In 1942, the War Production Board issued an order requiring
nonessential gold mines, including those of respondents, to cease
operating, but the Government did not occupy, use, or take physical
possession of the gold mines or the equipment connected with them.
The purpose of the order was to conserve equipment and manpower for
essential war uses. Claiming that the order amounted to a taking of
their right to mine gold during the life of the order, respondents
sued the Government in the Court of Claims for compensation.
Held:
1. The Special Jurisdictional Act of July 14, 1952, granting the
Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine actions brought
within a year from that date on the claims of owners or operators
of gold mines for losses allegedly resulting from the War
Production Board's order, "notwithstanding any statute of
limitations, laches, or lapse of time," was no more than a waiver
of defenses based on the passage of time. It was not a
congressional mandate to award compensation for losses resulting
from the order. Pp.
357 U. S.
162-165.
2. The Board's order did not constitute a taking of private
property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
and respondents are not entitled to compensation. Pp.
357 U. S.
165-169.
134 Ct.Cl. 1, 130, 138 F. Supp. 281, 146 F. Supp. 476,
reversed.
Page 357 U. S. 156
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the interest of national defense, the War Production Board,
in 1942, issued its Limitation Order L-208 [
Footnote 1] ordering nonessential gold mines to close
down. This litigation was instituted in the Court of Claims to
recover compensation from the United States for its alleged taking,
under such order, of respondents' rights to operate their
respective gold mines. Two issues are now presented. First, whether
the Act of July 14, 1952, [
Footnote
2] granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to entertain
the claims arising out of L-208, was a mandate to that court to
award compensation for whatever losses were suffered as a result of
L-208, or whether it amounted merely to a waiver by the United
States of defenses based on the passage of time. For the reasons
hereafter stated, we hold that it was the latter. We, therefore,
reach the second question -- whether L-208 constituted a taking of
private property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth
Page 357 U. S. 157
Amendment. [
Footnote 3] For
the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it did not.
Early in 1941, it became apparent to those in charge of the
Nation's defense mobilization that we faced a critical shortage of
nonferrous metals, notably copper, and a comparable shortage of
machinery and supplies to produce them. Responsive to this
situation, the Office of Production Management (OPM) and its
successor, the War Production Board (WPB), issued a series of
Preference Orders. These gave the producers of mining machinery and
supplies relatively high priorities for the acquisition of needed
materials. They also gave to those mines, which were deemed
important from the standpoint of defense or essential civilian
needs, a high priority in the acquisition of such machinery. Gold
mines were classified as nonessential, and eventually were
relegated to the lowest priority rating. These orders prevented the
mines operated by respondents from acquiring new machinery or
supplies, so that, by March of 1942, respondents were reduced to
using only the machinery and supplies which they had on hand.
Soon thereafter, a severe shortage of skilled labor developed in
the nonferrous metal mines. This was due in part to the expanding
need for nonferrous metals, and in part to a depletion of mining
manpower as a result of the military draft and the attraction of
higher wages paid by other industries. It became apparent that the
only reservoir of skilled mining labor was that which remained in
the gold mines. Pressure was brought to bear on the WPB to close
down the gold mines with the expectation that many gold miners
would thus be attracted to the nonferrous mines.
Page 357 U. S. 158
As a part of this conservation program, WPB, on October 8, 1942,
issued Limitation Order L-208 [
Footnote 4] now before us. That order was addressed
exclusively to the gold mining industry, which it classified as
nonessential. It directed each operator of a gold mine to take
steps immediately to close down its operations and, after seven
Page 357 U. S. 159
days, not to acquire, use or consume any material or equipment
in development work. The order directed that, within 60 days, all
operations should cease, excepting only the minimum activity
necessary to maintain mine buildings, machinery and equipment, and
to keep the workings safe and accessible. Applications to the
Page 357 U. S. 160
WPB were permitted to meet special needs and several exceptions
were made under that authority. Small mines were defined and
exempted from the order. The WPB did not take physical possession
of the gold mines. It did not require the mine owners to dispose of
any of their machinery or equipment.
On November 19, 1942, Order L-208 was amended to prohibit the
disposition of certain types of machinery or
Page 357 U. S. 161
supplies without the permission of an officer of the WPB. Each
mine operator was required to submit an itemized list of all such
equipment held in inventory and to indicate which items he would be
willing to sell or rent. [
Footnote
5] On August 31, 1943, L-208 was further amended to permit
disposition of equipment, without approval of the WPB, to persons
holding certain preference ratings. [
Footnote 6] The order, thus amended, remained in effect
until revoked on June 30, 1945. [
Footnote 7]
The first legal action against the Government arising out of
L-208 was brought in the Court of Claims in 1950. It was there
alleged that the order had amounted to a taking of the
complainant's right to mine gold during the life of the order. The
Government demurred, taking its present position that the order was
merely a lawful regulation of short supplies relevant to the war
effort. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that the damages
were not compensable.
Oro Fina Consolidated Mines, Inc. v.
United States, 118 Ct.Cl. 18, 92 F. Supp. 1016.
Accord,
Alaska-Pacific Consolidated Mining Co. v. United States,
Page 357 U. S. 162
120 Ct.Cl. 307. Somewhat later, the instant action was brought
in the Court of Claims by the Idaho Maryland Mines Corporation.
Relying on the
Oro Fina decision, the Government again
demurred. This time, however, the court overruled the demurrer on
the ground that this complaint contained detailed allegations
which, if true, in its opinion demonstrated that L-208 was an
arbitrary order without rational connection with the war effort. On
that basis, the court authorized a commissioner to hear this case
and several similar ones, solely to determine the Government's
liability, leaving determination of the amount of recovery, if any,
to further proceedings. 122 Ct.Cl. 670, 104 F. Supp. 576. [
Footnote 8] The commissioner heard the
cases and filed his report. The Court of Claims, with two judges
dissenting, held that the six respondents now before us were
entitled to just compensation. 134 Ct.Cl. 1, 53, 56, 138 F. Supp.
