Respondent, a manufacturer engaged in interstate commerce and
whose employees were entitled to the protection of the National
Labor Relations Act, operated a branch plant in an essentially
rural community of about 4,000 inhabitants. The plant had about 100
employees, none of whom were members of a labor union but many of
whom had signed applications to join a union. Apparently in an
effort to compel respondent to recognize the union as the
bargaining agent of the employees, some of the employees struck and
picketed the plant. The picketing was accompanied by massed
name-calling, threats, and other conduct calculated to intimidate
the officers, agents and nonstriking employees of the plant. A
state court enjoined not only the threatening, intimidating, or
coercing of employees of the plant, but also all "picketing or
patroling" of the plant premises.
Held:
1. The evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court,
affirmed by the State Supreme Court, that the conduct and massed
name-calling by petitioners were calculated to provoke violence,
and were likely to do so unless promptly restrained; and such
conduct and abusive language in such circumstances can be enjoined.
Pp.
355 U. S.
138-139.
2. However, the trial court unlawfully entered the preempted
domain of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as it enjoined
peaceful picketing. P.
355 U. S.
139.
3. Insofar as the injunction prohibits petitioners and others
cooperating with them from threatening violence, or provoking
violence on the part of any of the officers, agents or employees of
respondent, and prohibits them from obstructing or attempting to
obstruct the free use of the streets adjacent to respondent's place
of business, and the free ingress and egress to and from the
property, it is affirmed. P.
355 U. S.
139.
4. To the extent that the injunction prohibits all other
picketing and patroling of respondent's premises and in particular
prohibits peaceful picketing, it is set aside. Pp.
355 U. S.
139-140.
226 Ark. 80, 288 S.W.2d 589, affirmed in part, reversed in part;
judgment vacated and cause remanded.
Page 355 U. S. 132
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issues here are whether, under the circumstances of this
case, a state court may enjoin strikers and union representatives
from (1) "threatening, intimidating or coercing any of the
officers, agents or employees of [the employer] at any place," and
also "from obstructing, or attempting to obstruct the free use of
the streets adjacent to [the employer's] place of business, and the
free ingress and egress to and from [the employer's] property," and
(2) all "picketing or patroling" of the employer's premises. For
reasons hereafter stated, we conclude that the state court may
lawfully enjoin conduct of substantially the first category, but
not of the second.
Most of the material facts are uncontroverted. In 1955,
respondent, Rainfair, Inc., was a Wisconsin corporation with
headquarters in Racine, Wisconsin. It owned and operated a plant in
Wynne, Arkansas, an essentially rural community of about 4,000
inhabitants. About 100 women and seven men were there employed in
the manufacture of men's slacks which were shipped in interstate
commerce. None of the employees were members of a labor union, but
many had signed applications to join the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, CIO, which is one of the petitioners.
Apparently in an effort to compel the employer to recognize the
union as the bargaining agent of the employees, 29 of the employees
did not report for work on May 2, 1955. A picket line was
established on the street in front of the plant. Strike
headquarters were
Page 355 U. S. 133
maintained across the street from the plant entrance. Nearly all
of the strikers were women. Their number varied from eight to 37.
All was not quiet, however. On one occasion, nails were strewn over
the company's parking lot and, about a week later, the whole lot
was "seeded" with roofing tacks. Tacks were also scattered in the
driveway of the plant manager's home and on the driveways of 12 of
the nonstriking women employees. One of the pickets told the plant
manager that she would "wipe the sidewalk" with him and send him
back to Wisconsin because he "was nothing but trash." The plant
manager was followed by the strikers each time he left the plant;
he also was harassed at night by occasional shouting at his home
and by numerous anonymous telephone calls.
Immediately after the strike was called, respondent, by
registered mail, informed each of the strikers that, if they did
not return to work within a few days, the company would assume that
those not returning had quit there jobs. Only three returned.
Thirteen new employees were hired. The strike ended on May 19, the
pickets were withdrawn, and the strikers applied for reinstatement.
Respondent, however, declined to arrange for immediate
reinstatement. On June 17, the strikers voted to reestablish the
picket line on Monday, June 20. [
Footnote 1] The purpose was to protest against
respondent's failure to recognize the union and its refusal to
reinstate the employees who had applied for reinstatement in
May.
