Petitioner, a 38-year-old Mexican farm hand who can neither
speak nor write English, was arrested, jailed, and questioned in
Texas, and, after four days, during which he claims he was
mistreated, he confessed to a homicide in Nebraska. Thereafter, he
was taken to Nebraska, where he again confessed, although he makes
no claim of mistreatment by the Nebraska authorities. Twenty-five
days after his arrest and fourteen days after his arrival in
Nebraska, he was brought before a magistrate for the first time,
and he pleaded guilty. Two days later, before trial, counsel was
appointed to defend him. At his trial in a state court, the two
confessions and the plea were admitted in evidence over his
objection, and he was convicted of manslaughter. The State Supreme
Court affirmed.
Held: upon the record in this case, it cannot be said
that the admission in evidence of the confessions and plea violated
petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pp.
342 U. S. 56-68;
342 U. S.
68-73.
(a) The rule of
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.
S. 332, is not a limitation imposed by the Constitution,
and is not applicable to trials of criminal cases in state courts.
Pp.
342 U. S. 63-65;
342 U. S.
71-72.
(b) On the record in this case, it cannot be said that Nebraska
violated the requirements of due process in this conviction. Pp.
342 U. S. 60-63,
342 U. S. 65-68;
342 U. S.
68-73.
152 Neb. 831,
43 N.W.2d 1,
affirmed.
Petitioner's conviction in a state court of Nebraska for
manslaughter, claimed to have been in violation of rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, was affirmed by the State Supreme Court. 152
Neb. 831,
43 N.W.2d 1.
This Court granted certiorari. 341 U.S. 947.
Affirmed, p.
342 U. S.
68.
Page 342 U. S. 56
MR. JUSTICE REED announced the judgment of the Court and an
opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR.
JUSTICE CLARK join.
Petitioner, Agapita Gallegos, was convicted in a District Court
of Nebraska of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment, the maximum penalty. The charge was the slaying of
his paramour without deliberation or premeditation. This judgment
of conviction was sustained by the Supreme Court of Nebraska over
the objection that introduction at the trial of petitioner's prior
statements admitting the homicide violated the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution. 152 Neb. 831,
43 N.W.2d 1.
In view of certain undenied incidents giving color to petitioner's
allegation of unfairness in the prosecution, certiorari was granted
to determine whether the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated by the admission of the statements. 341
U.S. 947.
On September 19, 1949, at the request of the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service, petitioner, a
thirty-eight-year-old Mexican farm hand who can neither speak nor
write English, was arrested, together with his brother, by police
officers of El Paso County at the southwest corner of Texas, and
there booked on a charge of vagrancy. Gallegos had been an
itinerant farm worker in this country before his arrest, and had
recently returned here for such work.
We gather from the abbreviated record that information was
sought by the Texas authorities as to petitioner's acts in
Nebraska, where he had worked the preceding year. After arrest,
petitioner was questioned regarding his identity. He at once gave a
false name. Thereafter,
Page 342 U. S. 57
he was jailed in a small room for the next twenty-one hours.
Further questioning to establish identity was had on September 20,
1949, without result. Following his second interrogation,
petitioner was left alone for forty-eight hours. On September 22,
1949, petitioner was removed from his cell and interrogated. After
he gave his name and an admission that he had been in Nebraska, he
was reconfined; this time confinement ran for a period of
twenty-four hours.
On September 23, 1949, petitioner disclosed details of this
Nebraska crime. A statement in respect of the crime was immediately
prepared in English. This was read to the petitioner in Spanish,
and he thereafter signed it. His Texas detention continued until
September 27, 1949. During the entire time, no charge was filed
against him in any state or federal court, nor was he brought
before a magistrate.
We have Gallegos' evidence as to his Texas confinement, the
rooms he was placed in, their condition as to furnishings, and the
food provided. His testimony on these points is met only in part by
the testimony of the Chief Deputy Sheriff of El Paso, his
interrogator. There were times when Gallegos was not under his
direct observation. Nebraska had no other witness for the trial
familiar with conditions of the Texas restraint. Gallegos'
testimony through the interpreter concerning these matters is
vague. From it, one gathers that Gallegos sought to convey the
impression that the rooms were cells, that the one he occupied for
twenty-one hours was without a bed, that one he occupied was
without light or poorly lighted, and that the food was sparse,
perhaps not more than a meal a day.
