This is a stockholder's derivative suit brought in a Federal
District Court in California on grounds of diversity of citizenship
by a citizen of New York against two Delaware corporations and the
directors of one of them, who are citizens of California. The
complaint alleged fraudulent wastage of the assets of Warner Bros.,
the plaintiff's corporation, for the benefit of a son-in-law of one
of its directors and the son-in-law's corporation. It alleged that
a demand on the directors of Warner Bros. to institute the suit was
not made because it would have been futile, since all or a majority
of them had approved the contracts involved. The District Court
found that (1) the contracts were made in good faith and without
fraud, (2) the stockholders, officers or directors were not
"antagonistic to the financial interests" of Warner Bros., (3) none
of the directors "wrongfully participated" in the acts complained
of, and (4) if a demand had been made on Warner Bros. to institute
suit, the management would not have been disqualified "from
faithfully doing their duty," but that "such a demand would have
been futile." On these grounds, the District Court realigned Warner
Bros. as a party plaintiff and dismissed the bill for want of
diversity jurisdiction.
Held: it erred in doing so, and the judgment is
reversed and the cause remanded. Pp.
354 U. S.
92-98.
(a) In considering the issue of federal diversity jurisdiction,
the District Court should have considered only the face of the
pleadings and the nature of the controversy, without attempting to
adjudicate the merits of the charges of wrongdoing. Pp.
354 U. S.
94-98.
(b) Federal law governs the question of federal jurisdiction;
but local law will govern the decision on the merits. Pp.
354 U. S.
95-96.
(c) There is "antagonism" between a corporation and its
stockholder whenever the management is aligned against the
stockholder and defends a course of action which the stockholder
attacks, even though the management acts in good faith. Pp.
354 U. S. 95,
354 U. S.
96-98.
(d) Absent collusion, there is diversity jurisdiction when the
real collision of issues is between citizens of different States.
P.
354 U. S.
97.
Page 354 U. S. 92
(e) On the record in this case, it is evident that there is such
a collision here. Pp.
354 U. S.
97-98.
(f) Diversity jurisdiction having once vested, it was not lost
merely because the original plaintiff died while the suit was
pending and the special administrator substituted for him was a
citizen of California. P. 93,
n
1.
(g) The bill meets the requirements of Rule 23(b) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure that the stockholder show with particularity
what efforts he made to get those who control the corporation to
take action, "and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action
or the reasons for not making such effort." P. 94,
n 2.
237 F.2d 317 reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was filed in the Federal District Court in California
by reason of diversity of citizenship. It is a stockholder's
derivative suit. The first cause of action, the only one involved
here, is based on alleged fraudulent wastage of assets of Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. (which we will call Warner Bros.) for the
benefit of one Sperling, a son-in-law of a director of Warner
Bros., and United States Pictures, Inc. (which we will call
United), the son-in-law's corporation. Extended allegations are
made concerning various agreements between Warner Bros. and United
which, it is charged, are unfair to Warner Bros. Demand on the
directors of Warner Bros. to institute this action was not made,
because, it is averred, such a demand would be futile since,
inter alia, all or a majority of the
Page 354 U. S. 93
board of directors approved the contracts. The plaintiff is a
citizen of New York; [
Footnote
1] the defendant directors are citizens of California; and
Warner Bros. and United are Delaware corporations.
The complaint joined Warner Bros. as a defendant. It was urged
before the District Court, and it is claimed here, that, since the
cause of action sought to be enforced is one that belongs to the
corporation, and since the corporation is not "antagonistic" to the
stockholder within the meaning of that term as used in
Doctor
v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579,
196 U. S. 588,
Warner Bros. should be realigned as plaintiff. In that event, there
would be no diversity of citizenship, since Delaware corporations
would be on both sides of the lawsuit.
Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267.
The District Court held a hearing on the issue -- a hearing that
lasted 15 days. It found:
(1) that the contracts in controversy were made in good faith
and without fraud; that they were considered by the
Page 354 U. S. 94
directors to be in the best interests of Warner Bros. and that,
in approving them, they exercised their best business judgment;
(2) that Warner Bros. was not under the domination or control of
the Warners on the board, and that the stockholders, officers, or
directors were not "antagonistic to the financial interests" of
Warner Bros.;
(3) that neither all nor a majority nor any of the directors and
officers of Warner Bros. "wrongfully participated" in the acts
complained of; that the board was not dominated or controlled by
the Warners and Sperling or by any one or more of them;
(4) that, if demand had been made on Warner Bros. to institute
suit, the management would not have been disqualified "from
faithfully doing their duty" as officers and directors, but that
"such a demand would have been futile." [
Footnote 2]
For these reasons, the District Court realigned Warner Bros. as
a party plaintiff and dismissed the bill.
