The United States alleged, by a petition presented to the
district Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana,
that by the treaty of cession of the late province of Louisiana,
the United States succeeded to all the antecedent rights of France
and Spain as they then were, in and over the province, the dominion
and possession thereof, including all lands which were not private
property, and that certain lots and vacant lands in front of the
City of New Orleans, which the petition asserted passed to the
United States by the cession, had by an ordinance of the city been
directed to be sold for the use of the city. The petition prayed
that the City of New Orleans should be perpetually enjoined from
selling the same or doing any other act which shall invade the
rightful dominion of the United States over the said land or their
possession of it. The City of New Orleans claimed the ground which
lies between the line of the front houses of the city and the River
Mississippi:
First, as having been left by the King of France as quays for
the use and benefit of the city.
Second, because if since the foundation of the city the space of
ground became wider than was necessary for the use of the city as
quays, it was occasioned by alluvial deposits in front of the city
in consequence of works erected by the inhabitants at the expense
of the city to advance the levee in front on the river.
Third, because by the laws of Spain, in force when the alluvions
were formed in front of the city, such formations belonged to the
inhabitants of the cities, who may dispose of the same as they may
think convenient, on their leaving what is necessary for the public
use.
The District Court of Louisiana ordered the perpetual injunction
as prayed, and that decree was reversed on appeal.
In order to dedicate property for public use in cities and towns
and other places, it is not essential that the right to use the
same shall be vested in a corporate body. It may exist in the
public, and have no other limitation than the wants of the
community at large.
The principles upon which the case of
City of
Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet. 431, and the case of
Barclay v.
Howell, 6 Pet. 498, were decided examined and
affirmed.
If buildings had been erected on lands within the space
dedicated for public use, or grants of part of the same have been
made by the power which had authority to make and had made a
dedication of the same to public use, the erection of the buildings
and the making of the grants would not be considered as disproving
the dedication, and the grants would not affect the vested rights
of the public.
The question is well settled at common law that the person whose
land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course
gradually by alluvial formations shall still hold the same
boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be
applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus
bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his
territory, and as he is also without remedy for his loss in this
way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain. This rule is no
less just when applied to public than to private rights.
It would be a dangerous doctrine to consider the issuing of a
grant as conclusive evidence of a right in the power which issued
it. On its face it is conclusive and
Page 35 U. S. 663
cannot be controverted, but if the thing granted was not in the
grantor, no right passes to the grantee.
On 3 March, 1825, the Attorney of the United States for the
Eastern District of Louisiana filed a petition in the district
court stating that the Mayor of the City of New Orleans, in
pursuance of an ordinance of the city council thereof to that
effect, had advertised for sale in lots the vacant land included
between Ursuline, levee, and Garrison Streets and the public road
in the City of New Orleans, and also the vacant land included
between the custom house, levee and Bienville streets, and the
public road in the same city.
That by the treaty of cession of the late province of Louisiana
to the United States, they succeeded to all the antecedent rights
of France and Spain, as they then were in and over the province,
the dominion and possession thereof, including all lands which were
not private property, and that the dominion and possession of the
vacant lands endeavored to be sold by the city council had, ever
since the discovery and occupation of the province by France,
remained vested in the sovereign, and had not at any time prior to
the date of the treaty been granted to the City of New Orleans.
"Wherefore, inasmuch as the said attempt of the said city
council to sell the lands as private property is an invasion of the
rightful dominion and possession of the United States in the
premises,"
the petition prays that the mayor, aldermen and inhabitants of
New Orleans may be summoned to appear and answer the petition, and
in the meanwhile that they may be inhibited by injunction from
proceeding further in the said attempt or from doing any act to
invade the rightful dominion and possession of the United States in
the said land, and that after due proceeding, the injunction be
made perpetual, and also for all other suitable and needful
relief.
The district judge ordered an injunction according to the prayer
of the petition. In December, 1827, the Corporation of New Orleans
filed an answer to the petition of the United States which, after
the usual reservations, denied all the material facts and
allegations in the petition; and positively denied that the
dominion and possession of the pretended vacant land, which the
respondents had offered to sell by an ordinance of the city
council
"was or did (at the time
Page 35 U. S. 664
of the treaty of cession to the United States) remain vested in
either the King of Spain or the sovereign of France, either as
vacant land or under any other denomination, and that the same
passed as such to the United States."
The answer prayed that the petition should be dismissed and the
injunction dissolved.
In December, 1829, the Corporation of New Orleans filed a
supplemental answer to the petition of the district attorney of the
United States in which they ask leave to add the following pleas to
those contained in their original answer. They say that the
inhabitants of the City of New Orleans are the true and lawful
proprietors of the property.
1. Because all the space of ground which exists between the
front line of the houses of the city and the River Mississippi was
left by the King of France, under the name of quays, for the use
and benefit of the said inhabitants, as appears by authentic copies
of the original plans of the foundation of the city.
2. Because if since the foundation of the City of New Orleans
the space became wider than was necessary for public use and for
the quays of the city, it was in consequence of an increase formed
by alluvion in the greatest part of the front of the city, and the
works which were successively made, from time immemorial, by the
inhabitants of the city at their expense, to the levee in front
thereof, to advance it nearer to the river than it was
formerly.
3. Because, by the laws of Spain which were in force at the time
the alluvions were formed and said works were made, alluvions
formed by rivers in front of cities belonged to the inhabitants
thereof, who may dispose of the same as they think convenient on
their leaving what is necessary for the public use.
Further, they say the vacant lots claimed in the petition are
worth the sum of at least sixty thousand dollars, of the property
and disposal of which the respondents cannot be deprived unless
they were previously indemnified therefor by the government of the
United States.
The United States, in December, 1830, filed a replication to
these pleas denying all the allegations contained in the answer,
and the supplemental answer to the petition.
The case was afterwards submitted to a jury, but on the jury's
not being able to agree, they were discharged by the court with the
consent of the parties. Afterwards, the trial by jury being waived
by consent, the case was submitted to the court upon statements
of
Page 35 U. S. 665
facts prepared by the parties, and on 18 June, 1831, the
district court made a decree in favor of the United States, being
of "opinion that the defendants had not exhibited sufficient
evidence to support their title to the premises in dispute," and
decreed that the injunction of the United States be made
perpetual.
The Corporation of New Orleans prosecuted an appeal to this
Court.
The statement of facts exhibited, as proved by the United
States, contained:
1. A reference to proceedings before the commissioners of the
United States, under the acts of Congress relating to the adjusting
of land claims in Louisiana, relative to certain claims of lands
within the property asserted to belong to the Corporation of New
Orleans, which claims had afterwards been confirmed by
Congress.
2. A grant for a part of the land to Francisco Loiteau. The
particulars of the claims, referred to in No. 1, and of the grant
to Loiteau, are stated in the opinion of the Court.
3. Evidence that on the ground the United States, in 1819,
erected a building for a custom house, in which the courts of the
United States are held; that previous to 1793, the Spanish
government had erected on part of the ground two buildings, one
used as a custom house at the time of the cession, the other as a
tobacco warehouse; that a portion of a brick house still existed on
the lot granted to Francisco Loiteau; that the corporation had
erected water works on part of the ground, which are rented to
individuals; barracks for the accommodation of the garrison of New
Orleans were placed on the ground by the French government in 1757,
which existed and were occupied at the time of the cession.
4. An act of Congress of 1812, granting to the City of New
Orleans a lot of ground in the city; an act of 3 March, 1822,
entitled "an act supplemental to an act entitled an act authorizing
the disposal of certain lots of ground in the City of New Orleans
and Town of Mobile," which was alleged to have been passed at the
instance of the Corporation of New Orleans.
5. A copy of proceedings before the commissioners of the United
States on certain claims of the Corporation of New Orleans relative
to part of the ground.
6. An ordinance of Don Alexander O'Reilly, dated 22 February
1770. This decree designates the city properties "of the City
Page 35 U. S. 666
of New Orleans," but does not include in the same the property
in controversy.
7. The mayor, aldermen and inhabitants derive a large revenue
from duties imposed on vessels and boats moored at the levee, in
front of the City of New Orleans. It amounted, during the year
1830, to $30,000. And a duty has always been collected by the
municipal authorities of New Orleans on vessels moored at the levee
since the promulgation of the ordinance of O'Reilly above referred
to.