During the questioning in the four-day period from September
19th through the 23d, the state says petitioner was not treated or
threatened with violence. His questioning did not last longer than
an hour or two on any
Page 342 U. S. 58
day, and, according to the record, was conducted almost entirely
by the state's witness, the Chief Deputy Sheriff. However, Gallegos
testifies that he was told that he might be turned over to the
Mexican authorities for more severe questioning, and that a lie
detector might be used upon him. The record shows no flat denial of
Gallegos' assertions contained in the last sentence, but it does
show, by testimony of the Deputy Sheriff, that no threats or
promises were made, and that reference to the Mexican authorities,
if made, was that Gallegos would be turned over to the United
States Immigration Service, who, in turn, would deliver him to the
Mexican Immigration Service. Gallegos also spoke of threatened
violence. [
Footnote 1]
On September 27, 1949, a Nebraska sheriff reached Texas and took
petitioner to the Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, jail, arriving
Thursday, September 29 at 1 a.m. Gallegos was questioned on
Saturday, October 1, at which time he was interviewed through an
interpreter by three county police officers. He described the
crime
Page 342 U. S. 59
for which he was convicted. A transcript in English of the
interpreter's translations of the interview was made and some days
later read back to petitioner in a Spanish retranslation. The
evidence is that Gallegos confirmed this record. The record shows
no claim of mistreatment by Nebraska authorities.
By § 29-406, Neb.Rev.Stat., 1943, a police officer is commanded
to take an accused before a magistrate. This was not done until
October 13, 1949, when petitioner was brought before the county
judge of Scotts Bluff County for a preliminary hearing on a
complaint charging murder in the second degree. This was the first
time petitioner was brought before any magistrate or court. As an
incident to the hearing, petitioner was asked to plead. He pleaded
guilty. These two confessions and the plea were introduced at
petitioner's trial by the state. On October 15, 1949, before trial,
the District Court of Scotts Bluff County found petitioner to be
entitled to
Page 342 U. S. 60
counsel appointed by the court, and counsel was then for the
first time appointed.
Petitioner presents in his brief only the following
question:
"Are confessions and a plea obtained from a prisoner during a
period of twenty-five days illegal detention by federal and state
officers before being brought before a magistrate and before
counsel is appointed to assist the prisoner admissible in
evidence?"
An answer requires an examination into the circumstances of
record surrounding the statements.
Before the Supreme Court of Nebraska, on the basis of facts in
the record of the trial, it was urged that the confessions and plea
were inadmissible because they were the result of "physical torture
and threats of torture, mental duress, illegal transportation, and
illegal detention," in violation of the federal and state
constitutions. As conviction without acceptance of the voluntary
character of the confessions would logically have been impossible,
we assume that the jury, under applicable instructions, found the
statements voluntary. 152 Neb. 831, 837-840,
43 N.W.2d 1,
4-6. Evidently, neither judge nor jury accepted the testimony of
Gallegos on disputed facts as to coercion. Where direct
contradiction of petitioner's assertions as to conditions of his
detention in Texas was unavailable or unobtainable, the jury
disregarded or minimized or disbelieved Gallegos to such an extent
that his confessions were accepted as voluntary. The Deputy
Sheriff, the prosecution witness in the best position to know,
denied any coercion by promise, threat or violence. A criminal
prosecution approved by the state should not be set aside as
violative of due process without clear proof that such drastic
action is required to protect federal constitutional rights. While
our conclusion on due process
Page 342 U. S. 61
does not necessarily follow the ultimate determinations of
judges or juries as to the voluntary character of a defendant's
statements prior to trial, the better opportunity afforded those
state agencies to appraise the weight of the evidence, because the
witnesses gave it personally before them, leads us to accept their
judgment insofar as facts upon which conclusions must be reached
are in dispute. The state's ultimate conclusion on guilt is
examined from the due process standpoint in the light of facts
undisputed by the state. [
Footnote
2] That means not only admitted facts, but also those that can
be classified from the record as without substantial challenge.