Page 355 U. S. 134
Shortly after midnight, on the morning of June 20, two women
strikers deliberately drove a sharp instrument into two tires of a
car owned by the daughter of one of the nonstriking women
employees. [
Footnote 2] At
about 5:15 a.m., the police were summoned to the plant, where they
found a five-foot black snake inside the plant beneath a broken
window. At about 6 a.m., picketing was resumed. [
Footnote 3] Although the union posted notices
warning the strikers against committing acts of violence, a union
representative later was sufficiently concerned to ask the police
to have someone regularly on duty at the entrance to the plant. The
evidence shows that the tension was in large part caused by the
enormous amount of abusive language hurled by the strikers at the
company employees. The Supreme Court of Arkansas later summarized
this as follows:
"As the employees would go to and from work at the plant, or go
to lunch, or take a recess, the strikers would congregate along the
west edge of their lot and sometimes in Rowena Street and engage in
loud and offensive name calling, singing or shouting directed at
the workers. They would call the workers 'scabs,' 'dirty scabs,'
'fat scabs,' 'yellow scabs,' 'crazy scabs,' 'cotton patch scabs,'
'pony tailed scabs,' 'fuzzy headed scabs,' 'fools,' 'cotton picking
fools,' and other similar names. This took place every time an
employee left or entered the plant. It was done by the strikers
individually, in couples, or by the entire group and in a loud and
boisterous manner. One witness described it as 'just bedlam' when
more than a dozen joined in the shouting. Particular
Page 355 U. S. 135
names or remarks were reserved for individual workers. One
pregnant worker was greeted with, 'Get the hot water ready,' or, 'I
am coming to make another payment on the baby, call Dr. Beaton,'
or, 'Why, you can work another hour until you go to the delivery
room.' This worker and another drove to a filling station for
gasoline when two of the strikers drove up and told the attendant
not to wait on 'these scabs' before he waited on the strikers."
"One worker said the strikers always called her 'fat scab,' and
that individual pickets and strikers made fun of her clothing and
asked her if 'Pete,' the plant manager, still liked her 'low-cut
dresses and earrings.' This made the employee so angry she invited
the picket to come over and 'make it some of her business.' . .
."
"The strikers sang songs with improvised lyrics to the tune of
certain popular ballads and religious and Union songs. 'When the
Saints Go Marching In' became 'When the Scabs Go Marching In' and
the ballad, 'Davy Crockett,' began, 'Born in a cotton patch in
Arkansas, the greenest gals we ever saw. . . .'"
"The women pickets would stand in the street or sit near the
plant and shout ugly names, stick out their tongues, hold their
noses and make a variety of indecent gestures while pointing at the
workers in the plant. Several workers testified the continuous name
calling and boisterous conduct of the strikers made them afraid,
angry, ill, or nervous, and had an adverse effect on their ability
to properly do their work. Some of the workers would talk back to
the strikers, while others remained silent. The Chief of Police of
Wynne testified there was more tension during the second picketing
than the first, and that he was fearful there was going to be
trouble
Page 355 U. S. 136
during the second picketing, and so informed Union staff
members. One staff member called him once when trouble seemed
imminent, and wanted to 'go on record' as having requested the
presence of the officer."
226 Ark. 80, 83-84, 288 S.W.2d 589, 591.
On June 24, respondent filed a complaint in the local Chancery
Court. It described the conduct of the strikers and alleged that
such conduct amounted to "unlawful acts . . . for the unlawful
purpose of intimidating and coercing" respondent's employees into
joining the union, that respondent had no adequate remedy at law,
and that it was suffering irreparable damage from such conduct. The
court acted upon the complaint and the testimony of the plant
manager and issued a temporary injunction. After full hearing, it
made the injunction permanent on September 15. The trial court's
findings included the following statement:
"That the defendants, in picketing the plaintiff's plant, have
resorted to violence, coercion and intimidation, and such other
unlawful conduct as was calculated to cause a breach of the peace,
and that the defendants have unlawfully abused the right to
peaceably picket, as granted to them by the laws of this state and
the Federal Constitution, and that said defendants should be
permanently enjoined from picketing the plaintiff's plant."
The permanent decree enjoined not only the threatening and
intimidation of the employees of respondent at any place, but also
all picketing or patroling of respondent's premises by the named
defendants and all other persons in sympathy or acting in concert
with them. [
Footnote 4] The
Page 355 U. S. 137
Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the decree. 266 Ark. 80, 288
S.W.2d 589. We granted certiorari largely because of the sweeping
language of the decree. 352 U.S. 822.
The applicable principles of law are substantially agreed upon.
Respondent concedes that it is engaged in interstate commerce, and
that its employees are entitled to the protection of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
Respondent does not contend that the state court had power to
enjoin peaceful organized activity, recognizing that, generally,
the
Page 355 U. S. 138
National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction of
such matters.
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.
S. 468. Petitioners concede that the state court had the
power to enjoin violence.
United Workers v. Wisconsin
Board, 351 U. S. 266;
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.
S. 740. Respondent contends that the record here shows a
pattern of violence so enmeshed in the picketing that, to restore
order, it was necessary to enjoin all organized conduct.
Petitioners, on the other hand, urge that there was no violence
here, and no threat of it, and, accordingly, that there was no
factual warrant for the injunction which issued.
The issue here is whether or not the conduct and language of the
strikers were likely to cause physical violence. Petitioners urge
that all of this abusive language was protected, and that they
could not, therefore, be enjoined from using it. We cannot agree.
Words can readily be so coupled with conduct as to provoke
violence.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.