281, 310, 312. [
Footnote 9] A
new trial was denied. 134 Ct.Ct. 130, 146 F. Supp. 476. We granted
the Government's petition for certiorari in order to consider the
important constitutional issue presented. 352 U.S. 964.
Before reaching the merits, we face the suggestion of
respondents that the Special Jurisdictional Act of July 14, 1952,
66 Stat. 605, did more than waive the statute
Page 357 U. S. 163
of limitations and the defense of laches. Respondents contend
that this Act was a congressional mandate to the Court of Claims to
award compensation to such of the respondents as established any
loss which was, in fact, caused by L-208. We conclude that the
language of the Act and its legislative history demonstrate that it
was no more than a waiver of defenses based on the passage of
time.
The entire Act reads as follows:
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
United States Court of Claims be, and hereby is, given jurisdiction
to hear, determine, and render judgment, notwithstanding any
statute of limitations, laches, or lapse of time, on the claim of
any owner or operator of a gold mine or gold placer operation for
losses incurred allegedly because of the closing or curtailment or
prevention of operations of such mine or placer operation as a
result of the restrictions imposed by War Production Board
Limitation Order L-208 during the effective life thereof:
Provided, That actions on such claims shall be brought
within one year from the date this Act becomes effective."
The Act thus contains no language prejudging the validity of the
claims on their merits. On the other hand, it expressly permits the
filing of actions, based on L-208, within one year from the taking
effect of the Act, "
notwithstanding any statute of limitations,
laches, or lapse of time. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) That
this was the motivating purpose of Congress is further indicated by
the fact that the statute of limitations had recently run against
many of these claims by the time the Court of Claims, in the
instant case, upheld the claim on the pleadings
Page 357 U. S. 164
of the Idaho Maryland Mines Corporation. 122 Ct.Cl. 670, 104 F.
Supp. 576. This was explained to Congress as follows in the House
Report recommending passage of the bill:
"At the present time, many other claimants who may have as good
a right for an adjudication of their claims as does the Idaho
Maryland Mines Corp. may not prosecute such claims due to the
running of the statute of limitations. Many of the claimants after
the ruling in the
Oro Fina case undoubtedly felt that to
file in the Court of Claims would be useless and therefore allowed
the statute to run against them."
H.R.Rep.No. 2220, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
See also
S.Rep.No. 1605, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
The legislative history also discloses repeated failures to
induce Congress to act upon the merits of the claims. [
Footnote 10]
Page 357 U. S. 165
In view of such history, it is hard to believe that the
successful passage of this Act of July 14, 1952, would have taken
place, as it did, without opposition [
Footnote 11] had it included a concession of liability.
On the other hand, as explained in the above-quoted House Committee
Report, its passage is readily understood if it merely granted an
extension, for one year, of the time within which to file an action
to recover a claim, the merits of which would be determined by the
Court of Claims. For these reasons, we hold that this
Jurisdictional Act is fairly interpreted as amounting only to a
waiver of defenses based on the passage of time.
Turning to the merits, it is clear from the record that the
Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner
Page 357 U. S. 166
take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment
connected with them.
Cf. United States v. Pewee Coal Co.,
341 U. S. 114. All
that the Government sought was the cessation of the consumption of
mining equipment and manpower in the gold mines and the
conservation of such equipment and manpower for more essential was
uses. The Government had no need for the gold or the gold mines.
The mere fact that L-208 was in the form of an express prohibition
of the operation of the mines, rather than a prohibition of the use
of the scarce equipment in the mines, did not convert the order
into a "taking" of a right to operate the mines. Obviously, if the
use of equipment were prohibited, the mines would close, and it did
not make that order a "taking" merely because the order was, in
form, a direction to close down the mines. The record shows that
the WPB expected that L-208 would release substantial amounts of
scarce mining equipment for use in essential industries, and also
that experienced gold miners would transfer to other mines whose
product was in gravely short supply. The purpose of L-208 was to
encourage voluntary reallocation of scarce resources from the
unessential to the essential.
Respondents contend that L-208 was arbitrary, and without
rational connection with the war effort. [
Footnote 12] They contend that, if it were arbitrary,
there is no distinction in law between this case and one where the
Government consciously exercises its power to take for public use.
Respondents base their assertion of arbitrariness on several
circumstances. For example, they urge that the preamble to L-208
recited as its sole purpose the conservation of scarce materials.
If that alone were the purpose, they contend, it had already been
achieved by priority
Page 357 U. S. 167
orders which prevented the gold mines from obtaining any scarce
equipment. Order L-208 did more than merely prohibit the
acquisition of scarce equipment -- it also prohibited the use of
equipment previously acquired. The fact that L-208 did not require
the mine owners to sell their inventory of scarce equipment to
essential users was a reasonable course of action. The WPB could
properly rely on the profit motive to induce the mine owners to
liquidate their inventories, and it was thought that the people who
would be interested in purchasing used mining equipment probably
would be the owners of essential mines. In any event, L-208 was
soon amended to prohibit sales to nonessential users. [
Footnote 13]
Respondents also urge that the record shows that the shortage of
experienced miners was the dominant, if not the sole, consideration
for the issuance of L-208. They contend that the WPB had no
authority to compel gold miners to transfer to other mines. The
record shows that a dominating consideration in the issuance of
L-208 was the expectation that it would release experienced miners
for work in the nonferrous mines, but the record does not support a
finding that such was the sole purpose of the order. It was lawful
for the WPB to consider the impact of its material orders on the
manpower situation. Order L-208 did not draft gold miners into
government service as copper miners. It sought only to make the
gold miners available for more essential work if they chose to
move. Although the record indicates that the number of gold miners
who transferred to nonferrous mines was disappointingly small, yet
there were some who did, and others moved to other essential
wartime services. The record shows a careful official consideration
of the subject and a well considered decision to accomplish a
proper result. There is no suggestion that any of the officials
Page 357 U. S. 168
who were responsible for the order were motivated by anything
other than appropriate concern for the war effort.