Controversies as to facts take various forms. The jury may reach
a verdict of guilty although they resolved some subsidiary fact in
favor of the accused. In Gallegos' case, we do not know whether his
assertions, not directly contradicted, as to questionable
conditions of his Texas detention and examination were accepted as
true by the jury. It is quite possible that the jury thought the
confession voluntary even though it believed all of Gallegos'
testimony. As we cannot accept the verdict as a finding solely on
disputed facts, we must weigh Gallegos' uncontradicted testimony
along with the undisputed facts. We are not free, as Nebraska was,
to leave to the jury determinations of facts upon which the
admissibility of the statements is based. [
Footnote 3]
The issue of federal due process now tendered is to be
considered only on uncontroverted facts. The answer to the question
presented depends upon whether there is a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from the admitted
circumstances that
Page 342 U. S. 63
the two confessions of September 23 and October 1 were given no
police officers after arrest in Texas on September 19, 1949, while
no magistrate with supervisory power over the examinations was
present and while the accused was without counsel. Circumstances
surrounding the Texas, as well as the Nebraska, confession must be
appraised because Nebraska introduced the Texas confession in
evidence in the trial. The use of any confession obtained in
violation of due process requires the reversal of a conviction even
though unchallenged evidence, adequate to convict, remains.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401,
324 U. S. 404.
Both states require fugitives from justice to be promptly taken
before a magistrate on arrest for extradition. Texas, Vernon's Code
of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 998, 999, 217. Neb.Rev.Stat., 1943, §§
29-713, 29-715. The question must be weighed in the light of the
uncontradicted portion of Gallegos' own testimony of harsh
treatment and the answers of the prosecution and the judge and the
jury. The plea of guilty at the preliminary hearing on October 13
is also a factor. We therefore limit our examination to an inquiry
as to whether use at trial of these admissions of guilt theretofore
made by an accused violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision and judgment below determine for us that, under the
law of Nebraska, such detention and examination, without appearance
or arraignment, do not require exclusion of the confessions or plea
as involuntary. [
Footnote 4]
The rule of the
McNabb case, considered recently in
United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S.
36, is not a limitation imposed
Page 342 U. S. 64
by the Due Process Clause.
McNabb v. United States,
318 U. S. 332,
318 U. S. 340;
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596,
322 U. S. 597,
note 2. Compliance with the
McNabb rule is required in
federal courts by this Court through its power of supervision over
the procedure and practices of federal courts in the trial of
criminal cases. That power over state criminal trials is not vested
in this Court. A confession can be declared inadmissible in a state
criminal trial by this Court only when the circumstances under
which it is received violate those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
infraction by any state. [
Footnote
5]
The Federal Constitution does not command a state to furnish
defendants counsel as a matter of course, as is required by the
Sixth Amendment in federal prosecutions. [
Footnote 6] Lack of counsel at state noncapital trials
denies federal constitutional protection only when the absence
results in a denial to accused of the essentials of justice.
[
Footnote 7]
Page 342 U. S. 65
Lack of counsel prior to trial certainly has no greater effect.
Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, at
322 U. S. 599.
"The mere fact that a confession was made while in the custody of
the police does not render it inadmissible."
McNabb v. United
States, 318 U. S. 332,
318 U. S. 346;
cf. United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S.
36,
342 U. S.
39.
Prolonged detention without a charge of crime or without
preliminary appearance before a magistrate, the lack of counsel
before, during, or after arraignment, and confession to the police
in private, are, however, elements that should be considered in
determining whether a confession, permitted to be introduced and
relied upon at a trial, has been obtained under such circumstances
that its use violates due process.
Watts v. Indiana,
338 U. S. 49,
338 U. S. 54. Of
course, the plea of guilty at the preliminary hearing should be
treated in the same way as the confessions.
So far as due process affects admissions before trial of the
defendant, the accepted test is their voluntariness. [
Footnote 8] This requires appraisal of the
facts of each particular case open to consideration by this Court.
