The Secretary of Labor brought this action under § 17 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to restrain respondent from violating the
recordkeeping and overtime provisions of the Act. Respondent is a
firm of architects and engineers which designs public, industrial,
and residential projects and prepares plans and specifications for
them. It has offices in Norfolk, Va., and Washington, D.C., and
employs 65 or 70 person. Many of its projects and clients are
located outside of Virginia and the District of Columbia. Its
fieldmen often travel across state lines, and its plans and
specifications often are sent across state lines. Its draftsmen,
fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers all work intimately with plans
and specifications prepared by respondent for the construction,
repair, relocation, and improvement of various interstate
instrumentalities and facilities, including air bases, roads,
turnpikes, bus terminals, and radio and television
installations.
Held:
1. Respondent's nonprofessional employees are "engaged in
commerce" as that term is used in §§ 6 and 7 of the Act, and they
are within the coverage of the Act. Pp.
358 U. S.
208-213.
(a) The work done on plans and specifications for
instrumentalities and facilities of interstate commerce is so
directly and vitally related to their functioning as to be, in
practical effect, a part of such commerce. P.
358 U. S.
212.
(b) That a portion of respondent's business pertains to military
bases or new construction does not require a different result. P.
358 U. S.
213.
(c) The controlling factor is the activities of the individual
employees, and the employees here involved are clearly "engaged in
commerce." P.
358 U. S.
213.
2. In the circumstances of this case, injunctive relief would
not appear to be improper as a matter of law, but it will be within
the discretion of the District Court whether or not to issue an
injunction after further proceedings on remand of the case. Pp.
358 U. S.
213-215.
250 F.2d 253, reversed and case remanded for further
proceedings.
Page 358 U. S. 208
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, brought this action under §
17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 217, [
Footnote 1] to restrain respondent [
Footnote 2] from violating the
recordkeeping and overtime provisions of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206,
207, 211. The complaint was dismissed basically on the lower
court's conclusion that the activities of respondent, an
architectural and consulting engineering firm, were local in
nature, and not within the Act's coverage. 250 F.2d 253. We granted
certiorari 356 U.S. 917, to resolve an apparent conflict with a
decision of another Court of Appeals in a similar case. [
Footnote 3]
Respondent is hired to design public, industrial and residential
projects and to prepare plans and specifications
Page 358 U. S. 209
necessary for their construction. It has offices in both
Norfolk, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., and it employs some
sixty-five or seventy persons. Respondent does considerable work
for the armed services. The District Court estimated that
approximately 60% of the work in the Norfolk office has been done
for the Army Engineers or the Navy Department, while 85% of the
work in Washington has been performed for similar agencies or for
subdivisions of local governments in the District and nearby
States. Many of respondent's projects and clients are located
outside Virginia and the District of Columbia. A typical project
undertaken in the past was the design of a standard mobile Army
warehouse, with the attendant preparation of detailed plans and
specifications. In addition, respondent has designed various
construction projects, including the widening of streets at a naval
operating base, the extension and paving of airplane taxiways and
parking aprons at a naval air station, a local sewerage system in
Maryland, the alteration of various hangar facilities at military
air bases, the relocation of radio and television facilities, the
improvement of state roads and turnpikes, and the repair of
government buildings at shipyards. The balance of respondent's
activity has consisted of preparing plans and specifications for
the construction of private projects such as homes, commercial
buildings, bus terminals, shopping centers and the like. Respondent
has performed certain supervisory functions in connection with the
construction of some of the private projects, but almost none where
governmental agencies were involved.
The government contracts required respondent to produce plans
and specifications, copies of which were sent by the governmental
agencies to prospective bidders, many of whom were located outside
Virginia and the District of Columbia. These plans consisted of
drawings and designs, and were supplemented by explanatory
specifications
Page 358 U. S. 210
which contained the information necessary for estimating cost
and guiding contractors in bidding and construction. They were
prepared under the supervision of respondent's professional members
and associates by draftsmen employed by respondent. In many cases,
the information necessary to prepare the plans and specifications
was gathered on the site of the projects by fieldmen employed by
respondent. These fieldmen included surveyors, transitmen, and
chainmen who often traveled across state lines to get to the
projects. On one project, fieldmen from the Washington office went
daily to nearby Maryland to gather data for a sewerage project. In
addition to the draftsmen and fieldmen, various clerks and
stenographers employed by respondent participated in the mechanical
preparation of these plans and specifications.