Thus, the WPB made a reasoned decision that, under existing
circumstances, the Nation's need was such that the unrestricted use
of mining equipment and manpower in gold mines was so wasteful of
wartime resources that it must be temporarily suspended.
Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a particular
governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as
being a question properly turning upon the particular circumstances
of each case.
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U. S. 393,
260 U. S. 416.
In doing so, we have recognized that action in the form of
regulation can so diminish the value of property as to constitute a
taking.
E.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.,
339 U. S. 799;
United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256.
However, the mere fact that the regulation deprives the property
owner of the most profitable use of his property is not necessarily
enough to establish the owner's right to compensation.
See
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
123 U. S. 664,
123 U. S.
668-669. In the context of war, we have been reluctant
to find that degree of regulation which, without saying so,
requires compensation to be paid for resulting losses of income.
E.g., Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 251 U. S. 146;
Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.
S. 264;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.
S. 503;
and see United States v. Caltex, Inc.,
344 U. S. 149. The
reasons are plain. War, particularly in modern times, demands the
strict regulation of nearly all resources. It makes demands which
otherwise would be insufferable. But wartime economic restrictions,
temporary in character, are insignificant when compared to the
widespread uncompensated loss of life and freedom of action which
war traditionally demands.
We do not find in the temporary restrictions here placed on the
operation of gold mines a taking of private property
Page 357 U. S. 169
that would justify a departure from the trend of the above
decisions. The WPB here sought, by reasonable regulation, to
conserve the limited supply of equipment used by the mines, and it
hoped that its order would divert available miners to more
essential work. Both purposes were proper objectives; both matters
were subject to regulation to the extent of the order. L-208 did
not order any disposal of property or transfer of men. Accordingly,
since the damage to the mine owners was incidental to the
Government's lawful regulation of matters reasonably deemed
essential to the war effort, the judgment is reversed.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Issued October 8, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 7992-7993. Amended, November
19, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 9613-9614; November 25, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg.
9810-9811; and August 31, 1943, 8 Fed.Reg. 12007-12008. Revoked,
June 30, 1945, 10 Fed.Reg. 8110. For text of the order as issued
October 8, 1942,
see note
4 infra.
[
Footnote 2]
The Act is set forth in the text of this opinion at p.
357 U. S. 163,
infra.
[
Footnote 3]
"No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S.Const. Amend. V.
[
Footnote 4]
War Production Board Limitation Order L-208, 7 Fed.Reg.
7992-7993, provided as follows:
"The fulfillment of requirements for the defense of the United
States has created a shortage in the supply of critical materials
for defense, for private account and for export which are used in
the maintenance and operation of gold mines, and the following
order is deemed necessary and appropriate in the public interest
and to promote the national defense."
"§ 3093.1
Limitation Order L-208 -- (a)
Definitions. For the purposes of this order, 'nonessential
mine' means any mining enterprise in which gold is produced,
whether lode or placer, located in the United States, its
territories or possessions, unless the operator of such mining
enterprise is the holder of a serial number for such enterprise
which has been issued under Preference Rating Order P-56."
"(b)
Restrictions upon production. (1) On and after the
issuance date of this order, each operator of a nonessential mine
shall immediately take all such steps as may be necessary to close
down, and shall close down, in the shortest possible time, the
operations of such mine."
"(2) In no event on or after 7 days from the issuance date of
this order shall any operator of a nonessential mine acquire,
consume, or use any material, facility, or equipment to break any
new ore or to proceed with any development work or any new
operations in or about such mine."
"(3) In no event on or after 60 days from the issuance date of
this order shall any operator of a nonessential mine acquire,
consume, or use any material, facility, or equipment to remove any
ore or waste from such mine, either above or below ground, or to
conduct any other operations in or about such mine, except to the
minimum amount necessary to maintain its buildings, machinery, and
equipment in repair, and its access and development workings safe
and accessible."
"(4) The provisions of this order shall not apply to any lode
mine which produced 1200 tons or less of commercial ore in the year
1941, provided the rate of production of such mine, after the
issuance date of this order, shall not exceed 100 tons per month,
nor to any placer mine which treated less than 1000 cubic yards of
material in the year 1941, provided that the rate of treatment of
such placer mine, after the issuance date of this order, shall not
exceed 100 cubic yards per month."
"(5) Nothing contained in this order shall limit or prohibit the
use or operation of the mill, machine shop, or other facilities of
a nonessential mine in the manufacture of articles to be delivered
pursuant to orders bearing a preference rating of A-1-k or higher,
or in milling ores for the holder of a serial number under
Preference Rating Order P-56."
"(c)
Restrictions on application of preference ratings.
No person shall apply any preference rating, whether heretofore or
hereafter assigned, to acquire any material or equipment for
consumption or use in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a
nonessential mine, except with the express permission of the
Director General for Operations issued after application made to
the Mining Branch, War Production Board."
"(d)
Assignment of preference ratings. The Director
General for Operations, upon receiving an application in accordance
with paragraph (c) above, may assign such preference ratings as may
be required to obtain the minimum amount of material necessary to
maintain such nonessential mine on the basis set forth in paragraph
(b)(3) above."
"(e)
Records. All persons affected by this order shall
keep and preserve, for not less than two years, accurate and
complete records concerning inventory, acquisition, consumption,
and use of materials, and production of ore."
"(f)
Reports. All persons affected by this order shall
execute and file with the War Production Board such reports and
questionnaires as said Board shall from time to time
prescribe."
"(g)
Audit and inspection. All records required to be
kept by this order shall, upon request, be submitted to audit and
inspection by duly authorized representatives of the War Production
Board."
"(h)
Communications. All reports to be filed, appeals,
and other communications concerning this order should be addressed
to: War Production Board, Mining Branch, Washington, D.C., Ref.:
L-208."
"(i)
Violations. Any person who wilfully violates any
provision of this order, or who, in connection with this order,
wilfully conceals a material fact or furnishes false information to
any department or agency of the United States, is guilty of a
crime, and upon conviction may be punished by fine or imprisonment.
In addition, any such person may be prohibited from making or
obtaining further deliveries of, or from processing or using,
material under priority control and may be deprived of priorities
assistance."
