Respondent was born a national of the United States in the
Philippine Islands, came to the continental United States from the
Philippine Islands as a national prior to the Philippine
Independence Act of 1934, has remained within this country ever
since his arrival, and was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and
1950 for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral
turpitude.
Held: he may not now be deported under § 19(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who had been so sentenced
"after entry." Pp.
347 U. S.
638-643.
(a) Respondent is not deportable under § 19(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1917 unless he made an "entry" within the
meaning of that provision, notwithstanding § 8 (a)(1) of the
Philippine Independence Act which provides that citizens of the
Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall
be considered aliens for immigration purposes. Pp.
347 U. S.
639-640.
(b) When respondent came to the United States from the
Philippine Islands as a national prior to enactment of the
Philippine Independence Act of 1934, he did not make an "entry"
into the United States within the meaning of § 19(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1917, since he did not come from some "foreign
port or place." Pp.
347 U. S.
640-643.
207 F.2d 398 affirmed.
Page 347 U. S. 638
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913, and came
therefrom to the continental United States in 1930. He has lived
here ever since. In 1941, he was convicted in the State of
California of assault with a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for one year in the Alameda County jail. In 1950, he
was convicted in the State of Washington of second degree burglary,
and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that
State to a minimum term of two years in the state penitentiary. In
1951, after an administrative hearing, he was ordered deported to
the Philippine Islands under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917
as an alien who, "after entry," had been sentenced more than once
to imprisonment for terms of one year or more for crimes involving
moral turpitude. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, formerly 8 U.S.C. §
155(a).
After respondent was taken into custody, he filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. The petition attacked the validity
of the deportation order on the ground, among others, that he was
not subject to deportation under § 19(a), since he had not made an
"entry" within the meaning of that section. The District Court
dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District
Court's judgment and remanded the case with directions to order
respondent's release from custody. 207 F.2d 398. We granted
certiorari. 346 U.S. 914.
The sole question presented is whether respondent -- who was
born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who
came to the continental United States as a national prior to the
Philippine Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to
imprisonment in 1941
Page 347 U. S. 639
and 1950 for crimes involving moral turpitude -- may now be
deported under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
It is conceded that respondent was born a national of the United
States; that, as such, he owed permanent allegiance to the United
States, including the obligation of military service; that he
retained this status when he came to the continental United States
in 1930, and hence was not then subject to the Immigration Act of
1917 or any other federal statute relating to the exclusion or
deportation of aliens. [
Footnote
1] The Government, however, contends that respondent's status
as a national was changed by the Philippine Independence Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 456, which provided for the eventual independence of
the Philippines, subsequently achieved in 1946, 60 Stat. 1352.
Section 8(a)(1) of the 1934 Act provides:
"For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, . . . this
section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the
immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the
Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall
be considered as if they were aliens. For such purposes the
Philippine Islands shall be considered as a separate country, and
shall have for each fiscal year a quota of fifty. "
Page 347 U. S. 640
The Government urges that the reference in § 8(a)(1) to
"citizens of the Philippine Islands" includes Filipinos then
residing in the United States; that, by virtue of this provision,
the respondent was assimilated to the status of an alien for
purposes of "immigration, exclusion, or expulsion"; and that,
having been twice convicted thereafter of crimes involving moral
turpitude, he is deportable under § 19(a) of the Immigration Act of
1917.
The Government's argument is premised on the assumption that
respondent made an "entry" within the meaning of § 19(a). If he did
not make such an "entry," then he is not deportable under that
section, even assuming that the Government is correct in its broad
construction of the 1934 Philippine Independence Act. Section 19(a)
provides:
". . . except as hereinafter provided, any alien who is
hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more
because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral
turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien
to the United States, or who is hereafter sentenced more than once
to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in this
country of any crime involving moral turpitude,
committed at
any time after entry . . . shall, upon the warrant of the
Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported. . . ."
(Italics added.) The Court of Appeals sustained respondent's
contention that he had never made the requisite "entry." With this
conclusion we agree.
The Government would have us interpret "entry" in § 19(a) in its
"ordinary, everyday sense" of a "coming into the United States."
Under this view, respondent's "coming into the United States" from
the Philippine
Page 347 U. S. 641
Islands in 1930 would satisfy the "entry" requirement. While it
is true that statutory language should be interpreted whenever
possible according to common usage, some terms acquire a special
technical meaning by a process of judicial construction. So it is
with the word "entry" in § 19(a).
E.g., Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388;
United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.
S. 398;
DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878;
Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F.2d 559.
Cf. United States
ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422,
289 U. S. 425.
[
Footnote 2] In
United
States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, supra, at
279 U. S. 401,
this Court stated the applicable rule:
"The word 'entry' [in § 19(a)], by its own force, implies a
coming from outside. The extent shows that, in order that there be
an entry within the meaning of the act,
there must be an
arrival from some foreign port or place. There is no such
entry where one goes to sea on board an American vessel from a
Page 347 U. S. 642
port of the United States and returns to the same or another
port of this country without having been in any foreign port or
place."
(Italics added.)
See also United States ex rel. Stapf v.