In recent cases, where undisputed facts existed far more likely to
produce involuntary confessions than those in this case, there was
disagreement as to whether due process was violated. [
Footnote 9]
Page 342 U. S. 66
The facts here to support a claim of denial of due process are
not so convincing.
Certiorari was granted in this case because the record disclosed
a serious charge under the Due Process Clause against Nebraska
procedure in a criminal case. We have carefully weighed the
circumstances of the petitioner's
Page 342 U. S. 67
lack of education and familiarity with our law, his experience
and condition in life, his need for advice of counsel as to the law
of homicide and the probable effect on such a man of interrogation
during confinement. We have also taken into consideration Gallegos'
uncontradicted testimony about his accommodations, his limited
amount of
Page 342 U. S. 68
food and certain threats made by a Texas assistant sheriff not
present at the trial. The uncertain character of this
uncontradicted testimony, its lack of definiteness, and the action
of the trial judge and jury lead us to place little weight upon it.
Our position is confirmed by Gallegos' reiteration of his
confession while in custody in Nebraska, when he charges no
coercion except detention.
See Lyons v. Oklahoma,
322 U. S. 596,
322 U. S.
603.
We cannot say that Nebraska has here violated standards of
decency or justice in this conviction.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"Q. At any time when anybody was talking to you at the jail in
El Paso, Texas, did they act like they were trying to scare
you?"
"
* * * *"
"A. Yes, sir."
"Q. Tell us when that was?"
"A. When they started to investigate me."
"Q. Was that the first day you were in jail or the second day or
the third day?"
"A. The first day."
"Q. Tell us what happened."
"A. They tried to get words out of me forcibly by another
sheriff that is there."
"Q. Do you know who that other sheriff was?"
"A. I don't know what his name is."
"Q. Have you seen him here in this court room?"
"A. No, sir."
"Q. What did he do?"
"A. He would not take his eyes away from me, and he seemed like
he wanted to hit me, and I was frightened, and I didn't know what
to do."
[R. 84-85.]
"Q. But you say no one struck you?"
"A. No."
"Q. And no one ever raised their arm as if they were going to
strike you?"
"A. The other fellow."
"Q. What other fellow?"
"A. The other one that investigated me."
"Q. Where did he do that?"
"A. In one room that he had there where he was investigating
me."
"Q. How did he threaten to strike you?"
"A. With his hand."
"Q. Did he strike you at that time?"
"A. He just raised his hand."
"Q. Did he say he was going to strike you?"
"A. He said he was going to hit me because I would not tell him
the truth."
"Q. But he still did not hit you?"
"A. No, he did not hit me."
[R. 90-91.]
[
Footnote 2]
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596,
322 U. S. 603;
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401,
324 U. S. 404;
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596,
332 U. S. 599;
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49,
338 U. S. 51.
Cf. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.
S. 219,
314 U. S.
238-241.
[
Footnote 3]
152 Neb. 839,
43 N.W.2d 1,
5:
"While there is testimony given by the defendant from which the
jury could have found that the confessions made were involuntary
due to the manner in which defendant was held in confinement, the
treatment received while so held, and the threats made; however,
the testimony of the authorities in charge, both at El Paso and
Scotts Bluff, deny these facts, and, when their testimony is taken
together with certain testimony of the defendant, it presents a
factual situation from which the jury could properly find that the
confessions were freely and voluntarily made. This includes the
issue presented by the evidence offered as to whether or not the
complaint was properly translated at the preliminary hearing so it
was understood by the defendant in making his plea thereto. It also
includes the question of whether or not he understood the nature or
degree of the crime with which he was charged. These issues both
relate themselves directly to the question of whether or not he
understood what he was doing when he made his admission of guilt,
and consequently relate directly to whether it was voluntarily or
involuntarily made."
[
Footnote 4]
Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 839-840,
43 N.W.2d 1,
6:
"In regard to how soon after a person is arrested he must be
given a preliminary hearing, we said in
Maher v. State,
144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641, 650:"
"The question as to the time in which the defendant should be
given a preliminary hearing is a question for the court. There can
be no precise length of time, after the arrest of a person, in
which he must be given a hearing. The theory of the law is that he
must be given a hearing as soon as possible. A person charged
should be given a preliminary hearing just as soon as the nature
and circumstances of the case will permit."