"(j)
Appeal. Any person affected by this order who
considers that compliance therewith would work an exceptional and
unreasonable hardship upon him may appeal to the War Production
Board, by letter, in triplicate, setting forth the pertinent facts
and the reason he considers he is entitled to relief. The Director
General for Operations may thereupon take such action as he deems
appropriate."
"(k)
Applicability of priorities regulations. This
order and all transactions affected thereby are subject to all
applicable provisions of the priorities regulations of the War
Production Board, as amended from time to time."
"(P.D.Reg. 1, as amended, 6 F.R. 6680; W.P.B.Reg. 1, 7 F.R. 561;
E.O. 9024, 7 F.R. 329; E.O. 9040, 7 F.R. 527; E.O. 9125, 7 F.R.
2719; sec. 2(a), Pub.Law 671, 76th Cong., as amended by Pub.Laws 89
and 507, 77th Cong.)"
"Issued this 8th day of October, 1942."
"ERNEST KANZLER"
"
Director General for Operations"
[
Footnote 5]
Section 6(e), added to the original order on November 19, 1942,
7 Fed.Reg. 9613, provided:
"(e)
Restrictions on disposition of machinery and
equipment. No person shall sell or otherwise dispose of any
machinery or equipment of the types listed in Schedule A to
Preference Rating Order P-56, which has been used in a nonessential
mine, and no person shall accept delivery thereof, except with
specific permission of the Director General for Operations. On or
before November 19, 1942, or within sixty days after the effective
date, whichever is later, each operator of a nonessential mine
shall file with the War Production Board, Washington, D.C.,
Reference: L-208, an itemized list of such machinery and equipment,
signed by such operator or an authorized official, indicating each
item available for sale or rental. Upon receipt of such itemized
list, the War Production Board will furnish to the operator
appropriate forms to be filled out for each item which the operator
desires to dispose of."
[
Footnote 6]
8 Fed.Reg. 12007-12008.
[
Footnote 7]
10 Fed.Reg. 8110.
[
Footnote 8]
See also, Homestake Mining Co. v. United States, 122
Ct.Cl. 690, and
Central Eureka Mining Co. v. United
States, 122 Ct.Cl. 691.
[
Footnote 9]
The Court of Claims concluded that respondents had shown not
only that L-208 was arbitrary, but also that they had a sufficient
inventory of machinery and supplies so that they would have been
able to operate had it not been for the order. However, as to the
following companies, it ordered their petitions dismissed on the
ground that they had not shown that they would have been able to
continue operations, thus failing to show that L-208 was the
proximate cause of their loss: Alabama-California Gold Mines Co.,
Consolidated Chollar Gould & Savage Mining Co., and Oro Fino
Consolidated Mines, Inc., 134 Ct.Cl. at 53, 138 F. Supp. at
310.
[
Footnote 10]
Bills were first introduced in the 78th Congress, 1st Session
(1943), for the relief of the owners and operators of gold mines.
Early efforts were directed at recision of L-208. H.R. 3009, 89
Cong.Rec. 6181, was referred to the House Committee on Banking and
Currency, and never reported out; H.R. 3682, 89 Cong.Rec. 9653, was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and never
reported out.
At the same session of Congress, Senator McCarran introduced a
bill, S. 27, 89 Cong.Rec. 34, which provided legislative relief to
the mine owners
vis-a-vis their creditors. This bill,
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, was favorably
reported, 89 Cong.Rec. 5187, S.Rep.No.271, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
and, after amendment, it passed the Senate, 89 Cong.Rec. 6094-6095.
In the House, S. 27 was referred to the House Committee on Mines
and Mining, 89 Cong.Rec. 6180, and was never reported out. In the
following session of Congress, a similar bill was introduced in the
House by Representative Engle. H.R. 5093, 90 Cong.Rec. 6587. It too
was referred to the House Committee on Banking and Currency and was
never reported out.
In the 79th Congress, 1st Session (1945), Representative Engle
introduced the first bill calling for compensation for losses
arising out of L-208. H.R. 4393, 91 Cong.Rec. 9726. This bill was
referred to the House Committee on War Claims which, in turn,
referred the matter to a Subcommittee. The Subcommittee held
hearings over several days and issued a report to the full
Committee recommending approval. (This report was quoted at length
in the Reports to both Houses favoring passage of the
Jurisdictional Act.) The bill was never reported out of the full
Committee.
In the 81st Congress, 1st Session (1949), Senator McCarran
introduced S. 45, 95 Cong.Rec. 39, substantively similar to H.R.
4393 introduced by Representative Engle. The bill was referred to
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, which reported it favorably.
S.Rep.No.79, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. It was objected to, however, by
Senator Donnell, 95 Cong.Rec. 2764; Senator Hendrickson, by
request,
id. at 13297; Senator Schoeppel,
id. at
14722; Senator Williams, 96 Cong.Rec. 1278; Senator Hendrickson,
id. at 14691; and Senators Hendrickson and Williams,
id. at 16592, and consequently never came to a vote. In
the same Congress, Representative White introduced H.R. 7851, 96
Cong.Rec. 4066, a bill of the same type, which was referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, and never reported out.
[
Footnote 11]
The Special Jurisdictional Act was passed on the Consent
Calendar. 98 Cong.Rec. 6322-6323, 8931. The seriousness of a
concession of liability is evidenced by the Government's recent
estimate that its potential liability, if respondents prevail, can
be measured in "terms of thirty to sixty million dollars."
[
Footnote 12]
Ordinarily the remedy for arbitrary governmental action is an
injunction, rather than an action for just compensation.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579. Our view of the case makes it unnecessary to
reach that question.
[
Footnote 13]
See pp.
357 U. S.
160-161,
supra.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
For losses alleged to have resulted from a wartime order of the
War Production Board, various of the respondents sought monetary
relief in the Court of Claims. These suits had a checkered career
in that court, and, as a consequence, Congress passed remedial
legislation that has served as a ground for respondents' continued
assertion of their right to recover. A consideration of the history
of this controversy is necessary for due appreciation of this
legislation, and an understanding of the legislation, its
background and its meaning, is essential to a proper disposition of
the suit before us.
