A Negro resident of Memphis, Tenn., brought this class action in
a Federal District Court against officials of the City of Memphis,
the local street railway company, and one of that company's
employees, seeking a declaratory judgment as to his claimed
constitutional right, and that of others similarly situated, to
travel on buses within the City without being subjected, as
required by a Tennessee statute, to segregated seating arrangements
on account of race. The District Court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that no "actual controversy," within the meaning of the
Declaratory Judgment Act, had been shown, because appellant had
ridden a bus in Memphis on only one occasion, had done so for the
purpose of instituting this litigation, and was not "representative
of a class of colored citizens who do use the buses in Memphis as a
means of transportation."
Held: the record in this case establishes the existence
of an actual controversy which should have been adjudicated by the
District Court. Pp.
358 U. S.
202-204.
Reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, a Negro resident of Memphis, Tennessee, brought this
class action in the Western Division of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking a declaration
as to his claimed constitutional right, and that of others
similarly situated, to travel on buses within that City without
being subjected, as required by Tenn.Code Ann., 1955, §§ 65-1704
through 65-1709, to segregated seating arrangements on account of
race. An injunction against enforcement of this statute
Page 358 U. S. 203
or any other method of state-enforced segregation on Memphis
transportation facilities was also sought. Various officials and
officers of the City of Memphis, the Memphis Street Railway
Company, and one of that Company's employees were named as
defendants. After a hearing, a three-judge District Court, without
reaching the merits, dismissed the complaint on the ground that no
"actual controversy" within the intendment of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, had been shown, in that appellant
had ridden a bus in Memphis on only one occasion, and had "boarded
the bus for the purpose of instituting this litigation," and was
thus not "representative of a class of colored citizens who do use
the buses in Memphis as a means of transportation."
Of course, the federal courts will not grant declaratory relief
in instances where the record does not disclose an "actual
controversy."
Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co.,
344 U. S. 237. In
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U. S. 270,
312 U. S. 273,
this Court said:
"The difference between an abstract question and a 'controversy'
contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of
degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to
fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there
is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is
whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment."
In the present case, we think that the record establishes the
existence of an actual controversy which should have been
adjudicated by the lower court.
The District Court found that, when appellant boarded a Memphis
bus on April 26, 1956, and seated himself at the front of the
vehicle, the driver told him he must move to the rear, "stating
that the law required it because of
Page 358 U. S. 204
[his] color"; that, following appellant's refusal to comply, two
police officers shortly thereafter boarded the bus and "ordered
[appellant] to go to the back of the bus, get off, or be arrested";
and that, thereupon, appellant left the bus. The record further
shows that the appellees intend to enforce this state statute until
its unconstitutionality has been finally adjudicated. We do not
believe that appellant, in order to demonstrate the existence of an
"actual controversy" over the validity of the statute here
challenged, was bound to continue to ride the Memphis buses at the
risk of arrest if he refused to seat himself in the space in such
vehicles assigned to colored passengers. A resident of a
municipality who cannot use transportation facilities therein
without being subjected by statute to special disabilities
necessarily has, we think, a substantial, immediate, and real
interest in the validity of the statute which imposes the
disability.
See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affirming
the decision of a three-judge District Court reported at
142 F.
Supp. 707. That the appellant may have boarded this particular
bus for the purpose of instituting this litigation is not
significant.
See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.
S. 204,
324 U. S. 214;
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.
S. 429,
342 U. S.
434-435.
We hold that the court below erred in not proceeding to the
merits. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.