Fairlawn operates three meat markets in the vicinity of Akron,
Ohio. All of its sales are intrastate. Of its purchases, amounting
to about $900,000 in one year, about $100,000 come from out of the
State directly, and as much or more indirectly. After a labor union
had attempted unsuccessfully to organize Fairlawn's employees and
Fairlawn had refused to recognize the union as the bargaining agent
for its employees, the union picketed Fairlawn's stores and put
some secondary pressure on its suppliers. Upon Fairlawn's
complaint, an Ohio state court enjoined the union from picketing
Fairlawn, from trespassing on its premises, and from exerting
secondary pressure on its suppliers. No effort was made to invoke
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, but it is
assumed that the Board would have declined jurisdiction, and that
it had not ceded jurisdiction under § 10(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
Held: the labor dispute was within the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board, the state court was without
jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and the judgment is vacated.
Pp.
353 U. S.
22-25.
(a) Fairlawn's interstate purchases were not so negligible that
its business cannot be said to affect interstate commerce within
the meaning of § 2(7) of the National Labor Relations Act. P.
353 U. S.
22.
(b) Since the proviso to § 10 (a) of the National Labor
Relations Act operates to exclude state labor boards from disputes
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in
the absence of a cession agreement,
Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, ante, p.
353 U. S. 1, it must
also exclude state courts. P.
353
U.S. 23.
(c) Congress did not leave it to state labor agencies, to state
courts, or to this Court to decide how consistent with federal
policy state law must be. The power to make that decision in the
first instance was given to the National Labor Relations Board,
guided by the language of the proviso to § 10(a). Pp.
353 U.S. 23-24.
Page 353 U. S. 21
(d) Since the unitary judgment of the Ohio court as based on the
erroneous premise that it had power to reach the union's conduct in
its entirety, it is impossible to know whether its conclusion on
the mere act of trespass would have been the same outside of the
context of the union's other conduct. Pp.
353 U. S.
24-25.
164 Ohio St. 285, 130 N.E.2d 237, judgment vacated and cause
remanded.
Page 353 U. S. 22
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent operates three meat markets in the vicinity of Akron,
Ohio. All of its sales are intrastate, but, of its purchases in one
year totaling not quite $900,000, slightly more than $100,000 worth
came from outside Ohio directly, and as much or more indirectly.
Petitioner union, after an unsuccessful attempt to organize
respondent's employees, asked respondent for recognition as their
bargaining agent and for a union shop contract. When respondent
refused to enter into such a contract, the union picketed
respondent's stores and put some secondary pressure on its
suppliers. Upon respondent's complaint, the Court of Common Pleas
enjoined the union from picketing respondent, from trespassing upon
respondent's premises, and from exerting secondary pressure on the
suppliers. Petitioners objected throughout that the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board was exclusive. On appeal, the
Ohio Court of Appeals found that respondent's business was "purely
of a local character," and interstate commerce, therefore, was not
burdened or obstructed. The Court of Appeals held that the union's
picketing was unlawful according to Ohio policy, and it continued
in effect the injunction granted by the Court of Common Pleas.
[
Footnote 1] The Ohio Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal "for the reason that no debatable
constitutional question is involved." [
Footnote 2] We granted certiorari, 351 U.S. 922.
We do not agree that respondent's interstate purchases were so
negligible that its business cannot be said to affect interstate
commerce within the meaning of § 2(7) of the National Labor
Relations Act. [
Footnote 3]
Cf. 341 U. S.
Denver
Page 353 U. S. 23
Building & Construction Trades Council,
341 U. S. 675,
341 U. S.
683-685. In this case, unlike No. 280,
ante, p.
353 U. S. 1, and No.
50,
post, p.
353 U. S. 26, no
effort was made to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labor Board.
Although the extent of respondent's interstate activity seems
greater even than that in
Building Trades Council v. Kinard
Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933, we will assume that this is a
case where it was obvious that the Board would decline
jurisdiction. [
Footnote 4]
On this view of the case, our decision in
Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, ante, p.
353 U. S. 1,
controls. If the proviso to § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act operates to exclude state labor boards from disputes within the
National Board's jurisdiction in the absence of a cession
agreement, it must also exclude state courts.
See Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485,
346 U. S. 491.
The conduct here restrained -- an effort by a union not
representing a majority of his employees to compel an employer to
agree to a union shop contract -- is conduct of which the National
Act has taken hold. § 8(b)(2), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2).
Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra, teaches that, in such
circumstances, a State cannot afford a remedy parallel to that
provided by the Act.
It is urged in this case and its companions, however, that state
action should be permitted within the area of commerce which the
National Board has elected not to enter when such action is
consistent with the policy of the National Act. We stated our
belief in
Guss v. Utah
Page 353 U. S. 24
Labor Relations Board, ante, at pp.
353 U. S. 10-11,
that "Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity."
We add that Congress did not leave it to state labor agencies, to
state courts, or to this Court to decide how consistent with
federal policy state law must be. The power to make that decision
in the first instance was given to the Labor Board, guided by the
language of the proviso to § 10(a). This case is an excellent
example of one of the reasons why, it may be, Congress was specific
in its requirement of uniformity. Petitioners here contend that
respondent was guilty of what would be unfair labor practices under
the National Act, and that the outcome of proceedings before the
National Board would, for that reason, have been entirely different
from the outcome of the proceedings in the state courts. Without
expressing any opinion as to whether the record bears out its
factual contention, we note that the opinion of the Ohio Court of
Appeals takes no account of the alleged unfair labor practice
activity of the employer. Thus, it cannot be said with certainty
whether the state court's decree is consistent with the National
Act.
One final point remains to be considered. At two of respondent's
stores, located in suburban shopping centers, the picketing
occurred on land owned by or leased to respondent, though open to
the public for access to the stores. As one of the reasons for
finding the picketing unlawful, the Court of Appeals recited this
fact, and "trespassing upon plaintiff's property" is one of the
activities specifically enjoined. Whether a State may frame and
enforce an injunction aimed narrowly at a trespass of this sort is
a question that is not here. Here, the unitary judgment of the Ohio
court has based on the erroneous premise that it had power to reach
the union's conduct in its entirety. Whether its conclusion as to
the mere act of trespass would have been the same outside of the
context
Page 353 U. S. 25
of petitioner's other conduct we cannot know. The judgment
therefore is vacated, and the case remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BURTON, joined by MR.
JUSTICE CLARK,
see ante, p.
353 U. S. 12.
[
Footnote 1]
99 Ohio App. 517, 135 N.E.2d 689.
[
Footnote 2]
164 Ohio St. 285, 130 N.E.2d 237.
[
Footnote 3]
61 Stat. 138, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7).
[
Footnote 4]
The Board's current standards for asserting jurisdiction over
retail stores call for annual direct imports from out of state of
$1,000,000 or indirect imports of $2,000,000.
Hogue & Knott
Supermarkets, 110 N.L.R.B. 543. We leave aside the question
whether the presence of secondary pressure on respondent's
suppliers would have affected the Board's decision whether to take
jurisdiction.
