisions comparable to §§ 8, 10 and 14 of present
Article XXXII.
Page 358 U. S. 292
In 1939, after the union claimed that "there was a lot of people
that was transferring their title into other people's name to avoid
the conditions of the contract," § 3 was added to provide that
"certificate and title to the equipment must be in the name of the
actual owner." When the dispute brought the parties to the verge of
a strike in 1941, the note to § 1 and §§ 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 came
into the agreement. But, by 1946, the controversy reached a pitch
where the union demanded agreement from the carriers to abolish the
leasing practice:
"The unions were going to refuse the addition of any individual
owners, and the unions also desired to make certain restrictions on
the use of owner-operators, again claiming that the . . . company
operators were taking advantage of certain provisions of the
contract."
This demand was compromised by the addition of § 19 restricting
leasing to carriers "who will agree to submit all grievances
pertaining to owner-operators to joint Employer-Union grievance
committees in each respective state"; the section
"represented the compromise between the union position that it
should abolish all owner-operators and the companies' contention
there should be no limitation."
First. The Ohio courts rejected the petitioners'
contention that the evidence conclusively established that Article
XXXII dealt with subject matter within the scope of "collective
bargaining" in which federal law gave petitioners the right to
engage. The state courts rested their judgments principally on the
minimum rental regulations of § 12 of the Article. The principal
discussion occurs in the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas.
These regulations were held to constitute the Article a
price-fixing arrangement violating the Ohio antitrust law in that
they evidenced
"concerted action of the Union combining with a non-labor third
party in a formal contract. . . . [the] effect [of which] is to
oppress and
Page 358 U. S. 293
destroy competition. . . . [and] preclude an owner of property
from reasonable freedom of action in dealing with it."
It seems to us that in considering whether the Article deals
with a subject matter within the scope of collective bargaining as
defined by federal law the Ohio courts did not give proper
significance to the Article's narrowly restricted application to
the times when the owner drives his leased vehicle for the carrier,
and to the adverse effects upon the negotiated wage scale which
might result when the rental for the use of the leased vehicle was
unregulated at these times. Since no claim was presented to the
Ohio courts that the petitioners sought to apply these regulations
to Revel Oliver's arrangements with the respondent carriers except
on the very infrequent and irregular occasions when Oliver drove
one of his vehicles for a carrier, we take it that the Ohio courts'
opinions and judgments relate only to the validity of the Article
as applied at such times. This would necessarily be the case as the
text of the Article, and that text as illumined by its history,
conclusively establish that the regulations in no wise apply to the
terms of lease of a vehicle when driven by a driver not the owner
of the vehicle; the wages, hours and working conditions to be
observed by contracting employers of non-owner drivers are governed
by the general provisions in that regard found in other articles of
the collective bargaining agreement.
In the light of the Article's history and purpose, we cannot
agree with the Court of Common Pleas that its regulations
constitute a "remote and indirect approach to the subject of
wages," outside the range of matters on which the federal law
requires the parties to bargain. The text of the Article and its
unchallenged history show that its objective is to protect the
negotiated wage scale against the possible undermining through
diminution of
Page 358 U. S. 294
the owner's wages for driving which might result from a rental
which did not cover his operating costs. This is thus but an
instance, as this Court said of a somewhat similar union demand in
another case, in which a union seeks to protect lawful employee
interests against what is believed, rightly or wrongly, to be
"a scheme or device utilized for the purpose of escaping the
payment of union wages and the assumption of working conditions
commensurate with those imposed under union standards."
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products,
Inc., 311 U. S. 91,
311 U. S. 98-99.
Looked at in this light, as on the evidence it must be, to
determine its relevance to the collective bargaining rights under
the Federal Act, the point of the Article is obviously not
price-fixing but wages. The regulations embody not the "remote and
indirect approach to the subject of wages" perceived by the Court
of Common Pleas, but a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought
to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established
by the collective bargaining contract. The inadequacy of a rental
which means that the owner makes up his excess costs from his
driver's wages not only clearly bears a close relation to labor's
efforts to improve working conditions, but is, in fact, of vital
concern to the carrier's employed drivers; an inadequate rental
might mean the progressive curtailment of jobs through withdrawal
of more and more carrier-owned vehicles from service.