117 F.
Supp. 781. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 237 F.2d 317. The
case is here on a writ of certiorari. 352 U.S. 865.
This is a corporate cause of action brought by a stockholder.
Whether it is a proper case for assertion by a stockholder of that
cause of action is not the question here. Such was the problem
involved in
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.
S. 450, upon which so much reliance is placed in
supporting the court below. Here, we assume that this corporate
cause of action may be enforced by the stockholder.
Page 354 U. S. 95
We are concerned only with a question of federal diversity
jurisdiction.
The gist of the findings of the District Court is that, since
there was no fraud on the part of the directors in making the
contracts, but only an exercise of independent business judgment,
the management was not antagonistic to the financial interests of
the corporation. That is an issue that goes to the merits, not to
the question of jurisdiction. There will, of course, be antagonism
between the stockholder and the management where the dominant
officers and directors are guilty of fraud or misdeeds. But
wrongdoing in that sense is not the sole measure of antagonism.
There is antagonism whenever the management is aligned against the
stockholder and defends a course of conduct which he attacks. The
charge normally is cast in terms of fraud, breach of trust, or
illegality.
See Doctor v. Harrington, supra; Venner v. Great
Northern R. Co., 209 U. S. 24;
Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
330 U. S. 518,
330 U. S.
522-523. The answer, of course, always denies the charge
of wrongdoing. To stop and try the charge of wrongdoing is to delve
into the merits. That does not seem to us to be the proper course.
It is a time-consuming, wasteful exertion of energy on a
preliminary issue in the case. The instant case is a good
illustration, for it has been over eight years in the courts on
this question of jurisdiction.
Since our decision in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64, the
law which governs the merits in these derivative actions is local
law.
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U. S. 541,
337 U. S.
555-556. The result, then, of the approach followed by
the court below is to have more than a preliminary trial on matters
going to the merits of the controversy. Obviously, federal law
would govern the preliminary trial on the issues of wrongdoing, for
that matter goes to the question of federal jurisdiction. Yet,
should the District Court decide those issues in favor of
Page 354 U. S. 96
the stockholder, a second trial on the merits will require that
the same issues be tried out according to the set of rules supplied
by local law.
It seems to us that the proper course is not to try out the
issues presented by the charges of wrongdoing, but to determine the
issue of antagonism on the face of the pleadings and by the nature
of the controversy. The bill and answer normally determine whether
the management is antagonistic to the stockholder, as
Central
R. Co. v. Mills, 113 U. S. 249, and
Doctor v. Harrington, supra, indicate. [
Footnote 3] The management may refuse or fail
to act for any number of reasons. Fraud may be one; the reluctance
to take action against a close business associate may be another;
honest belief in the wisdom of the course of action which the
management has approved may be still another; and so on. As the
Court said in
Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S. R.
Co., 213 U. S. 435,
213 U. S.
451,
Page 354 U. S. 97
where the management was deemed to be antagonistic to the
stockholder, "The attitude of the directors need not be sinister.
It may be sincere." Whenever the management refuses to take action
to undo a business transaction or whenever, as in this case, it so
solidly approves it that any demand to rescind would be futile,
antagonism is evident. The cause of action, to be sure, is that of
the corporation. But the corporation has become, through its
managers, hostile and antagonistic to the enforcement of the
claim.
Collusion to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the
District Courts may, of course, always be shown, [
Footnote 4] and it will always defeat
jurisdiction. Absent collusion, there is diversity jurisdiction
when the real collision of issues,
Indianapolis v. Chase
National Bank, 314 U. S. 63,
314 U. S. 69,
or, as stated in
Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U. S.
32,
222 U. S. 36,
"the actual controversy," is between citizens of different States.
This is a practical, not a mechanical, determination, and is
resolved by the pleadings and the nature of the dispute.
