A willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes by making false
statements to Treasury representatives violates § 145(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 145(b), and is not punishable
exclusively under § 35(A) of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
which outlaws the willful making of false statements "in any
matter" within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States. Pp.
344 U. S.
43-47.
106 F. Supp. 510 reversed.
The District Court dismissed an indictment under § 145(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 145(b), on the ground that it
failed to charge an offense thereunder. 106 F. Supp. 510. On direct
appeal to this Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3731,
reversed, p.
344 U. S.
47.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
On March 16, 1951, a one-ount indictment was returned in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
against the appellees, Beacon Brass Company, a corporation, and
Maurice Feinberg, its
Page 344 U. S. 44
president and treasurer. The indictment charged that, in
violation of § 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 40 Stat. 1085,
as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 145(b), the appellees had willfully
attempted to evade taxes by making false statements to Treasury
representatives on October 24, 1945,
"for the purpose of supporting, ratifying, confirming and
concealing the fraudulent and incorrect statements and
representations made in the corporate tax return of said Beacon
Brass Co., Inc., for the fiscal period ending October 31, 1944,
filed on or about January 5, 1945. . . ."
Section 145(b) provides in pertinent part:
"[A]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof,
shall,
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be
guilty of a felony. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The six-ear limitation period, 43 Stat. 341, 342, as amended, 26
U.S.C. § 3748(a)(2), applicable to offenses under this statute had
expired on a charge for filing a false tax return in January, 1945,
but it had not expired on a charge of making false statements to
Treasury employees in October, 1945. The District Court viewed the
indictment as charging the separate crimes of filing a false return
and making subsequent false statements to Treasury representatives,
and dismissed the indictment as duplicitous.
On September 14, 1951, a second indictment was returned against
the appellees which repeated the charge that, in violation of §
145(b), they
"did willfully and knowingly attempt to defeat and evade a large
part of the taxes due and owing by the said corporation . . . by
making certain false and fraudulent statements and representations
at a hearing and conference before representatives and employees of
the United States Treasury
Page 344 U. S. 45
Department, on or about October 24, 1945. . . ."
Reference to the allegedly false return filed in January, 1945,
was omitted, and instead it was charged that the false statements
were made "for the purpose of concealing additional unreported net
income. . . ."
Section 35(A) of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1946 ed.)
(now 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 1001), makes it unlawful to
"knowingly and willfully . . . make . . . any false or
fraudulent statements or representations . . . in any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.
. . ."
Obviously, at the times of the indictments here, the three-ear
limitation period, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 3282, for violations of
this statute had expired as to statements made in October, 1945.
The District Court concluded that, since § 35(A) deals specifically
with false statements, Congress must be presumed to have intended
that the making of false statements should be punishable only under
§ 35(A). Therefore, the District Court dismissed the indictment on
the ground that it failed to charge an offense under 26 U.S.C. §
145(b). 106 F. Supp. 510. We noted probable jurisdiction of the
United States' appeal taken under authority of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V)
§ 3731.
We have before us two statutes, each of which proscribes conduct
not covered by the other, but which overlap in a narrow area
illustrated by the instant case. At least where different proof is
required for each offense, a single act or transaction may violate
more than one criminal statute.
United States v. Noveck,
273 U. S. 202,
273 U. S. 206;
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.
S. 338. Unlike § 35(A), § 145(b) requires proof that the
false statements were made in a willful effort to evade taxes. The
purpose to evade taxes is crucial under this section. The language
of § 145(b) which outlaws willful attempts to evade taxes "in any
manner" is clearly broad enough to include false statements made to
Treasury representatives
Page 344 U. S. 46
for the purpose of concealing unreported income.
Cf. Spies
v. United States, 317 U. S. 492,
317 U. S. 499.
The question raised by the decision below is whether, by enacting a
statute specifically outlawing all false statements in matters
under the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States, Congress
intended thereby to exclude the making of false statements from the
scope of § 145(b).
We do not believe that Congress intended to require the
tax-nforcement authorities to deal differently with false
statements than with other methods of tax evasion. By providing
that the sanctions of § 145(b) should be "in addition to other
penalties provided by law," Congress recognized that some methods
of attempting to evade taxes would violate other statutes as well.
See Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 644. Moreover,
since no distinction is made in § 35(A) between written and oral
statements, the reasoning of the court below would be equally
applicable to false tax returns which are, of course, false written
statements. But the Courts of Appeals have uniformly applied §
145(b) to attempts to evade taxes by filing false returns.
E.g., Gaunt v. United States, 184 F.2d 284, 288;
Taylor v. United States, supra, 179 F.2d at 643-644.
Further support for our conclusion can be found in
United
States v. Noveck, supra, where this Court rejected the
contention that the enactment of § 145(b) impliedly repealed the
general perjury statute insofar as that statute applied to false
tax returns made under oath.
Cf. United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86,
312 U. S. 93,
312 U. S. 95-96.
Finally, the enactment of other statutes expressly outlawing false
statements in particular contexts,
e.g., 18 U.S.C.(Supp.
V) §§ 1010, 1014, negates the assumption -- which was the
foundation of the decision of the court below -- that Congress
intended the making of false statements to be punishable only under
§ 35(A).
The appellees contend that the acts charged constitute only one
crime of tax evasion which was complete when
Page 344 U. S. 47
the allegedly false tax return was filed. On the basis of this
contention, appellees seek to sustain the decision below on the
grounds that the six-ear statute of limitations had run, and that
the dismissal of the first indictment is
res judicata, and
a bar to the second indictment for the same offense. We do not
consider these questions, because our jurisdiction on this appeal
is limited to review of the District Court's construction of the
statute in the light of the facts alleged in the indictment. 18
U.S.C.(Supp. V) § 3731;
United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U. S. 188,
308 U. S.
206-207.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK is of the opinion that the District Court
reached the right result, and would affirm its judgment.