Respondent, who is not an Indian, operates a general store in
Arizona on the Navajo Indian Reservation under a license required
by federal statute. He brought this action in an Arizona state
court against petitioners, a Navajo Indian and his wife who live on
the Reservation, to collect for goods sold to them there on credit.
They moved to dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction lay in the
tribal court, rather than in the state court.
Held: The motion should have been granted, since the
exercise of state jurisdiction in this case would undermine the
authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs, and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves,
which right was recognized by Congress in the Treaty of 1868 with
the Navajos, and has never been taken away. Pp.
358 U. S.
217-223.
83 Ariz. 241,
319 P.2d 998,
reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, who is not an Indian, operates a general store in
Arizona on the Navajo Indian Reservation under a license required
by federal statute. [
Footnote
1] He brought this
Page 358 U. S. 218
action in the Superior Court of Arizona against petitioners, a
Navajo Indian and his wife who live on the Reservation, to collect
for goods sold them there on credit. Over petitioners' motion to
dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction lay in the tribal court,
rather than in the state court, judgment was entered in favor of
respondent. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed, holding that,
since no Act of Congress expressly forbids their doing so, Arizona
courts are free to exercise jurisdiction over civil suits by
non-Indians against Indians though the action arises on an Indian
reservation. 83 Ariz. 241,
319 P.2d 998.
Because this was a doubtful determination of the important question
of state power over Indian affairs, we granted certiorari. 356 U.S.
930.
Originally, the Indian tribes were separate nations within what
is now the United States. Through conquest and treaties, they were
induced to give up complete independence and the right to go to war
in exchange for federal protection, aid, and grants of land. When
the lands granted lay within States, these governments sometimes
sought to impose their laws and courts on the Indians. Around 1830,
the Georgia Legislature extended its laws to the Cherokee
Reservation despite federal treaties with the Indians which set
aside this land for them. [
Footnote
2] The Georgia statutes forbade the Cherokees from enacting
laws or holding courts and prohibited outsiders from being on the
Reservation except with permission of the State Governor. The
constitutionality of these laws was tested in
Worcester
v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, when the State sought to
punish
Page 358 U. S. 219
a white man, licensed by the Federal Government to practice as a
missionary among the Cherokees, for his refusal to leave the
Reservation. Rendering one of his most courageous and eloquent
opinions, Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's assertion of
power was invalid.
"The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community, occupying
its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity
with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse
between the United States and this nation is, by our constitution
and laws, vested in the government of the United States."
6 Pet. at
31 U. S.
561.
Despite bitter criticism and the defiance of Georgia, which
refused to obey this Court's mandate in
Worcester,
[
Footnote 3] the broad
principles of that decision came to be accepted as law. [
Footnote 4] Over the years, this Court
has modified these principles in cases where essential tribal
relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would
not be jeopardized, but the basic policy of
Worcester has
remained. Thus, suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts
have been sanctioned.
See Felix v.
Patrick,
Page 358 U. S. 220
145 U. S. 317,
145 U. S. 332;
United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.
S. 432.
See also Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz.
337, 196 P.2d 456. And state courts have been allowed to try
non-Indians who committed crimes against each other on a
reservation.
E.g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,
326 U. S. 498.
But if the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction
or that expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has
remained exclusive. [
Footnote
5]
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.
S. 243,
228 U. S.
269-272;
Williams v. United States,
327 U. S. 711.
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
Cf. Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher, 116 U. S.
28.
Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that
the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a
reservation. To assure adequate government of the Indian tribes, it
enacted comprehensive statutes in 1834 regulating trade with
Indians and organizing a Department of Indian Affairs. 4 Stat. 729,
735. Not satisfied solely with centralized government of Indians,
it encouraged tribal governments and courts to become stronger and
more highly organized.
See, e.g., the Wheeler-Howard Act,
§§ 16, 17, 48 Stat. 987, 988, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477. Congress has
followed a policy calculated eventually to make all Indians
full-fledged participants in American society. This policy
contemplates criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians by any
State ready to assume the burdens that go with it as soon as the
educational and economic status of the Indians permits the change
without disadvantage to
Page 358 U. S. 221
them.
See H.R.Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6,
7 (1953). Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to
exercise this power, it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction
which
Worcester v. Georgia had denied. [
Footnote 6]
No departure from the policies which have been applied to other
Indians is apparent in the relationship between the United States
and the Navajos. On June 1, 1868, a treaty was signed between
General William T. Sherman, for the United States, and numerous
chiefs and headmen of the "Navajo nation or tribe of Indians."
[
Footnote 7] At the time this
document was signed, the Navajos were an exiled people, forced by
the United States to live crowded together on a small piece of land
on the Pecos River in eastern New Mexico, some 300 miles east of
the area they had occupied before the coming of the white man. In
return for their promises to keep peace, this treaty "set apart"
for "their permanent home" a portion of what had been their native
country, and provided that no one, except United States Government
personnel, was to enter the reserved area. Implicit in these treaty
terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in
Worcester v. Georgia, was the understanding that the
internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within
Page 358 U. S. 222
the jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existed. Since
then, Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have assisted in
strengthening the Navajo tribal government and its courts.
