Petitioner claims that her conviction in a state court of
first-degree murder was obtained by use in evidence of an oral
confession which had been obtained in such a manner that its use
violated due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Her
husband had died suddenly. Arriving at the cemetery just after the
interment, the sheriff asked her to come to the courthouse, which
she did. There, she talked with the sheriff, a deputy sheriff and
the district attorney, all of whom she knew. The district attorney
advised her that she did not have to answer any questions, and was
entitled to an attorney, but she did not request an attorney until
after her oral confession. She was treated in a temperate and
courteous manner. She was told that her husband had died of
poisoning, and the matter was approached as if to discover whether
it had been accidental. The district attorney told her that he had
once been cleared of a criminal charge by cooperating with the
investigators. The officers let her talk freely on family matters
without interruption. About four and a half hours after the
interview began, she made the oral confession in issue here.
Meanwhile, her father and uncle had come to the building and asked
to see her, but they were not permitted to do so until after the
interview.
Held: the record contains ample support for a finding
that the officers did not take advantage of petitioner, and that
nothing they did had the effect of overbearing her will, and the
judgment is affirmed. Pp.
357 U. S.
427-431.
5 Utah 2d 59,
296 P.2d 726,
affirmed.
Page 357 U. S. 427
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A jury in a Utah court found petitioner, Mrs. Ashdown, guilty of
the first-degree murder of her husband, and recommended a life
sentence. The question before us is whether petitioner's oral
confession was obtained in such a manner as to make its use in
evidence a violation of the due process of law required by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This
issue was thoroughly considered by the trial court, which made
findings in relation to it. The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the
record in detail and upheld the admission of the confession. 5 Utah
2d 59,
296 P.2d 726. We
granted certiorari. 353 U.S. 981. Our independent review of the
record brings us to the same conclusion.
On July 5, 1955, Ray Ashdown, petitioner's husband, died
suddenly in his home in Cedar City, Utah. Petitioner had summoned a
doctor, who arrived shortly before Ray Ashdown's death. The doctor
testified that the deceased gave the appearance of having been
poisoned, and that he told the doctor just before he died that he
had taken some bitter-tasting lemon juice about a half hour
earlier. On being called, the sheriff made a thorough search of the
Ashdown home, but found no trace of any poison. An autopsy was
performed, and the contents of the deceased's stomach was sent to
the state chemist's office for analysis. The report, received by
the sheriff on July 9, stated that the stomach of the deceased
contained strychnine.
July 9 was the day of the funeral. Promptly after receipt of the
chemist's report, the sheriff went to the cemetery, arriving just
after the interment. Through petitioner's brother-in-law, the
sheriff asked that petitioner come to the County and City Building.
At about 4 p.m., she and her sister arrived at the sheriff's
office.
Page 357 U. S. 428
The sheriff asked to talk with petitioner privately, and she
consented. They went across the hall to an empty courtroom, where
the sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and the district attorney, all
people known by the petitioner, talked with her for the next five
and one-half hours.
The sheriff told petitioner the results of the autopsy and the
chemist's report. Within the first half hour, the district attorney
advised her that she did not have to answer any questions and that
she was entitled to consult with an attorney. She made no request
for an attorney at that time. She said she did not think she could
add anything to help the investigation, but she mentioned her
husband had been despondent on several occasions. The officers let
her talk freely on family matters without interruption, and such
conversation consumed about half the time spent in the interview.
The sheriff attempted to direct her attention to discovering
whether her husband's death might have been due to an accident. To
impress her with the importance of the distinction between murder
and manslaughter, the district attorney read her some of the
statutes relating to those crimes. In addition, he told her about
an experience he had in the Army in Europe. He said he had been
accused of killing five men but, by cooperating with investigating
officials, he had been cleared of all blame for those deaths.
The officers reviewed in detail the events of July 5. Petitioner
admitted giving her husband a cup of lemon juice about a half hour
before his death. She said she had put salt in the juice, and
denied that she might have mistakenly used poison instead of salt.
The sheriff asked whether the deceased drank all of the lemon juice
offered him. Petitioner replied that he had not, and that she had
thrown out the remainder and put the cup, unwashed, on top of the
Frigidaire. In their search of the house, the officers found the
cup, washed, standing on the drainboard.
Page 357 U. S. 429
When asked about it, petitioner said that, after she had gone
for the second time to a neighbor's house to call the doctor (who
arrived before she returned), she had washed the cup and placed it
where the officers found it. Petitioner could not explain why she
had walked past the doctor and her husband, who was at that moment
in the last extremity, to wash a cup. Petitioner several times
asked whether the officers wanted her to confess to something she
had not done, and they repeatedly told her they did not.