Here, it is plain that the stockholder and those who manage the
corporation are completely and irrevocably opposed on a matter of
corporate practice and policy. A trial may demonstrate that the
stockholder is wrong and the management right. It may show a
dispute that lies in the penumbra of business judgment, unaffected
by fraud. But that issue goes to the merits, not to jurisdiction.
There is jurisdiction if there is real collision between
Page 354 U. S. 98
the stockholder and his corporation. That there is such a
collision is evident here.
The judgment must therefore be reversed, and the case remanded
to the District Court.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
While the action was pending, plaintiff died, and for him a
special administrator has been substituted. The latter is a citizen
of California.
Had the suit been originally commenced by the decedent's
representative, it would have been the citizenship of the
representative which would have been determinative of jurisdiction
in this diversity case.
See Chappedelaine v.
Dechenaux, 4 Cranch 306;
Childress
v. Emory, 8 Wheat. 642,
21 U. S. 669;
Mexican Central R. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.
S. 429,
187 U. S. 434;
Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.
S. 183,
284 U. S. 186.
But jurisdiction, once attached, is not impaired by a party's later
change of domicile.
Mullen v.
Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537. As Chief Justice Marshall
said in that case:
"It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of the Court depends
upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and
that, after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events."
Id., p.
22 U. S. 539.
The rationale, that jurisdiction is tested by the facts as they
existed when the action is brought, is applied to a situation where
a party dies and a non-diverse representative is substituted.
Dunn v. Clarke,
8 Pet. 1 (1834).
[
Footnote 2]
The bill therefore meets the requirements of Rule 23(b) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure that the stockholder show with
particularity what efforts he made to get those who control the
corporation to take action, "and the reasons for his failure to
obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort."
And see Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.
S. 450;
Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S.
R. Co., 213 U. S. 435.
[
Footnote 3]
The Court in
Doctor v. Harrington, supra, at
196 U. S.
587,
"The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant may be
the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the
corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to
act in a way detrimental to his rights. In other words, his
interests, and the interests of the corporation, may be made
subservient to some illegal purpose. If a controversy hence arise,
and the other conditions of jurisdiction exist, it can be litigated
in a Federal court."
The complaint in that case charged fraud by a dominant director
and stockholder to his advantage and to the detriment of the
minority stockholders. The answer denied the fraud. The Court did
not stop, as the District Court did in the instant case, to inquire
if transactions complained of were colorable, or were sustained by
sound business judgment. After reviewing the earlier decisions, the
Court concluded, "The case at bar is brought within the doctrine of
those cases by the allegations of the bill."
Id., p,
196 U. S. 588.
The leading case cited by the Court was
Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U. S. 450,
where, in determining whether a proper case for a derivative action
had been made out, the Court looked
only to the nature of the
charges contained in the bill. Id., pp.
104 U. S.
461-462.
[
Footnote 4]
28 U.S.C. § 1359 provides:
"A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court."
Collusion is shown, for example, where the neglect or refusal of
the directors to take the desired action on the part of the
corporation is simulated, so that it may be made to appear that the
diversity of citizenship necessary for federal jurisdiction exists.
Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537;
Quincy v. Steel, 120 U. S. 241.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER join, dissenting.
The Court holds that, collusion aside, whenever a corporation
refuses to bring a suit and a derivative suit is brought by a
stockholder on its behalf, the corporation is always to be aligned
as a defendant for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.
The Court thus makes the exception the rule, and, by confounding
the requirements for establishing a substantive cause of action
with the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, it overturns a
half-century's precedents in this Court. The scope and significance
of this undoing cannot be appreciated without a brief review of the
history of the jurisdictional adjudications -- which control the
present cases -- and of the wholly different precedents
establishing the substantive rules that govern stockholders' suits
when there is unquestionable jurisdiction in the constitutional
sense. It will also be necessary to set forth generous portions of
the opinions of the Court in prior cases to demonstrate that not
only do they not support the Court's view, but that they are being
overturned by it.
The present cases involve the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, and that question alone. No aspect of the substantive cause
of action is before us. At the outset, two guiding principles
governing this litigation must be kept clearly in mind: (1) These
are constitutional cases, involving the "judicial power" of the
United States over
Page 354 U. S. 99
controversies "between citizens of different States." (2) These
are stockholders' suits; the stockholder sues not in his own right,
but in the right and on behalf of the corporation.