See the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950, § 6, 64
Stat. 46, 25 U.S.C. § 636; 25 CFR §§ 11.1 through 11.87NH. The
Tribe itself has in recent years greatly improved its legal system
through increased expenditures and better trained personnel. Today
the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses exercise broad criminal and
civil jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders against Indian
defendants. [
Footnote 8] No
Federal Act has given state courts jurisdiction over such
controversies. [
Footnote 9] In
a general statute, Congress did express its willingness to have any
State assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians if the State
Legislature or the people vote affirmatively to accept such
responsibility. [
Footnote
10] To date, Arizona has not
Page 358 U. S. 223
accepted jurisdiction, possibly because the people of the State
anticipate that the burdens accompanying such power might be
considerable. [
Footnote
11]
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs, and hence would infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that
respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation, and the
transaction with an Indian took place there.
Cf. Donnelly v.
United States, supra; Williams v. United States, supra. The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of
Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized
this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done
so ever since. If this power is to be taken away from them, it is
for Congress to do it.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U. S. 553,
187 U. S. 564
566.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
31 Stat. 1066, as amended, 32 Stat. 1009, 25 U.S.C. § 262,
provides:
"Any person desiring to trade with the Indians on any Indian
reservation shall, upon establishing the fact, to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that he is a proper person
to engage in such trade, be permitted to do so under such rules and
regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may prescribe for
the protection of said Indians."
[
Footnote 2]
The Georgia laws are set out extensively in
Worcester
v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 521-528. The principal
treaties involved are found at 7 Stat. 18, 39.
[
Footnote 3]
For interesting accounts of this episode in the struggle for
power between state and federal governments
see IV
Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, 539-552; I Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History, c.19.
See also Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.
[
Footnote 4]
See The Kansas
Indians, 5 Wall. 737;
Ex parte Crow Dog,
109 U. S. 556;
United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375;
United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928;
Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89;
Begay v. Miller, 70
Ariz. 380,
222 P.2d 624;
Cohen, Federal Indian Law (Revision by the United States Interior
Department 1958); 55 Decisions of the Department of the Interior
5644.
The Federal Government's power over Indians is derived from Art.
I, § 8, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution,
Perrin v.
United States, 232 U. S. 478, and
from the necessity of giving uniform protection to a dependent
people.
United States v. Kagama, supra.
[
Footnote 5]
For example, Congress has granted to the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction upon Indian reservations over 11 major
crimes. And non-Indians committing crimes against Indians are now
generally tried in federal courts.
See 18 U.S.C. §§
437-439, 1151-1163; Cohen,
op. cit. supra, note 4 at 307-326.
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., 62 Stat. 1224, 64 Stat. 845, 25 U.S.C. §§
232, 233 (1952) (granting broad civil and criminal jurisdiction to
New York); 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (granting broad civil
and criminal jurisdiction to California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin). The series of statutes granting extensive
jurisdiction over Oklahoma Indians to state courts are discussed in
Cohen,
op. cit. supra, note 4 at 985-1051.
[
Footnote 7]
15 Stat. 667. In 16 Stat. 566 (1871), Congress declared that no
Indian tribe or nation within the United States should thereafter
be recognized as an independent power with whom the United States
could execute a treaty, but provided that this should not impair
the obligations of any treaty previously ratified. Thus, the 1868
treaty with the Navajos survived this Act.
[
Footnote 8]
Young, The Navajo Yearbook (1955), 165, 201; id. (1957), 107,
110.
[
Footnote 9]
In the 1949 Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Bill, S. 1407, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., setting up a 10-year program of capital and other
improvements on the Reservation, Congress provided for concurrent
state, federal and tribal jurisdiction. President Truman vetoed the
bill because he felt that subjecting the Navajo and Hopi to state
jurisdiction was undesirable in view of their illiteracy, poverty
and primitive social concepts. He was also impressed by the fact
that the Indians vigorously opposed the bill. 95 Cong.Rec.
14784-14785. After the objectionable features of the bill were
deleted, it was passed again and became law. 64 Stat. 44, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 631-640.
[
Footnote 10]
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, c. 505, §§ 6, 7, 67 Stat. 590, provides as
follows:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the
admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby
given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their
State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to
remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become
effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any
such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended
their State constitution or statutes as the case may be."
". . . The consent of the United States is hereby given to any
other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal
offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as
provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and
in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative
legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption
thereof."
Arizona has an express disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian
lands in its Enabling Act, § 20, 36 Stat. 569, and in Art. XX,
Fourth, of its Constitution.
Cf. Draper v. United States,
164 U. S. 240.
[
Footnote 11]
See H.R.Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7 (1953);
Secretary of Interior, Annual Report (1955), 247-248; id. (1956),
215-216;
id. (1957), 253-254.