Cf.
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.
S. 769,
315 U. S. 771.
It is not necessary to attempt to set precise outside limits to the
subject matter properly included within the scope of mandatory
collective bargaining,
cf. Labor Board v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U. S. 342, to
hold, as we do, that the obligation under § 8(d) on the carriers
and their employees to bargain collectively "with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" and to embody
their understanding in "a
Page 358 U. S. 295
written contract incorporating any agreement reached," found an
expression in the subject matter of Article XXXII.
See Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 518,
reversed on
other grounds, 161 F.2d 949. And certainly bargaining on this
subject through their representatives was a right of the employees
protected by § 7 of the Act.
Second. We must decide whether Ohio's antitrust law may
be applied to prevent the contracting parties from carrying out
their agreement upon a subject matter as to which federal law
directs them to bargain. Little extended discussion is necessary to
show that Ohio law cannot be so applied. We need not concern
ourselves today with a contractual provision dealing with a subject
matter that the parties were under no obligation to discuss; the
carriers, as employers, were under a duty to bargain collectively
with the union as to the subject matter of the Article, as we have
shown. The goal of federal labor policy, as expressed in the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining;
to encourage the employer and the representative of the employees
to establish, through collective negotiation, their own charter for
the ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize
industrial strife.
See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 45;
Labor Board v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.
S. 395,
343 U. S.
401-402. Within the area in which collective bargaining
was required, Congress was not concerned with the substantive terms
upon which the parties agreed.
Cf. Terminal Railroad Ass'n v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S.
1,
318 U. S. 6. The
purposes of the Acts are served by bringing the parties together
and establishing conditions under which they are to work out their
agreement themselves. To allow the application of the Ohio
antitrust law here would wholly defeat the full realization of the
congressional
Page 358 U. S. 296
purpose. The application would frustrate the parties' solution
of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good
faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no
limitations relevant here. Federal law here created the duty upon
the parties to bargain collectively; Congress has provided for a
system of federal law applicable to the agreement the parties made
in response to that duty,
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448; and
federal law sets some outside limits (not contended to be exceeded
here) on what their agreement may provide,
see Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union, 325 U. S. 797;
cf. United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n,
347 U. S. 186,
347 U. S. 190.
We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the application
here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties'
agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working
conditions.
Cf. California v. Taylor, 353 U.
S. 553,
353 U. S.
566-567. Since the federal law operates here, in an area
where its authority is paramount, to leave the parties free, the
inconsistent application of state law is necessarily outside the
power of the State.
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.
S. 538,
325 U. S.
542-544.
Cf. International Union v. O'Brien,
339 U. S. 454,
339 U. S. 457;
Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
340 U. S. 383;
Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 338 U.S. 953. The solution worked out by the parties
was not one of a sort which Congress has indicated may be left to
prohibition by the several States.
Cf. Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U. S. 301,
336 U. S.
307-312. [
Footnote
10] Of course, the paramount force of the federal
Page 358 U. S. 297
law remains even though it is expressed in the details of a
contract federal law empowers the parties to make, rather than in
terms in an enactment of Congress.
See Railway Employes' Dept.
v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225,
351 U. S. 232.
Clearly it is immaterial that the conflict is between federal labor
law and the application of what the State characterizes as an
antitrust law.
". . . Congress has sufficiently expressed its purpose to . . .
exclude state prohibition, even though that with which the federal
law is concerned as a matter of labor relations be related by the
State to the more inclusive area of restraint of trade."
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.
S. 468,
348 U. S. 481.
We have not here a case of a collective bargaining agreement in
conflict with a local health or safety regulation; the conflict
here is between the federally sanctioned agreement and state policy
which seeks specifically to adjust relationships in the world of
commerce. If there is to be this sort of limitation on the
arrangements that unions and employers may make with regard to
these subjects, pursuant to the collective bargaining provisions of
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, it is for Congress, not the
States, to provide it.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, believing that respondent Oliver, while
driving his own tractor in the performance of his independent
contract with the respondent carriers
Page 358 U. S. 298
was not an employee of those carriers, but was an independent
contractor,
United States v. Silk, 331 U.