The contrasting difference between a stockholder's suit for his
corporation and a suit by him against it is crucial. In the former,
he has no claim of his own; he merely has a personal controversy
with his corporation regarding the business wisdom or legal basis
for the latter's assertion of a claim against third parties.
Whatever money or property is to be recovered would go to the
corporation, not a fraction of it to the stockholder. When such a
suit is entertained, the stockholder is, in effect, allowed to
conscript the corporation as a complainant on a claim that the
corporation, in the exercise of what it asserts to be its uncoerced
discretion, is unwilling to initiate. This is a wholly different
situation from that which arises when the corporation is charged
with invasion of the stockholder's independent right. Thus, for
instance, if a corporation rearranges the relationship of different
classes of security holders to the detriment of one class, a
stockholder in the disadvantaged class may proceed against the
corporation as a defendant to protect his own legal interest.
The basic principles of diversity jurisdiction, often stated,
obviously bear repeating:
"To sustain diversity jurisdiction, there must exist an
'actual,'
Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U. S.
32,
222 U. S. 36, 'substantial,'
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U. S.
77,
254 U. S. 81, controversy
between citizens of different states, all of whom on one side of
the controversy are citizens of different states from all parties
on the other side.
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3
Cranch 267. Diversity jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
federal courts by the parties' own
Page 354 U. S. 100
determination of who are plaintiffs and who defendants. It is
our duty, as it is that of the lower federal courts, to 'look
beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according to their
sides in the dispute.'
Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co.,
197 U. S.
178,
197 U. S. 180."
Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U. S.
63,
314 U. S.
69.
The initial and leading case dealing with the alignment of
parties for jurisdictional purposes in a stockholder's suit is
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579.
That was a suit by stockholders against two individuals alleged to
control the company in question and a third-party corporation.
Realigning the corporation as a plaintiff, the Circuit Court held
that there was no diversity, and it dismissed the bill for lack of
jurisdiction. This Court reversed. After stating that Equity Rule
94 (now Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
contemplated suits "brought by a stockholder in a corporation
founded on rights which may properly be asserted by the
corporation," the Court went on to indicate what must have been the
basis for aligning the corporation in that case as a defendant:
"And the decisions of this court establish that such a suit,
when between citizens of different States, involves a controversy
cognizable in a Circuit Court of the United States. The ultimate
interest of the corporation made defendant may be the same as that
of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the corporation may be under
a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a way detrimental
to his rights. In other words, his interests, and the interests of
the corporation, may be made subservient to some illegal purpose.
If a controversy hence arise, and the other conditions of
jurisdiction exist, it can be litigated in a Federal court."
196 U.S. at
196 U. S.
587.
Page 354 U. S. 101
The Court then went on to discuss these other "conditions of
jurisdiction,"
i.e., the complainants' compliance with the
substantive and procedural requirements of Equity Rule 94. In
refusing to realign, the Court did not state that mere refusal to
sue on the part of the corporation was a sufficient reason to align
the corporation as a defendant. The Court referred to
"antagonistic" control and the stockholder's "interests, and the
interests of the corporation" being made "subservient to some
illegal purpose."
This question of what constitutes "antagonistic" control is the
crux of the present cases. The District Court in No. 316, in the
course of its thorough opinion, stated:
"For a corporation to be 'in antagonistic hands,' . . . or to
have a 'hostile attitude,' . . . such as would permit alignment on
the side against its presumptive financial interests surely
requires more than a mere argument or difference of opinion between
the corporation and the suing stockholder as to the desirability of
bringing the suit. Patently, if difference of opinion were all the
'controversy' required to be shown between the stockholder and his
corporation in order to preclude alignment of the latter with the
plaintiff stockholder, then there can be no occasion for all the
pages of discussion of corporate domination or control, since every
stockholder's derivative suit is, by definition, predicated upon
the assumption that the corporation has refused to sue."
117 F.
Supp. 781, 802. This has been the view that this Court has
consistently taken since
Doctor v. Harrington. Three years
later,
Doctor v. Harrington was reaffirmed and its basis
made clear in
Venner v. Great Northern R. Co.,
209 U. S. 24. That
was a stockholder's suit brought in a state court
Page 354 U. S. 102
against the Great Northern Railroad and its President, James J.
