1. In response to a summons, petitioner appeared before a Senate
Committee investigating crime. Answering without objection
questions asked on behalf of the Committee, he confessed to having
run a gambling business in Maryland.
Held: under 18 U.S.C. § 3486, his testimony before the
Committee was inadmissible in his trial in a state court for a
gambling offense, and his conviction based on such evidence is
reversed. Pp.
347 U. S.
179-183.
(a) Petitioners failure to claim a constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination did not deprive him of the statutory
protection afforded by § 3486. Pp.
347 U. S.
180-181.
(b) Section 3486 applies to criminal proceedings in state
courts, as well as federal courts. Pp.
347 U. S.
181-182.
(c)
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.
S. 547, in no way impairs the protection afforded
congressional witnesses by § 3486. Pp.
347 U. S.
182-183.
2. As thus construed, § 3486 does not exceed the constitutional
power of Congress. P.
347 U. S.
183.
202 Md. 455, 97 A.2d 281, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
In response to a summons, the petitioner Adams appeared to
testify before a Senate Committee investigating crime. Answering
questions, he confessed to having run a gambling business in
Maryland. That confession has been used in this case to convict
Adams of conspiring
Page 347 U. S. 180
to violate Maryland's anti-lottery laws. The trial court
sentenced Adams to pay a fine of $2,000 and serve seven years in
the state penitentiary. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed,
rejecting Adams' contention that use of the committee testimony
against him was forbidden by a provision in a federal statute. 97
A.2d 281. That provision, now 18 U.S.C. § 3486, set out in full
below, provides that no testimony given by a witness in
congressional inquiries "shall be used as evidence in any criminal
proceeding against him in any court. . . ." [
Footnote 1] The Maryland Court of Appeals held
that Adams had testified before the Committee "voluntarily," and
was therefore not protected by § 3486. We granted certiorari
because a proper understanding of the scope of this section is of
importance to the national government, to the states and to
witnesses summoned before congressional committees. 346 U.S. 864.
In this Court, Maryland contends that the Section does not bar use
of Adams' testimony, because: (1) he waived the statutory
"privilege" by testifying "voluntarily," meaning that Adams failed
to object to each committee question on the ground of its tendency
to incriminate him; (2) the Section should be construed so as to
apply to United States courts only. If these two statutory
contentions are rejected, we are urged to hold that Congress is
without constitutional power to bar the use of congressional
committee testimony in state courts.
(1) Circumstances may be conceivable under which statements made
in the presence of a congressional committee
Page 347 U. S. 181
might not be protected by § 3486. For example, a person might
voluntarily appear and obtain permission to make a statement in a
committee's presence, wholly for his own advantage, and without
ever being questioned by the committee at all. But Adams did not
testify before the Senate Committee under any such circumstances.
He was not a volunteer. He was summoned. Had he not appeared, he
could have been fined and sent to jail. 2 U.S.C. § 192. Nor does
the record show any spontaneous outpouring of testimony from him.
The testimony Maryland used to convict him was brought out by
repeated committee questions. It is true that Adams did not attempt
to escape answering these questions by claiming a constitutional
privilege to refuse to incriminate himself. But no language of the
Act requires such a claim in order for a witness to feel secure
that his testimony will not be used to convict him of crime.
Indeed, a witness does not need any statute to protect him from the
use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over
his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of that without a
statute. Consequently, the construction of § 3486 here urged would
limit its protection to that already afforded by the Fifth
Amendment, leaving the Section with no effect whatever. We reject
the contention that Adams' failure to claim a constitutional
privilege deprived him of the statutory protection of § 3486.
(2) Nor can we hold that the Act bars use of committee testimony
in United States courts, but not in state courts. The Act forbids
use of such evidence "in any criminal proceeding . . . in any
court." Language could be no plainer. Even if there could be
legislative history sufficiently strong to make "any court" mean
United States courts only, there is no such history. The few scraps
of legislative history pointed out tend to indicate that Congress
was well aware that an ordinary person
Page 347 U. S. 182
would read the phrase "in any court" to include state courts. To
construe this phrase as having any other meaning would make the Act
a trap for the unwary.
It is suggested, however, that, regardless of the plain meaning
of § 3486 as originally passed, an event since its passage should
cause us to give it an entirely different meaning. The Section
stems from an 1857 Act of Congress designed to grant committee
witnesses immunity from prosecution in order to compel them to give
self-incriminating testimony despite the Fifth Amendment. [
Footnote 2] Thirty-five years later, in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547,
this Court held that an act not providing "complete" immunity from
prosecution was not broad enough to permit a federal grand jury to
compel witnesses to give incriminating testimony. Section 3486 does
not provide "complete" immunity. The original purpose of Congress
to compel incriminating testimony has thus been frustrated.