On the part of the Corporation of New Orleans, the following
statement of facts, and also the documents annexed to the same,
were filed in the cause:
1. From time immemorial, both before and subsequently to the
cession of Louisiana to Spain, there has existed, for the
convenience of commerce, both in the towns of France and in those
of the French colonies situated on navigable streams or on the
seashore a vacant space between the first row of buildings and the
water's edge, which vacant space is generally termed a quay and is
destined for the reception of goods and merchandize imported or to
be exported. These quays are of various dimensions, regulated in
seaports by commercial operations and convenience and in those
situated on rivers both by the above considerations and by that of
the encroachments which the rivers may make on their banks.
2. Nevertheless the government or municipal authorities of those
places frequently permit buildings, intended for purposes of public
or private convenience, such as market houses, fountains, baths,
coffee houses, &c., to be erected on part of those quays.
3. Towns in the French colonies have never been incorporated
like those of the United States; they are founded in virtue of
orders emanating from the government or from the minister of the
marine and transmitted to the governors of the colonies, and their
administration was confided to intendants, who had authority to
enact the necessary police regulations.
4. The governors of colonies, on receiving these instructions,
issued their orders to the chief engineer of the colony, or, in
default of such officers, to a surveyor, to draft a plan of the
projected town. This engineer or surveyor drafted the plan and
signed it, with mention of the place and day, month, and year when
it was completed. This plan, thus signed and dated, was delivered
over to the governor,
Page 35 U. S. 667
and lots and squares were granted or sold out to individuals,
with reference to it.
5. The chief engineer was an officer of the royal corps of
engineers, and performed the duties both of military and civil
engineer.
6. For a number of years before the Revolution there has existed
in France an office attached to the navy department in which all
manuscript plans and maps of the French colonies or their cities,
forts, fortifications, &c., were deposited.
7. All the land on the banks of the Mississippi in Lower
Louisiana is alluvial. This river is subject to annual and
periodical rises, and unless its waters were confined within the
channel by strong embankments, they would overflow all the
adjoining land until they fell and retired within the bed of the
river -- that is to say, during about five or six months in each
year. But for these dykes, or levees as they are here called, the
construction and maintenance of which cost the inhabitants, who
are, and have always been, liable to the performance of this duty,
a great deal of money and labor, the whole country bordering on
this part of the Mississippi would be uninhabitable during the
spring and summer.
8. During this rise, the Mississippi is continually effecting
changes in its banks; it undermines them in the bends, and carrying
off the earth which it detaches, deposits it on the points, so that
in many parts of these bends, as soon as the waters fall and return
to their accustomed bed, the land on the margin, being deprived of
support, gives way, falls into the stream, disappears, and is
carried down by the current until it is united to the bank at some
lower part of the river.
9. For these reasons, it is an almost universal usage among
persons dwelling on the banks of the river to build their houses at
a sufficient distance from its margin to allow space for the
construction of new levees and to furnish new public roads without
being compelled to remove their houses and other buildings whenever
the levees and roads are carried off by the stream.
10. Under the French and Spanish governments, the vacant space
between the first row of buildings and the margin of the
Mississippi always existed; it never was divided into squares and
lots. The streets of the city have never been laid off or continued
from said row of houses to the river. It was only in 1818 that the
corporation caused the said streets to be prolonged as far as the
levee.
11. Under the Spanish government, there was, on this vacant
space, near the river, a wooden market house constructed by the
Page 35 U. S. 668
cabildo (council) between St. Anne and Dumaine Streets. This
building was demolished by the corporation and the present market
house constructed on the same spot.
There was also on this square and adjoining to the levee between
Dumaine and St. Philip Streets a wooden building belonging to Mr.
Arnaud Magnon, who had erected it in virtue of an authorization
from the Spanish governor. This same Magnon had, with the
permission of the cabildo, built, near the same spot and lower down
than his house, between the river and the levee and on an alluvion
then recently formed, a large shed or scaffold which he used as a
workshop, he being a shipbuilder.
There were also on this part of the bank, at the foot of the
levee in front of the public square, several small wooden cabins
which the cabildo had permitted individuals to erect there after
the fire of 1798, who were subject to the payment of a small annual
rent for the benefit of indigent orphan children. These huts were
destroyed after the cession of Louisiana to the United States and
at the instance of the corporation.
There were also on this vacant ground, under the Spanish
government, 1st, a wooden building between custom house and
Bienville Streets, which was used as a custom house; 2d, a large
storehouse, also of wood, near the said custom house, in which the
tobacco (of which the government had a monopoly) was stored. This
storehouse did not exist at the time the United States took
possession of the country. The custom house, which was in a very
bad condition, was abandoned at that time, and the United States
custom house was established, at the time of the cession, in a
small building situated on a portion of the ground occupied by the
old royal storehouses between Dumaine and St. Philip Streets.
12. Before the cession of this country to the United States,
this vacant space, throughout the whole extent of the front of the
city, was used by the public. It was at that time covered with
grass and weeds, and the horses and cattle of citizens were sent to
pasture upon it. Since the cession and since the increase of the
commercial business of the city, the vegetation has disappeared,
but the inhabitants of the city have, particularly since the
cession, continued to use the greater portion of this space for the
transportation, lading, and unlading of goods and as a place of
deposit for materials, &c. The streets running at right angles
to the river were prolonged by the corporation as far as the levee,
and this prolongation was executed and kept up at their expense. In
1818, they made, and have
Page 35 U. S. 669
since kept in repair at their own expense, a new street or high
road on that large open space at the foot of the levee and
throughout its whole extent.
13. Under the Spanish government, the inhabitants possessed the
commons all around the city, a part of which they appropriated to
various uses. Governor Carondelet, at the request of the cabildo,
caused a plan of it to be prepared by the surveyor general, Laveau
Trudeau, which was not finished until the year 1798, a copy of
which plan is annexed to the proceedings in this cause.
14. The levee in front of the city has always been made and kept
in repair by the inhabitants of New Orleans. In 1805, this levee
was generally, throughout its whole extent, three and a half feet
high, from fifteen to twenty feet broad at top, and widening
towards the basis.
15. Before the year 1815, this levee was undermined in many
places by the river, and threatened to fall in. In order to prevent
this accident, which would have compelled the corporation to make a
new one nearer the houses and consequently on the vacant space,
they caused, at their own expense, carpenter's work to a large
amount to be done in front of the levee, by means of which it was
put in the strong and solid state in which it now is. The point at
which this work was most required, and where most of it was
performed, was between St. Louis and Toulouse Streets, where the
soil on which the levee rested was so much undermined by the
current that the water sprung up through it in large quantities,
and the owners of the houses in that quarter feared that their
foundations would give way. The works above mentioned arrested the
progress of a danger which was so justly apprehended.
16. Since the taking possession of Louisiana by the United
States, an alluvion has been and is still continually forming in
the River Mississippi in front of the City of New Orleans,
particularly towards the upper end and lower extremities of the
city. These alluvial formations are exhibited, together with the
Streets made in 1818, in the plans drafted by Joseph Pelie, city
surveyor, and which are annexed to the record.
17. In consequence of works ordered by and performed at the
expense of the corporation, the levee in front of the city is now,
in the upper part of the city, one hundred and forty feet wide; in
the center of the city from sixty-six to eighty feet wide. These
augmentations have been made without encroaching on the vacant
space
Page 35 U. S. 670
between the street opened in 1818 and the water's edge on the
alluvial soil since formed on the outside of the levee.
18. Parts of this vacant space might be disposed of to
individuals without at all interfering with the public use of it or
with the loading or unloading of goods, the levee, as it now is,
being amply sufficient for all these purposes.
19. There are two copies of plans of the city annexed to the
record, the one made in 1724 by Mr. De Panger and signed by him,
the other made in 1728 by Mr. Nicholas Broutin, on both of which
the vacant space, the subject of the present controversy, is
designated by the name of "quay." The former of these plans is not
authenticated; the latter is authenticated according to all the
forms required in France for the authentication of copies of acts
or instruments in foreign countries. These two copies of plans are
taken from copies deposited among the archives of the city since
the end of the year 1819, and which Moreau Lislet, Esq., counselor
at law for the corporation, had caused to be obtained from the
office of plans and maps of the French colonies attached to the
department of the navy, and of French colonies. Nicholas Broutin
was the engineer of the King of France in Louisiana.
20. Authentic copies of various instruments by which lots
situated in front of the city were granted or sold under the French
government before the cession to Spain and in which they are
designated as situated on the quay or fronting the quay.
21. A plan which is found in the work of Pere Charlevoix, the
Jesuit, entitled "History of New France, with the historical
journal of a voyage, undertaken by order of the King, in North
America," published at Paris in the year 1724, in three volumes, in
quarto, vol. 2, 423, in which also, the vacant space, the subject
of the present controversy, is denominated a "quay."