Hill, with an allegation that the "railroad and its board of
directors were under his absolute control."
Id. at
209 U. S. 29.
Both defendants were citizens of the same State. They removed the
case into the federal court and the plaintiff, claiming that the
corporation should be realigned, sought remand to the state court
on the ground that the federal court lacked jurisdiction. The
Court, if such was its thought, obviously would have said
simpliciter that since, the corporation refused to sue,
the corporation must be aligned as a defendant. It did not do so.
The whole thought of Mr. Justice Moody's opinion is completely
contrary.
"Let it be assumed for the purposes of this decision that the
court may disregard the arrangement of parties made by the pleader,
and align them upon the side where their interest in and attitude
to the controversy really places them, and then may determine the
jurisdictional question in view of this alignment. [Citing the
In re Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, and other cases.]
If this rule should be applied, it would leave the parties here
where the pleader has arranged them. It would doubtless be for the
financial interests of the defendant railroad that the plaintiff
should prevail. But that is not enough. Both defendants unite, as
sufficiently appears by the petition and other proceedings, in
resisting the plaintiff's claim of illegality and fraud. They are
alleged to have engaged in the same illegal and fraudulent conduct,
and the injury is alleged to have been accomplished by their joint
action. The plaintiff's controversy is with both, and both are
rightfully and necessarily made defendants, and neither can, for
jurisdictional purposes, be regarded otherwise than as a defendant.
. . ."
Id. at
209 U. S.
31-32.
Page 354 U. S. 103
To make explicit the case's relation to the prior case of
Doctor v. Harrington, the Court continued:
"The case of Doctor v. Harrington is precisely in point on this
branch of the case, and is conclusive. In that case, the
plaintiffs, stockholders in a corporation, brought an action in the
circuit court against the corporation and Harrington, another
stockholder, 'who directed the management of the affairs of the
corporation, dictated its policy, and selected its directors.' It
was alleged that Harrington fraudulently caused the corporation to
make its promissory note without consideration, obtained a judgment
on the note, and sold, on execution, for much less than their real
value, the assets of the corporation to persons acting for his
benefit. On the face of the pleadings, there was the necessary
diversity of citizenship, but it was insisted that the corporation,
because its interest was the same as that of the plaintiff, should
be regarded as a plaintiff. The court below so aligned the
corporation defendant, and, as that destroyed the diversity of
citizenship, dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. This
court reversed the decree, saying (the quotation is of the part of
the Court's opinion in
Doctor, quoted
supra, p.
354 U.S. 100). There was
therefore in the case at bar the diversity of citizenship which
confers jurisdiction."
Id. at
209 U. S.
32-33.
The jurisdictional doctrine of
Doctor v. Harrington, as
reaffirmed and elaborated in
Venner v. Great Northern R.
Co., was accepted without question only ten years ago in
Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.
S. 518. The Court in that case summarized the
jurisdictional doctrine of alignment of parties in stockholders'
suits:
"The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the
court is not his own, but the corporation's.
Page 354 U. S. 104
It is the real party in interest, and he is allowed to act in
protection of its interest somewhat as a 'next friend' might do for
an individual, because it is disabled from protecting itself. If,
however, such a case as this were treated as other actions, the
federal court would realign the parties for jurisdictional purposes
according to their real interests. In this case, which is typical
of many, this would put [the corporation] on the plaintiff's side .
. . , and jurisdiction would be ousted.
Indianapolis v. Chase
National Bank, 314 U. S. 63. But jurisdiction is
saved in this class of cases by a special dispensation, because the
corporation is in antagonistic hands.
Doctor v.
Harrington, 196 U. S. 579."
Id. at
330 U. S.
522-523.
Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court throws further light
on what is meant by "antagonistic hands" by characterizing "the
real party in interest," the corporation, as "disabled from
protecting itself." That cannot mean anything else except what the
Venner case, quoting from
Doctor v. Harrington,
set forth as the reason for disablement,
viz., that the
very individuals who have a stranglehold over the corporation are
the people against whom suit is sought to be brought, and
therefore, in any sense that has any meaning, they are the
defendants for that reason. And it is not merely that the obvious
sense of the foregoing paragraph quoted from
Koster gives
the significance to
Doctor v. Harrington that
Venner gave it. That meaning is reinforced by the Court's
succeeding reference to a stockholder's interest in "bringing
faithless managers to book."