[
Footnote 3] It is argued that
Congress could not have intended to afford any immunity to
criminals unless it was thereby enabled to compel them to testify
about their crimes. Therefore, it is said, § 3486 should now be
given the narrowest possible construction -- made effective only
when the Fifth Amendment privilege is claimed, and held applicable
only to United States courts. Because Congress did not get all it
hoped, we are urged to deny witnesses the protection the statute
promises. But a court decision subsequent to an act's passage does
not usually alter its original meaning. And we reject the
implication that a general act of Congress is like a private
contract which courts should nullify upon a showing of partial or
total failure of consideration. Moreover, Congress has kept the
statute in force more than sixty years since the
Counselman decision. And, in 1938, Congress
Page 347 U. S. 183
reenacted the statute making changes deemed desirable to insure
its continued usefulness. 52 Stat. 943. Our holding is that
Counselman v. Hitchcock in no way impairs the protection
afforded congressional witnesses by § 3486.
(3) Little need be said about the contention that Congress lacks
power to bar state courts from convicting a person for crime on the
basis of evidence he has given to help the national legislative
bodies carry on their governmental functions. Congress has power to
summon witnesses before either House or before their committees.
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135.
Article I of the Constitution permits Congress to pass laws
"necessary and proper" to carry into effect its power to get
testimony. § 8. We are unable to say that the means Congress has
here adopted to induce witnesses to testify is not "appropriate"
and "plainly adapted to that end."
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. And, since Congress
in the legitimate exercise of its powers enacts "the supreme Law of
the Land," state courts are bound by § 3486 even though it affects
their rules of practice.
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.
S. 591,
161 U. S.
606-608.
Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.
S. 386.
The judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals affirming this
conviction is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
"No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before
any committee of either House, or before any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses
of Congress, shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding
against him in any court, except in a prosecution for perjury
committed in giving such testimony. But an official paper or record
produced by him is not within the said privilege."
11 Stat. 156, 12 Stat. 333, 52 Stat. 943, 62 Stat. 833, 18
U.S.C. § 3486.
[
Footnote 2]
Act of Jan. 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 156.
[
Footnote 3]
See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.
S. 323,
339 U. S.
335-337.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
I am in substantial agreement with the Court's opinion, but
differ in emphasis.
The only controlling fact for me is that this Act is on the
federal statute books. What someone intended almost a century ago
when it was passed, or in the 1890's when
Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, was
decided,
Page 347 U. S. 184
I do not know. Since the last event, some thirty Congresses have
come and gone, something near 15,000 Congressmen have been elected,
not allowing for reelection. How many of them knew of
Counselman v. Hitchcock, how many felt frustrated by it,
and how many would have vented their frustration by repeal, I do
not know or care. Congress left the Act on the books, and it was
there when this petitioner testified. The only question is what it
would mean to a reasonably well informed lawyer reading it.
I do not think it important whether petitioner was a "voluntary"
or "involuntary" witness before the congressional Committee or
whether he raised the question of his immunity under the Fifth
Amendment. No such qualification appears in the Act. The whole
object and usefulness of the statute is to relieve the witness of
the risks which might induce him to withhold testimony from
Congress. It is very customary for one who is asked for information
to appear before a committee without requiring the formality of a
subpoena. The Act does not strip one of its protection because he
may be a cooperative, or even interested, witness; indeed, its
purpose is to protect, and thereby encourage cooperation instead of
hesitation or resistance.
The statute seems as unambiguous as language can be. If words
mean anything, the statute extends its protection to all witnesses,
to all testimony, and in all courts. It is easy to see, as this
case illustrates, the hazard a witness would run otherwise. A
lawyer would be warranted from the face of this Act in advising the
witness that he had nothing to fear from frank and complete
disclosure to Congress. Thus, the Act wold have accomplished its
obvious purpose of facilitating disclosure.
I cannot see the slightest doubt that Congress has power to
enact the statute for that purpose. It does not take anything from
Maryland. It does not say Maryland
Page 347 U. S. 185
cannot prosecute petitioner; it just says she shall not put him
to disadvantage on the trial by reason of his cooperation with
Congress. It leaves Maryland with complete freedom to prosecute --
she just has to work up her own evidence, and cannot use that
worked up by Congress. The protection to the witness does not
extend beyond the testimony actually received. In this case,
petitioner was convicted by the State on the admissions he made
before the Senate Committee. Section 3486 was thereby violated, and
the conviction should be reversed.