Petitioner, born in 1910 in the Philippine Islands, has resided
in the continental United States since 1930, when he was admitted
for permanent residence. He was convicted in February, 1951, of
violating the federal narcotics laws. After administrative
proceedings, he was ordered deported under the Act of February 18,
1931, as amended, which provides for the deportation of "any alien"
convicted of violating a federal narcotics law. Petitioner's
application for habeas corpus was denied by the Federal District
Court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: petitioner was deportable under the 1931 Act, and
the judgment is affirmed. Pp.
353 U. S.
428-433.
(a) Under § 14 of the Philippine Independence Act of 1934,
persons born in the Philippine Islands, and who thereby were
nationals of the United States, became aliens on July 4, 1946,
regardless of permanent residence in the continental United States
on that date. Pp.
353 U. S.
429-431.
(b) "Entry" from a foreign country was not a condition of
deportability in the 1931 Act.
Barber v. Gorzales,
347 U. S. 637,
distinguished. P.
353 U. S.
431.
(c) In the provision of the 1931 Act that deportation shall be
accomplished "in manner provided in sections 19 and 20" of the
Immigration Act of 1917, the reference to the "manner provided" in
those sections draws into the 1931 Act not the requirement of
"entry," but only the procedural steps for securing deportation set
forth in those sections. Pp.
353 U. S.
431-432.
(d) The requirement of "entry" cannot be said to be implicit in
the 1931 Act on the ground that the power to deport depends upon
the power to exclude, and the power to exclude did not extend to
Filipinos. Congress not only had, but exercised, the power to
exclude Filipinos in § 8(a)(1) of the Independence Act. Pp.
353 U. S.
432-433.
234 F.2d 904, affirmed.
Page 353 U. S. 428
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, born in 1910 in the Philippine Islands, has
lived in the continental United States since 1930, when he was
admitted for permanent residence. In February, 1951, he was
convicted upon a plea of guilty of violating the federal narcotics
laws. He was taken into custody in March, 1951, and, after
administrative proceedings, was ordered deported under the Act of
February 18, 1931, as amended, which provided for the deportation
of "any alien" convicted of violating a federal narcotics law.
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner applied to the District Court for the Western
District of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus and declaratory
relief from the order of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
deporting him to the Philippine
Page 353 U. S. 429
Islands. The District Court denied the petitioner's application,
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. [
Footnote 2] We granted certiorari.
[
Footnote 3]
The sole issue for decision is whether the petitioner is
deportable as an alien within the meaning of the 1931 Act. The
parties agree that the petitioner was a national of the United
States at birth and when he entered the continental United States
for permanent residence. Under the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Spain
ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. [
Footnote 4] Article IX of the Treaty provided
that " . . . [t]he civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants . . . shall be determined by the Congress." [
Footnote 5] Pursuant to that Article,
the Congress declared,
inter alia, in the Act of July 1,
1902, that Filipinos born in the Islands after 1899 were to ". . .
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States. . . ." [
Footnote 6] The Filipinos, as nationals, owed an
obligation of permanent allegiance to this country. [
Footnote 7]
Upon the proclamation of Philippine independence on July 4,
1946, [
Footnote 8] § 14 of the
Philippine Independence Act of 1934 became operative. Section 14
provided:
"Upon the final and complete withdrawal of American sovereignty
over the Philippine Islands, the
Page 353 U. S. 430
immigration laws of the United States (including all the
provisions thereof relating to persons ineligible to citizenship)
shall apply to persons who were born in the Philippine Islands to
the same extent as in the case of other foreign countries."
48 Stat. 464, 48 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 1244. The Court of Appeals
held that the petitioner lost his status as a national when the
United States relinquished its sovereignty over the Islands on July
4, 1946, and that this occurred regardless of his residence in the
continental United States on that date. [
Footnote 9]
The petitioner argues that his status as a national, acquired at
birth under the Treaty and the 1902 statute, bears such close
relationship to the constitutionally secured birthright of
citizenship acquired by the American-born that its divestiture
should rest only upon the most explicit expression of congressional
intention. In the Independence Act, the Congress granted full and
complete independence to the Islands, and necessarily severed the
obligation of permanent allegiance owed by Filipinos who were
nationals of the United States. Anything less than the severance of
the ties for all Filipinos, regardless of residence in or out of
the continental United States, would not have fulfilled our
longstanding national policy to grant independence to the
Philippine people.
