An administrative condemnation proceeding instituted by
petitioner under an Iowa statute resulted in a commission's award
of $23,000 damages to the landowner. The statute provides for an
appeal from the commission's award to a state court. Petitioner
filed a complaint in the Federal District Court, alleging diversity
of citizenship, and praying that the damages for the taking of the
land be fixed at not more than $10,000. Petitioner also filed an
appeal in the state court, where, as required by Iowa law, the case
was docketed with the landowner as plaintiff and the petitioner as
defendant. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to remove the
state court proceeding to the federal court. Respondents filed in
the Federal District Court a motion to dismiss the complaint filed
therein and a motion to remand the case removed from the state
court.
Held:
1. The case removed from the state court was properly ordered
remanded to that court. Pp.
346 U. S.
578-580.
(a) In the circumstances of this case, an order denying a motion
to remand is reviewed, although the order would not be appealable
if it stood alone. P.
346 U. S.
578.
(b) Within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), petitioner was
plaintiff, and not "defendant," in the state court proceeding, and
therefore was not authorized to remove that proceeding to the
Federal District Court. Pp.
346 U. S.
578-580.
(c) For the purpose of removal, the federal law determines who
is plaintiff and who is defendant, and the procedural provisions of
the state law are not controlling. P.
346 U. S.
580.
2. The original complaint in the Federal District Court was
properly dismissed. Pp.
346 U. S.
580-582.
(a) Petitioner's complaint in the Federal District Court was an
attempt to have that court review the state proceedings on appeal.
Iowa law does not purport to authorize such an appeal, Congress has
provided none by statute, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
make no such provision. Pp.
346 U. S.
580-582.
Page 346 U. S. 575
(b) The complaint in the Federal District Court did not invoke
the jurisdiction of that court in an eminent domain proceeding. P.
346 U. S.
582.
(c) The question whether petitioner could proceed by way of an
original action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa is not here presented or decided. P.
346 U. S.
582.
204 F.2d 116, 954, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, a Delaware corporation, owns and operates its
railroad through Pottawattamie County, Iowa. It was authorized by
the Interstate Commerce Commission to improve its line of railway
in that county and by the Iowa State Commerce Commission to acquire
by condemnation any land necessary for the improvement.
On January 18, 1952, pursuant to the Iowa Code, [
Footnote 1] the petitioner filed with the
sheriff of the county its application to condemn certain lands in
the county owned by respondent Stude. The sheriff appointed a
commission
Page 346 U. S. 576
of six resident freeholders to assess damages. Notice was given
by the sheriff to the respondent owner and others interested in the
land, and an award of damages in the sum of $23,888.60 was allowed
to the owner, and $1,000 to the tenant. The amount of the
assessment was paid by the petitioner to the sheriff, and the
petitioner took possession of the land. [
Footnote 2] Such appraisal became final unless appealed
from.
On March 6, 1952, the petitioner filed with the sheriff of the
county a notice of appeal from the commission's award. The Iowa
Code provides for appeal as follows:
"472.18 Appeal. Any party interested may, within thirty days
after the assessment is made, appeal therefrom to the district
court, by giving the adverse party, his agent or attorney, and the
sheriff, written notice that such appeal has been taken."
"
* * * *"
"472.21 Appeals -- how docketed and tried. The appeal shall be
docketed in the name of the owner of the land, or of the party
otherwise interested and appealing, as plaintiff, and in the name
of the applicant for condemnation as defendant, and be tried as in
an action by ordinary proceedings."
Code of Iowa 1950.
Page 346 U. S. 577
The petitioner then filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against the
respondents in which it alleged diversity of citizenship,
jurisdictional amount, authority to make improvements and to
condemn therefor, together with a description of the land and that
respondent Stude was the owner, and that the assessment proceedings
had been instituted in the sheriff's office, resulting in the
assessment of damages of $23,888.60, which was alleged to be
excessive, and that appeal was taken by notice duly given. This
notice was referred to as Exhibit A to the complaint, which exhibit
recited that the appeal was taken to the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa, and a transcript of the sheriff's
proceeding was filed in that court. The prayer was that the damages
for the taking of the land be fixed at not more than $10,000. On
this complaint, a summons was issued and served upon the
respondents.
The petitioner also filed an appeal from this assessment in the
state court, the District Court for Pottawattamie County. The case
was docketed there with the landowner as the plaintiff and the
petitioner-ondemnor as defendant, as required by the Iowa Code.
Thereafter, a petition to remove the cause to the federal court was
filed by the petitioner. The respondents filed in the Federal
District Court a motion to dismiss the complaint filed therein and
a motion to remand the case removed from the state court.
The federal court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed
the complaint, but denied the motion to remand.
Chicago, R.I.
