At the time of the death in 1942 of a serviceman insured under
the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, his policy
designated an uncle as sole beneficiary. The insured's natural
father instituted an action to claim the proceeds. The uncle died
while that action was pending. The District Court found that the
uncle and the uncle's wife had stood
in loco parentis to
the insured from 1938 until the death of the insured, and that,
long before the insured's death, his natural father had abandoned
him.
Held:
1. An award to the deceased uncle's personal representative
cannot be sustained.
United States v. Henning, ante p.
344 U. S. 66. Pp.
344 U. S.
83-84.
2. Since the natural father had abandoned his son, and thus
ceased to be a parent in truth and fact, he is not a parent "who
last bore that relationship" within the meaning of § 602(h)(3)(C),
and therefore may not claim the proceeds. Pp.
344 U. S.
84-85.
3. The insured's foster mother (the uncle's wife), as the sole
survivor of those who "last bore" the parental relationship to the
insured, was entitled in her own right to all the accrued policy
proceeds. P.
344 U. S.
85.
191 F.2d 194 reversed.
In an action to determine the beneficiary under a policy of
National Service Life Insurance, the District Court made an award
of part of the proceeds to the personal representative of a
deceased beneficiary. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 191 F.2d 194.
This Court granted certiorari. 343 U.S. 925.
Reversed, p.
344 U. S.
85.
Page 344 U. S. 83
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Based on conflicting claims to the proceeds of a National
Service Life Insurance policy, this is a companion case to
United States v. Henning, ante, p.
344 U. S. 66.
The controversy is bottomed on the following facts: at the time
of the insured serviceman's death in 1942, his policy designated
John J. Peters, his uncle, as sole beneficiary. Challenging the
uncle's standing as a permissible beneficiary under the statute,
William Baumet, the insured's natural father, instituted an action
to claim the proceeds. [
Footnote
1] Before that action came to trial, John J. Peters died.
[
Footnote 2] After a subsequent
trial of the cause, the District Court found that John J. Peters
and his wife Julie Peters had stood
in loco parentis to
the insured from 1938 until his death, and that the natural
father's
Page 344 U. S. 84
contemporaneous conduct had amounted to an abandonment of his
son. [
Footnote 3] Concluding
that John J. Peters, as a person
in loco parentis, was a
validly designated beneficiary under the Act, [
Footnote 4] it dismissed Baumet's complaint.
Accordingly, the court awarded the installments which had matured
during John J. Peters' lifetime to Julie Peters as his personal
representative, and the installments thereafter maturing to Julie
individually as a person
in loco parentis who "last bore"
the parental relationship to the insured. [
Footnote 5] The Court of Appeals affirmed. [
Footnote 6] It agreed that, "after
1938, his father never saw him, manifested no interest in his
career, and contributed nothing toward his support;" in fact, there
was "a permanent estrangement between them." [
Footnote 7] And it approved the District Court's
allocation of the policy's proceeds. In so holding, the Court of
Appeals assumed that estates of deceased beneficiaries were proper
takers, and that the foster parents had long supplanted the natural
father in the parental relationship to the insured. In any event,
the court thought, "the insured can have but one maternal parent
and one paternal parent." [
Footnote
8] We granted certiorari, 343 U.S. 925.
For the reasons detailed in
United States v. Henning,
supra, we hold that estates of deceased beneficiaries may not
take proceeds under the Act. The award to John J. Peters' personal
representative must therefore fall. In regard to the natural
father's claim, the District Court's findings sharply reveal that
William Baumet, long before
Page 344 U. S. 85
his son's death had "abandoned his son" and ceased to be a
parent in truth and fact. He may not now retrieve the discarded
paternal robes to lay claim to the policy proceeds; to rule
otherwise would foil the plain intent of the 1942 amendments. Since
the foster parents, not he, "last bore" the parental relationship,
he cannot qualify as a taker by devolution under § 602(h)(3)(C) of
the Act. For that reason, we hold that the foster mother, Julie
Peters, as the sole survivor of those who "last bore" the parental
relationship, in her own right must take all accrued policy
proceeds.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, for the reasons
stated in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON in
United States v. Henning, ante, p.
344 U. S. 66,
dissent from the Court's refusal to permit the deceased
beneficiary's estate to share in the proceeds.
[
Footnote 1]
The insured's natural mother died in 1936, and no claim is
raised on her behalf. However, the infant half-rothers and
half-isters of the insured by their guardian
ad litem
filed a claim asserting that they followed their father William
Baumet on the priority ladder of § 602(h)(3), 38 U.S.C. §
802(h)(3). But their standing under § 602(h)(3)(D) is conditioned
on the absence of takers qualifying under § 602(h)(3)(C). Since we
find such a taker, their claims need not be considered here.
[
Footnote 2]
Julie Peters, as John's executrix, moved for substitution in his
stead. The District Court denied the motion, on the ground that
John J. Peters' rights were extinguished by his death. 81 F. Supp.
1012 (1948). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that accrued
installments passed to a deceased beneficiary's estate. 177 F.2d
806 (1949),
certiorari denied, 339 U.S. 923 (1950). A
subsequent trial followed.
[
Footnote 3]
The District Court's unreported findings and opinion are
reprinted at pp. 10 to 24 of the Appendix to the Brief for the
United States.
[
Footnote 4]
§§ 601(f), 602(g), 38 U.S.C. §§ 801(f), 802(g).
[
Footnote 5]
§ 602(h)(3)(C), 38 U.S.C. § 802(h)(3)(C).
[
Footnote 6]
Baumet v. United States, 191 F.2d 194 (1951).
[
Footnote 7]
191 F.2d at 195-196.
[
Footnote 8]
191 F.2d 194, 197.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part.
I think William Baumet and Julie Peters should share the accrued
policy proceeds
pari passu. I believe that the natural
father, as well as the foster mother, "last bore" the parental
relationship to the insured. No law, no dictionary, no form of
words can change that biological fact. The natural father, as well
as the natural mother, remains a parent no matter how estranged
parent and child may become. A stranger may, by conduct, become a
foster parent, but no conduct can transmute a natural parent into a
stranger.