Id. at
330 U. S.
524.
In the District Court in No. 316,
Smith v. Sperling,
Judge Mathes made an exhaustive survey of all the precedents
relating to the jurisdictional test to be applied in stockholders'
suits,
117 F.
Supp. 781,
aff'd, 237 F.2d
Page 354 U. S. 105
317, and stated the jurisdictional test to be derived from the
cases as follows:
"If the corporation has suffered actionable wrong and is 'in
antagonistic hands' --
i.e., so dominated that it is
incapacitated to act in keeping with its own financial interests --
then a federal court should not, because of such disability, align
the corporation with the plaintiff stockholder in determining
whether diversity jurisdiction exists."
117 F. Supp. at 801. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit took the same view in No. 149,
Swanson v. Traer,
230 F.2d 228, 237.
The jurisdictional rules that the Court has laid down for over
half a century -- emerging from all the cases and not merely from
Doctor v. Harrington standing by itself -- do not
represent a capricious or formalistic determination as to when
there is or is not diversity jurisdiction. On the contrary, they
represent a true appreciation of the nature of the stockholder's
suit and a faithful application of well settled principles of
diversity jurisdiction: when a suit is brought that is, in fact and
in law, the corporation's, the corporation, from the nature of the
cause of action, is a plaintiff, and must appear among the
plaintiffs, except when the corporation is in fact the tool of the
very people against whom a judgment is sought. In the latter
circumstances, the corporation is merely a compendious name for the
controlling defendants who are hiding behind it.
The Court, purporting to interpret this half-century of
precedents, sweeps them away. In so doing, it greatly expands the
diversity jurisdiction. "Antagonism" is a difficult standard to
meet, and is a more unusual situation. Refusal to sue provides
automatic entry. Moreover, whenever the corporation and the real
defendants are of the same citizenship, there would be no diversity
jurisdiction
Page 354 U. S. 106
unless antagonism could be shown. No similar restriction on
jurisdiction is made because of possible nondiverseness of the
stockholder and the corporation defendant, because it is generally
not too difficult to find a nondiverse stockholder to institute
suit.
The Court professes to do no more than to apply well settled
precedents. But the well settled precedents that are applied have
absolutely "nothing to do with the case." The Court has found
support in the line of cases that deal solely with substantive
requirements or with the procedural rules for establishing
compliance with those requirements. These have nothing to do with
the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity
suits.
Prior to the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, there was only
very limited federal question jurisdiction in the District Courts.
See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 727-730. Moreover, diversity jurisdiction was established on
the basis of the alignment set forth in the pleadings.
In re
Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457,
100 U. S. 469.
If a corporation desiring to bring suit could not come within the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction, the only way its suit could
be tried in the federal courts, prior to the vast enlargement of
their jurisdiction by the Act of 1875, was by virtue of a suit
brought on its behalf by a stockholder of the requisite
citizenship. This was the procedure followed in the important case
of
Dodge v. Woolsey, the Court noting that any suspected
issue of contrivance should have been alleged and proved by the
defendant.
59 U. S. 18 How.
331,
59 U. S.
346.
The result of this practice was described by Mr. Justice Miller
for the Court in the leading case of
Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U. S. 450,
104 U. S.
452.
"Since the decision of this court in
Dodge v. Woolsey .
. . , the frequency with which the most ordinary
Page 354 U. S. 107
and usual chancery remedies are sought in the Federal courts by
a single stockholder of a corporation who possesses the requisite
citizenship, in cases where the corporation whose rights are to be
enforced cannot sue in those courts, seems to justify a
consideration of the grounds on which that case was decided, and of
the just limitations of the exercise of those principles."
"This practice has grown until the corporations created by the
laws of the States bring a large part of their controversies with
their neighbors and fellow citizens into the courts of the United
States for adjudication, instead of resorting to the State courts,
which are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum.