The parties are agreed that respondent's professional employees
-- architects and engineers -- are exempted from the coverage of
the Act by § 13(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). [
Footnote 4] Therefore, the Secretary's injunction
action is directed at some fifty employees mentioned above:
draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers. The stenographers,
in addition to their connection with the plans and specifications,
manned respondent's private phone wire connecting the Norfolk and
Washington offices, prepared and typed substantial numbers of
letters concerning the described projects which were mailed to
persons in places other than Virginia and the District of Columbia,
and prepared payrolls in the Virginia office for employees at the
Washington and Norfolk locations.
Page 358 U. S. 211
The question at issue is whether these nonprofessional employees
are "engaged in commerce" as that term is used in §§ 6 and 7 of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. [
Footnote 5] To determine the answer to this question, we
focus on the activities of the employees, and not on the business
of the employer.
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.
S. 517;
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
317 U. S. 564;
Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.
S. 427. We start with the premise that Congress, by
excluding from the Act's coverage employees whose activities merely
"affect commerce," indicated its intent not to make the scope of
the Act coextensive with its power to regulate commerce. [
Footnote 6]
Kirschbaum Co. v.
Walling, supra; McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.
S. 491. However, within the tests of coverage fashioned
by Congress, the Act has been construed liberally to apply to the
furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction. Thus, the
Court stated in
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp.,
318 U. S. 125,
318 U. S.
128,
". . . the policy of Congressional abnegation with respect to
occupations affecting commerce is no reason for narrowly
circumscribing the phrase 'engaged in commerce.' [
Footnote 7] "
Page 358 U. S. 212
Where employees' activities have related to interstate
instrumentalities or facilities, such as bridges, canals and roads,
we have used a practical test to determine whether they are
"engaged in commerce." The test is
"whether the work is so directly and vitally related to the
functioning of an instrumentality or facility of interstate
commerce as to be, in practical effect, a part of it, rather than
isolated local activity."
Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., supra, at
349 U. S. 429.
[
Footnote 8] Coverage in the
instant case must be determined by that test, for, as the parties
stipulated below, the draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and
stenographers all worked intimately with the plans and
specifications prepared by respondent for the repair and
construction of various interstate instrumentalities and
facilities, including air bases, roads, turnpikes, bus terminals,
and radio and television installations. In our view, such work is
directly and vitally related to the functioning of these facilities
because, without the preparation of plans for guidance, the
construction could not be effected, and the facilities could not
function as planned. In our modern technologically oriented
society, the elements which combine to produce a final product are
diffuse and variegated. Deciding whether any one element is so
directly related to the end product as to be considered vital is
sometimes a difficult problem. But plans, drawings, and
specifications have taken on greater importance as the complexities
of design and bidding have increased. Under the circumstances
present here, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the
preparation of the plans and specifications was directly related to
the end products, and that the employees whose activities were
intimately related to such preparation were "engaged in
commerce."
Page 358 U. S. 213
Respondent urges that military bases are not instrumentalities
of commerce, but rather of war, and, in addition, that many of the
projects involved new construction, and hence cannot be considered
as existing facilities or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
In answer to respondent's first point, it is sufficient to note
that, under the Court's reasoning in
Powell v. United States
Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, a
facility designed for war may also be an instrumentality of
commerce.
See Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co., 127 F. Supp.
377. Here, respondent's employees admittedly worked on plans and
specifications relating to construction at military air bases. And
it is not disputed that these bases are used for interstate
commerce at least to the extent that interstate flights both land
at and take off from them and men, materials, and mail move through
them from distant points. Respondent's second objection must be
rejected also. Whatever vitality the "new construction" doctrine
retains after
Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., supra,
and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.
S. 493,
351 U. S. 500,
it is not applicable here, because, as the record shows, many
projects involved the repair, extension, or relocation of existing
facilities.
Respondent contends that its activities are essentially local in
nature. But, as we stated, Congress deemed the activities of the
individual employees, not those of the employer, the controlling
factor in determining the proper application of the Act. Here, the
activities of the employees show clearly that they are "engaged in
commerce," and thus are eligible for the protections afforded by
the Act.
Although not an issue below and not a matter of disagreement
between the parties before this Court, some doubt has arisen
whether injunctive relief is proper in this case. Examination of
the record reveals that the controversy has been whether the
admitted activities of respondent's employees during the period of
the complaint
Page 358 U. S. 214
brought them within the Act's coverage. Respondent does not
appear ever to have urged that an injunction would be improper if,
as a matter of law, its employees were "engaged in commerce." Its
position seems correct in light of the specific statutory
provision, § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217, which gives the District Courts
jurisdiction to restrain violations of the Act. And the numerous
suits brought by the Department of Labor under that section attest
to the fact that the commencement of an injunction action, where
coverage is in doubt, is not at all unusual.
See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., supra; Walling v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., supra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, supra; Mitchell v.
