A passenger bought from a railroad a ticket for a journey from
Meriden, Conn., to Fall River, Mass., via New Haven, Conn. On
arriving at New Haven, she alighted to transfer to another train
leaving about an hour later. At the station, her suitcase was
solicited by a redcap employee of the railroad, to whom she handed
it with instructions to return it at the Fall River train. No
baggage check was given, and no money paid. The suitcase was lost,
and the passenger sued in a state court. The railroad company
claimed that its liability was limited to $25 by a tariff filed
with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The state court rendered
judgment for $615, the actual value of the lost baggage.
Held: judgment affirmed. Pp.
346 U. S.
129-136.
(a) The transaction was incident to an interstate journey, and
the Interstate Commerce Act controls to whatever extent its
provisions apply. Pp.
346 U. S.
130-131.
(b) The suitcase in question was not "baggage carried on
passenger trains" within the meaning of the first exception added
in 1916 to the Carmack Amendment, 39 Stat. 442, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11).
Pp.
346 U. S.
131-135.
(c) Nor did the tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission control, since there was no "value declared in writing
by the shipper or agreed upon in writing" within the meaning of the
second exception to the Carmack Amendment. P.
346 U. S.
135.
(d) Only by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose
between higher and lower liability by paying a correspondingly
greater or lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to
an amount less than the actual loss sustained. Pp.
346 U. S.
135-136.
139 Conn. 278, 93 A.2d 165, affirmed.
A Connecticut state court awarded respondent a judgment against
a railroad for the loss of a suitcase entrusted to a redcap. The
State Supreme Court affirmed. 139
Page 346 U. S. 129
Conn. 278, 93 A.2d 165. This Court granted certiorari. 345 U.S.
903.
Affirmed, p.
346 U. S. 136.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the extent of an interstate carrier's
liability for a passenger's baggage loss. On October 5, 1949, Mrs.
Nothnagle, respondent here, purchased a railway ticket from
petitioner in Meriden, Connecticut, for a journey to Fall River,
Massachusetts, via New Haven, Connecticut. She boarded a train in
Meriden at 11:19 a.m., and later arrived shortly after 11:30 a.m.
in New Haven, where she alighted for transfer to another train. On
the station platform, here suitcase was solicited by a redcap
employee of petitioner, and she handed it to him with orders to
return it at the Fall River train departing at 12:40 p.m. No
baggage check was given; no money was paid. The suitcase vanished,
and respondent sued. At trial in the Meriden City Court, the
parties stipulated that the baggage and contents actually worth
$615 were lost due to petitioner's negligence. Petitioner insisted,
however, that its liability as an interstate carrier was governed
by a tariff schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission
which limited a recovery for baggage loss to $25 unless the
passenger had, in writing, declared a higher valuation.
The state courts granted full recovery to respondent. The trial
court found that, although respondent had not declared a greater
value, she had neither actual knowledge
Page 346 U. S. 130
of petitioner's asserted restriction nor was notified of its
existence by a legend on a baggage receipt or posted signs. In any
event, the court concluded, petitioner had accepted the baggage
only "for safekeeping, and not for transportation," so that the
parties' rights were determinable by Connecticut principles of
bailments, rather than any rule of federal law. [
Footnote 1] The Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors affirmed, viewing respondent's journey from Meriden to Fall
River as not "continuous," and "suspended for a substantial time in
New Haven" to be resumed only when she boarded the Fall River
train. [
Footnote 2]
Accordingly, that court deemed the case governed by Connecticut
law, under which petitioner was held liable for $615. [
Footnote 3] Petitioner claims that this
decision impairs federal rights secured by the Interstate Commerce
Act, and we granted certiorari to examine the scope of that
statutory protection. 345 U.S. 903.
We have little doubt that the transaction was incident to an
interstate journey within the ambit of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Neither continuity of interstate movement nor isolated segments of
the trip can be decisive.