From a time shortly before our entry into the Second World War,
gold mines in this country were subjected by the United States
Government to increasingly stringent limitations on their
operations. Because they were regarded as a nonessential industry,
they were first restricted in, and then virtually excluded from,
the acquisition of required machinery, spare parts and supplies
that were needed in mines producing critical materials. Finally, on
October 8, 1942, apparently more in an attempt to divert gold
miners into copper mines than
Page 357 U. S. 170
(as its preamble recited) to conserve critical materials, the
War Production Board issued Limitation Order L-208, 7 Fed.Reg.
7992-7993, as amended, 7
id. at 9613-9614, 8
id.
at 12007-12008, which ordered operators of gold mines that did not
also produce substantial quantities of strategic materials to cease
mining operations within sixty days. This order was revoked on June
30, 1945, 10
id. at 8110.
Early in 1950, one of the mine operators allegedly affected by
the shutdown order brought suit against the United States in the
Court of Claims, asserting that Order L-208 was issued "arbitrarily
and without authority of law," and was therefore a taking of
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment for which the
claimant sought just compensation. The court, while holding that
the six-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. § 2501) did not
begin to run against the claimant until the order was rescinded,
dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim under the Fifth
Amendment.
Oro Fina Consol. Mines, Inc. v. United States,
118 Ct.Cl. 18, 92 F. Supp. 1016 (1950). Approximately a month
before the end of the statutory period, three other mine operators
filed suits in the Court of Claims, also contending that, by virtue
of the WPB order, their property had been taken without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In their
complaints (as amended after the statute had run), they laid a
considerably more extensive factual basis for their contentions of
arbitrary and unauthorized action. The Court of Claims, in
Idaho Maryland Mines Corp. v. United States, 122 Ct.Cl.
670 104 F. Supp. 576 (1952), [
Footnote
2/1] denied the Government's motion
Page 357 U. S. 171
to dismiss the suits. It distinguished
Oro Fina on the
ground that the facts there alleged in support of the contentions
of unconstitutionality, by contrast with those in
Idaho
Maryland, had not been sufficient to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality attaching to governmental action. A motion by the
Government for rehearing was overruled two months later.
Ibid.
Within two weeks after the
Idaho Maryland decision
Senator McCarran of Nevada introduced a bill (S. 3195, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess.) to grant the Court of Claims jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the statute of limitations, to hear claims of gold
mine operators for losses resulting from the issuance of Order
L-208. 98 Cong.Rec. 5394. After consideration of the bill, the
Committee on the Judiciary on May 28, 1952, recommended "favorable
consideration of the measure by the Senate" in a report, S.Rep. No.
1605, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. The report, "[i]n order that the
background of this situation can be fully understood and
appreciated,"
id. at p. 2, set forth large portions of an
earlier report (on H.R. 4393 of the 79th Congress) setting forth in
great detail a factual basis for the following contentions:
"1. WPB Order L-208 was unique in that it was the only
Government order closing a productive industry."
"2. Issuance of the order was an administrative error, based
upon a statistical misconception, and may, furthermore, have been
illegal."
"3. The net results of order in accomplishing its avowed primary
purpose of channeling manpower to 'essential' mines were
negligible."
"4. The economic loss to the gold mining industry has been
great, and in some cases the damage may be irreparable."
Id. at p. 3.
Page 357 U. S. 172
In the conclusion of the report, it was stated (
id. at
p. 7) that
"The committee has carefully studied the facts relating to the
situation that arose as a result of the proclamation of the War
Production Board Limitation Order L-208 and is convinced that the
gold mining industry was dealt with in a fashion which merits the
consideration of the court in the adjudication of the losses which
may have been occasioned by this order. The
Idaho Maryland
Mines Corp. decision is ample evidence of the fact that the
least that can be done is to allow those persons affected by Order
L-208 their day in court for such recompense as may seem
justified."
The Senate passed the bill without debate on June 2. 98
Cong.Rec. 6322. In the House of Representatives, the bill was
referred to and considered by the Committee on the Judiciary, which
recommended its passage in a report (H.R.Rep.No. 2220, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess.) substantially identical with the Senate report. The House
passed the bill on July 2, 98 Cong.Rec. 8931, and it was signed by
the President on July 14, 1952. It provides as follows:
"That the United States Court of Claims be, and hereby is, given
jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment,
notwithstanding any statute of limitations, laches, or lapse of
time, on the claim of any owner or operator of a gold mine or gold
placer operation for losses incurred allegedly because of the
closing or curtailment or prevention of operations of such mine or
placer operation as a result of the restrictions imposed by War
Production Board Limitation Order L-208 during the effective life
thereof:
Provided, That actions on such claims shall be
brought within one year from the date this Act becomes
effective."
66 Stat. 605.
Page 357 U. S. 173
Thereupon, a number of gold mine operators brought suit in the
Court of Claims, and their claims were consolidated with those
involved in
Idaho Maryland for trial on the issue of
liability. These plaintiffs proceeded under alternative claims
against the United States: first, that the action of the Government
in ordering them to close their gold mines constituted a taking of
their property that entitled them to just compensation, and second,
that the Act of July 14, 1952, created liability on the part of the
Government for their provable losses resulting from the closing.
The Court of Claims (two judges dissenting) decided that the
closing of the mines constituted a compensable "taking" of the
plaintiffs' right to operate their mines within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. The court dealt with the statutory claim in the
following terms:
"In view of our decision in these cases, it is unnecessary to
discuss the various contentions relative to the special
jurisdictional act of July 14, 1952, 66 Stat. 605."