22. The laws of France and of its colonies prevailed in
Louisiana from the first settlement of the colony until 25 November
of the year 1769, when Alexander O'Reilly, captain general,
invested with full powers for that purpose by the King of Spain,
abolished them and substituted in their stead the laws of Spain,
which were in force at the time this suit was instituted.
23. Three works, entitled "Histoire de St. Dominique, par Moreau
de St. Mary," in two volumes, in quarto; "Histoire de la Nouvelle
France, par le Pere Charlevoix," three volumes, in quarto; and
"History of Louisiana, by Francois Xavier Martin" in two
Page 35 U. S. 671
volumes, in octavo, are admitted to be works of accuracy and
authenticity, on the subjects of which they treat, and may be
referred to as evidence in this cause.
Page 35 U. S. 710
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 35 U. S. 711
Under a practice which is peculiar to Louisiana, the attorney of
the United States, on its behalf, presented a petition to the court
which represented that the mayor of the City of New Orleans, in
pursuance of an ordinance of the city council, had advertised for
sale, for a day then past, and was about to advertise anew for
sale, in lots, the vacant land included between Ursuline levee and
Garrison Streets and the public road in the City of New Orleans,
and also the vacant land included between Custom House Levee and
Bienville Street and the public road in the said city.
And the petitioner further stated that by the treaty of cession
of the late Province of Louisiana by the French Republic to the
United States of America, the United States succeeded to all the
antecedent rights of France and Spain, as they then were, in and
over the said province, the dominion and possession thereof,
including all lands which were not private property, and that the
dominion and possession of the said vacant lands ever since the
discovery and occupation of the said province by France remained
vested in the sovereign, and had not at any time prior to the date
of said treaty been granted by the sovereign to the city. And the
petitioner prayed for an injunction to restrain the city council
from selling the land or doing any other act which shall invade the
rightful dominion of the United States over said land or their
possession of it, and a perpetual injunction was prayed.
To this petition the mayor, aldermen, and inhabitants of the
city answered and denied the material facts and allegations in the
petition, and they specially denied that the dominion and
possession of the land, at the time Louisiana was ceded to the
United States, were vested in either the King of Spain or the
sovereign of France, either as vacant land or under any other
denomination.
And in a supplemental answer the respondents said that the
inhabitants of the City of New Orleans are the true and lawful
proprietors of the vacant lots they have been enjoined not to
sell.
"1. Because all the space of ground which exists between the
front line of the houses of the city and the River Mississippi was
left by the King of France, under the name of 'quays,' for the use
and benefit of the inhabitants of the city."
"2. Because if since the foundation of the City of New Orleans
said space of ground became wider than was necessary for the public
use and the quays of the city, it was in consequence of an increase
formed by alluvion in the greatest part of the front of the
Page 35 U. S. 712
city and the works which were necessarily made from time
immemorial by the inhabitants of the city, or at their expense, to
the levee in front thereof to advance it nearer to the river than
it was formerly."
"3. Because, by the laws of Spain which were in force at the
time when said alluvions were formed and said works were made,
alluvions formed by rivers in front of cities belonged to the
inhabitants thereof, who may dispose of the same as they think it
convenient on their leaving what is necessary to the public
use."
And the respondents said that the vacant lots are of great value
and cannot be disposed of unless they shall be indemnified by the
government, &c.
A general replication was filed by the district attorney in
behalf of the United States.
Statements of facts signed by the parties appear in the
record.
If this cause be considered on the broad ground on which it is
presented by the facts and the arguments of counsel, it is one of
great importance. In one view, the title to property of the value
of several millions of dollars depends upon its decision, and in
any aspect in which it may be considered, principles of the civil
law, and the usages and customs of the governments of France and
Spain, and also, it is insisted, important principles of the common
law as well as the effect of certain acts of our own government are
involved.
In the able arguments which have been heard at the bar, these
topics have been elaborately examined and variously illustrated,
and it now becomes the duty of the Court to pronounce their opinion
in the case. Being constituted the organ of that opinion, the
matters in controversy will be considered under the following
arrangement.
1. The rights of the plaintiffs in error, by the principles of
the common law.
2. Their rights under the laws and usages of France and
Spain.
3. The interest of the United States in the property claimed by
the city, and their jurisdiction over it.
That property may be dedicated to public use is a well
established principle of the common law. It is founded in public
convenience, and has been sanctioned by the experience of ages.
Indeed, without such a principle, it would be difficult if not
impracticable for society in a state of advanced civilization to
enjoy those advantages which
Page 35 U. S. 713
belong to its condition and which are essential to its
accommodation.
The importance of this principle may not always be appreciated,
but we are in a great degree dependent on it for our highways, the
streets of our cities and towns, and the grounds appropriated as
places of amusement or of public business, which are found in all
our towns, and especially in our populous cities.
It is not essential that this right of use should be vested in a
corporate body; it may exist in the public, and have no other
limitation than the wants of the community at large.
This Court had occasion to consider this doctrine in two
important and leading cases, which lately came before them, and
which are reported in 6 Peters. The first one was the
City of
Cincinnati v. Lessee of White.
In 1789, the original proprietors of Cincinnati designated, on
the plan of the town, the land between Front Street and the Ohio
River, as a common for the use and benefit of the town forever. A
few years afterwards, a claim was set up to this common by a person
who had procured a deed from the trustee in whom the fee of the
land was vested, and who had entered upon the common, and claimed
the right of possession. The proof of dedication being made out to
the satisfaction of the court, they sustained the rights claimed by
the city. At the time the plan of the city was adopted by the
proprietors and this ground was marked on the plat as a common,
they did not in fact possess the equitable title to the space
dedicated, but they shortly afterwards purchased the equitable
title, and it was held that under the purchase the prior dedication
was good.
In its opinion, the court refers to a great number of decisions
of this Court and others in this country and also of the highest
courts in England to sustain the principles upon which the decision
was founded. The doctrine is now so well settled and so generally
understood that it cannot be necessary to cite authorities in
support of it.
In the case of
Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, the same
principle was sanctioned as applicable to facts somewhat variant
from those which constituted the Cincinnati case.
In 1784, the representatives of William Penn, in whom the
proprietary right of Pennsylvania was vested, by their agent, laid
out the Town of Pittsburgh. The original plan of the town, the
court said,
"shows that it was laid out into lots, streets and alleys, from
the
Page 35 U. S. 714
junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela Rivers, extending up
the latter to Grant Street. With the exception of Water Street,
which lies along the bank of the Monongahela, all the streets and
alleys of the town were distinctly marked by the surveyor, and
their width laid down. Near the junction of the rivers, the space
between the southern line of the lots and the Monongahela River is
narrow, but it widens as the lots extend up the river."
"From the plan of the town it does not appear that any
artificial boundary, as the southern limit of Water Street, was
laid down. The name of the street is given and its northern
boundary, but the space to the south is left open to the river. All
the streets leading south terminate at Water Street, and no
indication is given in the plat, or in any part of the return of
the surveyor that it did not extend to the river, as it appears to
do by the face of the plat."
And the surveyor being dead, his declarations at the time of
making the survey, that Water Street should extend to the river,
were sanctioned as evidence, and it appearing that the convenience
of the town required the extension of this street to the river, and
there being no statement or line marked on the plat of the town as
opposed to it, and as the public for thirty years or more, in some
parts of the town, had thus used the street, and that property had
been bought and sold in reference to it, in this form: it was held
to be sufficient evidence of its having been dedicated to the
public. The street thus extended afforded a large and convenient
space for commercial purposes along the shore of the river, beyond
what was required for a street.
On 26 September, 1712, about thirty-eight years after Louisiana
had been taken possession of by Lasalle, in the name of the King of
France, a charter was granted by the King to Crozat, conferring on
him exclusive rights for commercial and other purposes, over a
great extent of country, which included the territory that now
forms the State of Louisiana.
The absolute property in fee simple was vested in him of all the
lands he should cultivate, with all buildings, &c., he taking
from the governor and intendant grants, which were to become void
on the land ceasing to be improved.
The laws, edicts, and ordinances of the realm and the custom of
Paris were extended to Louisiana. This charter was afterwards
surrendered by Crozat to the King, and a new one was granted on 6
September, 1717, to a corporation styled the Western
Page 35 U. S. 715
Company. The land, coasts, harbors, and islands in Louisiana,
were granted to this company, as they had been to Crozat, "it doing
faith and homage to the King and furnishing a Crown of gold, of the
weight of thirty marks, at each mutation of the sovereignty."