Petitioner at one point stated that her husband had put the
strychnine in the lemon juice. After a brief interrogation as to
how he had done it, the sheriff told her he did not believe her
husband had poisoned himself. Petitioner then confessed that she
had put five or six grains of strychnine in the cup. She said she
had planned to take it herself, but later decided to give it to her
husband. The sheriff testified that she was emotionally upset,
crying and sobbing. The confession came about four and one-half
hours after the questioning began. Petitioner hesitated to say
where she had obtained the strychnine, and suggested she should
have an attorney. The sheriff did not respond to this request. He
said merely that she had told them everything except where the
poison came from, and she might as well tell that "and get this
over with." She then told where she had obtained the
strychnine.
Meanwhile, petitioner's father and uncle had come to the County
and City Building. They asked to see petitioner, and their request
was denied pending completion of the interview. They waited in the
sheriff's office, and, at his request, made several trips to the
Ashdown home. From their position in the hall outside the
courtroom, they heard petitioner crying and sobbing. After
petitioner had confessed, the sheriff asked her whether she
Page 357 U. S. 430
wanted to see her relatives. At first she refused, saying she
was ashamed to face them, but the sheriff persisted, and she
eventually consented.
On the 10th, the sheriff prepared a written statement of what
petitioner had said the day before, and took it to her cell. She
was told she could sign the statement or not, as she wished, and
she could make changes. She examined the statement carefully, made
numerous changes, and signed it.
At the trial, the court held an extended hearing in the absence
of the jury on the admissibility of petitioner's confessions.
Petitioner took the stand during the preliminary hearing, but
testified only as to what the district attorney had said. She did
not challenge any other statements of the sheriff, the deputy
sheriff, or the district attorney. The trial court ruled that all
statements made by petitioner after her request for an attorney,
including the written statement, should be excluded. Thus, only the
oral confession was introduced in evidence before the jury.
Petitioner emphasizes the statement of the district attorney
that he had once avoided a criminal charge by cooperating with the
investigating officers. Petitioner argues that this statement was
an implied promise of immunity or leniency to be exercised in
return for a confession. We agree with the Supreme Court of Utah
that, under the circumstances, this statement was not improper. It
was made long before petitioner confessed, and in connection with
the search for an accidental explanation of the death. Moreover,
petitioner was repeatedly told not to confess to something she had
not done.
A study of the record as a whole convinces us that the interview
with petitioner was temperate and courteous. The sheriff proceeded
cautiously, and acted with consideration for the feelings of
petitioner. For example, he explained that the reason he did not
seek a written statement
Page 357 U. S. 431
until the day after the interview was that
"We thought we would talk to her on the 10th, she would be calm,
and wouldn't be excited, and she would know what she was doing. We
didn't want to feel like taking advantage of her."
Petitioner's emotional distress during the interview may be
attributed to her remorse, rather than to any coercive conduct of
the officers. There is nothing in the record which indicates that
the sheriff chose to question petitioner immediately after her
husband's funeral in order to capitalize on her feelings. Rather,
he appears to have taken the first opportunity to talk with her
after it had been established that her husband's death was caused
by poisoning. The questioning was done by officers whom petitioners
knew. She was not questioned in relays, or made to repeat a story
over and over while the interrogators searched for an inconsistency
or flaw. She was allowed to talk without interruption about such
matters as she chose. In sum, we find ample support in this record
for a finding that the officers did not intend to take advantage of
petitioner, and that nothing they did had the effect of overbearing
her will.
Accordingly, the judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs,
dissenting.
The uncle and the father of petitioner appeared at the sheriff's
office shortly after petitioner was arrested. The uncle testified
that he said, "I don't think she has got a right to be questioned
without her father's presence or some attorney." The father
testified that he said,
"I made the remark that it didn't look to me like a fair, square
deal, to railroad that girl into that sheriff's office without
counsel or friends of any description."
The uncle and the father were denied admission. They were calmed
by the assurance that the accused had a
Page 357 U. S. 432
lawyer at her side to aid her under the questioning of the
police -- which was not true.
The request of a next of kin or friend outside the jail that
counsel be furnished the accused who was inside under examination
should be demand enough. Certainly those on the outside would have
calmer judgment than the accused. They should speak for her unless
it is clear, as it was not in this case, that the accused had
waived her right to a lawyer and had elected to talk instead. For
the reasons stated in my dissent in
Crooker v. California,
357 U. S. 433,
357 U. S. 441,
I would reverse this judgment of conviction.