134 Ct.Cl. 1, 53. 138 F. Supp. 281, 310 (1956).
Since a court of the United States may properly decide a
constitutional question only if the case cannot fairly be disposed
of on a nonconstitutional basis, any statutory question that is not
frivolous should be met and disposed of before questions requiring
construction of the Constitution are reached. The reason for the
Court of Claims' failure to heed this fundamental rule can only be
surmised. This litigation was initiated before the Act of July 14,
1952, had been passed by Congress, and was framed exclusively in
constitutional terms. The statutory claim was injected into the
litigation at a time when the court, having already handed down
several decisions on the question of whether or not a claim under
the Fifth Amendment had been stated, had become preoccupied with,
and therefore oriented toward, the constitutional aspects of the
claims. Understandable though this approach may be, it should not
be permitted to govern
Page 357 U. S. 174
the ultimate disposition of the cases before us. In the interest
of responsible administration of our constitutional system, the
scope and meaning of the Act of July 14, 1952, call for
determination before any decision is made as to whether or not the
Government's action amounted to a "taking" within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.
The critical question is, of course, whether the Act merely
eliminates the bar of the statute of limitations or substantively
establishes a congressionally acknowledged basis for recovery. On
its face, the Act is readily susceptible of either interpretation.
The action authorized by the statute --
i.e., the filing
of a certain type of suit in the Court of Claims within one year --
is consistent with either or these alternative legislative ends. In
order to waive the Government's then-existing defense of the
statute of limitations, it was necessary for Congress to authorize
the assertion of claims notwithstanding the availability of that
defense. And recognition by Congress of what it may regard as a
just claim against the Government is not necessarily to be met by
an outright appropriation to the claimants: there often remain
questions (such as may be involved here, whether or not the alleged
losses were caused by the Government's liability-creating action)
that Congress quite properly wishes to have judicially determined
before funds are to be withdrawn from the Treasury for the benefit
of claimants.
Since the statutory language alone sheds little light on the
congressional purpose, it is appropriate to canvass the legislative
background of the Act. At the outset, it should be noted that the
legislative manner attending the passage of the Act has no
relevance as to its interpretation. It is no more admissible that a
statute's passage virtually without debate and from a bill on the
consent calendar should reflect on its weight than that a decision
of this Court should be given less weight because it was argued
Page 357 U. S. 175
on the summary docket. There is no reason to suppose that this
legislation did not receive the careful study that the committees
in their reports claim to have given it. Here, one need not even
draw on the indisputable fact that much legislation is passed
solely on the basis of committee recommendations; the grievances of
the gold mining industry had been continually pressed on Congress
since shortly after the issuance of L-208, [
Footnote 2/2] so that the problem to which the Act was
directed was one with which many members of Congress were
undoubtedly thoroughly conversant.
Nothing is clearer from a reading of the committees' reports
than that their members regarded the gold mine operators to have
been unjustly treated by the Government. It is, of course, no
concern of ours whether or not they were justified in thinking so.
The reports quote extensively from an earlier report casting
serious doubt on the propriety, and even the legality, of the
government order, and detailing the seriousness of the industry's
resulting losses. To be sure, support may be drawn from this
condemnation for either of the competing interpretations of the
statute. It may imply a conviction that the Government should pay
for whatever losses resulted from the issuance of the order; but it
may also serve as nothing more than a justification for making an
exception to the statute of limitations. Specific statements in the
reports only compound this ambiguity. The committees make clear
their concern that prospective claimants, discouraged by the
Oro Fina decision, may have failed to assert their claims
within the statutory period, discovering too late (through the
Idaho Maryland decision) that they might have recovered.
See S.Rep.
Page 357 U. S. 176
No. 1605, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2; H.R.Rep.No.2220, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2. On the other hand, the committees' conclusions that
"the gold mining industry was dealt with in a fashion which
merits the consideration of the court in the adjudication of the
losses which may have been occasioned by this order,"
and that "the least that can be done is to allow those persons
affected by Order L-208 their day in court for such recompense as
may seem justified," S.Rep.No.1605,
supra, at p. 7;
H.R.Rep.No.2220,
supra, at p. 7, provide ground for
inferring that Congress intended to establish a right of recovery
if one did not already exist. The most, then, that can be said
concerning the background of the Act is that it is
inconclusive.
Although the language of the statute is equivocal and its
legislative history ambiguous, another relevant line of inquiry
must be pursued. The Act of July 14, 1952, is but one of many
special jurisdictional statutes passed from time to time by
Congress, and a number of these have been construed by the Court of
Claims. An examination of these cases tends to corroborate the
conclusion that the wording of the statute provides little clue to
its judicially ascertainable meaning. The phrase "to hear,
determine, and render judgment . . . on the claim," or an
approximate equivalent, is common to most special jurisdictional
statutes, including many that have been held to do no more than
waive limited defenses.
See, e.g., Act of Sept. 25, 1950,
64 Stat. 1032, involved in
California v. United States,
127 Ct.Cl. 624, 628, 119 F. Supp. 174, 177; Act of June 15, 1946,
60 Stat. 1227, involved in
Zephyr Aircraft Corp. v. United
States, 122 Ct.Cl. 523, 551, 104 F. Supp. 990, 997;
cf.
United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewas, 229 U.
S. 498,
229 U. S. 500.
Again, statutes similar in significant respects to the Act of July
14, 1952, have been construed in some cases to create a legal basis
for recovery where none had existed before,
see, e.g., Act
of June 14,
Page 357 U. S. 177
1935, 49 Stat. 2078, involved in
Stubbs v. United
States, 86 Ct.Cl. 152; Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1399,
involved in
Creech v. United States, 102 Ct.Cl. 301, 60 F.
Supp. 885, while, in other cases, to do no more than provide a
forum for the adjudication of a claim on the basis of existing
legal principles,
see, e.g., Act of May 11, 1948, 62 Stat.
1350, involved in
Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. United
States, 120 Ct.Cl. 291, 98 F. Supp. 572.
In many of these special jurisdictional statutes, Congress has
clarified its purpose by employing various qualifying phrases and
clauses. The absence of such qualifications may be found to have
some relevance in the interpretation of the statute before us. For
example, where a specific defense is waived (as the statute of
limitations is waived in the Act of July 14, 1952), Congress has,
on occasion, been at pains to emphasize that the effect of the
statute should extend no further than that limited waiver.
See,
e.g., Act of Aug. 24, 1949, 63 Stat. 1169, involved in
Breinig Bros., Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct.Cl. 645, 110
F. Supp. 269; Act of Oct. 18, 1951, 65 Stat. A124, involved in
Watson v. United States, 135 Ct.Cl. 145, 146 F. Supp. 425.
Moreover, it has not been uncommon for Congress in these statutes
specifically to provide that the passage of the act should not be
construed as "an inference of liability" on the part of the United
States Government.
See, e.g., Act of July 16, 1952, 66
Stat. A206, A207, involved in
Griffith v. United States,
135 Ct.Cl. 278; and Act of Aug. 25, 1950, 64 Stat. A191, involved
in
Booth v. United States, 140 Ct.Cl. ___, 155 F. Supp.
235.
Of course, if there is any significance to Congress' failure
expressly to limit the application of the statute, it must also be
recognized that Congress failed to employ techniques that would
have made clear any intention to create a new right of action.
Congress might, for example, have made a virtual confession of
liability, as
Page 357 U. S. 178
it did in the Act of March 1, 1929, 45 Stat. 2345, involved in
Garrett v. United States, 70 Ct.Cl. 304. Congress might
have waived other defenses than the statute of limitations.
See, e.g., the Act of May 28, 1928, 45 Stat. 2001,
involved in
Alcock v. United States, 74 Ct.Cl. 308. Or
Congress might, as it has often done, spell out in detail precisely
what the task of the Court of Claims is to be under the statute,
making clear what issues remain to be litigated.
See,
e.g., Act of July 2, 1956, 70 Stat. A103, involved in
Kramer v. United States, 137 Ct.Cl. 537, 149 F. Supp. 152;
Act of July 16, 1952, 66 Stat. A206, involved in
Griffith v.
United States, 135 Ct.Cl. 278; Act of March 19, 1951, 65 Stat.
5, involved in
Board of County Comm'rs v. United States,
123 Ct.Cl. 304, 105 F. Supp. 995.
The Court of Claims, in seeking to determine the meaning of
these statutes, has had occasion to turn to their legislative
backgrounds. The court has, for example, been more readily able to
find an intention on the part of Congress to admit liability where
the claim in question arose out of a national emergency that had
necessitated hasty and experimental governmental action resulting
in disproportionate hardships,
see Nolan Bros. v. United
States, 98 Ct.Cl. 41, 89 (Act of July 23, 1937, 50 Stat. 533);
cf. Mansfield v. United States, 89 Ct.Cl. 12 (Act of Aug.
19, 1935, 49 Stat. 2148). Significance has also been attached to
the fact that Congress regarded the governmental action to have
been wrongful.
See Hawkins v. United States, 96 Ct.Cl.
357, 369-370 (Act of Feb. 11, 1936, 49 Stat. 2217) (statement in
committee report to effect that action was "unmoral, inequitable,
and unjust"). Contrariwise, however, where Congress has not made
its intention quite clear, the court has approached its task with
caution,
see Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. United States,
supra, 120 Ct.Cl. at 305, 98 F. Supp. at 573; and it has often
asserted that special jurisdictional statutes
Page 357 U. S. 179
should be strictly construed.
See, e.g., California v.
United States, supra, 127 Ct.Cl. at 629-630, 119 F.Supp. at
178-179;
cf. United States v. Cumming, 130 U.
S. 452,
130 U. S.
455.
Thus, even this limited examination of relevant materials leaves
one very much in balance. But the fact that the answer to this
question is not easy is no excuse for passing over it and deciding
constitutional questions. It is startling doctrine to construe the
Constitution in order to avoid difficult questions of statutory
interpretation. It may well be that the Court of Claims,
experienced as it obviously is in interpreting such statutes as
these, may find the purpose of the Act of July 14, 1952, more
readily susceptible of determination than could a court not
possessed of that specialized competence. When the alternatives are
initial and yet final decision by this Court and decision by an
experienced court with the possibility of review in this Court, the
choice seems clear. I would send the case back to the Court of
Claims for an authoritative construction of the Special
Jurisdictional Act.
[
Footnote 2/1]
That decision also governed the companion cases of
Homestake
Mining Co. v. United States, 122 Ct.Cl. 690, and
Central
Eureka Mining Co. v. United States, 122 Ct.Cl. 691.
[
Footnote 2/2]
E.g., S. 27, 78th Cong.; S. 344, 78th Cong.; H.R. 3009, 78th
Cong.; H.R. 3682, 78th Cong.; H.R. 5093, 78th Cong.; H.R. 4393,
79th Cong.; H.R. 950, 80th Cong.; S. 45, 81st Cong.; H.R. 7851,
81st Cong.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I dissent because I believe that the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution requires the Government to pay just compensation to
the respondents for the temporary "taking" of their property
accomplished by WPB Order L-208.
The Court views L-208 as a normal regulatory measure of the WPB,
which had authority to allocate critical materials during the late
war. It holds that this was the character of the administrative
Order even though the Court of Claims found that L-208 was actually
designed to cause a shift of gold miners to other nonferrous metal
mines, rather than to control the allocation of mining equipment in
short supply, as the Order on its face purported to do. In so
holding, the Court emphasizes that
Page 357 U. S. 180
the "manpower" objective was simply one of the purposes of
L-208. I am unable to reconcile the Court's conclusions with the
findings of the Court of Claims. Finding 46 of the Court of Claims
states that reallocation of gold miners by forced closure of the
gold mines was "
The dominant consideration . . . in the
issuance of . . . L-208." (Italics supplied.) That this finding
reflected the conclusion that the "manpower" purpose was the sole
objective of the Order seems clear from the fact that the Court of
Claims struck from this finding, as submitted to it by the hearing
officer, the following two sentences:
"Another consideration in the issuance of the order was as
stated in the preamble that the fulfillment of requirements for the
defense of the United States had created a shortage in the supply
of critical materials which had been used in the maintenance and
operation of gold mines."