See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,
324 U. S. 652,
324 U. S.
674-678,
324 U. S. 692.
Section 14 of the Independence Act, in clear language, applies "to
persons who were born in the Philippine Islands." This language
demonstrates, and we hold, as did the courts below, that persons
born in the Islands, and who thereby were nationals of the United
States
Page 353 U. S. 431
became aliens on July 4, 1946, regardless of permanent residence
in the continental United States on that date.
The petitioner contends that, because he was admitted for
permanent residence at the time the Islands were a territory of the
United States, he did not enter from a foreign country, and
therefore cannot be an alien within the purview of the 1931 Act. He
relies on
Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.
S. 637, where this Court held that a Filipino admitted
for permanent residence in 1930 was not deportable under § 19(a) of
the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien sentenced for certain
crimes "committed . . .
after entry." (Emphasis added.)
The word "entry" was held to be significant of a congressional
purpose to limit deportation under § 19(a) to aliens arriving "from
some foreign port or place," a description which did not fit a
territory belonging to the United States. But the 1931 Act differs
from the 1917 Act because it is silent as to whether "entry" from a
foreign country is a condition of deportability. By its terms, the
1931 Act applies to " . . . any alien . . . who, after . . .
[February 18, 1931], shall be convicted . . . " of a federal
narcotics offense. It follows that the holding in Gonzales is not
applicable.
The petitioner argues that the requirement of "entry," as
construed in
Gonzales, was incorporated into the 1931 Act
by the provision that deportation shall be accomplished "in manner
provided in sections 19 and 20" of the Immigration Act of 1917.
[
Footnote 10] We hold that
the reference
Page 353 U. S. 432
to the "manner provided" in those sections draws into the 1931
Act only the procedural steps for securing deportation set forth in
those sections.
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.
S. 585. The Congress adopted these procedures by
reference instead of spelling them out in the 1931 Act. [
Footnote 11]
The petitioner urges finally that the requirement of "entry" is
implicit in the 1931 Act. Citing
Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U. S. 698, he
argues that the bounds of the power to deport aliens are
circumscribed by the bounds of the power to exclude them, and that
the power to exclude extends only to "foreigners" and does not
embrace Filipinos admitted from the Islands when they were a
territory of the United States. It is true that Filipinos were not
excludable from the country under any general statute relating to
the exclusion of "aliens."
See Gonzales v. Williams,
192 U. S. 1,
192 U. S. 12-13;
Toyota v. United States, 268 U. S. 402,
268 U. S.
411.
But the fallacy in the petitioner's argument is the erroneous
assumption that Congress was without power to legislate the
exclusion of Filipinos in the same manner as "foreigners." This
Court has held that
". . . the power to acquire territory by treaty implies not only
the power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what
terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what
their status shall be. . . ."
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244,
182 U. S. 279.
[
Footnote 12] Congress not
only had, but exercised,
Page 353 U. S. 433
the power to exclude Filipinos in the provision of § 8(a)(1) of
the Independence Act, which, for the period from 1934 to 1946,
provided:
"For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, the
Immigration Act of 1924 (except section 13(c)), this section, and
all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration,
exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine
Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be
considered as if they were aliens. For such purposes, the
Philippine Islands shall be considered as a separate country and
shall have for each fiscal year a quota of fifty. . . ."
48 Stat. 462, 48 U.S.C. (1934 Ed.) § 1238.
The 1931 Act plainly covers the situation of the petitioner, who
was an alien, and who was convicted of a federal narcotics offense.
Cf. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy,
338 U. S. 521. We
therefore conclude that the petitioner was deportable as an alien
under that Act. The judgment is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The Act of February 18, 1931, as amended, provided:
". . . [A]ny alien (except an addict who is not a dealer in, or
peddler of, any of the narcotic drugs mentioned in this Act) who,
after . . . [February 18, 1931], shall be convicted for violation
of or conspiracy to violate any statute of the United States or of
any State, Territory, possession, or of the District of Columbia,
taxing, prohibiting, or regulating the manufacture, production,
compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving
away, importation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin,
marihuana, or any salt, derivative, or preparation of opium or coca
leaves, shall be taken into custody and deported in manner provided
in sections 19 and 20 of the Act of February 5, 1917, entitled 'An
Act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of
aliens in, the United States.'"
46 Stat. 1171, as amended, 54 Stat. 673, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) §
156a.
[
Footnote 2]
234 F.2d 904.
[
Footnote 3]
352 U.S. 906.
[
Footnote 4]
30 Stat. 1754.
[
Footnote 5]
Id. at 1759.
[
Footnote 6]
32 Stat. 691, 692;
compare 39 Stat. 545, 546.
[
Footnote 7]
Compare § 101 of the Nationality Act of 1940, which
defines the term "national" as follows:
"(a) The term 'national' means a person owing permanent
allegance to a state."