S. 704, and that, as such, he was expressly excluded
from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act by 61 Stat.
137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Judicial District of Ohio.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE
STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
[
Footnote 1]
Certificates of convenience and necessity are issued to common
carriers pursuant to §§ 206-208 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
Stat. 551, 552, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 306-308; permits are
issued to contract carriers pursuant to § 209, 49 Stat. 552, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 309.
[
Footnote 2]
The agreement covers between 3,000 and 3,500 employers and
between 45,000 and 50,000 truck drivers. Those covered in Ohio
consist of approximately 500 employers and 6,000 drivers. Upwards
of 90% of the Ohio drivers drive equipment owned by carriers who
operate under I.C.C. certificates or permits. The rest of the
covered drivers own their own equipment, usually one vehicle, but
since they are not holders of I.C.C. certificates or permits, they
lease their equipment to, and drive it for, certificated or
permitted carriers.
[
Footnote 3]
For the text of Article XXXII,
see Appendix, post, p.
358 U. S.
298.
[
Footnote 4]
For details of I.C.C. regulations governing the relationship
between certificated carriers and the lessors of motor vehicle
equipment,
see the discussion in
American Trucking
Ass'ns Inc. v. United States, 344 U.
S. 298.
[
Footnote 5]
The specific provision involved, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 1331.01,
provides as follows:
"As used in sections 1331.01 to 1331.14, inclusive, of the
Revised Code:"
"(A) 'Person' includes corporations, partnerships, and
associations existing under or authorized by any state or territory
of the United States, or a foreign country."
"(B) 'Trust' is a combination of capital, skill, or acts by two
or more persons for any of the following purposes:"
"(1) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or
commerce;"
"(2) To limit or reduce the production, or increase or reduce
the price of merchandise or a commodity;"
"(3) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making,
transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, produce, or a
commodity;"
"(4) To fix at a standard or figure, whereby its price to the
public or consumer is in any manner controlled or established, an
article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended
for sale, barter, use, or consumption in this state;"
"(5) To make, enter into, execute, or carry out contracts,
obligations, or agreements of any kind by which they bind or have
bound themselves not to sell, dispose of, or transport an article
or commodity, or an article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce,
or consumption below a common standard figure or fixed value, or by
which they agree in any manner to keep the price of such article,
commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure, or by
which they shall in any manner establish or settle the price of an
article, commodity, or transportation between them or themselves
and others, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and
unrestricted competition among themselves, purchasers, or consumers
in the sale or transportation of such article or commodity, or by
which they agree to pool, combine, or directly or indirectly unite
any interests which they have connected with the sale or
transportation of such article or commodity, that its price might
in any manner be affected."
"A trust as defined in division (B) of this section in unlawful
and void."
[
Footnote 6]
Involved are §§ 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended and reenacted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61
Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158. Section 7 is follows:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a)(3)."
Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) require employers and labor
organizations to bargain collectively. Section 8(d), in pertinent
part, provides:
"For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party. . . ."
[
Footnote 7]
Oliver is rather unusual among Ohio owner-drivers because he
owns not one vehicle, but a fleet, six trucks and four trailers,
each of which is under a lease agreement with one or the other of
the carrier respondents. Oliver drove only occasionally, "every
month or so for A.C.E. and every eight months or so for
Interstate," and Article XXXII applied to his leases only as to the
vehicle he drove on those occasions.
[
Footnote 8]
Accordingly, § 15 of Art. XXXII required the carriers to take
steps to modify both agreements. The Interstate Truck Service lease
with Oliver was for a fixed term, but contained a five-day
cancellation clause. The agreement between A.C.E. and Oliver was
not for any fixed term, and was brought into effect by the issuance
of individual waybills and manifests for particular hauls.