Corsi, 287 U. S. 129,
287 U. S. 132;
Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239, 242-243. This concept
of "entry" was codified by Congress in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. [
Footnote
3]
At the time respondent came to the continental United States, he
was not arriving "from some foreign port or place." On the
contrary, he was a United States national moving from one of our
insular possessions to the mainland. It was not until the 1934
Philippine Independence Act that the Philippines could be regarded
as "foreign" for immigration purposes. Having made no "entry,"
respondent is not deportable under § 19(a) as an alien who "after
entry" committed crimes involving moral turpitude. The Government
warns that this conclusion is inconsistent with a broad
congressional purpose to terminate the United States residence of
alien criminals. But we believe a different conclusion would not be
permissible in view of the well settled meaning of "entry" in §
19(a). Although not penal in character, deportation statutes, as a
practical matter, may inflict "the equivalent of banishment or
exile,"
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S.
6,
333 U. S. 10,
Page 347 U. S. 643
and should be strictly construed.
See Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388,
332 U. S. 391.
In the absence of explicit language showing a contrary
congressional intent, we must give technical words in deportation
statutes their usual technical meaning. [
Footnote 4]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in
1946, the Philippine Islands were American territory subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
See Hooven & Allison Co.
v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652,
324 U. S.
674-676. Persons born in the Philippines during this
period were American nationals entitled to the protection of the
United States and, conversely, owing permanent allegiance to the
United States. They could not be excluded from this country under a
general statute relating to the exclusion of "aliens."
See
Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1,
192 U. S. 12-13;
Toyota v. United States, 268 U. S. 402,
268 U. S. 411.
But, until 1946, neither could they become United States citizens.
See Toyota v. United States, supra; 60 Stat. 416.
[
Footnote 2]
In the
Volpe case, the Court stated:
"We accept the view that the word 'entry' . . . [in § 19(a)] . .
.
includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into
the United States, whether such coming be the first or any
subsequent one. And this requires affirmance of the challenged
judgment. . . . That the second
coming of an alien from a
foreign country into the United States is an entry within the
usual acceptation of that word is clear enough from
Lewis v.
Frick, 233 U. S. 291;
United States
ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398. An examination of
the Immigration Act of 1917, we think, reveals nothing sufficient
to indicate that Congress did not intend the word 'entry' in
section 19 should have its ordinary meaning."
(Italics added.) The context of the latter sentence makes it
clear that the Court regarded the word's "ordinary meaning" as
being "any coming of an alien from a foreign country." In the
Delgadillo case,
supra, the Court narrowed this
definition even further by holding that a resident alien does not
make an "entry" from a foreign country if his arrival in the
foreign country was unintentional.
[
Footnote 3]
Section 101(a)(13) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 167, 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13), provides in pertinent part: "The term
entry' means
any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port
or place or from an outlying possession. . . ."
Section 101(a)(29), 66 Stat. 170, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29),
defines "outlying possessions" as American Samoa and Swains Island.
By a special provision in the 1952 Act, the exclusion process is
made applicable to any alien coming to the continental United
States from Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin
Islands. 66 Stat. 188, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(7).
[
Footnote 4]
The respondent also attacks the validity of the deportation
order on the grounds: (1) that he made no "entry" because he was
not an alien when he came to this country; (2) that § 8(a)(1) of
the 1934 Philippine Independence Act did not apply to Filipinos
already residing here, and that, hence, he was not an alien in 1941
when he was sentenced for one of the two crimes involves in this
proceeding; (3) that he is not an alien today because Congress
lacked the power to deprive him of his status as a national. Our
disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider these
contentions.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE
BURTON join, dissenting.
But for this Court's holding that § 19(a) of the Immigration Act
of 1917 must be construed strictly and the word "entry" given a
special meaning, I would be content with the excellent dissent of
Judge Bone in the court below. 207 F.2d 398, 402.
The effect of the Court's opinion is to construe the Act
strictly in favor of the convicted criminal sought to be deported
for his criminal acts, rather than in favor of the United States in
protection of its citizens. I know of no good reason why we should
be strained construction of an Act compel the United States to
cling onto alien criminals. It is not the public policy of this
country to construe its statutes strictly in favor of alien
criminals whose convictions have already been established of
record. Why should we give a strained construction to the word
"entry" in the instant case? The least we should do is to give the
word "entry" its ordinary meaning.
Page 347 U. S. 644
In construing this very statute, this Court said in
United
States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.
S. 422,
289 U. S.
425:
"An examination of the Immigration Act of 1917, we think,
reveals nothing sufficient to indicate that Congress did not intend
the word 'entry' in section 19 should have its ordinary
meaning."
Cf. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy,
338 U. S. 521.
The case of
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.
S. 388, lends no authority to this case. In that case,
the alien had never voluntarily left the United States for foreign
land. His ship was torpedoed. He was blown into the sea. He was
rescued and taken to Cuba, from whence he came back to the United
States by way of Miami, Florida. This Court said:
"In this case petitioner, of course, chose to return to this
country, knowing he was in a foreign place. But the exigencies of
war, not his voluntary act, put him on foreign soil. It would
indeed be harsh to read the statute so as to add the peril of
deportation to such perils of the sea. We might as well hold that
if he had been kidnaped and taken to Cuba, he made a statutory
'entry' on his voluntary return. Respect for law does not thrive on
captious interpretations."
332 U.S. at
332 U. S.
391.
There is nothing captious or fortuitous about this petitioner's
"entry" into the United States. He came to this country from
outside, as all aliens do. No case by this Court supports the
special construction given by the Court to the word "entry."
Because of the Court's strict construction of this statute,
which has the effect of putting a liberal construction on the
statute in favor of the alien criminal, which I believe to be
contrary to the public policy of this country, I dissent.