"The actual facts govern. For this purpose, the destination
intended by the passenger when he begins his journey and known to
the carrier determines the character of the commerce."
Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163,
277 U. S. 168
(1928).
And see Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R. Co. v.
Settle, 260 U. S. 166,
260 U. S. 171
(1922);
Galveston, H. & S.A. R. Co. v. Woodbury,
254 U. S. 357
(1920). In this case, respondent undertook a voyage from
Connecticut to Massachusetts, with a temporary stopover for
transfer along the way. And it goes unchallenged here that the
redcap to whom she entrusted her baggage was a railroad
Page 346 U. S. 131
employee performing functions, whether viewed as services in
connection with an interrupted through trip from Meriden to Fall
River or with the second unquestionably interstate leg of
respondent's journey, incident to interstate travel and reached by
the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Cf. Williams v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386,
315 U. S. 394
(1942);
Stopher v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 246
I.C.C. 41 (1941). [
Footnote 4]
The Interstate Commerce Act, therefore, must control to whatever
extent its provisions apply.
With the enactment in 1906 of the Carmack Amendment, Congress
superseded diverse state laws with a nationally uniform policy
governing interstate carriers' liability for property loss.
E.g., Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.
S. 491,
226 U. S.
504-505 (1913);
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v.
Carl, 227 U. S. 639,
227 U. S.
648-649 (1913). Insofar as now pertinent, that enactment
provided that any interstate railroad
"receiving property for transportation . . . shall issue a
receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the
lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such
property caused by it . . . , and no contract, receipt, rule, or
regulation shall exempt such . . . railroad . . . from the
liability hereby imposed. [
Footnote
5]"
In 1915, Congress fortified the Carmack Amendment by adding, in
part, that "any such limitation, without respect to the manner or
form in which it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be
unlawful and void." [
Footnote
6] One year
Page 346 U. S. 132
later, however, a proviso qualified that prohibition by
rendering it inapplicable
"first, to baggage carried on passenger trains . . . , or trains
. . . carrying passengers; second, to property . . . received for
transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been or
shall hereafter be expressly authorized or required by order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates
dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or
agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in
which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect
than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the
value so declared or released. . . . [
Footnote 7] "
Page 346 U. S. 133
We assume that petitioner's tariff was properly filed pursuant
to a lawful authorization by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In
Stopher v. Cincinnati Union Terminal Co., 246 I.C.C. 41,
44-47 (1941), the Commission determined that an interstate
railroad's redcap services constituted railroad transportation as
defined by the Act, and directed that a tariff covering service
charges be filed. [
Footnote 8]
See also Dayton Union R. Co. Tariff for Redcap Service,
256 I.C.C. 289 (1943);
Redcap Service, Cincinnati, Columbus,
Indianapolis, 277 I.C.C. 427 (1950). Petitioner railroad
participated in filing New England Joint Tariff RC No. 3-N with the
Commission.
Cf. American Railway Express Co. v.
Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584,
260 U. S.
588-589 (1923). In addition to listing a schedule of
charges per piece and truckload of baggage, that tariff
declares
Page 346 U. S. 134
that
"Carriers will not accept a greater liability than Twenty-five
(25) Dollars per bag or parcel . . . handled by Red Caps under the
provisions of this tariff, unless a greater value is declared in
writing by the passenger. If a greater value is so declared in
writing by the passenger, an additional charge of
Ten (10)
Cents per bag or parcel will be made for each One Hundred
(100) Dollars or fraction thereof above Twenty-five (25) Dollars so
declared. Any bag or parcel which is declared by the passenger to
have a
value in excess of Five Hundred (500) Dollars will not
be accepted for handling by Red Caps under the provisions of
this tariff."
Clearly, that limitation of liability is voided by the Act
unless saved by the statutory proviso.
Adams Express Co. v.
Darden, 265 U. S. 265
(1924);
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore
Co., 253 U. S. 97
(1920). The excepted "baggage carried on passenger trains" refers
solely to free baggage checked through on a passenger fare.