[
Footnote 9]
The restraints entered by the judgment and order of the Court of
Appeals filed September 30, 1957, are:
"(a) That the defendants-appellees, A.C.E. Transportation Co.,
Inc., Interstate Truck Service, Inc., and defendants-appellants,
Local No. 24 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers and each of them, their
agents, representatives and successors or persons, acting, by,
through or for them, or in concert with each other, are hereby
perpetually restrained and enjoined from entering into any
agreements one with the other or carrying out the effects,
requirements or terms of any such agreement, which will require the
alteration, cancellation or violation of plaintiff-appellee's
[Revel Oliver's] existing lease or leasing agreement or any such
agreement hereafter renewed or renegotiated and entered into,
and"
"(b) That the defendants-appellees, A.C.E. Transportation Co.,
Inc., Interstate Truck Service, Inc., and defendants-appellants,
Local No. 24 of The International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers and Kenneth Burke, President
and Business Agent of said Local and each of them and the successor
of each and those acting in concert with said defendants-appellees
and appellants are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from
entering into any combination, arrangement, agreement or
stipulation in the future, or the negotiation therefor, the
purpose, intent or tendency of which is to fix or determine in any
manner the rate to be charged for the use of plaintiff's equipment,
leased by said plaintiff-appellee to the defendants-appellees,
A.C.E. Transportation Co., Inc., and Interstate Truck Service,
Inc., and"
"(c) That the said defendants-appellee, A.C.E. Transportation
Co., Inc., Interstate Truck Service, Inc., and
defendants-appellants, Local No. 24 of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers and
Kenneth Burke, President and Business Agent of said Local and each
of them and the successors of each are hereby perpetually enjoined
from giving force and effect to Section 32 [
sic] of the
Contract between them as is fully set forth in this Court's
finding, or any modification or alteration thereof, the import,
effect or tendency of which shall attempt to fix the rates and the
use of plaintiff-appellee's equipment or to fix or determine the
return for plaintiff-appellee's capital investment in said
equipment."
[
Footnote 10]
In
Algoma, state law was allowed to operate to restrict
a provision of a collective bargaining contract only after it was
found after an exhaustive examination of the legislative history of
the Wagner Act that Congress intended to leave the special subject
of the legality of maintenance of membership clauses up to the
States through § 8(3) of that Act, 49 Stat. 452. Questions of the
nature that we consider today were expressly left open. 336 U.S. at
336 U. S.
312.
|
358
U.S. 283app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Article XXXII of the Central States Area
Over-the-Road
Motor Freight Agreement
Owner-Operators.
Section 1. Owner-operators (See Note), other than certificated
or permitted carriers, shall not be covered by this Agreement
unless affiliated by lease with a certificated or permitted carrier
which is required to operate in full compliance with all the
provisions of this Agreement and holding proper ICC and state
certificates and permits. Such owner-operators shall operate
exclusively in such service and for no other interests.
(NOTE: Whenever "owner-operator" is used in this article, it
means owner-driver only, and nothing in this article shall apply to
any equipment leased except where owner is also employed as a
driver.)
Section 2. This type of operator's compensation for wages and
working conditions shall be in full accordance with all the
provisions of this Agreement. The owner-operator shall have
seniority as a driver only.
Section 3. Certificate and title to the equipment must be in the
name of the actual owner.
Section 4. In all cases, hired or leased equipment shall be
operated by an employee of the certificated or permitted carrier.
The employer expressly reserves the right
Page 358 U. S. 299
to control the manner, means and details of, and by which, the
owner-operator performs his services, as well as the ends to be
accomplished.
Section 5. Certificated or permitted carriers shall use their
own available equipment, together with all leased equipment under
minimum thirty-day bona fide lease arrangements, on a rotating
board, before hiring any extra equipment.
