GRUNEWALD v. U.S., 352 U.S. 866 (1956)
Syllabus
U.S. Supreme Court
GRUNEWALD v. U.S. , 352 U.S. 866 (1956)352 U.S. 866
Henry W. GRUNEWALD, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 183.
Max HALPERIN, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 184.
Daniel A. BOLICH, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 186.
Supreme Court of the United States
October 15, 1956
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are granted limiting the questions to those enumerated below:
(a) No. 183:
'1. Whether a conviction of a
conspiracy to procure from the Fraud Bureau of the Internal Revenue
Department a decision not to prosecute a tax fraud, where the
object of the conspiracy had been accomplished by January, 1949,
and prosecution was barred under the statute of limitations by
January, 1952, may be sustained, on the theory that the conspiracy
must have included a continuing agreement to conceal-the indictment
having been found October 25, 1954, and the proof being that one or
more of the conspirators in March, 1952, attempted to cover their
tracks from investigators.
'2. Whether independent acts of
alleged conspirators, after the accomplishment of the object of the
conspiracy and done without the knowledge or the participation of
the petitioner Grunewald, may suffice to support a charge against
him that the original conspiracy included a continuing purpose to
conceal so that the conspiracy might be deemed to extend down to
the last act of concealment.
'3. Whether an alleged continuing
conspiracy to conceal could be found as to the petitioner
Grunewald, when he was concerned only with the original object of
the conspiracy and was acquitted by the Trial Court on three counts
of attempting to influence witnesses, which the Court charged the
jury could be acts of continuing concealment.
'4. Whether a purpose to continue to
conceal the accomplishment of the primary conspiracy may be
inferred from the fact that the conspirators would be pre-
sumed to know that their activities would always be open to investigation- whether a subordinate conspiracy to conceal may be implied from the original crime.
'5. Whether the Trial Court committed
error in permitting the jury to find a continuing conspiracy to
conceal from the fact that, more than three years after and object
of the conspiracy had been accomplished, the petitioner Grunewald,
when his secretary was subpoenaed before a grand jury, told her she
need not answer various questions and could say she forgot.
'6. Whether the Trial Court committed
error in permitting the defendant Halperin, the only witness for
the defense, to be cross-examined, for the purpose of impeaching
his credibility, on the fact that he had been, prior to the trial,
subpoenaed before a grand jury and had there claimed his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination on a long line
of questions. The constitutional privilege thus infringed is that
part of the Fifth Amendment which reads '... nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..."?
No. 184:
'1. When a defendant testifies in his
own defense at his trial, and his answers to questions show that,
although averring his innocence, he was justified in invoking the
Fifth Amendment with regard to like questions before a Grand
Jury-as in this case all agree-is not that defendant denied due
process when the Government on cross-examination brings out before
the trial jury, the fact that he refused to answer the questions
before the Grand Jury, upon such constitutional grounds?
'2. When a defendant has been
subpoenaed to testify before a Grand Jury in an investigation, of
which he is a primary target, has claimed his Constitutional
privilege, advised the Grand Jury that he was doing so as an
innocent man ensnared in suspicious circumstances and because he
could not cross-examine or be represented [352 U.S. 866 , 868]
Opinions
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 183. Max HALPERIN, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 184. Daniel A. BOLICH, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 186. Supreme Court of the United States October 15, 1956 Page 352 U.S. 866 , 866 The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are granted limiting the questions to those enumerated below: (a) No. 183:
U.S. Supreme Court
GRUNEWALD v. U.S. , 352 U.S. 866 (1956) 352 U.S. 866 Henry W. GRUNEWALD, petitioner,v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 183. Max HALPERIN, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 184. Daniel A. BOLICH, petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES of America.
No. 186. Supreme Court of the United States October 15, 1956 Page 352 U.S. 866 , 866 The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are granted limiting the questions to those enumerated below: (a) No. 183:
'1. Whether a conviction of a
conspiracy to procure from the Fraud Bureau of the Internal Revenue
Department a decision not to prosecute a tax fraud, where the
object of the conspiracy had been accomplished by January, 1949,
and prosecution was barred under the statute of limitations by
January, 1952, may be sustained, on the theory that the conspiracy
must have included a continuing agreement to conceal-the indictment
having been found October 25, 1954, and the proof being that one or
more of the conspirators in March, 1952, attempted to cover their
tracks from investigators.
'2. Whether independent acts of
alleged conspirators, after the accomplishment of the object of the
conspiracy and done without the knowledge or the participation of
the petitioner Grunewald, may suffice to support a charge against
him that the original conspiracy included a continuing purpose to
conceal so that the conspiracy might be deemed to extend down to
the last act of concealment.
'3. Whether an alleged continuing
conspiracy to conceal could be found as to the petitioner
Grunewald, when he was concerned only with the original object of
the conspiracy and was acquitted by the Trial Court on three counts
of attempting to influence witnesses, which the Court charged the
jury could be acts of continuing concealment.
'4. Whether a purpose to continue to
conceal the accomplishment of the primary conspiracy may be
inferred from the fact that the conspirators would be pre-
Page 352 U.S.
