1. When a labor organization engaged in multistate activities
takes on the role of an employer, it is an "employer" within the
meaning of § 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Act
applies to its operations the same as it would to those of any
other employer, and the National Labor Relations Board has the same
jurisdiction over labor disputes between such a labor organization
and its employees as it would have in the case of any other
employer. Pp.
353 U. S.
313-318.
2. In this case, the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction over
labor unions, as a class, when acting as employers was contrary to
the intent of Congress, was arbitrary, and was beyond the Board's
power. Pp.
353 U. S.
318-320.
98 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 235 F.2d 832, reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the attempt of the petitioner, Local 11 of
the Office Employes International Union, AFL-CIO, to represent for
collective bargaining purposes the office-clerical workers employed
at the Teamsters
Page 353 U. S. 314
Building in Portland, Oregon. These office-clerical employees
were engaged by the various local unions and affiliates of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America, AFL. Local 11 filed a series of unfair
labor practice complaints with respondent, National Labor Relations
Board, charging in substance that the Teamster group [
Footnote 1] had interfered with the Local's
effort to organize the office-clerical workers in violation of §
8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote 2] The primary question is whether, with
respect to their own employees, labor organizations are "employers"
within the meaning of § 2(2) of the Act. [
Footnote 3] Since we decide this question in the
affirmative, a subsidiary question is posed: whether the Board may,
by the application of general standards of classification, refuse
to assert any jurisdiction over
Page 353 U. S. 315
labor unions as a class when they act as employers. The Board
here refused to assert any jurisdiction, and the complaints were
dismissed. 113 N.L.R.B. 987. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 98
U.S.App.D.C. 335, 235 F.2d 832. The importance of the
jurisdictional questions involved caused us to grant certiorari in
the interest of the proper administration of the Act. 352 U.S. 906.
We believe the Board erred when it refused to take jurisdiction,
and thus, in effect, engrafted a blanket exemption upon the Act for
all labor unions as employers.
We shall not deal with the merits of the unfair labor practice
complaints. As to the jurisdictional question, the findings
indicate that there are 23 workers employed by the various Teamster
organizations at the Teamsters Building. They are paid by the
Teamster group which, excluding the Security Plan Office, forms "an
integral part of a multistate enterprise." [
Footnote 4] The trial examiner
Page 353 U. S. 316
concluded that the Teamster group came within the term
"employer" under § 2(2) of the Act. He further found that their
operation was well within the monetary jurisdictional standards set
by the Board in
Jonesboro Grain Drying Cooperative, 110
N.L.R.B. 481 (1954). While the Board agreed with the examiner's
interpretation of § 2(2) as to the term "employer," it held, by a
divided vote, [
Footnote 5]
that, since the Teamster group was composed of unions, all engaged
in a nonprofit business, the criteria applied to other nonprofit
employers should govern. It further concluded
"that labor organizations, which, when engaged in their primary
function of advancing employee welfare, are institutions unto
themselves within the framework of this country's economic
scheme,"
should not "be made subject to any of the standards originated
for business organizations." 113 N.L.R.B. at 991.
I
With regard to the jurisdiction of the Board, the wording of §
2(2) of the Act is clear and unambiguous. It says that the term
"employer" includes any labor organization "when acting as an
employer." It follows that, when a labor union takes on the role of
an employer, the Act applies to its operations just as it would to
any other employer. The Board itself recognized this fact as
early
Page 353 U. S. 317
as 1951, in
Air Line Pilots Association, 97 N.L.R.B.
929. There, the Air Line Pilots Association was found to be an
employer, and the Board ordered that an election be held to
determine the wishes of that union's own employees in regard to the
selection of appropriate employee bargaining units and a collective
bargaining representative. Section 9 of the Act [
Footnote 6] was therefore applied to the
union as an employer.
The legislative history of § 2(2) unequivocally supports our
conclusion. The Act, before its adoption in 1935, was considered by
both the 73d and 74th Congresses. [
Footnote 7] On each occasion, the bill went into committee
with labor unions excluded from the definition of an employer.
[
Footnote 8] Twice, the Senate
Committee to which it was referred amended it to include within the
category of an employer labor unions when dealing with their own
employees. The Committee inserted the words "other than when acting
as an employer" after the exclusion of labor organizations from the
definition of an employer. The Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, to which the bill was referred, stated in explanation of
this alteration:
"The reason for stating that 'employer' excludes '
any labor
organization, other than when acting as an employer' is this:
in one sense, every labor organization is an employer -- it hires
clerks, secretaries, and the like. In its relations with its own
employees, a labor organization ought to be treated as an employer,
and the bill so provides."