The power is given to this company to grant land allodially. And
under its auspices, the ground where the City of New Orleans now
stands was selected as a place for the principal settlement of the
province. A short time afterwards, the foundation of the city was
laid, by the construction of a few huts and other improvements. In
1724, and also in 1728, by the facts proved, it seems, maps of the
town were made, on which the vacant space, now in controversy, was
designated by the name of quay.
The Western Company continued to act under its charter until
January, 1732, when, with the King's leave, the charter was
surrendered, and a retrocession was made by the company of the
"property, lordships and jurisdiction of Louisiana."
The Town of New Orleans was established, and the plan, as
designated in the maps referred to, adopted, while the country was
under the jurisdiction of the Western Company, and the dedication
to public use of the vacant space in contest was made by it so far
as a dedication is shown by the plan and the endorsement of the
word quay upon it.
In the agreed facts, a quay is admitted to be a vacant space
between the first row of buildings and the water's edge, and is
used for the reception of goods and merchandize imported or to be
exported. In the Civil Code of Louisiana, a quay is said to be
"common property, to the use of which, all the inhabitants of a
city, and even strangers are entitled in common, such as the
streets and public walks."
The term is well understood in all commercial countries, and
whilst there may be some differences of opinion as to its
definition, there can be little or none in regard to the popular
and commercial signification of it. It designates a space of ground
appropriated to the public use -- such use as the convenience of
commerce requires.
This entire vacant space has been used for the purposes to which
it was appropriated, with but occasional and slight interruptions,
to small portions of it, from the establishment of the designation
of the quay in 1724, until the present time. The interruptions
referred to were not such as deprived the public of the proper use
of the ground. They were generally of a temporary nature, and were
permitted,
Page 35 U. S. 716
where private accommodation was in some degree connected with
the public convenience. Temporary shops and baths, which were
constructed upon this ground, were of this character.
The public established, at different times and for different
purposes, buildings of a more permanent description, but these were
rendered necessary for the public service, and they seem not to
have encroached to any injurious extent on the public use of the
quay.
Some of these buildings have long since disappeared, and any of
them which may still remain do not subject the city or the public
to any inconvenience.
The city authorities, at an early day, would scarcely be
expected to object to the construction of barracks on this space,
for the accommodation of the soldiers, which were there stationed
for the protection of the city. And much less would they be
expected to object to the use of the common for the occasional
performance of military evolutions.
The custom house and public warehouse, erected on this ground by
the Spanish government, have disappeared, and the construction of
the present custom house on the quay by the federal government in
1819 cannot be considered as affecting the original dedication.
It may be convenient for the city to have the custom house
situated on this ground, and it does not interrupt the public
use.
Two or three grants to small lots of ground within this common
were made under the Spanish authorities, but under the present head
of inquiry, it is unnecessary to examine whether these acts were
not the exercise of arbitrary power by the Spanish officers, and
being in derogation of vested rights, should not be held as
nullities.
If these titles were given in the exercise of a discretion,
still they would not go to abrogate a vested right, only to the
extent of the titles. But this question will be more particularly
examined hereafter.
Suppose, on the common at Cincinnati or on the vacant space
connected with Water Street at Pittsburgh, it had been proved that
the state had constructed a custom house or temporary barracks,
would such acts have been considered as disproving a dedication.
Clearly they would not, nor would grants for one or two lots within
either space, unadvisedly issued and in derogation of vested
rights, have been so considered.
The title to Penn and his heirs was allodial, and we have
seen
Page 35 U. S. 717
that the Western Company was authorized to make such titles.
Like the heirs of Penn, the Western Company was proprietor of a
great extent of territory, and the dedications were made under
circumstances somewhat similar, but the proof of dedication of the
common or quay at New Orleans, is incomparably stronger than was
found in the Pittsburgh case.
It appears that this quay has been greatly enlarged by the
alluvial formations of the Mississippi River, and from this fact an
argument is drawn against the right of use in the city, at least to
the extent asserted.
The history of the alluvial formations by the action of the
waters of this mighty river is interesting to the public, and still
more so to the riparian proprietors.
The question is well settled at common law that the person whose
land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course
gradually by alluvial formations shall still hold by the same
boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be
applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus
bounded is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his
territory, and as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he
cannot be held accountable for his gain.
This rule is no less just when applied to public than to private
rights. The case under consideration will illustrate the
principle.
If the dedication of this ground to public use be established by
the principles of the common law, is it not of the highest
importance that the accumulations of the vacant space by alluvial
formations should partake of the same character and be subject to
the same use as the soil to which it becomes united?
If this were not the case, by the continual deposits of the
Mississippi, the City of New Orleans would in the course of a few
years be cut off from the river, and its prosperity impaired. If
the city can claim the original dedication to the river, it has all
the rights and privileges of a riparian proprietor.
But there is another consideration of great weight on this
subject. It appears that the city, from time immemorial, has been
compelled to construct at great expense, and keep in repair, levees
which resist the waters of the river and preserve the city from
inundation. If it were not for these levees or embankments, it
appears from the facts proved that not only the City of New
Orleans, but the country, to a great extent, bordering on the lower
Mississippi, would be
Page 35 U. S. 718
uninhabitable. These works resist the current of the river;
eddies are formed, and the deposits rapidly accumulate. In this way
has the vacant space been greatly enlarged within twenty or thirty
years past.
This enlargement of the quay cannot defeat or impair the rights
of the city, and the question only remains to be answered whether
the facts in this case, by the principles of the common law, show a
dedication of this vacant space to public use.
No one can doubt that the answer must be in the affirmative.
The original dedication is proved by the maps in evidence, and
by a public use of more than a century. These facts are conclusive.
The right of the city is sanctioned by time and established by
uncontroverted facts.
No case of dedication to public use has been investigated by
this Court where the right has been so clearly established.
What effect the acts of the federal government, and the acts of
the corporation of the city may have upon this right, will be
considered in another branch of this case.
As the rights claimed by the city had their origin under the
laws of France and were enjoyed for nearly forty years under the
laws of Spain, it becomes necessary to examine those laws to
ascertain the nature and extent of these rights. On this ground,
the claims of the city have been earnestly and ably, if not
confidently, resisted in the argument. The laws of France and of
its colonies, it is admitted, prevailed in Louisiana from its first
settlement until 25 November, 1769, when they were abrogated by
O'Reilly, captain general under the King of Spain.
On the part of the defendants in error, it is contended that the
corporation of the city has no title whatever to the soil, or to
the use of the premises in question, and great reliance is placed
on a decision lately made by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the
case of
De Armas v. New Orleans. Two of the three learned
judges who compose that court lay down principles in their opinions
in that case which are inconsistent with the right asserted by the
city in this case, and it is insisted that this decision, which
disaffirmed the right set up by the city, is conclusive on this
Court.
So far as the present controversy may be supposed to arise under
the laws of the United States or the treaty of cession, it is clear
that the decision of the Louisiana court cannot be considered as
settling the question. In the argument on behalf of the
government,
Page 35 U. S. 719
the principle is laid down that by the laws of France, a city or
town could not acquire a right or title to the soil of immovables
or to the use of them without letters patent from the King. And
Domat, with other authorities, is referred to, who, in treating of
communities, declare as a primary rule that they should be
established for the public good, and by order or permission of the
prince.
By the third section in the statement of facts, it appears that
towns in the French colonies were never incorporated like those of
the United States; they are founded in virtue of orders emanating
from the government, or from the minister of marine, and
transmitted to the governors of the colonies, and their
administration was confided to intendants, who had authority to
enact the necessary public regulations.
It is insisted that no reasons are assigned why the law of
France was not complied with by issuing a grant if the dedication
of this common was in fact made. That the plan of the town may be
presumed to have been made, and the ground in contest designated,
as appears on the maps, for other purposes than those supposed by
the city authorities. That the maps were for a long time lost sight
of, and could not have been considered as evidence to supply the
place of a grant; had this been the case, they would have been
preserved with care. But the most conclusive argument against this
dedication is, it is said, that until the town was incorporated by
letters patent, it was incapable of taking by grant. And the
decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is referred to as
sustaining this doctrine.
Great respect is due to the opinions of the two learned judges
who made this decision, and especially on questions arising under
the civil law, with the principles of which they must be familiar.
Still it would seem that a ready answer may be found to at least
some of the objections stated by the counsel. In the first place,
the dedication of this common was made by the Western Company, who
had power to make grants, and ignorance of their rights, by the
inhabitants of the city, or of the necessary evidence to establish
them, affords no very satisfactory proof against the existence of
those rights. And if reasons can be assigned why this ground was
designated on the plat as a quay, which show that such endorsement
could not have been designed as a substitute for a grant, yet, in
the absence of satisfactory reasons, is it not fair to presume in
favor of a servitude which has been enjoyed by the city for more
than a century?
