In 1945, petitioners testified in a naturalization hearing which
resulted in petitioner Bridges' admission to citizenship. In 1949,
all three were indicted under § 37 of the old Criminal Code, 35
Stat. 1096, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 371, for conspiring to
defraud the United States by obstructing the proper administration
of its naturalization laws, Bridges was indicted under § 346(a)(1)
of the Nationality Act of 1940 for testifying falsely in the
naturalization proceeding that he was not and had not been a member
of the Communist Party, and petitioners Schmidt and Robertson were
indicted under § 346(a)(5) of the same Act for willfully and
knowingly aiding Bridges to obtain a certificate of naturalization
by false and fraudulent statements.
Held: The general three-year statute of limitations, 18
U.S.C. (Supp. V), § 3282, is applicable to each of the offenses
charged, and the indictment came too late. Pp.
346 U. S.
210-228.
1. The running of the general three-year statute of limitations
was not suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act in
relation to the offenses charged in any of the counts. Pp.
346 U. S.
215-224
(a) The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applies to
offenses involving the defrauding of the United States in any
manner, but only when the fraud is of a pecuniary nature, or at
least of a nature concerning property; and none of the offenses
here charged were of such a nature. Pp.
346 U. S.
215-221.
(b) The wartime suspension of limitations authorized by Congress
in the language of this Act, or similar language in comparable
acts, is limited strictly to offenses in which defrauding or
attempting to defraud the United States is an essential ingredient
of the offense charged. P.
346 U. S. 221.
(c) Nothing in § 346(a)(1) makes fraud an essential ingredient
of the offense of making a false material statement under oath in a
naturalization proceeding. P.
346 U. S.
222.
(d) Nothing in § 346(a)(5) makes fraud an essential ingredient
of the offense of aiding someone to commit a violation of
Page 346 U. S. 210
§ 346(a)(1), and the insertion in the indictment of the words
"procured by fraud" does not change the result. Pp.
346 U. S.
222-223.
(e) A charge of conspiracy to commit a certain substantive
offense is not entitled to a longer statute of limitations than the
charge of committing the offense itself. P.
346 U. S.
223.
(f) That § 37 of the old Criminal Code, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
§ 371, also applies to conspiracies to defraud the United States
"in any manner or for any purpose" does not require a different
result as to the charge thereunder in this case. Pp.
346 U. S.
223-224.
2. The saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948,
codifying the Criminal Code, does not "save" the special five-year
statute of limitations of § 346(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940
so as to apply it to the violations of the latter Act charged in
the indictment. Pp.
346 U. S.
224-227.
199 F.2d 811 reversed.
The District Court denied petitioners' motions to dismiss their
indictments,
86 F.
Supp. 922, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, 199 F.2d 811, and denied rehearing en banc, 201 F.2d 254.
This Court granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 904.
Reversed and
remanded, p.
346 U. S.
228.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this proceeding, we are limited to the consideration of the
following questions: (1) is it barred by the statute of
limitations, and, if not, (2) is it barred by the principles of
res judicata, or estoppel, or the Due Process Clause
of
Page 346 U. S. 211
the Fifth Amendment? For the reasons hereafter stated we hold
that it is barred by the statute of limitations. We do not reach or
discuss the second question.
The issues raised by the first question are:
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act [
Footnote 1] has suspended the running
of the general three-year statute of limitations [
Footnote 2] in relation to the offenses
charged in --
"Count I, under the general conspiracy statute; [
Footnote 3]"
"Count II, under § 346(a)(1) of the Nationality Act of 1940;
[
Footnote 4] or"
"Count III, under § 346(a)(5) of the Nationality Act of 1940;
[
Footnote 5] and"
2. Whether the saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25,
1948, which enacted the present Criminal Code into law, [
Footnote 6] continued in effect the
special five-year statute of limitations of § 346(g) of the
Nationality Act of 1940 [
Footnote
7] in relation to violations of § 346(a) of that Act.
For the reasons set forth, we reach a negative conclusion on
each of the above issues.
Petitioner Harry Bridges entered the United States in 1920 as an
immigrant seaman from Australia. Subsequently, he defeated two
attempts of the United States to deport him because of his alleged
Communist Party membership or affiliation. The second such
attempt
Page 346 U. S. 212
culminated June 18, 1945, in
Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U. S. 135.
June 23, 1945, he applied, in the San Francisco office of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, for a Certificate of
Arrival and a Preliminary Form for Petition for Naturalization.
August 8, he appeared, with petitioners Schmidt and Robertson,
before an examiner for a preliminary examination. Each of the three
testified that Bridges was not a member of the Communist Party.
September 17, 1945, Bridges appeared in the Superior Court in
San Francisco for the naturalization hearing. Schmidt and Robertson
testified that they had known Bridges for five years or longer,
that he was a resident of the United States during that time, and
that they vouched for his loyalty to the United States. Bridges
gave the following answers under oath:
"Q. Do you now, or have you ever, belonged to any organization
that advocated the overthrow of the government by force or
violence?"
"A. No."
"Q. Do you now, or have you ever, belonged to the Communist
Party in the United States?"
"A. I have not, I do not."
He was then admitted to citizenship.
May 25, 1949, more than three years later, a grand jury in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California returned the present indictment in three counts.
Count I charges the three petitioners with a conspiracy to
defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, and defeating
the proper administration of its naturalization laws by having
Bridges fraudulently petition for and obtain naturalization by
falsely and fraudulently stating to the naturalization court that
he had never belonged to the Communist Party in the United States,
and that
Page 346 U. S. 213
such statement was known at all times by each of the petitioners
to be false and fraudulent. The appearance and testimony of the
petitioners in the naturalization proceeding were alleged as the
overt acts in the conspiracy.
That count is laid under the following general conspiracy
statute:
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to
such conspiracy shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars,
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
§ 37 of the old Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U.S.C. § 88,
now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 371.
Count II charges Bridges with willfully and knowingly making a
false statement under oath in the naturalization proceeding when he
testified that he was not and had not been a member of the
Communist Party. Count II is laid under § 346(a)(1) of the
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1163, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(1), which
makes it a felony for any person --
"Knowingly to make a false statement under oath, either orally
or in writing, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or
under, or by virtue of any law of the United States relating to
naturalization or citizenship. [
Footnote 8] "
Page 346 U. S. 214
Count III charges Schmidt and Robertson with willfully and
knowingly aiding Bridges, who was not entitled thereto, to obtain a
Certificate of Naturalization which was to be procured by false and
fraudulent statements. It avers that they knew that Bridges was a
member of the Communist Party and that he had made false and
fraudulent representations in the naturalization proceeding. Count
III is laid under § 346(a)(5) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54
Stat. 1164, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(5), which makes it a felony --
"To encourage, aid, advise, or assist any person not entitled
thereto to obtain, accept, or receive any certificate of arrival,
declaration of intention, certificate of naturalization, or
certificate of citizenship, or other documentary evidence of
naturalization or of citizenship --"
"a. Knowing the same to have been procured by fraud. . . .
[
Footnote 9]"
Petitioners each moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground,
inter alia, that each count was barred by the statute of
limitations. The motions were denied.
86 F. Supp.
922. The trial resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on each
count. Bridges received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for
two years on Count I and five years on Count II. The other
petitioners each received concurrent sentences of imprisonment for
two years on each of Counts I and III. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. 199 F.2d 811. Rehearing en banc was denied. 201 F.2d 254.
Because of an indicated conflict between that decision and part of
the decision in
Marzani v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C.
78, 168 F.2d 133,
aff'd
Page 346 U. S. 215
by an equally divided Court, 335 U.S. 895, 336 U.S.
922, as well as its conflict in part with
United States v.
Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243, and because of the importance of the
issues, we granted certiorari, 345 U.S. 904. [
Footnote 10]
The acts charged occurred in 1945. Accordingly, unless the
general three-year statute of limitations is suspended or
superseded, the indictment, found in 1949, was out of time, and
must be dismissed. [
Footnote
11]
I.
The running of the general three-year statute of
limitations was not suspended by the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act in relation to the offenses charged in any of the
counts.
A. The suspension prescribed by the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act applies to offenses involving the defrauding of the
United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not,
and in any manner, but only where the fraud is of a pecuniary
nature or at least of a nature concerning property.
The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act creates an exception
to a longstanding congressional "policy of repose"
Page 346 U. S. 216
that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law. From
1790 to 1876, the general limitation applicable to noncapital
offenses was two years, and since then it has been three years.
[
Footnote 12] In relation to
a comparable exception stated in § 1110(a) as the limitation
applicable under the Revenue Act of 1926, [
Footnote 13] Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for
the Court, said:
"Moreover, the concluding clause of the section, though
denominated a proviso, is an excepting clause, and therefore to be
narrowly construed.
United States v. McElvain,
272 U. S.
633,
272 U. S. 639. [
Footnote 14] And, as the section has
to do with statutory crimes, it is to be liberally interpreted in
favor of repose, and ought not to be extended by construction to
embrace so-called frauds not so denominated by the statutes
creating offenses."
United States v. Scharton, 285 U.
S. 518,
285 U. S.
521-522.
The legislative history of this exception emphasizes the
propriety of its conservative interpretation. It indicates a
purpose to suspend the general statute of limitations only as to
war frauds of a pecuniary nature or of a nature concerning
property. It nowhere suggests a purpose to swallow up the
three-year limitation to the extent necessary to reach the offenses
before us.
Page 346 U. S. 217
The present Suspension Act had its origin in the Act of August
24, 1942. [
Footnote 15]
See United States v. Smith, 342 U.
S. 225,
342 U. S.
226-227. That Act was a wartime measure reviving for
World War II substantially the same exception to the general
statute of limitations which, from 1921 to 1927, had been directed
at the war frauds of World War I. [
Footnote 16]
Page 346 U. S. 218
The Committee Reports show that, in 1921, Congress aimed the
proviso at the pecuniary frauds growing out of war contracts.
[
Footnote 17] Congress was
concerned with the exceptional opportunities to defraud the United
States that were inherent in its gigantic and hastily organized
procurement program. It sought to help safeguard the treasury from
such frauds by increasing the time allowed for their discovery and
prosecution. In 1942, the reports
Page 346 U. S. 219
and proceedings demonstrate a like purpose, coupled with a
design to readopt the World War I policy. [
Footnote 18]
Page 346 U. S. 220
This interpretation of the scope of the 1942 provision was
expressly approved in
Marzani v. United States, 83
U.S.App.D.C. 78-82, 168 F.2d 133-137. As to nine counts based upon
the amended False Claims Act, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the 1942 Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act did not suspend the three-year statute of
limitations. Those counts charged that false statements had been
made to government agencies in relation to Communist Party
membership, in connection with an application for a position in the
government service. Referring to
United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, the
Court of Appeals said:
"Thus, the [Supreme] Court held that defrauding the United
States in a pecuniary or financial sense is not a constituent
ingredient of offenses under the False Claims Act."
"It necessarily follows, in our view, that the Suspension Act
does not apply to offenses under the False Claims Act. The Supreme
Court has clearly said (1) that a statute identical in pertinent
part with the Suspension Act does not apply to offenses of which
defrauding the United States in a pecuniary way is not an essential
ingredient; and (2) that such defrauding of the United States is
not an essential ingredient of offenses under the False Claims
statute."
83 U.S.App.D.C. at 81, 168 F.2d at 136.
Brought here on several issues, including dismissal of the nine
counts, that case was twice affirmed, without opinion, by an evenly
divided Court. 335 U.S. 895, 336
Page 346 U. S. 221
U.S. 922.
See also United States v. Cohn, 270 U.
S. 339. [
Footnote
19]
As the offenses here charged are those of knowingly making a
false statement under oath in a proceeding relating to
naturalization (Count II), or of conspiring to have someone do so
(Count I), or of aiding someone to obtain a Certificate of
Naturalization knowing it to be procured by fraud (Count III), none
of them involve the defrauding of the United States in any
pecuniary manner or in a manner concerning property. We accordingly
hold that, for that reason, the Wartime Suspension of Limitations
Act does not apply to those offenses.
B. A further ground for our conclusion is that this Court
already has interpreted the language before us, or similar language
in comparable Acts, to mean that the wartime suspension of
limitations authorized by Congress is limited strictly to offenses
in which defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States is
an essential ingredient of the offense charged. Decisions of this
Court, made prior to 1942, had so interpreted the earlier
legislation that its substantial reenactment, in 1942, carried with
it the interpretation above stated.
United States v.
Scharton, 285 U. S. 518;
United States v. McElvain, 272 U.
S. 633;
United States v. Noveck, 271 U.
S. 201.
See also Braverman v. United States,
317 U. S. 49,
317 U. S. 54-55,
and
United States v. Cohn, 270 U.
S. 339.
Page 346 U. S. 222
The simplest demonstration of this point appears in Count II.
The offense there charged is that Bridges knowingly made a false
material statement in a naturalization proceeding. In that offense,
as in the comparable offense of perjury, fraud is not an essential
ingredient. The offense is complete without proof of fraud,
although fraud often accompanies it. The above-cited cases show
that, even though the offense may be committed in a pecuniary
transaction involving a financial loss to the Government, that fact
alone is not enough to suspend the running of the three-year
statute of limitations. Under the doctrine of these cases, the
suspension does not apply to the offense charged unless, under the
statute creating the offense, fraud is an essential ingredient of
it. The purpose of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is not
that of generally suspending the three-year statute,
e.g.,
in cases of perjury, larceny, and like crimes. It seeks to suspend
the running of it only where fraud against the Government is an
essential ingredient of the crime. In view of the opportunity to
commit such frauds in time of war, and in view of the difficulty of
their prompt discovery and prosecution, the Government seeks extra
time to deal with them. Nothing in § 346(a)(1) makes fraud an
essential ingredient of the offense of making a false material
statement under oath in a naturalization proceeding.
Likewise, in Count III, the aiding of someone to commit that
offense, in violation of § 346(a)(5), does not require proof of
fraud as an essential ingredient. If, as here, the main offense is
complete with the proof of perjury, the suspension does not apply
to the charge of aiding in the commission of that offense. The
insertion in the indictment of the words "procured by fraud" does
not change the offense charged. The embellishment of the indictment
does not lengthen the time for prosecution. It is
Page 346 U. S. 223
the statutory definition of the offense that determines whether
or not the statute of limitations comes within the Suspension
Act.
So it is with Count I. A charge of conspiracy to commit a
certain substantive offense is not entitled to a longer statute of
limitation than the charge of committing the offense itself. There
is no additional time prescribed for indictments for conspiracies
as such. The insertion of surplus words in the indictment does not
change the nature of the offense charged.
"The language of the proviso cannot reasonably be read to
include all conspiracies defined by section 37. [The general
conspiracy section of the old Criminal Code, now 18 U.S.C. (Supp.
V) § 371.] But if the proviso could be construed to include any
conspiracies, obviously it would be limited to those to commit the
substantive offenses which it covers."
United States v. McElvain, 272 U.
S. 633,
272 U. S.
639.
The Government contends that the General Conspiracy Act
[
Footnote 20] under which
Count I is laid comprises two classes of conspiracies: (1) "to
commit any offense against the United States," and (2) "to defraud
the United States in any manner or for any purpose." It urges that
the indictment here charges a conspiracy to defraud the United
States under the second clause. It suggests that, under that
clause, proof of a specific intent to defraud is an essential
ingredient of the offense, and thus brings Count I within the
Suspension Act. The fallacy in that argument is that, while the
indictment may be framed in the language of the second clause, both
it and the proof to support it rely solely on the fact of a
conspiracy to commit the substantive offenses violating § 346(a)(1)
or
Page 346 U. S. 224
§ 346(a)(5) as charged in Counts II and III. Count I actually
charges that petitioner conspired to "defraud the United States"
only by causing the commission of the identical offenses charged in
Counts II and III. The use in Count I of language copied from the
second clause of the conspiracy statute merely cloaks a factual
charge of conspiring to cause, or knowingly to aid, Bridges to make
a false statement under oath in his naturalization proceeding, or
to obtain by false statements a Certificate of Naturalization to
which he was not entitled.
The Court of Appeals, in
Marzani v. United States,
supra, was convinced that the Suspension Act did not apply to
such offenses, as those here involved, under the False Claims Act,
no matter what words descriptive of fraud were added to the
indictment, so long as fraud was not an essential ingredient of the
offense defined in the statute. Another Court of Appeals arrived at
a like conclusion in
United States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d
243, 256-257, with respect to offenses under the statute involved
in Count II of the instant indictment.
II.
The saving clause in § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948,
does not "save" the special five-year statute of limitations of the
National Act of 1940 so as to apply it to the violations of that
Act charged in Counts II and III.
The Government contends, alternatively, that the indictment,
which was found May 25, 1949, was timely as to Counts II and III,
even if the Suspension Act is not applicable to this indictment.
Its alternative contention is that those counts respectively charge
violations of § 346(a)(1) and (5) of the Nationality Act of 1940
which occurred in 1945, and that the indictment for them was found
within the special five-year limitation of § 346(g)
Page 346 U. S. 225
of that Act. [
Footnote
21] It appears, however, that § 346(a-h) was expressly
repealed, as of September 1, 1948, by § 21 of the Act of June 25,
1948, which enacted the new Criminal Code into law. Including its
controversial saving clause, that repealing section reads as
follows:
"SEC. 21. The sections or parts thereof of the Revised Statutes
or Statutes at Large enumerated in the following schedule are
hereby repealed. [
Footnote
22] Any rights or liabilities now existing under such sections
or parts thereof shall not be affected by this repeal."
62 Stat. 862.
By such repeal of § 346(g), the general three-year statute of
limitations became applicable. 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
[
Footnote 23] Three years
having expired before the indictment was found, § 3282 bars the
instant indictment. The Government, however, contends that the
above-quoted saving clause in § 21 refers not only to substantive
liabilities, but also to the period during which a crime may be
prosecuted, and thus includes the special five-year limitation
contained in § 346(g). This issue was presented to the Court of
Appeals in the instant case and was decided against the Government.
199 F.2d 811, 819-820. In doing so, the court relied in part upon a
like conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Obermeier, supra. That case related to an
indictment in two counts for knowingly making, in
Page 346 U. S. 226
1945, in a naturalization proceeding, as here, false statements
under oath in relation to membership in the Communist Party. The
review of legislative materials and court decisions made there need
not be repeated here in reaching the same result -- that the saving
clause in § 21 did not keep the special five-year limitation alive
after September 1, 1948. [
Footnote 24]
The purpose of Congress to substitute the general three-year
limitation in place of the special five-year limitation is
indicated in the Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3282,
which says:
"In the consolidation of these sections, the 5-year period of
limitation for violations of the Nationality Code, provided for in
said section 746(g) of Title 8, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Aliens and
Nationality, is reduced to 3 years. There seemed no sound basis for
considering 3 years adequate in the case of heinous felonies and
gross frauds against the United States, but inadequate for misuse
of a passport or false statement to a naturalization examiner."
To adopt the interpretation proposed by the Government would
produce the situation that offenses committed in August, 1948,
would be indictable until August, 1953, whereas like offenses
committed in the following October, 1948, would not be indictable
after October, 1951. The longer period for the prosecution of the
earlier offenses has no relation to war conditions. Such a result
is not to be inferred without a clear direction to that effect.
Finally, to interpret the words "rights or liabilities" in the
saving clause as including such procedural incidents as the period
within which indictments may be found
Page 346 U. S. 227
would overlook the practice of Congress to specify the saving of
such limitations expressly when and if Congress wished them to be
"saved." In the Revised Statutes of 1874, § 5598 preserved "All
offenses committed, and all penalties and forfeitures," but,
nevertheless, § 5599 was inserted to add
"All acts of limitation, whether applicable to civil causes and
proceedings, or to the prosecution of offenses, or for the recovery
of penalties or forfeitures. . . . [
Footnote 25]"
The 1909 Criminal Code contained similar provisions in §§ 343
and 344. 35 Stat. 1159. In 1933, when the Revised Statutes were
reexamined and obsolete sections, including § 5598, were repealed,
§ 5599 was retained. 47 Stat. 1431. The reason then given for its
retention was that the survival clause in the general repealing
statute, 47 Stat. 1431, referred "only to "rights" and
"liabilities" and not to remedies, recourse to which may be barred
by limitation." S.Rep. No. 1205, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 3.
See
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620.
As the general three-year statute of limitations is applicable
to each of the offenses charged, and has been neither suspended by
the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act nor made inapplicable by
§ 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948, the indictment in this proceeding
came too late to be effective. The motion to dismiss it should
Page 346 U. S. 228
have been granted when first made. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals, accordingly, is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
District Court with direction to dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3287.
[
Footnote 2]
18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
[
Footnote 3]
§ 37 of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U.S.C. § 88, now 18
U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 371.
[
Footnote 4]
54 Stat. 1163, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(1), now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §
1015(a).
[
Footnote 5]
54 Stat. 1164, 8 U.S.C. § 746(a)(5), now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §
1425.
[
Footnote 6]
62 Stat. 862.
[
Footnote 7]
54 Stat. 1167, 8 U.S.C. § 746(g).
[
Footnote 8]
Section 346(a) was repealed by § 21 of the Act of June 25, 1948,
62 Stat. 862, 868. Simultaneously, § 346(a)(1) was substantially
reenacted in 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 1015(a). For the effect, if any,
of the saving clause in § 21 upon the statute of limitations
relating to § 346(a),
see pp.
346 U. S.
224-227,
infra.
[
Footnote 9]
See note 8
supra, as to repeal of § 346(a). Simultaneously, §
346(a)(5) was substantially reenacted in 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) §
1425.
[
Footnote 10]
The grant was limited to questions 1 and 2 presented by the
petition for the writ,
viz.:
"(1) Whether, in view of prior adjudications, including the
determination of this Court in
Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U. S.
135, this proceeding is barred, in whole or in part, by
the principles of
res judicata, or estoppel, or the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
"(2) Whether this proceeding is barred by the statute of
limitations."
[
Footnote 11]
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall
be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital,
unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted
within three years next after such offense shall have been
committed."
18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3282.
[
Footnote 12]
1 Stat. 119; R.S. § 1044; 19 Stat. 32-33. The limitation as to
treason or other capital offenses was three years from 1790 until
it was removed in 1939. 1 Stat. 119; R.S. § 1043; 53 Stat. 1198; 18
U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3281.
[
Footnote 13]
44 Stat. 114-115, 18 U.S.C. (1925 ed., Supp. V) § 585.
[
Footnote 14]
". . . The purposes of the added proviso [to the general
limitation section] was to carve out a special class of cases. It
is to be construed strictly, and held to apply only to cases shown
to be clearly within its purpose."
United States v. McElvain, 272 U.
S. 633,
272 U. S.
639.
[
Footnote 15]
". . . the running of any existing statute of limitations
applicable to offenses involving the defrauding or attempts to
defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by
conspiracy or not, and in any manner, and now indictable under any
existing statutes, shall be suspended until June 30, 1945, or until
such earlier time as the Congress by concurrent resolution, or the
President, may designate. . . ."
56 Stat. 747-748.
This was amended in 1944 by the insertion of more specific
references to war contracts and to the handling of property under
the Surplus Property Act of 1944. 58 Stat. 667 and 781. Since
September 1, 1948, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3287, has provided that
--
"When the United States is at war, the running of any statute of
limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in
any manner, whether by conspiracy or not, or (2) committed in
connection with the acquisition, care, handling, custody, control
or disposition of any real or personal property of the United
States, or (3) committed in connection with the negotiation,
procurement, award, performance, payment for, interim financing,
cancelation, or other termination or settlement, of any contract,
subcontract, or purchase order which is connected with or related
to the prosecution of the war, or with any disposition of
termination inventory by any war contractor or Government agency,
shall be suspended until three years after the termination of
hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent
resolution of Congress. . . ."
The President proclaimed the termination of hostilities of World
War II, December 31, 1946. 3 CFR, 1946 Supp. 77-78.
[
Footnote 16]
"SEC. 1044. . . .
Provided, however, That in offenses
involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States
or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any
manner, and now indictable under any existing statutes, the period
of limitation shall be six years. . . ."
42 Stat. 220, November 17, 1921.
This proviso was eliminated by 45 Stat. 51, December 27,
1927.
[
Footnote 17]
In 1921, H.R.Rep.No. 365, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, supporting
the bill to enact the proviso, said:
"The Department of Justice has been engaged in the investigation
and is now engaged in the investigation of various alleged
offenses, consisting largely of frauds against the Government which
are claimed to have occurred during the war with Germany and since
its conclusion. Many of these alleged offenses grew out of the
[contractual] relation of the Government with various persons and
corporations engaged in the furnishing of military and naval
supplies of various kinds. Many of these transactions require the
most minute investigation in order to ascertain the exact facts,
and in every case a considerable period must elapse before such
facts may be gathered from the files and other sources that the
department may know whether prosecutions are justified or not. In
many cases, months, and perhaps considerable longer periods, will
be required for such investigations."
See also 61 Cong.Rec. 7060-7061, 7640.
In 1927, H.R.Rep.No. 16, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, supporting the
bill to eliminate the 1921 proviso, said:
"In 1921, the Attorney General represented that he was desirous
of having further time to investigate alleged war frauds, and that.
owing to the nature of the investigations, the statute of
limitations might run before it would be possible to obtain
indictments, and he therefore requested that the period of the
statute of limitations applicable to conspiracy to defraud the
Government of the United States should be extended from three years
to six years. The Congress complied with the request, and the
limitation was extended from three to six years so to that
particular class of offenses."
"The reasons for the above change have ceased to exist; that is,
the Department of Justice announced some time ago that it did not
propose to attempt any further prosecution of offenses of that
character, that is to say, offenses giving rise to the
statute."
See also 69 Cong.Rec. 473, 842.
[
Footnote 18]
In 1942, S.Rep.No. 1544, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, supporting
the suspension of the running of the statute, said:
"The purpose of the proposed legislation is to suspend any
existing statutes of limitations applicable to offenses involving
the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States or any
agency thereof, for the period of the present war. Contracting for
the United States is done through its various agencies, including
the departments and independent establishments and Government-owned
and Government-controlled corporations, and frauds against all of
these agencies are intended to be embraced by the bill."
"During the World War, many frauds committed against the
Government were not discovered until the 3-year statute of
limitations had almost expired, and, as stated in the committee
report hereinafter referred to, many of the alleged offenses were
barred from prosecution. The general criminal statute of
limitations (Rev.Stats., sec. 1044) was amended on November 17,
1921, extending the period to 6 years in respect to offenses
involving frauds against the United States. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"During normal times, the present 3-year statute of limitations
may afford the Department of Justice sufficient time to
investigate, discover, and gather evidence to prosecute frauds
against the Government. The United States, however, is engaged in a
gigantic war program. Huge sums of money are being expended for
materials and equipment in order to carry on the war successfully.
Although steps have been taken to prevent and to prosecute frauds
against the Government, it is recognized that, in the varied
dealings, opportunities will no doubt be presented for unscrupulous
persons to defraud the Government or some agency. These frauds may
be difficult to discover, as is often true of this type of offense,
and many of them may not come to light for some time to come. The
law enforcement branch of the Government is also busily engaged in
its many duties, including the enforcement of the espionage,
sabotage, and other laws."
A similar statement was made in H.R.Rep.No. 2051, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2, supporting the same bill H.R. 6484.
See also 88
Cong.Rec. 6160. This bill, readopting the 1921 policy, was
introduced at the suggestion of the Attorney General in lieu of a
proposal then pending to suspend the running of the statute of
limitations for every offense punishable under the laws of the
United States. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4916, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 6,
8,
and see 88 Cong.Rec. 4759-4760.
[
Footnote 19]
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, and
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.
S. 182, are not to the contrary. The statements there
made refer to conspiracies to defraud the United States "in any
manner or for any purpose" as used in the second clause of the
general conspiracy section.
See § 37 of the old Criminal
Code, 35 Stat. 1096, now § 371 of the new Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.
(Supp. V).
See also United States v. Gilliland,
312 U. S. 86. They
do not control the interpretation of the provisions in the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act discussed in this opinion.
[
Footnote 20]
§ 37 of the old Criminal Code, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U.S.C. § 88,
now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 371,
see p.
346 U. S. 213,
supra.
[
Footnote 21]
"(g) No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any
crime arising under the provisions of this Act unless the
indictment is found or the information is filed within five years
next after the commission of such crime."
54 Stat. 1167, 8 U.S.C. § 746(g).
[
Footnote 22]
In that schedule of repealed actions, at 62 Stat. 868, are §§
346(a-h), (l), and 347 of the Nationality Act of 1940, also
identified as from Chapter 876, 54 Stat. 1163-1168, approved
October 14, 1940.
[
Footnote 23]
See note 11
supra.
[
Footnote 24]
In
United States v. Smith, 342 U.
S. 225,
342 U. S.
226-227, n. 1, we assumed, without deciding, that this
reservation had no effect on the running of a statute of
limitations.
[
Footnote 25]
See also the general saving clause that was in the
Revised Statutes but has been regarded as not applicable to matters
of remedy and procedure:
"SEC. 13. The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to
release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability
incurred under such statute unless the repealing Act shall so
expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still
remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action
or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or
liability."
See 1 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 109.
Hallowell v.
Commons, 239 U. S. 506;
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205,
218 U. S. 218;
Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U.
S. 452.
MR. JUSTICE REED, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
MINTON join, dissenting.
The limitation for prosecutions under the second clause of 18
U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to defraud the United States, formerly
fixed at three years by 18 U.S.C. § 3282, limitation for offenses
not capital, is suspended for us by the Wartime Suspension of
Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287. The Code sections, so far as
applicable, appear below. [
Footnote
2/1] As stated in the Court's opinion, the indictment
Page 346 U. S. 229
under § 371 was brought more than three years after the alleged
offense, but within time if the wartime suspension applies. The
applicability of that section, § 3287, depends upon whether the
conspiracy charged in the indictment was an offense "involving
fraud . . . against the United States . . . in any manner, whether
by conspiracy or not" within the meaning of said § 3287.
An indictment under § 371 may be found for conspiracy to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States. These are alternative, disjunctive provisions. One
addresses itself to the conspiracy to commit substantive offenses
specified under other statutes, the other to a conspiracy to
defraud the United States. Such a conspiracy is itself the
substantive offense charged in the indictment. This construction
has been accepted by the courts without variation. [
Footnote 2/2]
The indictment, Count I, charges conspiracy "to defraud the
United States by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the proper
administration of its naturalization laws" by causing Bridges
falsely and fraudulently to state that he "had never belonged to
the Communist Party in the United States." We think that this
alleged offense, since it is an effort to defraud the United States
by impairing or obstructing or defeating its naturalization laws,
obviously falls within the terms of the suspension of limitations,
§ 3287, "involving fraud" "by conspiracy."
We see nothing in the legislative history of § 3287 to raise a
question as to its applicability to this indictment. The opinion of
the Court quotes excerpts from reports concerning the need of
suspension of limitation following the First World War. A statute
was then passed, which
Page 346 U. S. 230
we accept as having been enacted for the same purpose and with
the same coverage as the present legislation.
See n 15 of the Court's opinion. Those
reports do show that war frauds of a pecuniary nature were
uppermost in the minds of Congress. Court's opinion,
n 17. This was only natural in view of the
haste and waste of war, but it does not follow logically that
frauds against the proper exercise of governmental functions are
excluded. The cited excerpts do not specifically exclude them.
Certainly frauds impairing, obstructing, or defeating selective
service, [
Footnote 2/3] alien
property, [
Footnote 2/4]
administration of prices and wages, [
Footnote 2/5] and the allotment of scarce material,
[
Footnote 2/6] as well as the
Immigration and Nationality Act, would hardly be omitted knowingly
by Congress from a suspension of limitation for frauds against the
Government. Yet many of these would fall under the Court's
interpretation that wartime suspension applies only to war frauds
of a pecuniary nature or of a nature concerning property. It was as
hard, perhaps harder, to find and punish frauds against
administration as those of a pecuniary or property nature. A
general amnesty bill against war frauds would be fairer than to
hold only those guilty of financial frauds. Both the purpose and
the language of the Suspension Act lead to the conclusion that
frauds against administration are within its scope.
The Court asserts that the Wartime Suspension Act should be
limited to those frauds of a pecuniary or property nature because
the Act is an exception to a "longstanding congressional
policy
of repose.'" Of course,
Page 346 U. S.
231
statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. But our
public policy is fixed by Congress, not the courts. [Footnote 2/7] The public policy on repose
for wartime frauds is fixed by the Suspension Act, and it is the
words of that Act that determine our policy, not some general
feeling that litigation over frauds should end.
Nor can we accept the Court's reliance on
Marzani v. United
States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 168 F.2d 133, 137, as a sound
precedent for construing the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act
to apply only to frauds of a pecuniary or property nature. On
review, this Court was evenly divided. The Court of Appeals held
that the Wartime Suspension Act did not apply, because
"[t]he Supreme Court has clearly said (1) that a statute
identical in pertinent part with the Suspension Act does not apply
to offenses of which defrauding the United States in a pecuniary
way is not an essential ingredient; and (2) that such defrauding of
the United States is not an essential ingredient of offenses under
the False Claims statute."
168 F.2d at 136. Marzani was indicted under the False Claims
Act. [
Footnote 2/8]
The cases relied upon for the first point are
United States
v. Noveck, 271 U. S. 201;
United States v. McElvain, 272 U.
S. 633, and
United States v. Scharton,
285 U. S. 518.
Noveck's case held an indictment for perjury in an income tax
return was barred, despite a suspension statute much like § 3287,
because fraud was not an element of the crime of perjury.
McElvain's case held similarly as to the substantive offense of a
willful attempt to evade a tax. Scharton's case followed
Noveck, and held that fraud on the United States was not
an ingredient of evading a tax by false statements.
Page 346 U. S. 232
Under the second point, the Court of Appeals relied upon
United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S.
86. There this Court held that the 1934 Amendment to
Criminal Code § 35, 48 Stat. 996, enlarged § 35 so as to include
false representations in any documents "within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States." 312 U.S. at
312 U. S. 90.
Thus, the former holding of this Court that the False Claims Act
was restricted to "pecuniary or property loss,"
United States
v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339,
270 U. S. 346,
was made inapplicable to the section as amended. The Court of
Appeals, however, thought that the
Gilliland decision
meant that defrauding the United States in a financial sense is not
a constituent ingredient under the False Claims Act. Therefore, the
Suspension Act did not apply.
Cf. United States v.
Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367. It is immaterial whether the
Court of Appeals was correct in thinking that defrauding the United
States in a financial sense was an essential ingredient of the
False Claims Act. We think it clear that defrauding the United
States is an essential ingredient of this charge of conspiracy
under § 371. We do not think
Marzani adds strength to the
Court's position that the Suspension Act applies only to financial
fraud.
The cases both under the first and second points of the
Marzani decision deal with the suspension statutes as
applied to substantive crimes that did not require proof of fraud
against the United States for conviction. It was enough that the
charge and proof showed perjury, false swearing or
misrepresentation to a government agency. Fraud was not an
essential ingredient. The contrary is true in the present
prosecution under Count I.
As we showed in the second paragraph of this opinion, the
substantive crime here charged is the conspiracy to defraud the
United States, punishable as a conspiracy. The fraud is an
essential element. There can be no doubt that this crime, denounced
by § 371, covers nonpecuniary
Page 346 U. S. 233
or nonproperty frauds. This has been true since
Haas v.
Henkel, 216 U. S. 462,
216 U. S. 479.
[
Footnote 2/9] We do not agree with
the Court's analysis of the indictment that the offenses charged in
Count I are "knowingly making a false statement" in a
naturalization proceeding or aiding to obtain a certificate of
naturalization by fraud. These are the overt acts of the Count I
conspiracy, not the substantive offense of defrauding the
Government in its administrative processes charged in Count I.
As Count I describes the substantive offense of conspiracy to
defraud the United States, we do not agree with the Court's
statement that:
"The use in Count I of language copied from the second clause of
the conspiracy statute merely cloaks a factual charge of conspiring
to cause, or knowingly to aid, Bridges to make a false statement
under oath in his naturalization proceeding, or to obtain by false
statements a Certificate of Naturalization to which he was not
entitled."
To prove the substantive offense of conspiracy under § 371, it
is necessary to prove the fraud. It cannot be said that a false
statement as to Communist membership in a naturalization hearing
would not be a fraud against the administration of the
naturalization laws within the language of
Haas v. Henkel,
supra, of "impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful
function of any department of government." 216 U.S. at
216 U. S.
479.
We therefore would affirm the judgment below as to Count I.
Petitioners have also contended here that the conviction is barred
because the principles of
res judicata or collateral
estoppel require us to hold that Bridges' nonmembership during the
crucial period has been judicially
Page 346 U. S. 234
determined. They point to the Landis proceedings of 1938,
referred to in
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.
S. 135,
326 U. S. 138,
this Court's decision in that case, and the naturalization
proceedings themselves of 1945. None of these, though, are
res
judicata, since this is a criminal cause. Nor can collateral
estoppel be invoked. There has been no court holding that Bridges
has not been a Communist. The Landis determination of then
nonmembership was not a judicial one.
Pearson v. Williams,
202 U. S. 281. In
Bridges v. Wixon, supra, no holding on the factual
question of membership was reached. And the naturalization
proceedings did not determine nonmembership, because Bridges could
legally have been granted citizenship even had he been found by the
Court to have been a member of the Communist Party.
See 8
U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 705, 707, which merely prohibited grant of
naturalization to members of organizations advocating the overthrow
of the government, or to those not attached to the Constitution.
This has been changed. 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)(2). There is no necessary
identity in law between Communist Party members and such persons.
See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.
S. 118.
Cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.
S. 524,
342 U. S. 536,
n. 22.
As our views have not prevailed as to Count I, we forbear to
express any views as to Counts II and III.
[
Footnote 2/1]
18 U.S.C. § 371:
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
Id., § 3282:
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall
be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital,
unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted
within three years next after such offense shall have been
committed."
Id., § 3287:
"When the United States is at war, the running of any statute of
limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or
attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in
any manner, whether by conspiracy or not, . . . shall be suspended
until three years after the termination of hostilities as
proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of
Congress."
[
Footnote 2/2]
Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 423-424;
Miller v. United States, 24 F.2d 353, 360;
United
States v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365, 368.
Cf. United States v.
Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 838-839, a case in which two Justices of
this Court sat as Circuit Justices.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C.App. §§
321, 451-470, 1001-1017.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, as amended, 55 Stat.
839, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1
et seq.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798, as amended, 65
Stat. 131, 66 Stat. 296, 50 U.S.C.App. § 2061
et seq., §§
2101-2110.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Ibid., §§ 1912, 2072, 2073.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24,
334 U. S.
34-35.
[
Footnote 2/8]
18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 80, substantially reenacted, 18 U.S.C. §
287.
[
Footnote 2/9]
See also United States v. Cohn, 270 U.
S. 339,
270 U. S. 346;
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.
S. 182,
265 U. S. 188;
cf. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.
S. 702.