This is a stockholders' derivative suit brought in a Federal
District Court in Illinois on grounds of diversity of citizenship
by citizens of Nevada against an Illinois corporation, certain
individual citizens of Illinois, a Delaware corporation and an
Indiana corporation. The complaint alleged a conspiracy to defraud
the Illinois corporation through sales to it of certain properties
in which some of the directors were personally interested. It also
averred a demand on the directors to bring suit, their refusal to
do so, and the futility of making any demand on the stockholders.
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no such hostility to
the plaintiffs as to make the Illinois corporation "antagonistic"
to its stockholders, and it realigned that corporation as a party
plaintiff and affirmed dismissal of the suit on the ground that
there was no diversity jurisdiction.
Held: the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Pp.
354 U. S.
115-117.
(a) The management is definitely and distinctly opposed to the
institution of this litigation; it is therefore "antagonistic" to
the stockholders, and the corporation was properly made a
defendant.
Smith v. Sperling, ante, p.
354 U. S. 91. P.
354 U. S.
116.
(b) Whether the stockholders may sue on behalf of their
corporation is a question of local law on which the Court of
Appeals did not rule, and the case is remanded to it for
consideration of that question. Pp.
354 U. S.
116-117.
230 F.2d 228 reversed and remanded.
Page 354 U. S. 115
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, a companion case to No. 316,
Smith v. Sperling,
ante, p.
354 U. S. 91,
presents another aspect of the problem of realignment of parties in
a stockholders' derivative suit that is brought in the Federal
District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff
stockholders are citizens of Nevada and stockholders in the Chicago
North Shore & Milwaukee Ry. Co., an Illinois corporation. It
was made a defendant along with individuals, who are citizens of
Illinois, a Delaware corporation, and an Indiana corporation. The
complaint charged a conspiracy to defraud the Railway Co. The
alleged fraud consisted of a series of sales of transit properties
to the Railway Co., properties in which it is charged some of the
directors were personally interested. The complaint averred a
demand on the directors to bring suit, a refusal on their part, and
the futility of making any demand on the stockholders.
Answers were filed and motions made to dismiss. The District
Court dismissed the bill on the ground that no showing had been
made that the refusal of the management to act to redress the
alleged wrong was not a decision entrusted to the good faith
judgment of the directors. In other words, the District Court
concluded that the controversy did not fall within the exceptional
group of cases where the stockholder may dispute the management and
take the reins of corporate litigation in his own hands.
Page 354 U. S. 116
On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach that question.
Though it appeared from the record that the directors were opposed
to the bringing of the suit, the Court of Appeals concluded that
there was no such hostility to the plaintiffs as to make it
"antagonistic" within the meaning of the cases. It accordingly
realigned the corporation as a party plaintiff. Since there were
then Illinois citizens on each side of the litigation, the
requisite diversity was not present, and the orders dismissing the
bill were affirmed. 230 F.2d 228. The case is here on a writ of
certiorari. 352 U.S. 865.
For the reasons stated in
Smith v. Sperling, supra, we
think this case is an instance where the management -- for good
reasons or for bad -- is definitely and distinctly opposed to the
institution of this litigation. The management is therefore
antagonistic to the stockholders as that conception has been used
in the cases. It follows that the corporation was properly made a
defendant.
There remains for consideration the question ruled on by the
District Court, and which the Court of Appeals did not reach,
viz., whether this suit is of that exceptional character
which stockholders may bring.
As we stated in
Smith v. Sperling, ante, p.
354 U. S. 91, since
our decision in
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, the question whether in these diversity suits a
stockholder may sue on behalf of his corporation is governed by
local law.
See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U. S. 541,
337 U. S.
555-556. The classical description of those situations
is contained in
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.
S. 450,
104 U. S.
460:
"Some action or threatened action of the managing board of
directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the
authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of
organization;"
"Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by
the acting managers, in connection
Page 354 U. S. 117
with some other party, or among themselves, or with other
shareholders as will result in serious injury to the corporation,
or to the interests of the other shareholders;"
"Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are
acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the
corporation itself, or of the rights of the other
shareholders;"
"Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are
oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the
corporation, which is in violation of the rights of the other
shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a
court of equity."
Whether local law follows that definition or adopts another and
whether this case falls within the one provided by local law is a
question on which the Court of Appeals has not ruled. We therefore
remand the case to it for consideration of the question.
Reversed.
[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, joined by MR. JUSTICE
BURTON, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER,
see
ante, p.
354 U. S.
98.]