Page 35 U. S. 720
Whether the retrocession of Louisiana, its jurisdiction,
&c., by the Western Company to the King of France could affect
the rights previously granted by it may be hereafter
considered.
It is admitted that the power of the sovereign over the streets
of a city is limited. He cannot alien them, nor deprive the
inhabitants of their use, because such use is essential to the
enjoyment of urban property. And a distinction is drawn, in this
respect, between the streets of a city and other grounds dedicated
to public use. The latter, it is contended, is not only under the
supervision of the King as to its use, but he may sell and convey
it.
Now it would seem, in reason, that the principle is the same in
both cases. The inhabitants of a town cannot be deprived of their
streets, as the streets are essential to the enjoyment of their
property. In other words, by closing the streets, the value of the
buildings of the town would be greatly reduced, if not entirely
destroyed. And if ground dedicated to public use, which adds to the
beauty, the health, the convenience and the value of town property,
be arbitrarily appropriated by the sovereign to other purposes, is
not the value of the property, which has been bought and sold in
reference to it, greatly impaired? The value may not be reduced to
the same ruinous extent, as it would be to close the streets, but
the difference is only in the degree of the injury, and not in the
principle involved.
Domat, liv. 1, title 8, sec. 1, art. 1, says there are two kinds
of things destined to the common use of men, and of which everyone
has the enjoyment. The first are those which are so by nature, as
rivers, the sea and its shores. The second, which derive their
character from the destination given them by man, such as streets,
highways, churches, market houses, courthouses, and other public
places, and it belongs to those in whom the power of making laws
and regulations in such matters is vested, to select and mark out
the places which are to serve the public for these different
purposes.
But, it is said, if the dedication was made by the King, the
citizens of New Orleans or the public did not acquire a right
paramount to his. And that having a right to regulate the use, and
the fee never having been conveyed by him to the city, by grant or
otherwise, he must of course retain the power of disposing of the
property.
The right of the King to this property is compared to the right
of a city, which is vested with the fee and the use, and as in such
case the corporation may dispose of the property dedicated with
the
Page 35 U. S. 721
sanction of the sovereign power, the sovereign, it is contended,
having the right of property and the power to regulate the use, may
alien.
And it is said that this supervision of the use by the King was
a doctrine peculiarly applicable to Louisiana and the City of New
Orleans, where the changes are so frequent by the continual
formations on the shores of the Mississippi, in addition to
increase of population and business, which often require
alterations in the streets and other public places.
Though certain places may be dedicated to public purposes by the
supreme power, and may be said to be withdrawn from commerce, still
it is insisted where no grant has been made, and private rights
have not become vested in the property, it is not withdrawn from
the sovereign power.
This argument goes upon the fact that the title to the quay
remained in the King of France, which is a controverted point.
That the King, under the law of nations, was entitled to the
right of soil of Louisiana is not contested. The same rights
belonged to the sovereign of France in this respect as have been
accorded to other European sovereigns who made discoveries on this
continent, but the conclusion which is drawn from this, that as no
grant was given, the King had a right to alien the ground in
contest, the same as any other part of Louisiana, is not
admitted.
This argument in behalf of the power of the King of France over
the common is founded upon the supposition that the cession of the
country to the King by the Western Company destroyed the rights
which had become vested under it, and also that as no grant for the
land in contest has been proved, none can be presumed.
The doctrine of presumption is as fully recognized in the civil
as it is in the common law. It is a principle which no enlightened
tribunal, in the search of truth, and in applying facts to human
affairs, can disregard.
The retrocession of Louisiana to France by the Western Company
did not abrogate the rights which had been acquired under it. All
the grants to individuals made by the company were respected, and
there is no act by the French government, from the foundation of
the city to the transfer of the country in 1769 to Spain, which
shows that this dedication was not as much respected and sanctioned
by the King as were the grants to private citizens. Does not this
long acquiescence of the monarch and enjoyment of the property by
the city afford some evidence of right? But in addition to this
Page 35 U. S. 722
consideration, it appears in evidence that from the time the
plan of the city was adopted until the country was ceded to Spain,
numerous transfers of property were made in which the property is
described as being bounded by this quay, and also many official
transactions of public officers in which the quay is recognized and
referred to. This shows in what light this vacant space was
considered by the public for nearly fifty years after the
dedication was made, and it is not probable that this subject could
have been wholly overlooked by the King. The plan of the city
containing the designation of this quay was published by Charlevoix
in his Histoire de la Nouvelle France, and perhaps by Voltaire. It
is true that New Orleans contained at this time a very limited
population, but it is matter of history that not many years after
the foundation of the city was laid, the most splendid scheme of
commercial enterprise connected with banking operations was
projected in France in reference to Louisiana. So excited did the
public mind become on this subject and so generally was the public
attention directed to it that there is little probability the
dedication of this common could have escaped the notice of the King
of France. It was not, probably, deemed too large for the
accommodation of a city which was to become the emporium of a
country of such vast resources.
The public use of this common for so great a number of years,
and the general recognition of it from the time it was dedicated,
in numerous private and official transactions, and the acquiescence
of the French King, offered no unsatisfactory evidence of right. If
a grant from the King were necessary to confirm the claim of the
city, might it not be presumed under such circumstances?
But suppose the dedication had not been made by the Western
Company, and the title were admitted to be in the King, as decided
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana; is it clear that he had the
power to alien the ground at pleasure?
It cannot be insisted that the dedication of this property to
public use, whether the title to the thing dedicated became vested
in the city or its use only, could withdraw it from the political
jurisdiction of the sovereign power. This would place property of
this description on a higher and more sacred principle than private
property. But in no point of view can this be the case.
That a jurisdiction to a limited extent was exercised by the
King of France over the quays of Paris and the public grounds of
other cities in the Kingdom, such as permitting buildings to be
constructed
Page 35 U. S. 723
thereon and regulating the manner and extent of such occupancy,
is admitted, but this power seems to have been in the nature of a
police regulation, and was so exercised as was not incompatible
with the public use of the grounds. This authority, however, does
not prove that the fee or the right of use was not in the public or
that the King had power to convey the lands.
Domat says
"Rivers, their banks, highways, are public places which are for
the use of all according to the laws of the country. They belong to
no individual, and are out of commerce; the King only regulates the
use of them."
And again, in vol. 2, lib. 1, tit. 8, sec. 2, 3 and 16:
"We class public places as out of commerce; those which are for
the use of the inhabitants of a city or other place and in which no
individual can have any right of property, as the walls, ditches or
gates of a city, and public squares."
In Domat b. 1, tit. 8, sec. 2, art. 19, it is said:
"If it should happen that some buildings on a public square
should be constructed, they might either be demolished if they
should prove any way hurtful or inconvenient, or be suffered to
stand upon condition of their paying a rent, or making some other
amends to the public, if found to be more advantageous to let them
remain, either because they would be an ornament to a market place
or other public place or because of the rent they would yield or
other advantages that might be made of them."
Judge Martin, who dissented from the opinion of the superior
court in the case above cited, says,
"Of public places the public may claim the use by exhibiting
evidence of a dedication to its profit by the sovereign or
pater familias, without any letters patent, grant or
deed."
And
"of places which are alleged to be the exclusive property of the
town or city, or of which the exclusive right to use is claimed,
letters patent, a grant or deed must be produced."
The power of appropriating private property to public purposes
is an incident of sovereignty. And it may be that by the exercise
of this power under extraordinary emergencies, property which had
been dedicated to public use but the enjoyment of which was
principally limited to a local community might be taken for higher
and national purposes and disposed of on the same principles which
subject private property to be taken.
In a government of limited and specified powers like ours, such
a power can be exercised only in the mode provided by law; but in
an
Page 35 U. S. 724
arbitrary government, the will of the sovereign supersedes all
rule on the subject.
But it must be admitted that while the French laws and usages
may show the nature and extent of the right of the public to this
common, as it was originated and regulated by them for nearly half
a century, yet it is to the Spanish laws and usages we must chiefly
look in determining this head of the controversy.
From the abrogation of the French laws in Louisiana by O'Reilly
in 1769, until the country came into the possession of the United
States, the laws of Spain acted upon and governed the rights in
controversy. The retrocession of the country from Spain to France,
and the cession of France to the United States followed so soon
afterwards, that these transfers, it is admitted, caused no
interruption to the laws of Spain.
Louisiana was ceded by France to Spain without any abridgement
of the vested rights to property enjoyed by private individuals or
communities. The rights of the City of New Orleans were in no
respect affected by this cession, unless they have been affected by
the action of the Spanish laws, and we will now examine this
point.