& P. R. Co. v. Kay, 107 F. Supp. 895. The petitioner
appealed from the judgment dismissing its complaint. The
respondents gave notice of appeal from the order of the District
Court denying the motion to remand. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court's judgment dismissing the complaint and
Page 346 U. S. 578
reversed the District Court's denial of the motion to remand,
and ordered the cause remanded to the state court. 204 F.2d 116;
204 F.2d 954. We granted certiorari, 346 U.S. 810.
The Order Denying the Motion to Remand. Obviously, such
an order is not final and appealable if standing alone.
Reed v.
Lehman, 91 F.2d 919;
Miller v. Pyrites Co., 71 F.2d
804. While these two cases were separate actions pending on the
docket of the Federal District Court, they both involve the same
subject and they were treated by the parties, the District Court,
and the Court of Appeals as if the dismissal appealed from and the
order in the removal case were made in one case. Treating them as
one case, the cross-rror, challenging the order denying the motion
to remand, may be considered as assigned in a case involving an
appealable order, the order dismissing the complaint and the
action. This is true despite the fact that the order denying the
motion to remand, standing alone, would not be appealable.
Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 311 U.
S. 282,
311 U. S.
287.
We come, therefore, to the merits of the motion to remand. The
question on this motion is whether the petitioner was a defendant
nonresident of Iowa, and therefore authorized to remove to the
Federal District Court as provided by statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a).
The proceeding before the sheriff is administrative until the
appeal has been taken to the district court of the county. Then the
proceeding becomes a civil action pending before "those exercising
judicial functions" for the purpose of reviewing the question of
damages.
Myers v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 118 Iowa 312,
315-316, 91 N.W. 1076, 1078. When the proceeding has reached the
stage of a perfected appeal and the jurisdiction of the state
district court is invoked, it then becomes in its nature a civil
action, and subject to removal by the
Page 346 U. S. 579
defendant to the United States District Court.
Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U. S. 403,
98 U. S. 407.
[
Footnote 3]
Is the petitioner such a defendant? The petitioner contends it
is because the Code of Iowa, § 472.21, provides that, on appeal,
the case shall be docketed in the district court with the landowner
as the plaintiff and the condemnor as the defendant, and thereafter
tried as in an original proceeding. The Supreme Court of Iowa has
construed this statute to mean that, in such proceedings on appeal,
the condemnor is the defendant.
Myers v. Chicago & N.W. R.
Co., supra, at 324, 91 N.W. at 1081. This Court was urged in
Mason City R. Co. v. Boynton, 204 U.
S. 570, to follow that construction put upon this
identical provision of the Iowa statute by the Supreme Court of
Iowa. This Court declined to do so, saying:
"It is said that this court is bound by the construction given
to the state law by the state court. Indeed, the above § 2009 does
not need construction; it enacts, in terms, that the landowner
shall be plaintiff. As the right to remove a suit is given only to
the defendants therein, being nonresidents of the state, it is
argued that the state decision ends the case."
"But this court must construe the act of Congress regarding
removal. And it is obvious that the word 'defendant,' as there
used, is directed toward more important matters than the burden of
proof or the right to open and close. It is quite conceivable that
a state enactment might reverse the names which, for the purposes
of removal, this court might think the proper ones to be applied.
In condemnation proceedings, the words 'plaintiff' and 'defendant'
can be used only
Page 346 U. S. 580
in an uncommon and liberal sense. The plaintiff complains of
nothing. The defendant denies no past or threatened wrong. Both
parties are actors: one to acquire title, the other to get as large
pay as he can. It is not necessary, in order to decide that the
present removal was right, to say that the state decision was
wrong. We leave the latter question where we find it. . . ."
"
* * * *"
". . . Therefore, in a broad sense, the railroad is the
plaintiff, as the institution and continuance of the proceedings
depend upon its will. . . ."
204 U. S. 204 U.S.
570 at
204 U. S.
579-580.
For the purpose of removal, the federal law determines who is
plaintiff and who is defendant. It is a question of the
construction of the federal statute on removal, and not the state
statute. The latter's procedural provisions cannot control the
privilege of removal granted by the federal statute.
Shamrock
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.
S. 100,
313 U. S. 104.
Here, the railroad is the plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and
cannot remove. The remand was proper.
The Motion to Dismiss. We think it was properly
granted, and the original complaint in the Federal District Court
correctly dismissed. The steps taken by the petitioner were those
to perfect an appeal to the Federal District Court. The notice said
it was the intention of the petitioner to docket the appeal in the
federal court. The transcript on appeal was filed in the federal
court, and the complaint filed sought a review of the commission's
assessment of damages. The proceeding makes no sense on any other
basis, for the action is brought not by the person injured, namely,
the landowner, but by the railroad that inflicted the damage. It
will be noticed, further, that there is no prayer for damages, but
only for
Page 346 U. S. 581
a review of the assessment, in keeping with the Iowa Code, §
472.23, which provides, "no judgment shall be rendered except for
costs. . . ." In short, it was an attempt of the petitioner to
review the state proceedings on appeal to the Federal District
Court.
The petitioner, after giving notice of appeal by filing notice
with the sheriff, etc., could not perfect that appeal to any court
but the court which the statute of Iowa directed, which was the
District Court of that State for the County of Pottawattamie. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa does
not sit to review on appeal action taken administratively or
judicially in a state proceeding. A state
"legislature may not make a federal district court, a court of
original jurisdiction, into an appellate tribunal or otherwise
expand its jurisdiction. . . ."
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.
S. 315,
319 U. S. 317.
The Iowa Code does not purport to authorize such an appeal,
Congress has provided none by statute, and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure make no such provision.
We cannot ignore this plain attempt to appeal and treat the
complaint as initiating an original action, as if the parties had
agreed that the petitioner could take the land, leaving only a
controversy as to the amount of compensation. In that instance,
there would be an implied agreement that the petitioner would pay
the landowner the fair value of the land. Either party might in
that posture of the case ask for a declaration as to the amount of
compensation owing. The claim for damages would arise in that case
from the substantive rights given by the implied contract, and the
suit would be one to enforce that contract. We have no such case
here. The right to take the land and the ensuing right to damages
here spring from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
petitioner here seems to ignore the means by which it obtained the
land and seeks to review only
Page 346 U. S. 582
the question of damages. It may not separate the question of
damages and try it apart from the substantive right from which the
claim for damages arose. Nor can it be said that petitioner has
fully exercised its power of eminent domain, leaving nothing to be
determined but the question of damages. Petitioner has possession,
but not title to the land. The land does not belong to the
petitioner until the damages are paid. The sheriff, or the clerk of
the state district court in case of appeal, must file in the county
recorder's office all the papers filed in the proceeding. Code of
Iowa 1950, §§ 472.35, 472.36. The Iowa Code, § 472.41, makes this
record presumptive evidence of title in the condemnor. Petitioner
is still in the process of trying to get the land by virtue of its
power of eminent domain. But obviously the complaint here was not
filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court in an eminent
domain proceeding.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do have elaborate
provisions for procedure in the federal court in condemnation
proceedings. It is obvious that the petitioner was not proceeding
under these Rules. Whether it could so proceed as an original
action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa is not before us.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concurs in the result.
[
Footnote 1]
"471.6 Railways. Any railway, incorporated under the laws of the
United States or of any state thereof, may acquire by condemnation
or otherwise so much real estate as may be necessary for the
location, construction, and convenient use of its railway. . .
."
"
* * * *"
"472.3 Application for condemnation. Such proceedings shall be
instituted by a written application filed with the sheriff of the
county in which the land sought to be condemned is located. . .
."
"
* * * *"
"472.4 Commission to assess damages. The sheriff shall
thereupon, except as otherwise provided, appoint six resident
freeholders of his county, none of whom shall be interested in the
same or a like question, who shall constitute a commission to
assess the damages to all real estate desired by the applicant and
located in the county."
Code of Iowa, 1950.
[
Footnote 2]
"472.25 Right to take possession of lands. Upon the filing of
the commissioners' report with the sheriff, the applicant may
deposit with the sheriff the amount assessed in favor of a
claimant, and thereupon the applicant shall, except as otherwise
provided, have the right to take possession of the land condemned
and proceed with the improvement. No appeal from said assessment
shall affect such right, except as otherwise provided."
Code of Iowa 1950.
[
Footnote 3]
In that case, the power of eminent domain was relied upon from
beginning to the end.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
I think the railroad has a right to have its case tried in the
United States District Court. Congress has given such courts power
to try any case that is (1) a "civil" action, (2) between "Citizens
of different States," (3) a "controversy," and (4) involves a
matter which "exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive of
interest and costs."
Page 346 U. S. 583
28 U.S.C. § 1332. If a complaint alleges these four things, a
district court has jurisdiction. Here, the railroad's complaint
shows all four. The case is plainly a "civil" action, not a
criminal one. The railroad is a "citizen" of Delaware, and the
other parties are "citizens" of Iowa. There is a "controversy"
about transferring title to property and how much the railroad must
pay for it. And the dispute concerns more than $3,000 -- the owners
want $23,888.60, the railroad is willing to pay only $10,000. The
foregoing allegations were sufficient to establish, and did
establish, district court jurisdiction. Other facts were also
alleged. If these facts were relevant to nonjurisdictional issues,
they were properly alleged; if immaterial, they could have been
stricken. In any event, a court cannot lose its power to act merely
because of unnecessary words. A point is made of the railroad's
reference to certain prior state proceedings as though it had a
right to "appeal" to the federal court from these proceedings. But,
assuming that the railroad confidently believed it had a right to
appeal from the state commission, and therefore put a wrong label
on its civil action, the District Court was still under a duty to
try the case. After all, the railroad simply asked the court to fix
damages for the property taken at "not to exceed $10,000," and for
"such further relief as may be just and proper under the
circumstances." And the pendency of a similar condemnation
proceeding in the state court certainly did not destroy the federal
court's jurisdiction. Nor did the District Court lose its
jurisdiction because the railroad failed to invoke Rule 71A or to
observe its procedure. In trying the case, the court should, of
course, require observance of the Rule, if applicable, but failure
of the railroad to comply with it is no sufficient reason for the
court's refusal to settle the controversy. All of the alleged
procedural mistakes attributed to the railroad could easily have
been cured;
Page 346 U. S. 584
none could possibly justify a final, unconditional dismissal of
its cause of action.