Section 6. Separate checks shall be issued by the certificated
or permitted carriers for driver's wages and equipment rental. At
no time shall the equipment check be for less than actual miles
operated. Separate checks for drivers shall not be deducted from
the minimum truck rental revenue. The driver shall turn in time
direct to the certificated or permitted carrier. All monies due the
owner-operator may be held no longer than two weeks, except where
the lease of equipment agreement is terminated and in such cases
all monies due the operator may be held no longer than thirty (30)
days from the date of the termination of the operation of the
equipment.
Section 7. Payment for equipment service shall be handled by the
issuance of a check for the full mileage operated, tonnage or
percentage, less any agreed advances. A statement of any charges by
the certificated or permitted carrier shall be issued at the same
time, but shall not be deducted in advance.
Section 8. The owner-operator shall have complete freedom to
purchase gasoline, oil, grease, tires, tubes, etc., including
repair work, at any place where efficient service and satisfactory
products can be obtained at the most favorable prices.
Section 9. There shall be no deduction pertaining to equipment
operation for any reason whatsoever.
Section 10. The Employer of certificated or permitted carrier
hereby agrees to pay road or mile tax, social security
Page 358 U. S. 300
tax, compensation insurance, public liability and property
damage insurance, bridge tolls, fees for certificates, permits and
travel orders, fines and penalties for inadequate certificates,
license fees, weight tax and wheel tax, and for loss of driving
time due to waiting at state lines, and also cargo insurance. It is
expressly understood that the owner-driver shall pay the license
fees in the state in which title is registered.
All tolls, no matter how computed, must be paid by the Employer
regardless of any agreement to the contrary.
All taxes or additional charges imposed by law relating to
actual truck operation and use of highways, no matter how computed
or named, shall be paid by the Carrier, excepting only vehicle
licensing as such, in the state where title is registered.
Section 11. There shall be no interest or handling charge on
earned money advanced prior to the regular pay day.
Section 12. (a) All certificated or permitted carriers hiring or
leasing equipment owned and driven by the owner-driver shall file a
true copy of the lease agreement covering the owner-driven
equipment with the Joint State Committees. The terms of the lease
shall cover only the equipment owned and driven by the owner-driver
and shall be in complete accord with the minimum rates and
conditions provided herein, plus the full wage rate and
supplementary allowances for drivers as embodied elsewhere in this
Agreement.
(b) The minimum rate for leased equipment owned and driven by
the owner-driver shall be:
Single axle, tractor only . . . . . . . 9 1/2�
Tandem axle, tractor only . . . . . . . 10�
Single axle, trailer only . . . . . . . 3�
Tandem axle, trailer only . . . . . . . 4�
Page 358 U. S. 301
75% of the above rates to apply for deadheading, if and when
ordered, provided, however, that the 75% rate will apply only on
first empty dispatch away from the home terminal; thereafter the
full equipment rental rate to apply until driver is redispatched
from home terminal; the above rates to be based on 23,000-pound
load limit. On load limits over 23,000 pounds, there shall be
one-half (1/2) cent additional per mile for each 1,000 pounds or
fraction thereof in excess of 23,000 pounds. There shall be a
minimum guarantee of 24,000 pounds for leased equipment owned and
driven by the owner-driver. Nothing herein shall apply to leased
equipment not owned by a driver.
The minimum rates set forth above result from the joint
determination of the parties that such rates represent only the
actual cost of operating such equipment. The parties have not
attempted to negotiate a profit for the owner-driver.
Section 13. Driver-owner mileage scale does not include use of
equipment for pickup or delivery at point of origin terminal or at
point of destination terminal, but shall be subject to negotiations
between the Local Union and Company. Failure to agree shall be
submitted to the grievance procedure.
Section 14. There shall be no reductions where the present basis
of payment is higher than the minimums established herein for this
type of operation. Where owner-operator is paid on a percentage or
tonnage basis and the operating company reduces its tariff, the
percentage or tonnage basis of payment shall be automatically
adjusted so that the owner-operator suffers no reduction in
equipment rental or wages, or both.