(Emphasis added.) S.Rep. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4.
Page 353 U. S. 318
The bill which became the Act in 1935, S.1958, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess., contained the identical language set forth in italics in the
above Senate Report. It is inescapable that the Board has
jurisdiction.
II
The question remains whether the Board may, nevertheless, refuse
to assert jurisdiction over labor unions, as a class, when acting
as employers. The Board, in the face of the clear expression of the
Congress to the contrary, has exempted labor unions when acting as
employers from the provisions of the Act. We believe that such an
arbitrary blanket exclusion of union employers as a class is beyond
the power of the Board. While it is true that
"the Board sometimes properly declines to [assert jurisdiction],
stating that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by
its assertion of jurisdiction
in that case,"
(emphasis supplied),
Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. &
Const. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675,
341 U. S. 684
(1951), here, the Board renounces jurisdiction over an entire
category of employers,
i.e., labor unions, a most
important segment of American industrial life. It reasons that
labor unions are nonprofit organizations. But, until this case, the
Board has never recognized such a blanket rule of exclusion over
all nonprofit employers. It has declined jurisdiction on an
ad
hoc basis over religious, educational, and eleemosynary
employers such as a university library, a symphony orchestra, a
research laboratory, and a church radio station. [
Footnote 9] When the Act was amended in 1947,
the Congress was aware of the Board's general practice of
Page 353 U. S. 319
excluding nonprofit organizations from the coverage of the Act
when these organizations were engaged in noncommercial activities.
[
Footnote 10] The House of
Representatives attempted to give these exclusions specific
legislative approval. [
Footnote
11] However, the Senate draft of the bill excluded only
hospital employers from the Act's coverage. The Senate version
became a part of the Act, and the language is the same as that
involved here. The joint committee report on which the final
enactment was based recited that the activities of nonprofit
employers or their employees had been considered as coming within
the Act only "in exceptional circumstances and in connection with
purely commercial activities." [
Footnote 12] To place labor unions in this category is
entirely unrealistic, for the very nature of the excluded nonprofit
employers is inherently different from that of labor unions, and
the reason for such exclusion has no applicability to union
activity such as that found here. This is particularly true when we
consider the pointed language of the Congress -- repeated in
Taft-Hartley in 1947 -- that unions shall not be excluded when
acting as employers. As the dissenting judge in the Court of
Appeals points out, "§ 2(2)'s strikingly particular reference to
labor unions sharply differentiates them from nonprofit
organizations generally. . . ." 98 U.S.App.D.C. at 337, 235 F.2d at
834. We do not, therefore, believe that it was within the Board's
discretion to remove unions as employers from the coverage of the
Act after Congress had specifically included them therein.
Page 353 U. S. 320
It is true that the dollar volume jurisdictional standards
adopted by the Board to govern its jurisdiction,
Hollow Tree
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950), exclude small employers
whose business does not sufficiently affect commerce. [
Footnote 13] But its exercise of
discretion in the local field does not give the Board the power to
decline jurisdiction over all employers in other fields. To do so
would but grant to the Board the congressional power of repeal.
See also Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S.
1,
353 U. S. 4
(1957), where the Court refused to pass "upon the validity of any
particular declination of jurisdiction by the Board or any set of
jurisdictional standards."
We therefore conclude that the Board's declination of
jurisdiction was contrary to the intent of Congress, was arbitrary,
and was beyond its power. The judgment is therefore reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for remand to the
Board for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page 353 U. S. 321
[
Footnote 1]
The complaints were leveled at the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and its representative, Teamster Local No. 206, Teamster
Local No. 223, the Teamsters' Joint Council of Drivers No. 37, the
Oregon Teamsters' Security Plan Office and its administrator, and
the Teamsters Building Association, Inc. The latter owns and
operates an office building in Portland, Oregon. The
office-clerical employees petitioner attempted to organize perform
services for the various teamster organizations here involved.
These organizations are the exclusive tenants of the building.
[
Footnote 2]
61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
[
Footnote 3]
61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), provides in pertinent
part:
"SEC. 2. When used in this Act --"
"
* * * *"
"(2)
The term 'employer' includes any person acting as
an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any corporation or association operating a
hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, or any person subject to the
Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or
any labor
organization (other than when acting as an employer), or
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization."
(Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 4]
The annual payment of initiation fees and taxes from members of
the Teamsters Union throughout the country to the International's
headquarters in Washington, D.C., amounts to more than $6,000,000.
The minimum monetary jurisdictional requirement for a multistate
enterprise such as the Teamsters, promulgated by the Board in
Jonesboro Grain Drying Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 481 (1954), is
$250,000.
The Security Plan Office administers 18 trust funds, and
receives contributions provided for by collective bargaining
agreements with some 2,000 employers located in four western
States. Some of the funds are invested in health and welfare
insurance policies on which over $2,000,000 per annum in premiums
is paid to a California insurance carrier. The minimum "direct
outflow" requirement established for jurisdictional purposes in
Jonesboro, supra, is $50,000. The California insurance
carrier remits 4% of the premiums to the Security Plan Office to
defray the expense of maintaining an office and processing and
paying claims under the health and welfare plan. The Security Plan
Office employed and paid at various times from five to ten of the
personnel at the Teamsters Building.
The Teamsters Building Association, Inc., is, as are the other
Teamsters, a nonprofit corporation. Its stock is held by six
Teamster locals, including Local 206, one of the defendants charged
with unfair labor practices in the complaint before the Board. The
Association's sole function is the ownership and maintenance of the
office building in Portland which is occupied by the various
Teamster organizations.
[
Footnote 5]
We treat the opinion of the Board, as did the Court of Appeals,
as being that of members Farmer and Peterson. While Mr. Murdock's
concurrence was on the "more limited grounds" that Congress never
intended labor unions to be employers with respect to their own
employees when engaged in union activities, he concurred in the
dismissal by Messrs. Farmer and Peterson. The other two members
dissented.
[
Footnote 6]
61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159.
[
Footnote 7]
S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 8]
"(2) The term 'employer' . . . shall not include . . . any labor
organization. . . ."
S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3. This bill, while receiving
committee approval as altered, was not enacted. When Senator Wagner
resubmitted the bill the next year, he did so in its original
form.
[
Footnote 9]
Trustees of Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951)
(library);
Philadelphia Orchestra Association, 97 N.L.R.B.
548 (1951) (orchestra);
Armour Research Foundation, 107
N.L.R.B. 1052 (1954) (laboratory); and
Lutheran Church,
Missouri Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954) (radio station).
[
Footnote 10]
H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32.
[
Footnote 11]
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. The exclusions would have
included
"any corporation, community chest, fund, or foundation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals."
[
Footnote 12]
See note 10
supra.
[
Footnote 13]
See also Hotel Association of St. Louis, 92 N.L.R.B.
1388 (1951), where the Board declined jurisdiction over hotel
employers. The Board's refusal was based on the local character of
the hotel business. The District Court for the District of Columbia
has held that such refusal is not arbitrary in
Hotel Employees
Local No. 255 v. Leedom, 147 F.
Supp. 306 (1957).
In
Checker Cab Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 683 (1954), the Board
declined jurisdiction of an action involving a purely local
employer operating two taxicab companies in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
See also Yellow Cab Company of California, 90 N.L.R.B.
1884 (1950);
Skyview Transportation Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1895
(1950); and
Brooklyn Cab Corp., 90 N.L.R.B. 1898 (1950).
In these cases, the declination of jurisdiction was based on the
local character of the operations. We indicate neither approval nor
disapproval of these jurisdictional declinations.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR.
JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN join, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I agree that labor organizations are "employers" under §2(2) of
the Act with respect to their own employees. I dissent, however,
from the Court's holding that the Board is without power to decline
to assert jurisdiction over labor unions as a class. I am of the
view that the Board has discretionary authority to decline to do so
when the Board determines, for proper reasons, that the policies of
the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction.
Cf. Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades
Council, 341 U. S. 675,
341 U. S. 684;
Hotel Association of St. Louis, 92 N.L.R.B. 1388,
aff'd, Hotel Employees Local No. 255 v.
Leedom, 147 F.
Supp. 306;
Checker Cab Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 683. However,
the declination to assert jurisdiction was rested upon the same
grounds relied upon by the Board in declining jurisdiction over
nonprofit organizations. These grounds, in my view, are not proper
reasons for declining to assert jurisdiction over labor
organizations. I would therefore remand the case to the Court of
Appeals for remand to the Board for reconsideration.