During the trial of petitioner in a Federal District Court on
charges of willful evasion of federal income taxes, an unnamed
person communicated with a juror who afterwards became the jury
foreman, and remarked to him that he could profit by bringing in a
verdict favorable to petitioner. The juror reported the incident to
the judge, who informed the prosecuting attorneys and advised with
them. As a result, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made an
investigation and report, which was considered by the judge and
prosecutors alone, but nothing further was said or done. Petitioner
and his counsel first learned of the matter after a verdict of
guilty had been rendered, and petitioner thereupon moved for a new
trial, which was denied.
Held: the case is remanded to the District Court with
directions to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident
complained of was harmful to petitioner, and if found to have been
harmful, to grant a new trial. Pp.
347 U. S.
228-230.
(a) In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial
about the matter pending before the jury is presumptively
prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court
and the instructions and directions of the court made during the
trial, with full knowledge of the parties. P.
347 U. S.
229.
(b) The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests
heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and
hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was
harmless to the defendant. P.
347 U. S.
229.
205 F.2d 277, judgment vacated.
Page 347 U. S. 228
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted by a jury on several counts
charging willful evasion of the payment of federal income taxes. A
matter admitted by the Government to have been handled by the trial
court in a manner that may have been prejudicial to the petitioner,
and therefore confessed as error, is presented at the threshold,
and must be disposed of first.
After the jury had returned its verdict, the petitioner learned
for the first time that, during the trial, a person unnamed had
communicated with a certain juror, who afterwards became the jury
foreman, and remarked to him that he could profit by bringing in a
verdict favorable to the petitioner. The juror reported the
incident to the judge, who informed the prosecuting attorneys and
advised with them. As a result, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
was requested to make an investigation and report, which was
accordingly done. The FBI report was considered by the judge and
prosecutors alone, and they apparently concluded that the statement
to the juror was made in jest, and nothing further was done or said
about the matter. Neither the judge nor the prosecutors informed
the petitioner of the incident, and he and his counsel first
learned of the matter by reading of it in the newspapers after the
verdict.
The above-stated facts were alleged in a motion for a new trial,
together with an allegation that the petitioner was substantially
prejudiced, thereby depriving him of a fair trial, and a request
for a hearing to determine the circumstances surrounding the
incident and its effect on the jury.
* A supporting
affidavit of the petitioner's
Page 347 U. S. 229
attorneys recited the alleged occurrences and stated that, if
they had known of the incident, they would have moved for a
mistrial and requested that the juror in question be replaced by an
alternate juror. Two newspaper articles reporting the incident were
attached to the affidavit. The Government did not file answering
affidavits. The District Court, without holding the requested
hearing, denied the motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals
held that the District Court had not abused its discretion, since
the petitioner had shown no prejudice to him. 205 F.2d 277, 291.
The case is here on writ of certiorari. 346 U.S. 884.
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about
the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed
presumptively prejudicial if not made in pursuance of known rules
of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made
during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon
the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the
defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the
defendant.
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.
S. 140,
146 U. S.
148-150;
Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d
522, 527.
We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know,
what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have
occurred were harmful or harmless. The sending of an FBI agent in
the midst of a trial to investigate a juror as to his conduct is
bound to impress the juror and is very apt to do so unduly. A juror
must feel free to exercise his functions without the FBI or anyone
else looking over his shoulder. The integrity of jury proceedings
must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions. The trial court
should not decide and take final action
ex parte on
information such
Page 347 U. S. 230
as was received in this case, but should determine the
circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or
not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties
permitted to participate.
We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case to the District Court with directions to hold a
hearing to determine whether the incident complained of was harmful
to the petitioner, and if, after hearing, it is found to have been
harmful, to grant a new trial.
Judgment vacated.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
* The motion for a new trial was also grounded on many other
contentions, several of which have also been presented to this
Court. Because of our disposition of the case on the issue treated
herein, we do not pass upon these additional questions.