Section 15. It is further understood and agreed that any
arrangements which have heretofore been entered into between
members of this Union, either among themselves or with the Employer
or with the aid of the Employer,
Page 358 U. S. 302
applicable to owner-driver equipment contrary to the terms
hereof, shall be dissolved or modified within thirty (30) days
after the signing of this Agreement so that such arrangements shall
apply only to equipment of the owner-driver while being driven by
such owner-driver. In the event that the parties cannot agree on a
method of dissolution or modification of such arrangement to make
the same conform to this Agreement, the question of dissolution or
modification shall be submitted to arbitration, each party to
select one member of the arbitration board, and the two so selected
to choose a third member of said board. If the two cannot agree
upon the third within five (5) days, he shall be appointed by the
Joint State Committee. The decision of said board to be final and
binding.
Section 16. It is further agreed that the intent of this clause
and this entire Agreement is to assure the payment of the Union
scale of wages as provided in this Agreement and to prohibit the
making and carrying out of any plan, scheme or device to circumvent
or defeat the payment of wage scales provided in this Agreement.
This clause is intended to prevent the continuation of or formation
of combinations or corporations or so-called lease of fleet
arrangements whereby the driver is required to and does
periodically pay losses sustained by the corporation or fleet
arrangement, or is required to accept less than the actual cost of
the running of his equipment, thus, in fact, reducing his scale of
pay.
Section 17. It is further agreed that if the Employer of
certificated or permitted carrier requires that the
"driver-owner-operator" sell his equipment to the Employer or
certificated or permitted carrier, directly or indirectly, the
"driver-owner-operator" shall be paid the fair true value of such
equipment. Copies of the instruments of sale shall be filed with
the Union and unless objected to within ten (10) days shall be
deemed satisfactory. If any
Page 358 U. S. 303
question is raised by the Union as to such value, the same shall
be submitted to arbitration, as above set forth, for determination.
The decision of the arbitration board shall be final and
binding.
Section 18. It is further agreed that the Employer or
certificated or permitted carrier will not devise or put into
operation any scheme, whether herein enumerated or not, to defeat
the terms of this Agreement, wherein the provisions as to
compensation for services on and for use of equipment owned by
owner-driver shall be lessened, nor shall any owner-driver lease be
cancelled for the purpose of depriving Union employees of
employment, and any such complaint that should arise pertaining to
such cancellation of lease or violation under this section shall be
subject to Article X.
Section 19. (a) The use of individual owner-operators shall be
permitted by all certificated or permitted carriers who will agree
to submit all grievances pertaining to owner-operators to joint
Employer-Union grievance committees in each respective state. It is
understood and agreed that all such grievances will be promptly
heard and decided with the specific purpose in mind of
(1) protecting provisions of the Union contract;
(2) prohibiting any and all violations directly or indirectly of
contract provisions relating to the proper use of individual
owners;
(3) prohibiting any attempts by any certificated or permitted
carrier in changing his operation which will affect the rights of
drivers under the terms of the contract, and generally the
certificated or permitted carriers agree to assume responsibility
in policing and doing everything within their power to eliminate
all alleged abuses in the use of owner-drivers which resulted in
the insertion of Section 19 (Article XXXIII) in the original
1945-47 Over-the-Road contract;
Page 358 U. S. 304
(4) owner-driver operations to be terminal to terminal, except
where no local employees to make such deliveries or otherwise
agreed to in this contract;
(5) the certificated or permitted carriers agree that they will,
with a joint meeting of the Unions, set up uniform rules and
practices under which all such cases will be heard;
(6) it shall be considered a violation of the contract should
any operator deduct from rental of equipment the increases provided
for by the 1955 Amendments or put into effect any means of evasion
to circumvent actual payment of increases agreed upon effective for
the period starting February 1, 1955, and ending January 31,
1961.
(b) No owner-operator shall be permitted to drive or hold
seniority where he owns three or more pieces of leased equipment.
This provision shall not apply to present owner-operators having
three or more pieces of equipment under lease agreement, but such
owner-operator shall not be permitted to put additional equipment
in service so long as he engages in work covered by this Agreement
or holds seniority. Where owner-operator drives, he can hold
seniority where he works sixty (60) per cent or more of time.