. . . A corporation having such a controversy, which it is foreseen
must end in litigation, and preferring for any reason whatever that
this litigation shall take place in a Federal court, in which it
can neither sue its real antagonist nor be sued by it, has recourse
to a holder of one of its shares, who is a citizen of another
State. This stockholder is called into consultation, and is told
that his corporation has rights which the directors refuse to
enforce or to protect. He instantly demands of them to do their
duty in this regard, which of course they fail or refuse to do, and
thereupon he discovers that he has two causes of action entitling
him to equitable relief in a court of chancery -- namely, one
against his own company . . . for refusing to do what he has
requested them to do and the other against the party which contests
the matter in controversy with that corporation. These two causes
of action he combines in an equity suit in the Circuit Court of the
United States, because he is a citizen of a different State, though
the real parties to the controversy
Page 354 U. S. 108
could have no standing in that court. . . . [T]he whole case is
prepared for hearing on the merits, the right of the stockholder to
a standing in equity receives but little attention, and the
overburdened courts of the United States have this additional
important litigation imposed upon them by a simulated and
conventional arrangement unauthorized by the facts of the case or
by the sound principles of equity jurisdiction."
Id. at
104 U. S.
452-453.
The Court in
Hawes v. Oakland was not concerned at all
with control of the corporation by allegedly wrongdoing directors
for purposes of aligning the parties. The Court was concerned with
imposition on the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in the
general run of stockholders' actions and, more particularly, in the
usual situation where the defendants would not be directors at all,
but third parties having nothing to do with the management of the
corporation.
The Court in
Hawes, therefore, announced restrictions
upon a stockholder's attempting to bring "a suit founded on a right
of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the
corporation itself is the appropriate plaintiff."
Id. at
104 U. S. 460.
Not only must a complainant show some
ultra vires or
fraudulent action by the directors, but he must also demonstrate
that he was a shareholder at the time of the transaction complained
of (or acquired shares thereafter by operation of law), that he has
made efforts to induce the desired action by the directors and, if
necessary, by the stockholders, and that
"the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the
United States jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise
have no cognizance. . . ."
Id. at
104 U. S. 461.
These rules were codified that Term in Equity Rule 94,
see
104 U.S. ix, now Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Their history and purpose indicate the character of
the
Page 354 U. S. 109
requirements laid down by the Court. They do not define the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Court; they are the allegations
in any event requisite to the Court's proceeding to consider the
case. In
Hawes itself, the Court, after finding that the
stockholder had not complied with the requisites for suit,
dismissed the action not for want of jurisdiction, but for want of
equity. The argument that compliance with the rule was a
jurisdictional requirement was made and rejected in
Venner v.
Great Northern R. Co., 209 U.S. at
209 U. S.
33-34:
"this argument overlooks the purpose and nature of the rule. . .
. Neither the rule nor the decision from which it was derived deals
with the question of the jurisdiction of the courts, but only
prescribes the manner in which the jurisdiction shall be
exercised."
Compliance with Rule 94 was the issue in
Delaware &
Hudson Co. v. Albany & S. R. Co., 213 U.
S. 435. In that case, the lower court certified to this
Court questions concerning maintenance of a stockholders' suit in
the face of failure to allege demand for relief upon the directors
and stockholders of the corporation. The Court held that such a
demand would have been futile in view of the control of the
defendant corporation by the other corporate defendant. It was
during the course of its discussion of the futility of making a
demand in such a situation that the Court stated what is relied
upon by the Court in the present case -- that the "attitude of the
directors need not be sinister. It may be sincere."
Id. at
213 U. S. 451.
Of course, the Court in that case was quite correct. But it was not
concerned with, or adverting to, jurisdictional alignment, any more
than it was talking about jurisdictional alignment in
Hawes, also now relied upon by the Court. Both cases
involved by the preliminary requirements for stating a cause of
action under the Rules. (For a similar discussion of what
stockholders must allege with respect to the attitude of directors,
but in a case where there was clearly
Page 354 U. S. 110
federal question jurisdiction,
see Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S.
318-323, and
297 U. S.
341-344.)
*
Further confusion is introduced by the fact that both problems
-- jurisdictional alignment and compliance with Rule 94 -- may be
present in the same case. This was true in
Doctor v.
Harrington, where the Court was not very careful in making
explicit separation of the two issues; it was also true of
Venner v. Great Northern R. Co., supra, where the Court
was very careful to separate the two issues. Such separation of
very different concepts is, of course, essential when one
characterizes the attitude of the directors. It is one thing when
suit is against a third party to hold that a demand on the
directors need not be made if such demand would for any reason be
futile, and that sincere opposition by directors would make such a
demand futile. It is quite something else to state that, since
sincere opposition is sufficient for that purpose, it is also
sufficient to demonstrate that the corporation is "disabled from
protecting itself," and should therefore be aligned as a defendant.