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.
S. 678;
Brown v. Western R. of Alabama,
338 U. S. 294,
338 U. S.
298-299,
338 U. S.
303.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
Stripped of irrelevant and beclouding elements, this is a suit
brought in a federal court for the ascertainment of the value of
land, acquired by eminent domain under the prescribed Iowa
procedure.
If the Rock Island had decided to initiate this suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, as
it was unquestionably entitled to do, since there was diversity of
citizenship,
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining
Co., 196 U. S. 239, the
procedure defined by the Iowa Code would, under Rule 71A(k) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, have had to be followed. For that Rule
provides that, in an eminent domain proceeding, the state procedure
for determination of the value of the condemned land by a jury or
commission, or both, must be followed. [
Footnote 2/1] The sole difference, therefore, between
the initiation of such an original condemnation proceeding in the
federal court, regarding which no jurisdictional question could
have been raised, and what was done here is that the railroad went
directly to the sheriff's commissioners, instead of having the
District Court send it there, or itself employ the same kind of
factfinding procedure.
Once the sheriff's commissioners had found the value of the
land, there came into operation the Iowa law authorizing
Page 346 U. S. 585
reconsideration of the amount by a court. This marks the
beginning of the judicial phase of the proceedings, "appeal" though
it loosely be called. [
Footnote
2/2] One is entitled to ask what considerations bar access at
this point to the Federal District Court in Iowa "sitting . . .
[as] a court of that state,"
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St.
Bernard Mining Co., supra, at
196 U. S. 255,
when all the statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction are
present. Can it be that there is something inexorable about the
Iowa eminent domain procedure whereby it must run its full course
in the Iowa courts, thus preventing the railroad from pursuing its
first judicial remedy in the federal court of the State? But there
is nothing in the Iowa Code or in the United States Judicial Code
which ousts the federal court of its statutory jurisdiction simply
because the Rock Island complied literally with the Iowa
condemnation procedure.
Looked at from another aspect, this case may be seen simply as a
suit for a declaration of money owed, satisfying the requirements
of diversity jurisdiction. "The point in issue," in the language of
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403,
98 U. S. 407,
is
"the compensation to be made to the owner of the land; in other
words, the value of the property taken. No other question was open
to contestation in the District Court."
As is spelled out in MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion, with which I
substantially agree, this case presents a dispute over some $13,000
-- only that, and nothing more -- and, as such, is within the scope
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Page 346 U. S. 586
I am not astute to find grounds for sustaining diversity
jurisdiction. But, while exercises in procedural dialectics, so
rampant in the early nineteenth century, still hold for me
intellectual interest, I do not think they should determine
litigation in the middle of the twentieth, even when based merely
on diversity of citizenship. I had supposed that the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the district courts were, to a considerable degree,
designed as a liberation from these wasteful and fettering
niceties. The history of this litigation and its disposition will
hardly be cited as an illustration of the fulfillment of the hope
with which Congress allowed these Rules to take effect:
"It is confidently expected that the adoption of the new rules
will materially reduce the uncertainty, delay, expense, and the
likelihood that cases may be decided on technical points of
procedure which had no relation to the just determination of the
controversy on its merits."
H.R.Rep. No. 2743, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"(k) CONDEMNATION UNDER A STATE'S POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. The
practice as herein prescribed governs in actions involving the
exercise of the power of eminent domain under the law of a state,
provided that, if the state law makes provision for trial of any
issue by jury, or for trial of the issue of compensation by jury or
commission or both, that provision shall be followed."
[
Footnote 2/2]
As Chief Judge Gardner, dissenting on the rehearing below,
pointed out, the fact that the Rock Island filed a "notice of
appeal," as required by the Iowa Code, does not affect this
case.
"The mere fact that the attempted appeal from the commissioners'
award was not warranted and did not, in itself, confer jurisdiction
did not preclude the Rock Island from invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Federal Court on the grounds set out in its
original complaint."
204 F.2d 954, 955, 956.