Raines, 238 F.2d 186;
Mitchell v. Feinberg, 236 F.2d
9;
Chambers Construction Co. v. Mitchell, 233 F.2d
717.
The Act sets up four means for enforcement. Section 16(a), 29
U.S.C. § 216(a), provides for criminal prosecution of willful
violators. Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), gives individual
employees rights of actions in civil suits to recover unpaid
minimum wages, overtime compensation and certain liquidated
damages. Section 16(c), 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), allows the Secretary of
Labor to bring such an action in behalf of such employees provided
the suit does not involve "an issue of law which has not been
settled finally by the courts." Section 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217, of
course, provides for injunctions. Even a cursory examination of
these provisions shows that the injunction is the only effective
device available to the Secretary when coverage is in doubt and he
wishes to establish the availability of the Act to employees not
theretofore afforded its protections.
We fail to see what undue burden will be placed on respondent by
the issuance of an injunction, especially in view of the District
Court's suggestion, to which both parties appear to have
acquiesced, that, if coverage premised on the admitted activities
is established, the
Page 358 U. S. 215
parties should have no trouble in deciding which of the
employees are covered. In any event, upon proceedings on remand, it
will still be within the discretion of the District Court whether
or not to issue an injunction. If, for instance, respondent
discloses its records, enters a stipulation concerning which
employees are covered, and agrees not to violate the Act in the
future, the District Court might conclude that an injunction is
unnecessary.
Compare Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808, 810,
with Chambers Construction Co. v. Mitchell, supra, 233
F.2d at 725.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
District Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
"The district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction, for cause
shown, to restrain violations of section 15 of this title. . .
."
Section 15 makes it unlawful to violate,
inter alia,
any of the provisions of §§ 6, 7, 11(c) and 11(d), 29 U.S.C. §§
206, 207, 211(c) and 211(d).
[
Footnote 2]
The action was commenced against Lublin, McGaughy &
Associates, a copartnership, Alfred M. Lublin, John B. McGaughy,
William T. McMillan and William Marshall, Jr., doing business as
Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, and each of those persons
individually. Throughout the action, these defendants have been
treated as a single business entity which we shall refer to herein
as respondent.
[
Footnote 3]
Mitchell v. Brown Engineering Co., 224 F.2d 359 (C.A.
8th Cir.),
certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 875.
[
Footnote 4]
The section provides:
"The provisions of sections 206 and 207 of this title shall not
apply with respect to (1) any employee employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing
capacity, or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are
defined and delimited by regulations of the Administrator). . .
."
[
Footnote 5]
Section 6 provides:
"(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce
wages at the following rates. . . ."
Section 7 provides:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer
shall employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce for a workweek longer than
forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed."
[
Footnote 6]
See also the limitations contained in § 3(j), 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(j), concerning the coverage of persons engaged in occupations
related to the production of goods for commerce.
[
Footnote 7]
See also Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., supra; Alstate
Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13;
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra, at
317 U. S.
567.
[
Footnote 8]
See also Fitzgerald Const. Co. v. Pedersen,
324 U. S. 720;
MeLeod v. Threlkeld, supra; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
supra; Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., supra.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, dissenting.
While I am of the view that the evidence may be sufficient to
show that some of respondents' employees at some times -- namely,
fieldmen when traveling interstate in gathering information needed
for the preparation of architectural and engineering plans, and
construction supervisors when actually supervising the repairing or
remodeling of structures used in commerce -- are "engaged in
commerce," within the meaning of § 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), I am nevertheless persuaded
that the evidence is not sufficient, and does not show conduct
sufficiently continuous as to any category of employees, to justify
the entry of a general injunction against respondents from, in
effect, "violating the law," thus requiring them to live under pain
of contempt citation for violation of a general injunctive decree,
while others live under the law of the land. I am further persuaded
to this conclusion in the knowledge that such of these employees as
can show that their particular work at a particular time rendered
them "engaged in commerce" have a complete legal remedy
Page 358 U. S. 216
under § 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), to recover
overtime compensation plus an additional equal amount, attorneys'
fees and costs. As I read its opinion, these are the factors that
persuaded the Court of Appeals to affirm the District Court's
denial of the prayed injunction, 250 F.2d 253, 260-261, and, for
those reasons, I would affirm its judgment.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting.
With the general principles stated in the Court's opinion there
can be no dispute. Their application to the facts of the present
case, however, does not lead me to the conclusion reached by the
Court. Believing that the Court of Appeals did not err in deciding
on which side of the shadowy line between such decisions as
McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491, and
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.
S. 564, this case falls, I would affirm the
judgment.