That, as we have seen, is factually false, and is contrary to what
this Court for 52 years has laid down as the controlling rules
governing diversity jurisdiction.
One final matter of general importance should be discussed
before applying the general principles adduced to the facts of the
present cases. The Court states:
"[T]he proper course is not to try out the issues presented by
the charges of wrongdoing, but to determine the issue of antagonism
on the face of the pleadings and by the nature of the
controversy."
Of course, the charges of wrongdoing need not be determined to
ascertain the jurisdiction of
Page 354 U. S. 111
the federal courts. What must be determined when directors or
other persons alleged to control the corporation are joined as
defendants is the relation of these people to the corporation. And
while, in certain cases, the issues may be determined from the face
of the pleadings, the courts are not so limited. The Court speaks
of making "a practical, not a mechanical, determination," but a
more mechanical determination could hardly be imagined. If anything
had been regarded as settled until today about federal
jurisdiction, it was that
"It is our duty, as it is that of the lower federal courts, to
'look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according to
their sides in the dispute.'
Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co.,
197 U. S.
178,
197 U. S. 180."
Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U. S.
63,
314 U. S. 69. Of
course, this may take time, and may not always be easy of
determination. I had not thought up to now that such considerations
should lead us to disregard our constitutional obligation, for, as
the District Court in No. 316 stated,
"It is more than costly error therefore -- it is an
unconstitutional invasion of the jurisdiction of the state courts
-- for a federal court to sustain federal jurisdiction of a civil
action between private persons where 'the matter in controversy'
exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 . . . but does not arise 'under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,' . . . and
diversity of citizenship as to 'the matter in controversy' does not
exist. U.S.Const., Art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1332. . . ."
117 F. Supp. at 808.
The proceedings in each of the present cases have followed
different paths. In No. 316,
Smith v. Sperling, the
District Court held a hearing to determine the presence of the
special circumstances that this Court's decisions indicated would
require alignment of the corporation as a defendant. It did not
find such circumstances, and, aligning the corporation as a
plaintiff, it dismissed the cause of action for lack of the
requisite diversity. 117
Page 354 U. S. 112
F.Supp. 781. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed this aspect of the case. 237 F.2d 317. I find no
justification for overturning the findings and conclusions of the
District Court, made after extended hearing and analysis and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. I would therefore affirm.
In No. 149,
Swanson v. Traer, the District Court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on the merits because it did not
appear that they had "laid a foundation sufficient to support a
derivative stockholders' suit." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that necessary
realignment of the corporation as a plaintiff destroyed diversity
and required dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction. 230
F.2d 228. Examining the pleadings, the position taken by the
corporation in the litigation, especially the affidavit and
statement by counsel for the corporation, the Court of Appeals
concluded that,
"in their business judgment, both the directors and Mr. Busch
[the corporation's counsel] were of the sincere opinion that the
filing of such a suit would not be for the best interests of the
corporation and its stockholders. The named plaintiffs disagreed.
This difference of opinion is not, of itself, evidence of
antagonism on the part of the Railway Company."
Id. at 237.
The court stated that the allegation of the complaint that
"several members" of the corporation's board of directors at the
time suit was filed had been a part of the alleged conspiracy was
insufficient to allege antagonism by a majority of the board. The
court was also impressed by a lengthy, detailed affidavit filed by
the corporation's counsel, retained after the transactions
complained of, who stated that he had reviewed the transaction
pursuant to the direction of the board of directors, and had
advised against suit. The facts relied on by the Court of Appeals
are not without weight in support of its conclusion. The
plaintiffs' general allegations, however,
Page 354 U. S. 113
imply hostility on the part of the whole board of directors,
and, in this state of the record, plaintiffs should have been given
an opportunity to substantiate their allegations at a hearing
before the District Court, as was the indicated course of
proceeding when the matter initially came before the District
Court. For this reason, I would remand the case for such a
hearing.
* The confusion between these two lines of cases -- the
jurisdictional alignment cases and the cases dealing with the
problems with which former Equity Rule 94 was concerned -- is fully
treated in the opinion of District Judge Mathes in No. 316.
See 117 F.
Supp. 781, 792-809.