The fundamental laws of the Spanish nation, and which are
understood to be alike binding on the King and the people, are
found in the Partidas and the Recopilacion.
The 9th law, tit. 20, of Partida 3, contains the following:
"The things which belong separately or [severally] to the
commons of cities or towns are fountains of water, the places where
the fairs or markets are held or where the city council meet, the
alluvions or sand deposits on the banks of rivers, and all the
other uncultivated lands immediately contiguous to the said cities,
and the race grounds and the forests and pastures, and all such
other places which are established for the common use."
The 23d law, tit. 32, of Partida 3, is as follows:
"No one ought to erect a house or other building or works in the
squares, nor on the commons
[exidos] nor in the roads
which belong to the commons of cities, towns or other places, for
as these things are left for the advantage or convenience and the
common use of all, no one ought to take possession of them or do or
erect any works there for his own particular benefit, and if anyone
contravenes this law, that which he does there must be pulled down
and destroyed; and if the corporation of the place where the works
are constructed chooses to retain them for their own use and not
pull them down, they may
Page 35 U. S. 725
do so, and they make use of the revenue they derive therefrom in
the same manner as any other revenues they possess, and we moreover
say that no man who has erected works in any of the above-mentioned
places can or shall acquire a right thereto by prescription."
In the Recopilacion, law 1, b. 4, tit. 15, is the following:
"Whereas, in our Kingdoms persons hold and possess some cities,
towns, villages, and civil and criminal jurisdiction without any
title from us or from the Kings our predecessors, and it has been
doubted whether the same could be acquired against us and our Crown
by any time, we do ordain and command that immemorial possession,
proved in the manner and under the conditions required by the law
of Toro, which is law the 1st, tit. 7, b. 5, of this Recopilacion,
be sufficient to acquire against us and our successors, any cities,
towns, villages, use or jurisdiction civil or criminal, and thing
or part thereof annexed or belonging thereto. Provided that the
time of said prescription be not interrupted by us or by our
command, naturally or civilly. But the supreme, civil or criminal
jurisdiction which Kings have, by their sovereignty and Kingly
power, which consists in exercising and having justice done, when
other lords and judges do not, we do ordain that this cannot be
acquired or prescribed by the said time or any other, and likewise
what the laws say cannot be acquired by time must be understood of
the imposts and tributes coming to or owing to us."
And again, Recopilacion, law 1, tit. 7, b. 5, is the following
law:
"We do ordain that the
mayorazgo [
mayorat of
the French, entail in English] may be proved by the instrument of
its institution, together with the written permission of the King
who authorized it, provided the said instruments are authenticated,
or by witnesses who testify in the form required by law to the
tenor of the same, and likewise by immemorial custom proved,
establishing that the former possessors have held and possessed the
property or
mayorazgo -- that is to say, that the eldest
legitimate sons and their descendants used to inherit said
property, as such, when the holder thereof left other son or sons,
without leaving them anything equivalent to what those who
succeeded to the
mayorazgo received, provided the
witnesses be of good reputation, and declare that they have seen it
thus for forty years, and heard their seniors say that they always
saw it, and never heard the contrary said, and that it a matter of
public voice,
Page 35 U. S. 726
notoriety and opinion, amongst the inhabitants or residents of
the place."
In the Novissima Recopilacion, b. 7, tit. 16, law 1, is the
following:
"Our pleasure and will is to preserve their rights, rents, and
property to our cities, towns, and places, and not to make any gift
of anything of them, wherefore we command that the gift or gifts
which we may make, or any part of them, to any person whatsoever,
are not valid."
A faithful observance of these laws would have preserved the
rights of the city as to the common free from invasion. No law was
cited in the argument which showed the power of the King of Spain
to alienate land which had been dedicated to the public use, and it
is clear that the exercise of such a power would have violated the
public law, which is understood to have limited the exercise of the
sovereign power in this respect.
The King of Spain, like the King of France, had the power to
give permission to construct buildings on grounds dedicated to
public use without injury to the public rights, but this does not
show that either sovereign had the power to alien such lands.
In the 3d Partida, law 3, tit. 32, the sovereign was authorized
to grant permission to build on public places. And the comment of
Rodriguez, 15 and 16, is that the building must be so constructed
that no one should be injured in his right thereby, because the
privileges granted by princes are understood to be granted without
prejudice to third persons.
On 22 February, 1770, O'Reilly, Governor of Louisiana, published
an ordinance in conformity to law "to designate city properties and
rents belonging to the City of New Orleans," and among other
regulations,
"six dollars were required to be paid by each boat of the
tonnage of two hundred tons, &c., for right of anchorage,
established and destined to the keeping in repair of the levee or
dyke, which does contain the river within its limits, in the whole
front of the city, &c."
This regulation was to continue during the pleasure of his
Majesty.
As power was given to the King of Spain by law to grant
permission to build on public places, it would seem to follow that
such places were not only withdrawn from commerce, but that the
King could not alien them. For if he had the power to do this in as
unlimited a manner as over the Crown lands, it would include the
exercise of every minor authority over them. If he could sell
and
Page 35 U. S. 727
convey the lands dedicated to public use, surely he might,
without any authority of law, grant permission to build on such
lands.
But as it appears from the evidence in the case that permission
was not only given to construct buildings on this common, but that
a part of it was granted in fee, it is contended that this is
evidence of the King's power not only to regulate the use of this
common, but to convey it in fee. And the leading case of
Arredondo, 6
Pet. 691, is referred to as sanctioning the principle that a grant
issued by a Spanish functionary is not only evidence of title, but
also that the officer had the power to issue it.
In that case, this Court did hold, and the same principle has
been sanctioned in numerous cases since, that a grant should be
considered as
prima facie evidence that it was rightfully
issued, but that it might be impeached by anyone who set up an
adverse claim.
We will examine the grants made, under Spanish authority, to any
part of this common and other acts of jurisdiction over it
exercised by the government of Spain which have been proved by the
evidence.
On 14 June, 1792, Carondelet, Governor, Intendant, &c.,
granted to Liotaud a lot of ground situated within this common, and
in the grant he says, "making use of the power which the King has
vested in us, we grant in his royal name," &c.
And on 10 August, 1795, another grant was made of a lot in the
common to Mentzinger by the same governor.
In 1793, Arnaud Magnon, a master carpenter, represented by
petition to the governor and intendant general that he had built a
barge for the public, and as a compensation therefor he asked
eighteen or nineteen feet on one side of his house to enlarge it,
the same being very small, and that the same was granted to him,
but that he had no instrument of writing as evidence of the same,
and which he solicits.
And he also represented to the intendant general that, his
dwelling house having been included in the conflagration of 1788,
that governor Miro permitted him to construct a small house near
the river "on the inner side of its dyke," and in consequence of
this misfortune and his having built a barge, &c., a small
portion of land of eighteen to nineteen feet adjoining his house
had been granted to him. That he was afterwards allowed to build a
shed for the convenience of ship buildings, &c., and he prays
that a title may be granted to him for the lot.
Page 35 U. S. 728
This petition was submitted to the attorney general, who
reported that it appeared to him "it would be an act of injustice
to refuse the petitioner the corresponding titles of property that
he solicits," for
"although the council of this city might have some objection, on
account of the said lot's being situated within its precincts, this
opposition may be easily overcome by the certainty that if Magnon
did not occupy the said lot, it would be necessary that another
should occupy it, owing to the necessity and usefulness of said
ship yard to the public."
It does not appear that this claim was ever carried into grant
by the Spanish authorities.
In 1783, on the petition of Etienne Planche, who represented
himself to be a carpenter and caulker, and having much work which
he could not do in his yard &c., he asked permission to build a
shed in front of his house, which was not to be closed, &c.
This leave was given, and he and those claiming under him occupied
the ground for many years, but no grant was ever obtained from the
Spanish governor for the lot.
Catharine Gonzales, widow of Bertrand, set up a claim, and it
appears that on the petition of her former husband he was permitted
to rebuild his house on the common, which had fallen into decay,
which was allowed by the governor, &c. But no grant was ever
issued by the Spanish authority for this lot.
These permissions to build were given by the governor and
intendant under the law, which has been cited, that authorized the
sovereign to grant permission to construct buildings on the public
grounds.
This was not considered inconsistent with the public use, as the
power was not to be exercised to the prejudice of third
parties.
The three lots for which grants were issued, it must be admitted
under the circumstances, is such a final disposition of the
property as it wholly incompatible with the public right. For the
fee of these lots was not only granted, but also the use.
This transfer of the fee, it is contended, affords conclusive
evidence that the title to the common remained in the King, and
having, in addition to this, the power to regulate its use, he
could alien it at pleasure.