866 , 867
sumed to know that their activities would always be open to
investigation- whether a subordinate conspiracy to conceal may be
implied from the original crime.
'5. Whether the Trial Court committed
error in permitting the jury to find a continuing conspiracy to
conceal from the fact that, more than three years after and object
of the conspiracy had been accomplished, the petitioner Grunewald,
when his secretary was subpoenaed before a grand jury, told her she
need not answer various questions and could say she forgot.
'6. Whether the Trial Court committed
error in permitting the defendant Halperin, the only witness for
the defense, to be cross-examined, for the purpose of impeaching
his credibility, on the fact that he had been, prior to the trial,
subpoenaed before a grand jury and had there claimed his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination on a long line
of questions. The constitutional privilege thus infringed is that
part of the Fifth Amendment which reads '... nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..."?
No. 184:
'1. When a defendant testifies in his
own defense at his trial, and his answers to questions show that,
although averring his innocence, he was justified in invoking the
Fifth Amendment with regard to like questions before a Grand
Jury-as in this case all agree-is not that defendant denied due
process when the Government on cross-examination brings out before
the trial jury, the fact that he refused to answer the questions
before the Grand Jury, upon such constitutional grounds?
'2. When a defendant has been
subpoenaed to testify before a Grand Jury in an investigation, of
which he is a primary target, has claimed his Constitutional
privilege, advised the Grand Jury that he was doing so as an
innocent man ensnared in suspicious circumstances and because he
could not cross-examine or be represented
Page 352 U.S.
866 , 868
by counsel, may the trial court charge the jury that they, may
consider his refusal to testify before the Grand Jury on the score
of his credibility, although his trial testimony was entirely
consistent with his position before the Grand Jury?
'3. Under the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's appearance before a Grand Jury as set
forth in the last preceding paragraph, does not the Court's
instruction as aforesaid illegally impeach and impede the
defendant's statutory right to be a witness on his own
behalf?
'4. Does the rationale of Raffel v.
United States, 271
U.S. 494 [46 S. Ct. 566], apply to prior invocation of the
Fifth Amendment before a Grand Jury as distinguished from such
action at a prior trial?
'5. Does not the doctrine and
rationale of Slochower v. Board of Higher Education [350 U.S. 551], decided by
this Court April 9, 1956, compel the conclusion that a defendant
under the circumstances aforesaid, is denied due process of law
when he is examined by the Government and compelled to admit that
he refused to answer questions before the Grand Jury, and the Trial
Court advises the jury they may consider that refusal on the
subject of his credibility?
'6. Is not a defendant, particularly
one who asserted that he was invoking the Fifth Amendment as an
innocent man being plotted against and beset by suspicious
circumstances entitled to have the jury charged, 'An innocent man
may honestly claim his answers may tend to incriminate him'?
'8. Does not the opinion of the Court
of Appeals that the statute of limitations against conspiracy was
not tolled, in that certain overt acts of concealment when
committed were chargeable to the original conspiracy disregard and
deny effect to this Court's views on proof of subsidiary
concealment conspiracies, as set forth in Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S.
440 [] and Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 []?
Page 352 U.S.
866 , 869
'9. Does not the conclusion of the Court of Appeals herein that
a single conspiracy rather than a multiplicity of conspiracies are
disclosed by the record, run counter to this Court's decision in
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 []?'
No. 186:
'1. Whether the three year Statute of
Limitations, applicable to the charge of conspiracy, barred
conviction of the petitioner Bolich inasmuch as the objective of
the alleged conspiracy had been achieved by January, 1949-more than
five years before the date of the indictment which was filed on
October 25, 1954.
'2. Whether multiple conspiracies
were established by the evidence, rather than a single general
conspiracy, to the substantial prejudice of the rights of the
petitioner Bolich.
'6. Whether the trial Court committed
prejudicial error in permitting the government to elicit from the
defendant Halperin upon his cross- examination that he had invoked
the Fifth Amendment at a Grand Jury hearing and the trial Court
charged the jury that they might consider Halperin's claim of
constitutional privilege as adversely affecting his
credibility.'
A total of two hours will be allowed for argument on these
questions.
(b) No. 184:
'7. Does it constitute due process to
subpoena a person to testify before a Grand Jury in an
investigation of which he is a primary target, and thereby permit
an examination before trial of a de facto defendant?
'11. Does a lawyer who advises a
witness to plead the Fifth Amendment where the witness is justified
in doing so become guilty of corruptly endeavoring to influence the
witness merely because the interposition of the Constitutional
privilege might also serve to protect the person giving the
advice?'
Page 352 U.S.
866 , 870
A total of one hour will be allowed for argument on these
questions.
Messrs. Edward J. Bennett and Harold H. Corbin, for petitioner
grunewald.
Messrs. Henry G. Singer and Harry Silver, for petitioner
Halperin.
Messrs. Rudolph Stand and Frank Aranow, for petitioner
Bolich.
Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney,
Beatrice Rosenberg, and Mr. Richard J. Blanchard, for the United
States.
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