"Both objectives [the other being 'manpower'] were in some
measure accomplished with the closing of the plaintiffs' gold mines
pursuant to the order."
On the basis of its findings, the Court of Claims concluded in
its opinion:
"From the language of the order itself [L-208] and from the
circumstances surrounding its promulgation, it is apparent that its
only purpose was to deprive the gold mine owners and operators of
their right to make use of their mining properties."
These conclusions, which seem to me to be convincingly supported
by the evidence in the record, require that L-208 be regarded as
having no other purpose than to effect the closing of respondents'
mines in order to free gold mine labor for essential war work. The
Government acknowledges that, during the war, it lacked any legal
authority to order the transfer of civilian manpower.
Page 357 U. S. 181
Viewing L-208 in this light, I cannot agree with the Court's
conclusion that the Order was simply a "regulation" incident to
which respondents happened to suffer financial loss. Instead, I
believe that L-208 effected a temporary "taking" of the
respondents' right to mine gold which is compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.
L-208 was the only order promulgated during World War II which,
by its terms, required a lawful and productive industry to shut
down at a severe economic cost.
See S.Rep. No. 1605, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3. As a result of the Order, the respondents were
totally deprived of the beneficial use of their property. Any
suggestion that the mines could have been used in such a way (that
is, other than to mine gold) so as to remove them from the scope of
the Order would be chimerical. Not only were the respondents
completely prevented from making profitable use of their property,
but the Government acquired all that it wanted from the mines --
their complete immobilization and the resulting discharge of the
hardrock miners. It is plain that, as a practical matter, the Order
led to consequences no different from those that would have
followed the temporary acquisition of physical possession of these
mines by the United States.
In these circumstances, making the respondents' right to
compensation turn on whether the Government took the ceremonial
step of planting the American flag on the mining premises,
cf.
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.
S. 114,
341 U. S. 116,
is surely to permit technicalities of form to dictate consequences
of substance. In my judgment, the present case should be viewed
precisely as if the United States, in order to accomplish its
purpose of freeing gold miners for essential work, had taken
possession of the gold mines and allowed them to lie fallow for the
duration of the war. Had the Government adopted the latter course,
it is hardly debatable that respondents
Page 357 U. S. 182
would have been entitled to compensation.
See United States
v. Pewee Coal Co., supra.
As the Court recognizes, governmental action in the form of
regulation which severely diminishes the value of property may
constitute a "taking."
See United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799;
United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256;
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.
S. 546.
"The general rule, at least, is that, while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will
be recognized as a taking."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.
S. 393,
260 U. S. 415.
In my opinion, application of this principle calls here for the
conclusion that there was a "taking," for it is difficult to
conceive of a greater impairment of the use of property by a
regulatory measure than that suffered by the respondents as a
result of L-208.
None of the cases relied on by the Government precludes our
acknowledging the confiscatory nature of L-208 and according
respondents just compensation. Except in the extraordinary
situation where private property is destroyed by American armed
forces to meet the exigencies of the military situation in a
theatre of war,
see United States v. Caltex, Inc.,
344 U. S. 149, no
case in this Court has held that the Government is excused from
providing compensation when property has been "taken" from its
owners during wartime in the interest of the common good. Cases
such as
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.
S. 414;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.
S. 503;
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.
S. 742, involving the wartime regulation of prices,
rents, and profits, are wide of the mark. In all of them, the
Government was administering a nationwide regulatory system, rather
than a narrowly confined order directed to a small, singled-out
category of individual concerns. Furthermore, none of the
regulations involved in those cases prohibited the profitable
exploitation of a legal business. And in none of them
Page 357 U. S. 183
did the Government, following issuance of its edict, stand
virtually in the position of one in physical possession of the
property.
Also beside the point are the wartime prohibition cases.
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
251 U. S. 146,
dealt with the consequences of the Act of November 21, 1918, 40
Stat. 1045, 1046, which placed upon the property owners a burden
not nearly so onerous as the one imposed on respondents by L-208.
That Act permitted unrestricted sale of liquor for more than seven
months from the date of its passage, and, even after that time,
there was no restriction on sale for export or on local sale for
other than beverage purposes. Moreover, the prohibition cases arose
only after congressional action dealing specifically with the sale
of liquor, and the Court in
Hamilton particularly adverted
to the fact that Congress might properly conclude that such sale
should be halted "in order to guard and promote the efficiency" of
the armed forces and defense workers.
Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., supra, at
251 U. S. 155.
This latter factor was also the premise of
Jacob Ruppert, Inc.
v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264. Not
only has there been no comparable congressional finding that gold
mining was injurious, but the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
which conducted a thorough analysis of the operation of L-208,
recognized that "Issuance of the order was an administrative error
. . . , and may, furthermore, have been illegal." S.Rep. No. 1605,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3.
The question whether there has been a taking cannot, of course,
be resolved by general formulae, but must turn on the circumstances
of each particular case. As I have shown, the present case is
plainly outside the run of past decisions. In those cases, the
Court was rightfully reluctant to sanction compensation for losses
resulting from wartime regulatory measures which, under conditions
of total mobilization, have ramifications touching everyone
Page 357 U. S. 184
in one degree or another. But where the Government proceeds by
indirection, and accomplishes by regulation what is the equivalent
of outright physical seizure of private property, courts should
guard themselves against permitting formalities to obscure
actualities. As Mr. Justice Holmes observed in
Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, at
260 U. S.
416:
"We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change."
We should treat L-208 as being what, in every realistic sense,
it was, a temporary confiscation of respondents' property. The
Government is not absolved from providing just compensation here
because the WPB may have lacked authority to "take" respondents'
mines in order to free the miners for essential work in other
mines.
See International Paper Co. v. United States,
282 U. S. 399,
282 U. S. 406;
cf. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.
S. 173. I need hardly add that we should not be deterred
from according respondents their due because their claims and those
of others similarly situated may run into sizable amounts. The
Court of Claims, certainly not given to the easy allowance of
demands upon the public treasury, faced up to what the Constitution
plainly requires in this instance. We should affirm its
judgment.