If this power was possessed by the King, why was the authority
given, in the law which has been stated, to grant permission to
construct buildings on public grounds? This power, as appears
from
Page 35 U. S. 729
the record, was exercised over the common in controversy, and
only in three instances were lots granted absolutely. In the case
New Orleans v. Bermudez, decided by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, 3 Martin 309, the court said,
"However contradictory these expressions may appear to be, the
worst conclusion which can be drawn therefrom against the City of
New Orleans is that they had not that kind of possession which is
the consequence of an absolute right of ownership. Yet the
sovereign having never thought fit to exercise any further right
over these commons, and the claim of the city to them having been
recognized and confirmed by the successor of that sovereign, the
inhabitants of New Orleans must be considered as having never
ceased to be the rightful possessors of that land,"
&c.
And in the same book, 303, the court said,
"In the year 1795, the Baron Carondelet, then Governor of
Louisiana for the King of Spain, granted to Henry Mentzinger, the
appellee, a lot of ground, situated in the City of New Orleans,
close to the levee. . . ."
"But the appellants contend that the spot on which it is located
is part of the public highway, and therefore could not have been
lawfully granted for private use even by the King himself."
"That public places, such as roads and streets, cannot be
appropriated to private uses is one of those principles of public
law which required not the support of must argument. Nor is there
any doubt that if, by a stretch of arbitrary power, the preceding
government had given away such places to individuals, such grants
might be declared void."
"But is this grant located in a street, or on the public road?
On this important question of fact, the evidence, produced by the
appellant is 'by no means satisfactory.' They show that according
to general usage in this country, the public road in front of the
river is close to the levee. But could there be no derogation from
that usage? Was that usage observed within the City of New Orleans?
Does not the convenience of placing markets and other public places
as near the water as possible, as it is recommended by the law of
the Indies, make it necessary to deviate from such usages in
cities?"
"General usage, however, is the only ground on which the
appellants rest their pretensions. No plan of the city has been
exhibited, to show that the lot of the appellee is located upon a
place which had been reserved for public use; no testimony has been
adduced to prove that this spot is part of the ground laid out for
the
Page 35 U. S. 730
public road. We are called upon to declare this grant void
merely because the general usage of the country is to place the
road next the levee."
From this opinion it would seem that if there had been
satisfactory proof before the court that the ground in controversy
had been appropriated to public use, the decision, instead of being
favorable to the grantee, would have been against him.
There can be no difference in principle between ground dedicated
as a quay to public use and the streets and alleys of a town, and
as to the streets, it may be asked, whether the King could
rightfully have granted them. This will not be pretended by anyone.
And it is believed that the public right to a common is equally
beyond the power of the sovereign to grant unless he dispose of it
under the power to appropriate property to the national use, and
then compensation must be paid.
The grant to Liotaud was also contested by the city authorities;
but it was decided against them on a ground which did not embrace
the merits of the claim, on the part of the city, as now
presented.
In speaking of this case, Mr. Justice Martin, in his able and
learned opinion in the case of
De Armas v. New Orleans,
says:
"In
Liotaud's Case, the then plaintiffs labored under
the inability to establish the appropriation to the public use by
the founder of the City of New Orleans of the space which separates
the first row of houses from the Mississippi."
"The appellants stated their ability to establish that
immediately after the grant; murmurs had been excited, and the
inalienability of any part of the space having been tenaciously
insisted on, the governor had revoked his grant and indemnified the
grantee by the concession of the lot on one of the streets, but the
court decided the testimony was inadmissible, and the witnesses
were not heard."
"Magnon," the same judge remarks,
"was a shipbuilder, and the shipyard was between the levee and
the water. The governor, deeming the builder's residence near it
necessary to the public service, allotted him a space of ground to
live on near the yard, but on the opposite side of the levee. The
question arising out of this grant was not litigated, the city
agreeing to compensate Magnon for the relinquishment of his
claim."
This lot, however, though a part of the ground alleged to have
been dedicated to public use, is not within the common or quay
contested in this case.
And it appears from the above opinion that to prevent any other
titles' being made for any part of the common, certain
proceedings
Page 35 U. S. 731
were instituted by the attorney general at the instance of the
city authorities which prevented the emanation of any other grants
for any part of the quay until the country was ceded to the United
States.
From a careful examination of the jurisdiction exercised over
this common by the governments of France and Spain, and the laws
which regulated this description of property in both countries, the
conclusion seems not to be authorized that it was considered as a
part of the public domain or Crown lands, which the King could sell
and convey. This power was not exercised by the King of France, and
the exercise of the power by the Spanish governor in the instances
stated was in violation of the laws of Spain, and equally against
its usages.
The land, having been dedicated to public use, was withdrawn
from commerce, and so long as it continued to be thus used, could
not become the property of any individual. So careful was the King
of Spain to guard against the alienation of property which had been
dedicated to public use that in a law cited, all such conveyances
are declared to be void.
It would be a dangerous doctrine to consider the issuing of a
grant as conclusive evidence of right in the power which issued it.
On its face, it is conclusive and cannot be controverted, but if
the thing granted was not in the grantor, no right passes to the
grantee. A grant has been frequently issued by the United States
for land which had been previously granted, and the second grant
has been held to be inoperative. And in a case recently decided by
this Court, where the government had granted land in the State of
Ohio as land belonging to the United States which was found to be
within the Virginia reservation in that state to satisfy certain
military claims, it was held that the title did not pass under the
grant. If, then, the common in question had been dedicated to
public use so as to withdraw it from commerce and so vest the title
in the public as to preserve it from alienation by the King, the
grants issued for the lots stated cannot affect the right of the
public, at least beyond the limits of those grants.
That both the Kings of France and Spain could exercise a certain
jurisdiction over this common and other places similarly situated
has been stated, but this was a police regulation, and was
rightfully exercised in such a manner as not to encroach upon the
public use. This seems to be the result to which a careful
examination of the laws and usages of both countries must lead
us.
Page 35 U. S. 732
We come now to examine, under the third head, the interest of
the United States in the property claimed by the city, and their
jurisdiction over it.
The first article of the treaty of cession is as follows:
"Whereas, by the article the third of the treaty concluded at
St. Ildefonso the 1st October 1800, between the first consul of the
French Republic and His Catholic Majesty, it was agreed as follows:
His Catholic Majesty promises and engages, on his part, to
retrocede to the French Republic, six months after the full and
entire execution of the conditions and stipulations herein relative
to his royal highness the Duke of Parma, the Colony or Province of
Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of
Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and such as it
should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between
Spain and other states."
And in behalf of the French Republic, the first consul
ceded,
"forever and in full sovereignty, the said territory, with all
its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as
they have been acquired by the French Republic,"
&c.
And in the second article it is declared that in the cession
"are included the adjacent islands belonging to Louisiana, all
public lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings,"
&c.
Under this treaty, Louisiana was ceded to the United States in
full sovereignty, and in every respect, with all its rights and
appurtenances, as it was held by the Republic of France, and as it
was received by that republic from Spain. And it is insisted that
the same rights of jurisdiction and property which appertained to
the sovereign of Spain, under its laws and regulations, were by the
treaty transferred to the United States, and that whether this
right extends to the fee of the property in contest or the
regulation of its use, it is contended that this Court must take
jurisdiction of the case and restrain the city authorities from
selling any part of it.
To show that the federal government has considered this common
as a part of the public domain under the treaty, various laws of
Congress have been referred to and official proceedings by the
agents of the government in reference to it, and also it is shown
that the action of the government has been solicited by the city
authorities, who, by these acts, it is insisted, have acknowledged
the right of property to be in the United States, as asserted in
their behalf by the district attorney of Louisiana. We will refer
more particularly to those acts.
Page 35 U. S. 733
On 26 March, 1804, Congress passed an act "erecting Louisiana
into two territories and providing for the government thereof," in
the fourteenth section of which it was provided that all grants for
land within the territories ceded by France the title of which was,
at the date of the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, in the Crown, &c.,
of Spain, were declared to be null and void. Provided nothing in
the section was to make void any
bona fide grant,
agreeably to the laws, usages, &c., of the Spanish government.
An act entitled "an act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles
and claims to land within the Territory of Orleans and the District
of Louisiana" was passed on 2 March, 1805. This act, after
specifying what titles under the Spanish government should be held
valid and requiring the evidences of title to be exhibited,
&c., authorized the appointment of a register, who, with two
commissioners to be appointed, were to constitute a board for the
decision of land claims in the territory, &c., and their report
was required to be laid before Congress, &c. And by an act of 3
March, 1807, it was provided
"That the claim of the City of New Orleans to the commons
adjacent to said city and within six hundred yards of the
fortifications of the same be and the same is hereby recognized and
confirmed, provided that the corporation shall, within six months
after passing this act, relinquish and release any claim they may
have to such commons beyond the distance of six hundred yards
aforesaid,"
&c.