S. 568,
315 U. S.
571-572. Petitioners contend that the words used,
principally "scab" and variations thereon, are within a protected
terminology. But if a sufficient number yell any word sufficiently
loudly showing an intent to ridicule, insult or annoy, no matter
how innocuous the dictionary definition of that word, the effect
may cease to be persuasion and become intimidation and incitement
to violence. [
Footnote 5] Wynne
is not an industrial metropolis. When, in a small community, more
than 30 people get together and act as they did here, and heap
abuse on their neighbors and
Page 355 U. S. 139
former friends, a court is justified in finding that violence is
imminent. Recognizing that the trial court was in a better position
than we can be to assess the local situation, we think the evidence
supports its conclusion, affirmed by the State Supreme Court, that
the conduct and massed name-calling by petitioners were calculated
to provoke violence, and were likely to do so unless promptly
restrained.
Though the state court was within its discretionary power in
enjoining future facts of violence, intimidation, and threats of
violence by the strikers and the union, yet it is equally clear
that such court entered the preempted domain of the National Labor
Relations Board insofar as it enjoined peaceful picketing by
petitioners. The picketing proper, as contrasted with the
activities around the headquarters, was peaceful. There was little,
if any, conduct designed to exclude those who desired to return to
work. Nor can we say that a pattern of violence was established
which would inevitably reappear in the event picketing were later
resumed.
Cf. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U. S. 287.
What violence there was was scattered in time, and much of it was
unconnected with the picketing. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that an injunction against such conduct would be
ineffective if picketing were resumed.
Accordingly, insofar as the injunction before us prohibits
petitioners and others cooperating with them from threatening
violence against, or provoking violence on the part of, any of the
officers, agents or employees of respondent and prohibits them from
obstructing or attempting to obstruct the free use of the streets
adjacent to respondent's place of business, and the free ingress
and egress to and from that property, it is affirmed. On the other
hand, to the extent the injunction prohibits all other picketing
and patroling of respondent's premises and, in
Page 355 U. S. 140
particular, prohibits peaceful picketing, it is set aside. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is vacated, and the case
is remanded to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS,
being of opinion that Congress has given the National Labor
Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction of this controversy, would
reverse the judgment in its entirety and remand the cause to the
state court for dismissal of the injunction.
[
Footnote 1]
In the meantime, the union had filed unfair labor practice
charges against respondent before the National Labor Relations
Board. These were still pending at the time of the hearing of the
instant case. The union also requested the Board to conduct a
representation election, but this request was withdrawn before the
hearing on the injunction. At an election held on October 19, a
majority of the employees of respondent voted not to be represented
by the union.
[
Footnote 2]
They later were convicted of this misdemeanor.
[
Footnote 3]
The placards were inscribed, "Rainfair Workers on Strike,
Rainfair is unfair to its employees, Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, CIO."
[
Footnote 4]
"It is, therefore, considered and decreed by this court that the
defendants James E. Youngdahl . . . and each of them, and their
agents and employees, and each and every one of the officers and
members of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, and all
other persons in sympathy, or acting in concert with them, be, and
they are hereby permanently enjoined while on, adjacent to, or near
plaintiff's premises located on Martin Drive and Rowena Street, in
Wynne, Arkansas, from interfering with plaintiff's business, its
customers and employees, and from picketing or patroling, or
causing to be picketed or patroled the plaintiff's premises, and
the sidewalks, streets, or other property adjacent to plaintiff's
premises, with placards or banners designating said place of
business as unfair to organized labor, or with placards otherwise
so worded as to give said place of business such designation; that
the defendants, and each of them, their agents and employees, and
the officers and members of the above-mentioned union, and all
sympathizers, and all other persons acting in concert with them,
be, and they are hereby restrained and enjoined from accosting and
detaining, or causing to be accosted or to be detained on the
sidewalks or streets adjacent to or on plaintiff's premises, any
person or persons seeking to enter or depart from said place of
business for the purpose of dissuading them from patronizing, or
working for plaintiff, or from calling attention to any alleged
unfairness of plaintiff, or its place of business, to organized
labor; from threatening, intimidating or coercing any of the
officers, agents or employees of plaintiff at any place; from
loitering and congregating around and under the tent and upon the
property that is used as the union's headquarters, located directly
across Rowena Street in front of plaintiff's premises; and from
obstructing, or attempting to obstruct the free use of the streets
adjacent to plaintiff's place of business, and the free ingress and
egress to and from plaintiff's property."
[
Footnote 5]
In Arkansas, there was then in effect a statute of long standing
which expressly made it a crime for any person to
"make use of any profane, violent, vulgar, abusive, or insulting
language toward or about any other person in his presence or
hearing, which language in its common acceptation is calculated to
arouse to anger the person about or to whom it is spoken or
addressed, or to cause a breach of the peace or an assault. . .
."
Ark. Stat. 1947, § 41-1412.