See, e.g., Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker,
233 U. S. 97,
233 U. S. 117.
[
Footnote 9] It cannot apply to
redcap service for which the carrier exacts a separate charge,
because the cost of providing that facility is not an element in
the determination of passenger rates.
Redcap Service,
Cincinnati, Columbus, Indianapolis, 277 I.C.C. 427, 436
(1950). [
Footnote 10] The
limitation must therefore qualify under
Page 346 U. S. 135
the proviso as part of an authorized schedule of rates graduated
according to property valuations in writing. Petitioner's tariff,
on its face, does not deviate from the statutory standard, and it
may be read as complying with the law.
Cf. American Railway
Express Co. v. Lindenburg, supra; Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.
Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319,
241 U. S. 327
(1916).
But the facts here do not bring the case within the statutory
conditions. There was no "value declared in writing by the shipper
or agreed upon in writing" -- in fact, not even a baggage check
reciting a limitation provision changed hands. [
Footnote 11] Moreover, the actual value of
respondent's baggage exceeded $500; the tariff itself deems such
highly valued property unacceptable for handling by redcaps. But
only by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between
higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or
lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to an amount
less than the actual loss sustained.
Boston & Maine R. Co.
v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439,
246 U. S.
444-445 (1918);
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke,
255 U. S. 317,
255 U. S.
321-323 (1921);
cf. The Steamship Ansaldo San
Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U.
S. 494,
294 U. S.
497-498 (1935). Binding respondent by a limitation which
she had no reasonable opportunity to discover
Page 346 U. S. 136
would effectively deprive her of the requisite choice; [
Footnote 12] such an arrangement
would amount to a forbidden attempt to exonerate a carrier from the
consequences of its own negligent acts.
Ibid.; cf. Watson Bros.
Transp. Co. v. Feinberg Kosher Sausage Co., 193 F.2d 283, 286
(1951).
"The great object of the law governing common carriers was to
secure the utmost care in the rendering of a service of the highest
importance to the community. A carrier who stipulates not to be
bound to the exercise of care and diligence 'seeks to put off the
essential duties of his employment.' It is recognized that the
carrier and the individual customer are not on an equal footing.
'The latter . . . cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek
redress in the courts.'
Santa Fe, P. & P. R. Co. v. Grant
Bros. Construction Co., 228 U. S. 177,
228 U. S.
184-185 (1913). In sum, respondent cannot be held bound
by petitioner's limitation, and the judgment of the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors must be"
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
R. 7-9. The decision of the Meriden City Court is not
reported.
[
Footnote 2]
139 Conn. 278, 282, 93 A.2d 165, 167 (1952).
[
Footnote 3]
139 Conn. at 283, 93 A.2d at 167.
[
Footnote 4]
Neither here nor in
Williams was the Commission's
ruling in the
Stopher case challenged.
[
Footnote 5]
34 Stat. 595, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11).
[
Footnote 6]
38 Stat. 1197, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). The 1915 amendment was
qualified by the following proviso:
"
Provided, however, That, if the goods are hidden from
view by wrapping, boxing, or other means, and the carrier is not
notified as to the character of the goods, the carrier may require
the shipper to specifically state in writing the value of the
goods, and the carrier shall not be liable beyond the amount so
specifically stated, in which case the Interstate Commerce
Commission may establish and maintain rates for transportation,
dependent upon the value of the property shipped as specifically
stated in writing by the shipper."
The object of the legislation was the imposition of full
liability on carriers except (1)
"where the property shipped is hidden from view by wrapping,
[so] that the representation as to value made by the shipper
[should] in all cases be binding upon him;"
(2) where the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizes rates
based upon value as represented by the shipper, in which case the
carrier's liability is limited to the represented value. S.Rep.No.
407, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; H.R.Rep. No. 1341, 63d Cong., 3d
Sess., p. 2. The Commission held the first exception applicable to
transportation of passenger baggage and recognized carriers' right
to promulgate pertinent terms and conditions dependent on
passengers' declared valuations.
In re The Cummins
Amendment, 33 I.C.C. 682, 696-697 (1915). In the following
year, Congress in effect overruled that determination.
See
note 7 infra.
[
Footnote 7]
39 Stat. 442, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). The Committee Report
accompanying the 1916 legislation observed in reference to the 1915
proviso:
"The construction put upon the proviso by the Interstate
Commerce Commission has resulted in some vexatious requirements
insisted upon by carriers, and in some injustice. For instance, it
has been held by the commission that, under the proviso, the
carrier may compel the shipper to state the value of the goods
tendered for shipment, and that, if the true value is not stated,
the shipper is liable to criminal prosecution under section 10 of
the act to regulate commerce. The committee does not agree with the
commission in the interpretation so placed upon the proviso, but
there is no way in which to remedy the matter except to make the
intent of Congress so clear that it is impossible to misunderstand
it. Further, the commission had held that
baggage carried on
passenger trains upon the ticket of a passenger is within the
terms of the law. Whether this construction is correct or
incorrect, it is palpable that
baggage so transported on a
passenger fare ought not to be subject to the rule which
controls ordinary freight, and, in the bill now reported, it is
excepted in express terms."
Congress eliminated the 1915 proviso, therefore, and explained
the aim of the 1916 legislation
"to restore the law of full liability as it existed prior to the
Carmack amendment of 1906, so that, when property is lost or
damaged in the course of transportation under such circumstances as
to make the carrier liable, recovery is had for full value or on
the basis of full value. From this general rule there is excepted,
first, baggage carried on passenger trains. This is done for
obvious reasons. Second, other property . . . , with respect to
which the Interstate Commerce Commission has fixed or authorized
affirmatively a rate dependent upon value, either an agreed or a
released value."
(Emphasis added.) S.Rep. No. 394, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p.
2.
[
Footnote 8]
See 49 U.S.C. § § 1(1), 1(3), 1(5)(a), 6(1).
[
Footnote 9]
Cf. 49 U.S.C. § 22, referring to "free baggage" carried
on passenger tickets.
See also notes
7 supra, and
10 infra.
[
Footnote 10]
That distinction has long been recognized by the Commission.
National Baggage Committee v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.
Co., 32 I.C.C. 152 (1914);
In re The Cummins
Amendment, 33 I.C.C. 682, 696 (1915);
Ellison-White
Chautauqua System v. Director General, 68 I.C.C. 492, 495
(1922). In fact, only recently, the Commission disallowed a
proposed tariff of charges for passenger baggage because of
"the long and universally established practice of permitting a
reasonable amount of a passenger's baggage, whether in the baggage
car on in his personal possession, to be carried as a part of the
passenger fare contract, and the apparently uniform sanction of
such a practice by the courts and the regulatory bodies."
Service Charges for Checking Baggage, 288 I.C.C. 691,
695 (1953).
[
Footnote 11]
See Caten v. Salt City Movers & Storage Co., 149
F.2d 428, 432 (1945). We need not now consider whether an inscribed
baggage receipt would constitute a sufficient writing to satisfy
the statute,
compare American Railway Express Co. v.
Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584,
260 U. S.
590-591 (1923), or whether a carrier's refusal to handle
property above a certain value is permissible at all.
[
Footnote 12]
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S.
97 (1914), and
New York Central & H.R. R. Co. v.
Beaham, 242 U. S. 148
(1916), cannot control this case. Neither decision involved the Act
as amended by the 1915 and 1916 legislation; both dealt with free
baggage checked through on a passenger ticket; the carrier in both
cases had supplied some notice of its limitation of liability. In
Galveston, H. & S.A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U.
S. 357 (1920), the sole issue raised or considered
related to the interstate nature of the passenger's journey.