"(b) The term 'national of the United States' means . . . (2) a
person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes
permanent allegiance to the United States. It does not include an
alien."
54 Stat. 1137, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 501.
[
Footnote 8]
Presidental Proclamation No. 2695, 60 Stat. 1352, 11 Fed.Reg.
7517; Presidential Proclamation No. 2696, 60 Stat. 1353, 11
Fed.Reg. 7517.
[
Footnote 9]
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has consistently
followed this principle.
E.g., Resurreccion-Talavera v.
Barber, 231 F.2d 524;
Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d
398,
affirmed on other grounds, 347 U. S. 347 U.S.
637;
Mangaoang v. Boyd, 205 F.2d 553;
Cabebe v.
Acheson, 183 F.2d 795;
cf. Madrona Banez v. Boyd, 236
F.2d 934.
[
Footnote 10]
The "manner provided" in § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39
Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 155, was "upon the
warrant of the Attorney General." Section 20, 39 Stat. 890, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed., Supp. IV) § 156, related to ports to
which aliens are to be deported, costs of deportation and other
details. The Attorney General is required by that section to deport
"to the country specified by the alien, if it is willing to accept
him into its territory." In the administrative proceedings the
petitioner specified the Philippine Islands.
[
Footnote 11]
It is not contended that the procedures specified in §§ 19 and
20 were not followed in this case.
[
Footnote 12]
See Magoon, Reports (1902), 120:
"The inhabitants of the islands acquired by the United States
during the late war with Spain, not being citizens of the United
States, do not possess the right of free entry into the United
States. That right is appurtenant to citizenship. The rights of
immigration into the United States by the inhabitants of said
islands are no more than those of aliens of the same race coming
from foreign lands."
Illustrative of the scope of the congressional power is the
treatment afforded Puerto Ricans who were first nationals, 31 Stat.
77, 79, and who later became citizens, 39 Stat. 951, 953.
See
also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244,
182 U. S. 280,
as to the status of the inhabitants of other territories acquired
by the United States.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The act of February 18, 1931, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) § 156a,
provided for the deportation of "any alien" convicted of violating
a narcotic law after the date of the Act. Petitioner is a citizen
of the Philippines and is therefore an alien by virtue of the
Philippine Independence Act, 48 Stat. 456, c. 84, § 8; and he was
convicted of narcotics violation in 1951, which was after his
status had been changed from a national to an alien. If the 1931
Act is to be read literally, the deportation of this Filipino is
warranted.
Page 353 U. S. 434
But to read the Act literally is, I think, to miss its real
import.
First. In 1931, the only aliens here were those who had
made an "entry" into this country. The condition of "entry" seems,
herefore, necessarily implicit in the 1931 Act. Without that
condition the Act would have had no application whatsoever at the
time of its passage, for at that time every "alien" was a national
of another country who had "entered" here. While the Philippine
Independence Act later made Filipinos "aliens," that class of
"aliens" who were resident here at the time never made an "entry"
into this country. As
Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.
S. 637, holds, they were nationals to whom the concept
of "entry" was inapplicable.
Second. The 1931 Act provides that the offending alien
shall be deported "in [the] manner" provided in §§ 19 and 20 of the
1917 Act, 8 U.S.C. (1946 Ed.) §§ 155, 156. The words "in [the]
manner" are said to refer to the means for securing deportation
which, by § 19(a) of the 1917 Act, are described as "upon the
warrant of the Attorney General."
Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U. S. 585,
228 U. S. 591,
construed the language of an earlier deportation Act in that way.
It held that "in the manner provided" in that Act meant "the means
for securing deportation." Yet it is difficult for me to say that,
by that ruling, "in the manner" became words of art in legislative
drafting. The
Bugajewitz case involved a statute with a
very special legislative history. The words "in the manner
provided" had been substituted for "as provided." So it was
apparent that Congress, by the amendment, had narrowed the meaning.
There is no such special legislative history here. The words "in
the manner" seem to me to be synonymous in this setting with "as
provided" or "under the conditions of." And the condition of the
1917 Act most relevant here is a crime committed "after entry."
Page 353 U. S. 435
No matter how the case is viewed, the 1931 Act is applicable
only to aliens who had made an "entry" in this country.
This Filipino came to the United States in 1930 and he has never
left here. If the spirit of the 1931 Act is to be observed, he
should not be lumped with all other "aliens" who made an "entry."
The Filipino alien, who came here while he was a national, stands
in a class by himself and should remain there, until and unless
Congress extends these harsh deportation measures to his class.