Other acts were passed in relation to land claims in the
district which it cannot be necessary to notice.
Arnaud Magnon, whose claim has been before referred to, applied
to the commissioners under the above act to report on hand titles,
&c., who reported:
"We know of no law or usage of the Spanish government respecting
claims similarly situated, but think it highly probable that had
the claimant applied he would have obtained a grant for it, as a
grant was made to a lot of ground adjoining him under no higher
pretensions. Nor does this appear to come within any of the
provisions of the laws of the United States, although there have
been ten consecutive years' possession, the land has not been
inhabited or cultivated. This part of the claim we do not feel
ourselves authorized to decide on, but are of opinion that in
justice, the claim ought to be confirmed."
And on the claim on John J. Chesse the commissioners report
that
"they did not feel authorized to make any decision on the
claim,
Page 35 U. S. 734
but they thought it would be more an act of justice than
generosity if the government should confirm it."
A similar report was made on the claim of Catherine Gonzales and
Peter Urtubuise. Their claims were for lots of ground within the
common, and they have been confirmed by acts of Congress, and
patents have been issued to the claimants.
The claim of the city to the commons was presented by P.
Derbigny and L. S. Kerr, who were duly authorized to present it in
behalf of the city. And the commissioners reported
"that the claim was in part settled by the acts of Congress of
1807 and 1811, which confirm to the corporation six hundred yards
from the fortifications of the city, but which are nevertheless
embraced by the claim aforesaid. That they had in vain searched in
the documents to which they were referred for proof of even a
shadow of title to this land. That there was no evidence of its
ever having been granted or considered as belonging to the city
either by the French or Spanish government. The board therefore
rejected the claim."
On 3 April, 1812, Congress "passed an act granting to the
Corporation of the City of New Orleans the use and possession of a
lot in the said city."
By this act, the city
"was authorized to use, possess and occupy the same, for the
purpose of erecting or causing to be erected and kept in operation
a steam engine or engines for conveying water into the said city
and all buildings necessary to the said purpose, provided that if
the space of ground shall not be occupied for the said purpose
within the term of three years from and after the passing of this
act or shall at any time thereafter cease to be so occupied for the
term of three years, the right and claim of the United States
thereto shall remain unimpaired."
And by an Act of 30 March, 1822,
"the Corporation of the City of New Orleans was authorized to
appropriate so much of the lot of ground on which Fort St. Charles
formerly stood as may be necessary for continuing Esplanade Street
to the Mississippi River, and also to sell and convey that portion
of the said ground which lies below said street,"
&c.
By the Act of 20 April, 1818, Congress authorized the President
to abandon the use of the navy arsenal, military hospital, and
barracks in the City of New Orleans and, after laying off the
ground into lots, to sell them at public sale, &c. And he was
authorized to cause the Fort St. Charles to be demolished and the
navy yard in the
Page 35 U. S. 735
city to be discontinued, and the lot of ground on which the fort
stood was appropriated to the use of a public square, to be
improved as the corporation of the city should think proper. These
acts related to lots within the common of the city, though but few
of them are included in that part of the ground respecting which
this suit was commenced.
These official acts of the federal government, by legislation
and otherwise, respecting the common claimed by the city, and some
of which were induced by the special application of the
corporation, afford strong evidence, it is contended, not only of
the right of the United States to the property in question, but
that such right was fully recognized by the corporation.
It must be admitted that several of these acts are unequivocal
in their character, and do show, as contended by the Attorney
General, an admission on the part of the city not only that
Congress had a right to legislate on this subject, but also to
dispose of certain parts of the common in fee. And these acts, if
unexplained, do strengthen the argument against the claim set up by
the city.
It is a principle sanctioned as well by law as by the immutable
principles of justice that where an individual acts in ignorance of
his rights, he shall not be prejudiced by such acts. And this rule
applies at least with as much force to the acts of corporate bodies
as to those of individuals. We will therefore inquire, as we are
bound to do, whether, under the circumstances of this case, the
acts of the city can justly be considered as prejudicing the claim
which it asserts.
In the first place, the fact that when we obtained possession of
Louisiana, the City of New Orleans was composed of citizens who, in
their language, habits of thinking and acting, were almost as
dissimilar from other parts of the United States as if they had
inhabited a different continent is of great importance, and, above
all, they were unacquainted with the nature of our government in a
great degree, and the principles of our jurisprudence.
They may be supposed to have been acquainted with the civil law,
and to some extent, at least, with their rights as recognized and
sanctioned by the laws and usages of Spain.
It is well known that the policy of Spain in regard to a
disposition of her public domain is entirely different to that
which has been adopted by the United States. We dispose of our
public lands by sale, but Spain has uniformly bestowed her domain
in reward for
Page 35 U. S. 736
meritorious services or to encourage some enterprise deemed of
public utility.
That a community composed, as were the citizens of New Orleans,
almost entirely of foreigners, and under the circumstances which
existed, should have mistaken their rights is not extraordinary.
Indeed it would have been a matter of surprise if they had, under
the new system, understood the extent of their claim. They did
exhibit their claim to the commissioners, who rejected it. And this
no doubt induced the corporation to make the applications to
Congress which have been noticed.
But in addition to the consideration that the city authorities
probably acted in ignorance of their rights, it may be safely
assumed that they had not the power, by the acts referred to, to
divest the city of a vested interest in this common.
We come now to inquire whether any interest in the vacant space
in contest passed to the United States under the treaty of
cession.
In the second article of the treaty, "all public lots and
squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings, fortifications,
barracks, and other edifices, which are not private property" were
ceded. And it is contended, as the language of this article clearly
includes the ground in controversy, whether it be considered a
public square or vacant land, the entire right of the sovereign of
Spain passed to the United States.
The government of the United States, as was well observed in the
argument, is one of limited powers. It can exercise authority over
no subjects except those which have been delegated to it. Congress
cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal jurisdiction, nor can
it be enlarged under the treatymaking power.
If the common in contest, under the Spanish Crown, formed a part
of the public domain or the Crown lands, and the King had power to
alien it as other lands, there can be no doubt that it passed under
the treaty to the United States, and it has a right to dispose of
it the same as other public lands. But if the King of Spain held
the land in trust for the use of the city, or only possessed a
limited jurisdiction over it, principally, if not exclusively, for
police purposes, was this right passed to the United States under
the treaty?
That this common, having been dedicated to public use, was
withdrawn from commerce and from the power of the King rightfully
to alien it has already been shown, and also that he had a limited
power over it for certain purposes. Can the federal
Page 35 U. S. 737
government exercise this power? If it can, this Court has the
power to interpose an injunction or interdict to the sale of any
part of the common by the city if it shall think that the facts
authorize such an interposition.
It is insisted that the federal government may exercise this
authority under the power to regulate commerce.
It is very clear that as the treaty cannot give this power to
the federal government, we must look for it in the Constitution,
and that the same power must authorize a similar exercise of
jurisdiction over every other quay in the United States. A
statement of the case is a sufficient refutation of the
argument.
Special provision is made in the Constitution for the cession of
jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal
government shall establish forts or other military works. And it is
only in these places or in the territories of the United States
where it can exercise a general jurisdiction.
The State of Louisiana was admitted into the Union on the same
footing as the original states. Her rights of sovereignty are the
same, and by consequence, no jurisdiction of the federal
government, either for purposes of police or otherwise, can be
exercised over this public ground which is not common to the United
States. It belongs to the local authority to enforce the trust and
prevent what it shall deem a violation of it by the city
authorities.
All powers which properly appertain to sovereignty which have
not been delegated to the federal government belong to the states
and the people.
It is enough for this Court, in deciding the matter before it,
to say that in its opinion neither the fee of the land in
controversy nor the right to regulate the use is vested in the
federal government, and consequently that the decree of the
district court must be
Reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss
the bill.
As it is not necessary, we do not decide on the right of the
corporation to sell any part of the common or to appropriate it in
any other manner than as originally designated.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel, on consideration
whereof it is
Page 35 U. S. 738
ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court, that the decree of
the said district court in this cause be, and the same is hereby
reversed and annulled. And this Court, proceeding to render such
decree as the said district court ought to have rendered in the
premises, doth order, adjudge, and decree that the bill of the
complainant in this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to
the said District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, with directions to the said district court
to carry this decree into effect.
