EMRAY REALTY CORP. v. WEAVER, 355 U.S. 382 (1958)
U.S. Supreme Court
EMRAY REALTY CORP. v. WEAVER , 355 U.S. 382 (1958)355 U.S. 382
EMRAY REALTY CORP., appellant,
v.
Robert C. WEAVER, as State Rent Administrator.
No. 631.
Supreme Court of the United States
January 20, 1958
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice BRENNAN concur, dissenting.
For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, see 355 U.S. 373, 78 S. Ct. 359.
The question in these cases is whether a person injured by a violation of 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13a, 15 U.S.C.A. 13a, may sue the wrongdoer for treble damages and an injunction under 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 15, 26, 15 U.S.C.A. 15, 26. A dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750, 1018, indicated that the action would lie, and Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, sustained a recovery on that theory, though the point now at issue was neither briefed nor considered.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows suits for treble damages for acts forbidden by 'the antitrust laws.' Section 16 allows relief by injunction for violations of 'the antitrust laws.' The Court holds that 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is not a part of 'the antitrust laws' as used in the Clayton Act.
We disagree. The legislative history in our opinion shows that Congress intended to permit private actions to be brought for violations of 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.
It is true that 1 of the Clayton Act defines 'antitrust laws'
as including, inter alia, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1-7, 15
note, and the Clayton Act and that the Robinson-Patman Act did not
in terms amend 1. It is also true that 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act
does not in terms amend 2 of the Clayton Act, while 1 of the
Robinson-Patman Act does. 80 Cong.Rec. 9414. The legislative
history is further clouded by the fact that certain types of price
discriminations are forbidden by both 11 and 3 of the Rob-
[355 U.S. 382 ,
384]
U.S. Supreme Court
EMRAY REALTY CORP. v. WEAVER , 355 U.S. 382 (1958) 355 U.S. 382 EMRAY REALTY CORP., appellant,v.
Robert C. WEAVER, as State Rent Administrator.
No. 631. Supreme Court of the United States January 20, 1958 Page 355 U.S. 382 , 383 Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice BRENNAN concur, dissenting. For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, see 355 U.S. 373, 78 S. Ct. 359. The question in these cases is whether a person injured by a violation of 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13a, 15 U.S.C.A. 13a, may sue the wrongdoer for treble damages and an injunction under 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 15, 26, 15 U.S.C.A. 15, 26. A dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750, 1018, indicated that the action would lie, and Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, sustained a recovery on that theory, though the point now at issue was neither briefed nor considered. Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows suits for treble damages for acts forbidden by 'the antitrust laws.' Section 16 allows relief by injunction for violations of 'the antitrust laws.' The Court holds that 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is not a part of 'the antitrust laws' as used in the Clayton Act. We disagree. The legislative history in our opinion shows that Congress intended to permit private actions to be brought for violations of 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is true that 1 of the Clayton Act defines 'antitrust laws' as including, inter alia, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1-7, 15 note, and the Clayton Act and that the Robinson-Patman Act did not in terms amend 1. It is also true that 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act does not in terms amend 2 of the Clayton Act, while 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act does. 80 Cong.Rec. 9414. The legislative history is further clouded by the fact that certain types of price discriminations are forbidden by both 11 and 3 of the Rob- Page 355 U.S. 382 , 384 inson-Patman Act. Suits for damages on account of these violations plainly are suits for damages under the 'antitrust laws' within the meaning of the enforcement provisions of the Clayton Act. It is only when a violation of 3 alone is involved that the issue we are concerned with here arises. Yet why allow suits for treble damages for price discrimination under 2 and not allow them when the discrimination practiced is of the kind condemned by 3? There is no suggestion that any such line was being drawn by the Congress. The emphasis on the restrictive effect of 3 relates simply to its criminal sanctions, not to the remedial provisions with which we are presently concerned. When the Conference Report was being considered in the House, Representative Miller, a House Conferee supporting the bill, made the following statements (80 Cong.Rec. 9421):
Page 355 U.S. 382 , 385 'Mr. Hancock of New York. Is it not perfectly clear that any vendor who discriminates in price between purchasers is guilty of a crime and is also subject to triple damages to anyone who claims to be aggrieved?
Page 355 U.S. 382 , 386 In reply, Senator Van Nuys, one of the Senate Conferees, did not contest the statement about civil and criminal penalties, but instead addressed his remarks to the contention concerning the defense: