Respondent was employed by petitioner railroad as a "freight
brakeman" in its yards. His duties included work aboard
petitioner's car floats moored in navigable waters. He was injured
on a car float while releasing allegedly defective hand-brakes on a
freight car which was being unloaded from the car float by a switch
engine.
Held: Respondent's remedy was under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act exclusively, and not under the
Federal Employers' Liability Art. Pp. 334-342.
194 F.2d 612 reversed.
Respondent's suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act was
dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act applied
exclusively. 99 F. Supp. 506. The Court of Appeals reversed. 194
F.2d 612. This Court granted certiorari. 344 U.S. 811.
Reversed, p. 342.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This certiorari requires us to determine which federal
industrial accident statute -- the Federal Employers' Liability Act
or the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act --
applies to the circumstances of this case. The petitioning Railroad
had employed O'Rourke in its Harismus Cove Yard at Jersey City
since 1942 as a "freight brakeman." He worked as part of a five-an
crew making up trains. Their duties included work on
Page 344 U. S. 335
the petitioner's car floats that moved freight and passenger
cars from and to the Yard by water. The accident occurred during
the night of January 28, 1948. Having already removed cars from
three floats, the crew began to unload one carrying box cars.
O'Rourke was required to climb up on each and release the
hand-rakes, so that the cars could be pulled off the float by the
engine. During the process, he fell from one and sustained the
injury which is the basis for this suit. It was brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. § 51
et seq., [
Footnote 1]
alleging a faulty brake mechanism maintained in violation of the
Safety Appliance Acts, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. § 1
et
seq., as the causative factor. The District Court granted the
railroad's motion to dismiss on the ground that the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers'
Page 344 U. S. 336
Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et
seq., applied exclusively, [
Footnote 2] 99 F. Supp. 506, but the Court of Appeals
reversed on the ground that the Liability Act covered "railroad
employees injured while engaged in railroad work on navigable
waters." It decided respondent was "not employed in maritime
employment . . . within the meaning of the Compensation Act." 194
F.2d 612, 615. We granted certiorari, 344 U.S. 811, because of an
alleged conflict with an earlier decision of this Court,
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 281 U.
S. 128.
The need for a federal statute of the Harbor Workers' Act type
and scope became obvious after
Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205,
wherein it was held that neither the Federal Employers' Liability
Act nor the state compensation statute applied to a railroad
employee engaged in loading a vessel of the company which had no
relation to its railroading operations. Specifically, the state act
was held inapplicable because the matter fell exclusively within
the federal admiralty jurisdiction:
"The work of a stevedore, in which the deceased was engaging, is
maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the
injuries which he received were likewise maritime, and the rights
and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters
clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction."
244 U.S. at
244 U. S.
217.
Page 344 U. S. 337
The resulting federal statute took the form of a compensation
act to assure injured employees who were not seamen a prompt and
certain recovery, rather than an employers' liability statute, such
as was extended in 1920 to seamen by the Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185,
46 U.S.C. § 688. A summary of the congressional attempts to bring
admiralty law into harmony with modern concepts of the duty of an
employer although without fault to carry the burden of industrial
accidents, appears in the
Nogueira case, 281 U.S. at
281 U. S.
135-136. These efforts failed to meet the constitutional
test of uniformity held essential in admiralty law in order to
obviate conflicting requirements in maritime commerce.
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.
S. 219. They failed because Congress attempted to place
legislation on maritime accidents under state compensation laws.
After this Court's suggestion in the
Washington case, 264
U.S. at
264 U. S. 227,
Congress adopted the valid, exclusive, and uniform compensation act
now in effect for longshoremen and harbor workers.
Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U. S. 22.
Seamen preferred to take the risks of the Jones Act.
Nogueira
v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra, at
281 U. S. 136.
This act and the Jones Act provided means for indemnification for
injuries for all maritime employees who were beyond the
constitutional reach of state legislation. A quarter of a century
of experience has not caused Congress to change the plan. The
"
Jensen line of demarcation between state and federal
jurisdiction" has been accepted.
Davis v. Department of
Labor, 317 U. S. 249,
317 U. S. 256.
New Jersey could not have enacted statutes granting compensation
for respondent's injury on navigable water. Therefore, respondent
comes within the coverage of that portion of § 903(a) that includes
those outside the reach of state compensation laws.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 51,
note 1 supra, gives a right of recovery
due to defects because
Page 344 U. S. 338
of carrier negligence in, among other equipment, "boats." We
need not, however, in this case, determine whether the car float is
a "boat" that should be regarded as in substance a part of a
railroad's extension.
See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
supra, at
244 U. S. 213.
It is clear that whether or not the boat is an extension of the
railroad under the Liability Act is immaterial. The later Harbor
Workers' Act, by §§ 903(a) and 905, covered such injuries on
navigable water, and made its coverage exclusive.
Nogueira v.
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra, at
281 U. S.
130-131.
Whether or not the Harbor Workers Act applies to the exclusion
of the Employers' Liability Act by virtue of the provisions of 33
U.S.C. § 905 depends on § 903 which defines its "coverage":
"(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect
of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any drydock) and if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law. . . . [
Footnote 3]"
Section 904 fixes liability for this compensation with the
"employer," who, in turn, is defined by § 902(4):
"The term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees
are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any drydock)."
The Court considered these provisions in a similar setting in
the
Nogueira case,
supra. That case involved a
railroad employee injured while loading freight into cars
Page 344 U. S. 339
located on a moored car float. The Harbor Workers' Act was held
to apply. As was pointed out:
"The definition [§ 903(a)] is manifestly broad enough to embrace
a railroad company, provided it has employees who 'are employed in
maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters
of the United States.' . . . From the standpoint of maritime
employment, it obviously makes no difference whether the freight is
placed in the hold or on the deck of a vessel, or whether the
vessel is a car float or a steamship. A car float in navigable
waters is subject to the maritime law like any other vessel."
281 U.S. at
281 U. S. 132
and
281 U. S. 134.
But respondent contends, in support of the result below, that the
cases are distinguishable, and that this language does not
determine his claim. He emphasizes that
Nogueira was
engaged in loading the cars. This is pictured as an operation far
more similar to the popular conception of a longshoreman's job than
his own, which he insists was "railroading." [
Footnote 4]
We are clear, however, that the emphasis on the nature of
respondent's duties here misses the mark. The statute applies, by
its own terms, to accidents on navigable waters when the employer
has any employees engaged in maritime service. The portions of the
Nogueira opinion quoted bring this railroad company within this
category, since its car float operations are there held to be
maritime, as they obviously are. Whether the injury occurred to an
employee loading freight into cars on the float, as in the
Nogueira case, or to one like respondent moving
Page 344 U. S. 340
loaded cars from a float could make no difference. Both
employments are maritime.
See Nogueira v. New York, N.H. &
H. R. Co., supra, at
281 U. S. 134.
Besides, § 902(4) is directed at the employer when it speaks of
maritime employment, not at the work the employee is doing. The
exclusive coverage of §§ 903, 905 extends to an employee of an
employer, made liable by § 904, when he is injured, in the course
of his employment, on navigable water. The Court of Appeals, we
think, is in error in holding that the statute requires, as to the
employee, both injury on navigable water and maritime employment as
a ground for coverage by the Compensation Act. An injured worker's
particular activity at the time of injury determines, of course,
whether he was injured in the course of his employment within §
902(2), and whether he was a member of the crew of the vessel
within the exceptions of §§ 902(3) and 903(a)(1). This explains the
emphasis on the factor of the individual's job in
Parker v.
Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244,
314 U. S.
245-246, and
South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, 309 U. S. 251.
[
Footnote 5]
The Court of Appeals thought that this Court's
Nogueira
opinion left open, as did the Second Circuit's opinion in
Nogueira, "that the mere locus of the accident necessarily
determines the right." 32 F.2d 179 at 182. We read the
Nogueira case differently. There, it was said:
"There was no exclusion of stevedores or of those sustaining
injuries upon navigable waters in loading or unloading a vessel
unless it was under eighteen tons net. The application of the act
in such cases was explicitly made to depend upon the question
whether the injury occurred upon navigable waters and recovery
therefor could not validly be provided by a state compensation
statute."
281 U.S. at
281 U. S.
136.
Page 344 U. S. 341
Analogous cases lend weight to our conclusion.
Buren v.
Southern Pacific Co., 50 F.2d 407, is indistinguishable on its
facts. [
Footnote 6] The result
in
Parker, as well, is totally inconsistent with any
"duties test." Armistead, the employee there, was a janitor with
the motor boat company. He had been ordered to ride in one of the
boats during a test trip in order to keep a lookout for hidden
objects. 314 U.S. at
314 U. S. 246.
Compensation under the Harbor Workers' Act could not have been paid
in connection with his death if we were to test its applicability
by the nature of his regular work. A number of lower court cases
are in similar vein. Those we collect in the margin deal with
various types of construction and service workers, obviously not
themselves engaged in traditional "maritime employment," if one
were to look solely to the particular type of job they were engaged
for. [
Footnote 7] Each was held
to fall within the scope of the statute. Section 902(4) requires
the employer to pay compensation if he has "any" employees so
engaged. [
Footnote 8] If, then,
the accident
Page 344 U. S. 342
occurs on navigable waters, the Act must apply if the injured
longshoreman was there in furtherance of his employer's business,
irrespective of whether he himself can be labeled "maritime." Such
are the admitted facts of this case. The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act applies.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
45 U.S.C. § 51:
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce
between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of
the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and
any of the States or Territories, or between the District of
Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation
or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or,
in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband
and children of such employee, and, if none, then of such
employee's parents, and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent
upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines,
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or
other equipment."
"Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign
commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and
substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for
the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by
such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled
to the benefits of this chapter."
[
Footnote 2]
33 U.S.C. § 905:
"The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this
chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
The portion of the section which we have omitted contains
certain other conditions to applicability. None applies here.
Respondent was not a member of the crew, and the vessel was of more
than eighteen tons.
[
Footnote 4]
The
Nogueira case was a unanimous decision. On the same
day,
Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.
S. 222, was decided with three dissents. An award of
state compensation to Span was reversed because, as a painter
employed in the repair of a completed ship lying in navigable
waters, a state compensation statute could not cover him.
[
Footnote 5]
Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565;
Merrit-hapman & Scott v. Willard, 189 F.2d 791, and
Long Island R. Co. v. Lowe, 145 F.2d 516, fall within a
similar category.
[
Footnote 6]
See Gussie v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1 N.J.Super. 293, 64
A.2d 244;
Richardson v. Central R. Co. of N.J., 233
App.Div. 603, 253 N.Y.S. 789;
Byrd v. N.Y. Central System,
6 N.J.Super. 568, 70 A.2d 97.
Zientek v. Reading
Co., 93 F. Supp.
875, is contrary, but, as to this,
see our opinion in
Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.
S. 187,
342 U. S. 190,
Job v. Erie R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 698, and
Rist v.
Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 104 F. Supp. 29.
[
Footnote 7]
Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.
S. 222 (a painter);
De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v.
Henderson, 142 F.2d 481 (member of shore gang);
Travelers
Ins. Co. v. McManigal, 139 F.2d 949 (carpenter);
Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Branham, 136 F.2d 873 (foreman of a concrete
pouring gang);
Standard Dredging Corp. v. Henderson, 57 F.
Supp. 770 (member of shore gang);
Ford v.
Parker, 52 F. Supp.
98 (watchman). This list is illustrative, but by no means
exhaustive.
[
Footnote 8]
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.
S. 249, is an illustration of the difficulty encountered
in applying this standard, happily not present in the case at bar.
The
Davis case avoided uncertainty in areas where state
and federal statutes might overlap. In the present case, we have
two federal statutes, and a line marking their coverage can be
drawn.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
BLACK, and MR. JUSTICE CLARK join, dissenting.
There is but one question here, and that is whether this
respondent was engaged in "maritime employment" at the time of his
injury. If he was, then the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act applies, and not the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. That was decided in
Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H. R.
Co., 281 U. S. 128. In
that case, an employee of a railroad company was trucking
interstate freight from the dock onto a float for loading in a car
standing on the car float. He was likened to a stevedore. Here,
this railroad employee was a brakeman engaged in removing freight
cars from a car float by the use of an ordinary switch engine. The
cars were in interstate commerce. Preparatory to the removal of the
cars from the car float, it was this railroad employee's duty to
let off the brakes. He alleged that, while thus engaged, the
railroad's use of a defective brake in violation of the Safety
Appliance Act caused him to be thrown from the freight car to the
deck of the car float and injured. The car float was upon navigable
waters.
Was it maritime employment to get these cars off the car float,
or was it railroad employment? If this railroad employee had been
doing his braking job on land, no one would have thought he was
engaged in anything but railroad employment. Does it become
maritime employment
Page 344 U. S. 343
because it happened over navigable waters? We think not. The
place is the only thing that differentiates the situations. Place
is admittedly not enough to make what is braking on land other than
braking when done over navigable waters. Not only must we look to
the place where the accident happened, but of equal importance is
the nature of the employment. The nature of the employment is
certainly not maritime. It was an ordinary railroad chore, done by
an ordinary railroad brakeman. If this were not so, the train crews
on trains being ferried across navigable streams in the United
States would be employed in maritime service. With the imagination
of the Court's opinion, a train crew, while crossing a bridge with
its supports in a navigable stream, would be employed in maritime
service.
We would treat this railroad employee as being in law what he
was in real life, a railroad brakeman, engaged in interstate
commerce and subject to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and
affirm this judgment.