In a proceeding instituted in 1950, a lawyer was disbarred by a
State Supreme Court in 1954 for forging a promissory note in 1935,
when he concededly was suffering from a degree of insanity which
resulted in his confinement in an insane asylum for several years
thereafter. After release from the asylum, he had practiced law for
six years without any charge of misconduct being brought against
him. Solely because of his disbarment by the State Court,
petitioner subsequently was disbarred by a Federal District Court
under a Rule providing for such action "[w]henever . . . any member
of its bar has been disbarred . . . from practice . . . in any
other court."
Held: the District Court erred in considering itself
conclusively bound by the state court disbarment, and the case is
remanded to the District Court for disposition on the merits under
its Rules, in accordance with the standards defined in
Selling
v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46, and
in this Court's opinion in this case. Pp.
354 U. S.
279-283.
(a) While a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of a
state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court
by the same route. P.
354 U. S.
281.
(b) Ample opportunity must be afforded to show cause why an
accused practitioner should not be disbarred, and an order of
disbarment by a state court is not conclusively binding on federal
courts. P.
354 U. S.
282.
(c) The "principles of right and justice" do not require a
federal court to enforce automatic disbarment of a lawyer 18 years
after he had uttered a forgery when concededly he was suffering
from some form of insanity. P.
354 U. S.
282.
228 F.2d 617 reversed and remanded.
Page 354 U. S. 279
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Because of petitioner's disbarment by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana struck him from its roll of attorneys, and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the order. 228
F.2d 617. The case raises an important question regarding
disbarment by a federal court on the basis of disbarment by a state
court, and so we granted certiorari. 351 U.S. 961.
A proceeding for disbarment of a lawyer is always painful. The
circumstances of this case make it puzzling as well as painful. The
facts are few and clear. It is undisputed that petitioner, in 1935,
forged a promissory note and collected its proceeds. Criminal
prosecution and action for disbarment were duly initiated, but both
were aborted because the petitioner was "suffering under an
exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity" at
the time of this behavior, to such a degree that he was committed
to an insane asylum and was under a decree of interdiction until
1948. Years after, criminal prosecution was unsuccessfully revived,
State v. Theard, 212 La. 1022, 34 So. 2d 248. The
disbarment proceedings, which led to the order in the federal court
now under review, got under way in 1950 ,and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, acting on the findings of a committee of the Louisiana
State Bar Association, overruled exceptions to the petition for
disbarment. In so doing, the court met the plea of insanity against
the claim
Page 354 U. S. 280
of misconduct with the statement that it did not "view the
mental deficiency of a lawyer at the time of his misconduct to be a
valid defense to his disbarment."
Louisiana State Bar Assn. v.
Theard, 222 La. 328, 334,
62 So. 2d
501, 503. The next year, "after issue had been joined," the
Supreme Court of Louisiana appointed a Commissioner to take
evidence and to report to that court his findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Commissioner did so, and reported to the
Supreme Court this fact that we deem vital to the issue before
us:
"It must then, from the record, be held that the respondent was
suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some
degree of insanity."
225 La. 98, 104, 105,
72 So. 2d
310, 312. The Commissioner deemed himself, however, bound by
"the law of the case" as announced by the Supreme Court in 222 La.
328, 334,
62 So. 2d
501, 503,
supra, according to which it was immaterial
to disbarment that the petitioner "was probably suffering from
amnesia and other mental deficiencies at the time of his misdeeds."
Ibid. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in its second
decision, approved the Commissioner's view about "the law of the
case" and added that, were the doctrine otherwise, it would not
change its previous ruling. 225 La. 98, 108,
72 So. 2d
310, 313.
The state proceedings thus establish that petitioner was
disbarred in 1954 for an action in 1935, although, at the time of
the fateful conduct, he was concededly in a condition of mental
irresponsibility so pronounced that for years he was in an insane
asylum under judicial restraint. The proceedings also establish
that, as an active practitioner for six years preceding disbarment,
after recovering his capacity, including the argument of thirty-six
cases before the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
for the Parish of Orleans, no charge of misconduct or impropriety
was brought against him.
Page 354 U. S. 281
It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for
review open to this Court, as recently canvassed in
Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252, and
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.
S. 232, to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments, and
we are not, in any event, sitting in review of the Louisiana
judgment. While a lawyer is admitted into a federal court by way of
a state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal
court by the same route. The two judicial systems of courts, the
state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the
present context, lawyers are included. The court's control over a
lawyer's professional life derives from his relation to the
responsibilities of a court. The matter was compendiously put by
Mr. Justice Cardozo, while Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals.
"'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions'
(
Matter of Rouss, [221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783]).
The appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for
something more than private gain. He became an officer of the
court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice."
People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-471,
162 N.E. 487, 489. The power of disbarment is necessary for the
protection of the public in order to strip a man of the implied
representation by courts that a man who is allowed to hold himself
out to practice before them is in "good standing" so to do.
The rules of the various federal courts, more particularly the
District Court which disbarred this petitioner, have provisions
substantially like the present Rule 8 of this Court, dealing with
disbarment.
"Where it is shown to the court that any member of its bar has
been disbarred from practice in any State, Territory, District,
Commonwealth, or Possession, or has been guilty of conduct
Page 354 U. S. 282
unbecoming a member of the bar of this court, he will be
forthwith suspended from practice before this court. He will
thereupon be afforded the opportunity to show good cause within
forty days why he should not be disbarred."
Disbarment being the very serious business that it is, ample
opportunity must be afforded to show cause why an accused
practitioner should not be disbarred. If the accusation rests on
disbarment by a state court, such determination, of course, brings
title deeds of high respect. But it is not conclusively binding on
the federal courts. The recognition that must be accorded such a
state judgment and the extent of the responsibility that remains in
the federal judiciary were authoritatively expounded in
Selling
v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46. The
short of it is that disbarment by federal courts does not
automatically flow from disbarment by state courts. Of the
conditions that qualify such a state court judgment, the one here
relevant is that some
"grave reason existed which should convince us that to allow the
natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would
conflict with the duty which rests upon us not to disbar except
upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and
justice, we were constrained so to do."
Id. at
243 U. S.
51.
We do not think that "the principles of right and justice"
require a federal court to enforce disbarment of a man eighteen
years after he had uttered a forgery when concededly he "was
suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some
degree of insanity." Neither considerations relating to "the law of
the case,"
cf. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.
S. 436,
225 U. S. 444,
nor the temptation to get bogged down in the quagmire of
controversy about the
M'Naghten rule require automatic
acceptance by a federal court of the state disbarment in the
circumstances of this case. The District Court apparently felt
itself
Page 354 U. S. 283
so bound. This we deem error. The case must therefore be
remanded to that court for disposition of the motion for disbarment
under that court's Rule 1(f) of its General Rules, in accordance
with the standards defined in
Selling v. Radford, supra,
and this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACK concur in the
result.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.