Petitioners, who are Negro members of a union designated as
their bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act, brought a class
suit against the union, its brotherhood and certain of their
officers to compel them to represent petitioners without
discrimination in protection of their employment and seniority
rights under a contract between the union and the Railroad. They
alleged that the Railroad had purported to abolish 45 jobs held by
petitioners and other Negroes, but had employed whites in the same
jobs (except in a few instances in which it had rehired Negroes to
fill their old jobs with loss of seniority) and that, despite
repeated pleas, the union had done nothing to protect petitioners
from such discriminatory discharges. The District Court dismissed
the suit on the ground that the National Railroad Adjustment Board
had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. It was error to dismiss the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act confers
upon the Adjustment Board exclusive jurisdiction only over
"disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers," whereas this is a suit by employees against their
bargaining agent to enforce their statutory right not to be
discriminated against by it in bargaining. Pp.
355 U. S.
44-45.
2. The Railroad was not an indispensable party to this suit, and
failure to join it was not a ground for dismissing the suit. P.
355 U. S.
45.
3. The complaint adequately set forth a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Pp.
355 U. S.
45-48.
(a) The fact that, under the Railway Labor Act, aggrieved
employees can file their own grievances with the Adjustment Board
or sue the employer for breach of contract is no justification for
the union's alleged discrimination in refusing to represent
petitioners. P.
355 U. S.
47.
(b) Failure of the complaint to set forth specific facts to
support its general allegations of discrimination was not a
sufficient
Page 355 U. S. 42
ground for dismissal of the suit, since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. Pp.
355 U. S.
47-48.
229 F.2d 436, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Once again, Negro employees are here under the Railway Labor Act
[
Footnote 1] asking that their
collective bargaining agent be compelled to represent them fairly.
In a series of cases beginning with
Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192,
this Court has emphatically and repeatedly ruled that an exclusive
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and without
discrimination because of race, and has held that the courts have
power to protect employees against such invidious discrimination.
[
Footnote 2]
This class suit was brought in a Federal District Court in Texas
by certain Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, petitioners here, on behalf of themselves and
other Negro employees similarly situated against the Brotherhood,
its Local Union No. 28 and certain officers of both. In summary,
the complaint
Page 355 U. S. 43
made the following allegations relevant to our decision:
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at
its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the
designated bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act for the
bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged. A contract existed
between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the
bargaining unit certain protection from discharge and loss of
seniority. In May, 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs
held by petitioners or other Negroes, all of whom were either
discharged or demoted. In truth, the 45 jobs were not abolished at
all, but instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted,
except for a few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their
old jobs, but with loss of seniority. Despite repeated pleas by
petitioners, the Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to
protect them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to
give them protection comparable to that given white employees. The
complaint then went on to allege that the Union had failed in
general to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith. It
charged that such discrimination constituted a violation of
petitioners' right under the Railway Labor Act to fair
representation from their bargaining agent. And it concluded by
asking for relief in the nature of declaratory judgment, injunction
and damages.
The respondents appeared and moved to dismiss the complaint on
several grounds: (1) the National Railroad Adjustment Board had
exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy; (2) the Texas and New
Orleans Railroad, which had not been joined, was an indispensable
party defendant; and (3) the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be given. The District Court granted the motion
to dismiss holding that Congress had given the Adjustment Board
exclusive jurisdiction over
Page 355 U. S. 44
the controversy. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
apparently relying on the same ground, affirmed. 229 F.2d 436.
Since the case raised an important question concerning the
protection of employee rights under the Railway Labor Act we
granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 818.
We hold that it was error for the courts below to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They took the position that § 3
First (i) of the Railway Labor Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction
on the Adjustment Board because the case, in their view, involved
the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement. But § 3 First (i), by its own terms, applies only to
"disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers." [
Footnote 3] This
case involves no dispute between employee and employer, but, to the
contrary, is a suit by employees against the bargaining agent to
enforce their statutory right not to be unfairly discriminated
against by it in bargaining. [
Footnote 4] The Adjustment Board has no
Page 355 U. S. 45
power under § 3 First (i) or any other provision of the Act to
protect them from such discrimination. Furthermore, the contract
between the Brotherhood and the Railroad will be, at most, only
incidentally involved in resolving this controversy between
petitioners and their bargaining agent.
Although the District Court did not pass on the other reasons
advanced for dismissal of the complaint, we think it timely and
proper for us to consider them here. They have been briefed and
argued by both parties, and the respondents urge that the decision
below be upheld, if necessary, on these other grounds.
