The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
violated by the Maryland statute here involved, which makes
evidence obtained by illegal search or seizure generally
inadmissible in prosecutions in state courts for misdemeanors, but
permits the admission of such evidence in prosecutions in Anne
Arundel County for certain gambling misdemeanors. Pp.
346 U. S.
546-554.
(a) The statute is within the liberal legislative license
allowed a state in prescribing rules of practice relating to its
police power. Pp.
346 U. S.
549-550.
(b) The statute is not rendered invalid by the fact that
illegally obtained evidence is not admissible in prosecutions for
lottery misdemeanors, though admissible in prosecutions for
operating gambling pools, nor by the fact that such evidence is not
admissible in prosecutions for violations of county gambling
restrictions, though admissible in prosecutions for violations of
comparable state gambling restrictions. P.
346 U. S.
550.
(c) Distinctions based on county areas are not necessarily so
unreasonable as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
346 U. S.
550-554.
(d) The statute does not affirmatively sanction illegal searches
and seizures in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. P.
346 U. S.
554.
201 Md. 212, 94 A.2d 280, affirmed.
Appellant's conviction of a gambling misdemeanor was affirmed by
the Maryland Court of Appeals over his objection that evidence had
been admitted under a Maryland statute which violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 201 Md. 212, 94 A.2d
280. On appeal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2),
affirmed, p.
346 U. S.
554.
Page 346 U. S. 546
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The ultimate issue here is whether Maryland has violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by authorizing
its courts, in prosecutions in Anne Arundel County for certain
gambling misdemeanors, to admit evidence procured by illegal search
or seizure. The violation is charged because Maryland, at the same
time, prohibits the admission of such evidence in like prosecutions
in other counties, and, even in Anne Arundel County, prohibits its
admission in prosecutions for many other misdemeanors. For the
reasons hereafter stated, we hold that Maryland's action is
valid.
In 1952, police officers of Anne Arundel County arrested the
appellant, Salsburg, and two other men, in a two-room building in
the rear of a garage on the Governor Ritchie Highway in that
County. The officers had no warrant but, when they received no
answer to their knock on the locked door of the rear room, they
broke it open with an ax. Upon entering, they found appellant and
two companions apparently engaged in operating a betting pool on
horse races, and arrested them. The officers seized three
telephones, two adding machines, several racing forms, and much
paraphernalia commonly used in operating such a betting pool. The
State concedes that the entry, search, and seizure were
illegal.
Salsburg and his companions were brought to trial in the Circuit
Court of Anne Arundel County charged with making or selling a book
or pool on the result of a running race of horses in violation of
Flack's Md.Ann.Code 1951,
Page 346 U. S. 547
Art. 27, § 306. [
Footnote 1]
Before trial, each of the accused moved to quash the warrant,
suppress and return the seized evidence, and dismiss the proceeding
against him, all on the ground that the proceeding depended upon
illegally seized evidence. Each claimed that the admission of such
evidence was prohibited by a Maryland statute, known as the Bouse
Act, and that a 1951 amendment to that Act which purported to allow
the admission of such evidence in such a prosecution in Anne
Arundel County was invalid because in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [
Footnote 2] The
trial court admitted the evidence. Each of the accused was
convicted and sentenced to serve six months in the Maryland House
of Correction, as well as to pay $1,000 plus costs. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the convictions of Salsburg's
companions
Page 346 U. S. 548
on the ground that neither of them could complain of the
illegality of the search or seizure, because they had no title to
or interest in the premises searched.
Rizzo v. Maryland,
93 A.2d 280. As to Salsburg, the tenant of the premises, the Court
of Appeals heard further argument on the constitutionality of the
1951 amendment, and then affirmed the trial court. 94 A.2d 280. His
case is here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 1257(2).
The history of the Bouse Act is enlightening. Originally,
Maryland courts followed the common law practice of admitting
evidence in criminal prosecutions without regard to the legality of
its obtention.
Lawrence v. Maryland, 103 Md. 17, 32-37, 63
A. 96, 102-104. In 1914, the decision in
Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383,
announced a contrary rule of practice in the federal courts. It
held that evidence illegally seized by federal officers is not
admissible in federal prosecutions. In 1928, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland declined to adopt that practice, and reaffirmed the
Maryland common law practice.
Meisinger v. Maryland, 155
Md.195, 141 A. 536; 142 A. 190. In 1929, the General Assembly of
Maryland passed the Bouse Act substantially adopting the federal
practice for prosecutions of misdemeanors in the state courts.
[
Footnote 3]
This left the common law practice in effect in felony cases.
Marshall v. Maryland, 182 Md. 379, 384, 35 A.2d 115, 118;
Delnegro v. Maryland, 198 Md. 80, 86, 81 A.2d 241,
244.
In 1935, prosecutions under the "Health-Narcotic Drugs" subtitle
of the general title "Crimes and Punishments" were exempted from
the Bouse Act. [
Footnote 4] In
1947,
Page 346 U. S. 549
a proviso was added exempting, in Baltimore County, prosecutions
for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. Md.Laws 1947, c. 752.
In 1951, that proviso was extended to Baltimore City and 13
counties, including Anne Arundel. Md.Laws 1951, c. 145. In the same
year, the amendment now before us exempted prosecutions in Anne
Arundel County
"
for a violation of the gambling laws as contained in
Sections 288 to 307, inclusive, of Article 27 of the Annotated Code
of Maryland (1939 Edition) [now §§ 303-329 of the 1951
edition],
sub-title 'Gaming,' or in any laws amending or
supplementing said subtitle."
Id. c. 704. Also in 1951, this exemption was extended
to Wicomico and Prince George's Counties.
Id., c. 710.
[
Footnote 5]
Appellant concedes that the State has the legislative "power" to
choose either the rule which excludes or that which admits
illegally seized evidence. He does not attack the validity of the
application of one to felonies and of the other to misdemeanors. He
contends, however, that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated when Maryland admits the illegally
seized evidence in prosecutions for certain misdemeanors in certain
counties, but excludes it in prosecutions for the same type of
misdemeanors in other counties and for somewhat comparable
misdemeanors in the same and other counties. He sees no rational
basis for the classifications made in the 1951 amendment.
Whatever may be our view as to the desirability of the
classifications, we conclude that the 1951 amendment
Page 346 U. S. 550
is within the liberal legislative license allowed a state in
prescribing rules of practice. A state has especially wide
discretion in prescribing practice relating to its police power, as
is the case here.
The 1951 amendment establishes no additional or different
offenses in Anne Arundel County. It deals only with the
admissibility of evidence in the prosecution of certain
misdemeanors otherwise established by law. Rules of evidence, being
procedural in their nature, are peculiarly discretionary with the
lawmaking authority, one of whose primary responsibilities is to
prescribe procedures for enforcing its laws. Several states have
followed diametrically opposite policies as to the admission of
illegally seized evidence.
See Appendix,
Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
338 U. S. 33-39.
See also Adams v. New York, 192 U.
S. 585,
192 U. S.
594-596. Maryland seeks to derive some benefit from each
of the policies.
Appellant complains further that prosecutions for lottery
misdemeanors are subject to the rule of exclusion of the Bouse Act,
while those for operating gambling pools are exempt. He complains
also that prosecutions for violations of county gambling
restrictions are subject to the Act, while violations of comparable
state gambling restrictions are not. In our opinion such
differences are not fatal to the legislative scheme. We do not sit
as a superlegislature, or a censor.
"To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its
invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from
judicial interference. The problems of government are practical
ones, and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations
-- illogical, it may be, and unscientific."
Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S.
61,
228 U. S. 69-70.
See also Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.
S. 265,
249 U. S. 268.
Cf. Johnson v. Maryland, 193 Md. 136, 66 A.2d 504.
We find little substance to appellant's claim that distinctions
based on county areas are necessarily so unreasonable
Page 346 U. S. 551
as to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause relates to
equality between persons as such, rather than between areas. This
was established long ago in a decision which upheld a statute of
Missouri requiring that, in the City of St. Louis and four
counties, appeals be made to the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
whereas appeals made elsewhere in that State must be directed to
the Supreme Court of Missouri. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Bradley said:
"[T]here is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State
from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all
or any part of its territory. If the New York, for example, should
see fit to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New
York City and the surrounding counties, and the common law and its
method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in
the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This
would not, of itself, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, be a denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws. . . . It means that no person or class of persons shall be
denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and under like
circumstances."
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22,
101 U. S. 31.
[
Footnote 6]
Page 346 U. S. 552
There seems to be no doubt that Maryland could validly grant
home rule to each of its 23 counties and to the City of Baltimore
to determine this rule of evidence by local option. [
Footnote 7] It is equally clear, although
less usual, that a state legislature may itself determine such an
issue for each of its local subdivisions, having in mind the needs
and desires of each. Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional
requisite.
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S.
91,
234 U. S.
98-99.
Maryland has followed a policy of thus legislating, through its
General Assembly, upon many matters of local concern, including the
prescription of different substantive offenses in different
counties. [
Footnote 8] The
cumbersomeness
Page 346 U. S. 553
of such centrally enacted legislation as compared with the
variations which may result from home rule is a matter for
legislative discretion, not judicial supervision, except where
there is a clear conflict with constitutional limitations. We find
no such conflict here.
The presumption of reasonableness is with the State. [
Footnote 9] While the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of the legislation was not on him,
the Attorney General of Maryland has suggested here several
considerations bearing appropriately upon the action of the General
Assembly. Maryland lies largely between the metropolitan centers of
Baltimore, in Maryland, and of Washington, in the District of
Columbia. Between them are Anne Arundel County, adjoining
Baltimore, and Prince George's County, adjoining Washington. In
Anne Arundel lies Annapolis, the capital of the State, and
considerable rural territory. Those locations suggest that, in
matters related to concentrations of population, the state
government might well find reason to prescribe, at least on an
experimental basis, substantive restrictions and variations in
procedure that would differ from those elsewhere in the State.
Criminal law provides a long established field for such legislative
discretion. [
Footnote 10] In
this
Page 346 U. S. 554
connection, the Attorney General referred specifically to an
increase in gambling activity in Anne Arundel County which he
attributed in part to a policy adopted by the Criminal Court of
Baltimore in imposing maximum prison sentences for gambling
offenses, thus tending to drive gambling operations into adjoining
areas. He suggested, as a justification for a legislative
distinction between prosecutions for violations of state lottery
laws and of the gambling laws here specified, that the former were
of a more readily detected and easily proved character than the
latter.
We find no merit in the suggestion of appellant that the 1951
amendment to the Bouse Act affirmatively sanctions illegal searches
and seizures in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the statute were so interpreted, such a
question might arise. [
Footnote
11] However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not so
interpreted it, and nothing in its text suggests approval of
illegal searches and seizures. The Act offers to offending searches
and seizers no protection or immunity from anything -- be it civil
liability, criminal liability, or disciplinary action.
We sustain the validity of the 1951 amendment to the Bouse Act,
and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, accordingly
is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE REED took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
In the warrant which started this proceeding before a Justice of
the Peace, the section was identified as Art. 27, § 291, Flack's
Md.Ann.Code 1939.
[
Footnote 2]
At the time of the trial, the Bouse Act, including amendments,
appeared as follows in Art. 35, § 5, Flack's Md.Ann.Code 1951:
"No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed
admissible where the same shall have been procured by, through, or
in consequence of any illegal search or seizure or of any search
and seizure prohibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State;
nor shall any evidence in such cases be admissible if procured by,
through, or in consequence of a search and seizure the effect of
the admission of which would be to compel one to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case; provided, however, that nothing
in this section shall prohibit the use of such evidence in
Baltimore County, Baltimore City, Anne Arundel, Caroline, Carroll,
Cecil, Frederick, Harford, Kent, Prince Georges, Queen Anne's,
Talbot, Washington, Wicomico and Worcester Counties, in the
prosecution of any person for unlawfully carrying a concealed
weapon.
Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall
prohibit the use of such evidence in Anne Arundel, Wicomico, and
Prince George's Counties in the prosecution of any person for a
violation of the gambling laws as contained in Sections 303-329,
inclusive, of Article 27, subtitle 'Gaming,' or in any laws
amending or supplementing said sub-title."
(Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 3]
The original Bouse Act, Md.Laws 1929, c.194, consisted of only
that part of the first sentence which precedes the first proviso in
Art. 35, § 5, Flack's Md.Ann.Code 1951.
See note 2 supra.
[
Footnote 4]
Md.Laws 1935, c. 59, now Art. 27, § 368, of Flack's Md.Ann.Code
1951.
[
Footnote 5]
This trend has continued. In 1952, the exemption as to
prosecutions for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon was made
statewide. Md.Laws 1952, c. 59. In 1953, the exemption as to
prosecutions under the above-specified gambling laws has been
extended to Worcester, Howard, and Cecil Counties. Md.Laws 1953,
cc. 84, 419. Finally, prosecutions in Wicomico County under certain
alcoholic beverage laws have been exempted.
Id., c.
581.
[
Footnote 6]
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all
persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the
same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two
States separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this
line, there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side
no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial
proceeding. If diversities of laws and judicial proceedings may
exist in the several States without violating the equality clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid reason why there may
not be such diversities in different parts of the same State."
Id. at
101 U. S. 31.
See also Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.
S. 589,
181 U. S.
597-599;
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S.
68,
120 U. S.
72.
[
Footnote 7]
E.g., as to local option in relation to intoxicating
liquor,
see Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.
S. 445;
Rippey v. Texas, 193 U.
S. 504,
and see Fort Smith Light & Traction Co.
v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387,
274 U. S.
391.
[
Footnote 8]
Without appraising their validity, but as illustrating Maryland
practice, we find Flack's Md.Ann.Code 1951, full of such examples.
Art. 2B -- differing requirements as to sales of alcoholic
beverages in various counties and cities; Art. 27, § 136 -- one
county is exempted from a general prohibition against interference
with water supply; § 146 -- deals with the effect of disorderly
conduct in three counties; § 545 -- exempts two counties from
certain provisions against placing tacks, broken glass, etc., on
highways; § 566 -- makes special provisions as to junk yards in
five counties; §§ 578-610b -- prescribe a variety of
Sabbath-breaking provisions for several counties and
municipalities; Art. 51, § 7 -- grants a right of jury service to
women, except in ten counties; § 9 -- provides varying methods of
selecting jury panels in several counties.
"It has long been the practice of the Maryland Legislature
either to enact local laws or to exempt particular counties from
the operation of general laws."
Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission, 187 Md. 67, 80, 48 A.2d 593, 600;
Stevens v.
Maryland, 89 Md. 669, 674, 43 A. 929, 931.
Cf. Maryland
Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 69 A.2d
471.
[
Footnote 9]
". . . It is . . . a maxim of constitutional law that a
legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits,
upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting
the interests of the people as a whole, and courts will not lightly
hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was one in the
enactment of which it has transcended its power."
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Matthews,
174 U. S. 96,
174 U. S.
104.
"A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial
of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it."
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell,
294 U. S. 580,
294 U. S. 584.
See also Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.,
249 U. S. 152,
249 U. S.
157-158;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S. 61,
220 U. S.
78-79.
[
Footnote 10]
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, supra. The
State is not bound "to strike at all evils at the same time or in
the same way."
Semler v. Oregon Dental Examiners,
294 U. S. 608,
294 U. S.
610.
[
Footnote 11]
". . . we have no hesitation in saying that, were a State
affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy, it
would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
338 U. S.
28.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I am still of the view, expressed on other occasions (
see
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,
338 U. S. 40-41;
Schwartz
v.
Page 346 U. S. 555
Texas, 344 U. S. 199,
344 U. S. 205)
that the Fourteenth and the Fourth Amendments preclude the use in
any criminal prosecution of evidence obtained by the lawless action
of police officers who, in disregard of constitutional safeguards,
ransack houses or places of business without search warrants issued
under the strict surveillance which the Constitution commands.