As in the courts below, respondents contend that the Texas and
New Orleans Railroad Company is an indispensable party which the
petitioners have failed to join as a defendant. On the basis of the
allegations made in the complaint and the relief demanded by
petitioners, we believe that contention is unjustifiable. We cannot
see how the Railroad's rights or interests will be affected by this
action to enforce the duty of the bargaining representative to
represent petitioners fairly. This is not a suit, directly or
indirectly, against the Railroad. No relief is asked from it, and
there is no prospect that any will or can be granted which will
bind it. If an issue does develop which necessitates joining the
Railroad, either it or the respondents will then have an adequate
opportunity to request joinder.
Turning to respondents' final ground, we hold that, under the
general principles laid down in the
Steele, Graham, and
Howard, cases the complaint adequately set forth a claim
upon which relief could be granted. In appraising the sufficiency
of the complaint, we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts
Page 355 U. S. 46
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
[
Footnote 5] Here, the
complaint alleged, in part, that petitioners were discharged
wrongfully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting according to
plan, refused to protect their jobs as it did those of white
employees or to help them with their grievances all because they
were Negroes. If these allegations are proven, there has been a
manifest breach of the Union's statutory duty to represent fairly
and without hostile discrimination all of the employees in the
bargaining unit. This Court squarely held in
Steele and
subsequent cases that discrimination in representation because of
race is prohibited by the Railway Labor Act. The bargaining
representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and invidious"
[
Footnote 6] distinctions among
those it represents does not come to an abrupt end, as the
respondents seem to contend, with the making of an agreement
between union and employer. Collective bargaining is a continuing
process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in
the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems
not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee
rights already secured by contract. The bargaining representative
can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions
than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. [
Footnote 7] A contract may be fair and
impartial on its face, yet administered in such a way, with the
active or tacit consent of the union, as to be flagrantly
discriminatory against some members of the bargaining unit.
Page 355 U. S. 47
The respondents point to the fact that under the Railway Labor
Act aggrieved employees can file their own grievances with the
Adjustment Board or sue the employer for breach of contract.
Granting this, it still furnishes no sanction for the Union's
alleged discrimination in refusing to represent petitioners. The
Railway Labor Act, in an attempt to aid collective action by
employees, conferred great power and protection on the bargaining
agent chosen by a majority of them. As individuals or small groups,
the employees cannot begin to possess the bargaining power of their
representative in negotiating with the employer or in presenting
their grievances to him. Nor may a minority choose another agent to
bargain in their behalf. We need not pass on the Union's claim that
it was not obliged to handle any grievances at all, because we are
clear that, once to undertook to bargain or present grievances for
some of the employees it represented, it could not refuse to take
similar action in good faith for other employees just because they
were Negroes.
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set
forth specific facts to support its general allegations of
discrimination, and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The
decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules
require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" [
Footnote 8] that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to the
Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "notice pleading"
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the
other pretrial procedures
Page 355 U. S. 48
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of
both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed
facts and issues. [
Footnote 9]
Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that "all pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice," we have no doubt
that petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave
the respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome, and accept the principle
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits.
Cf. Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.,
303 U. S. 197.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.
[
Footnote 2]
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210;
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232;
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.
S. 768;
cf. Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board,
323 U. S. 248;
Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S.
892.
[
Footnote 3]
In full, § 3 First (i) reads:
"The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a
carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and
unadjusted on the date of approval of this Act (June 21, 1934),
shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief
operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such
disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either
party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a
full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon
the disputes."
48 Stat. 1191, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i).
[
Footnote 4]
For this reason, the decision in
Slocum v. Delaware, L.
& W.R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, is
not applicable here. The courts below also relied on
Hayes v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 184 F.2d 337,
certiorari
denied, 340 U.S. 942, but, for the reasons set forth in the
text, we believe that case was decided incorrectly.
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 108
F.2d 302;
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774;
Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631.
[
Footnote 6]
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
323 U. S. 192,
323 U. S.
203.
[
Footnote 7]
See Dillard v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 199 F.2d
948;
Hughes Tool Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
147 F.2d 69, 74.
[
Footnote 8]
Rule 8(a)(2).
[
Footnote 9]
See, e.g., Rule 12(e) (motion for a more definite
statement); Rule 12(f) (motion to strike portions of the pleading);
Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Rule 16
(pretrial procedure and formulation of issue); Rules 26-37
(depositions and discovery); Rule 56 (motion for summary judgment):
Rule 15 (right to amend).