". . . Here, the court, in the first instance, heard all of the
evidence relating thereto and determined that sufficient foundation
had been laid for their admission. The evidence was then presented
to the jury, and the question as to their character, whether
voluntary or involuntary, was submitted to it by the court's
instructions Nos. 12, 13, and 14. We find the facts and
circumstances relating to the giving of the two confessions and the
admission of guilt at the preliminary hearing justified the trial
court in admitting them in evidence in the first instance and
submitting their character, whether voluntary or involuntary, to
the jury.
See Kitts v. State, [151 Neb. 679, 39 N.W.2d
283]."
[
Footnote 5]
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312,
272 U. S. 316;
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46,
332 U. S.
54.
[
Footnote 6]
Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.
S. 660;
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.
S. 640;
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.
S. 134.
[
Footnote 7]
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.
S. 437,
335 U. S. 441;
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455,
316 U. S. 462;
compare Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271,
326 U. S.
278.
[
Footnote 8]
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278,
297 U. S.
285-286;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.
S. 227,
309 U. S. 236,
309 U. S. 238;
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219,
314 U. S.
238.
[
Footnote 9]
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49,
338 U. S.
51-52:
"On November 12, 1947, a Wednesday, petitioner was arrested and
held as the suspected perpetrator of an alleged criminal assault
earlier in the day. Later the same day, in the vicinity of this
occurrence, a woman was found dead under conditions suggesting
murder in the course of an attempted criminal assault. Suspicion of
murder quickly turned towards petitioner, and the police began to
question him. They took him from the county jail to State Police
Headquarters, where he was questioned by officers in relays from
about eleven thirty that night until sometime between 2:30 and 3
o'clock the following morning. The same procedure of persistent
interrogation from about 5:30 in the afternoon until about 3
o'clock the following morning, by a relay of six to eight officers,
was pursued on Thursday the 13th, Friday the 14th, Saturday the
15th, Monday the 17th. Sunday was a day of rest from interrogation.
About 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning, November 18, the petitioner
made an incriminating statement after continuous questioning since
6 o'clock of the preceding evening. The statement did not satisfy
the prosecutor, who had been called in, and he then took petitioner
in hand. Petitioner, questioned by an interrogator of twenty years'
experience as lawyer, judge and prosecutor, yielded a more
incriminating document."
"Until his inculpatory statements were secured, the petitioner
was a prisoner in the exclusive control of the prosecuting
authorities. He was kept for the first two days in solitary
confinement in a cell aptly enough called 'the hole' in view of its
physical conditions as described by the State's witnesses. Apart
from the five night sessions, the police intermittently
interrogated Watts during the day, and, on three days, drove him
around town hours at a time with a view to eliciting
identifications and other disclosures. Although the law of Indiana
required that petitioner be given a prompt preliminary hearing
before a magistrate, with all the protection a hearing was intended
to give him, the petitioner was not only given no hearing during
the entire period of interrogation, but was without friendly or
professional aid and without advice as to his constitutional
rights. Disregard of rudimentary needs of life -- opportunities for
sleep and a decent allowance of food -- are also relevant not as
aggravating elements of petitioner's treatment, but as part of the
total situation our of which his confessions came and which stamped
their character."
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S.
62,
338 U. S.
63-64:
"The officers making the arrest had no warrant, and did not tell
the petitioner why he was being arrested. These officers began to
question the petitioner as soon as they reached the City Hall
police station. One of them examined the petitioner for three hours
on that afternoon, and again that night from eight to eleven
o'clock. From time to time other officers joined in the
interrogation. Petitioner persistently denied any knowledge of the
murder."
"The next morning, June 4, the petitioner was booked on the
police records as being held for questioning. Later that day, he
was questioned for about four hours more. On June 5, he was
interrogated for another four hours, and, on the 6th, for day and
night sessions totaling six hours. The questioning was conducted
sometimes by one officer and at other times by several working
together; it appears, in fact, that whenever one of the police
officers interested in the investigation had any free time, he
would have the petitioner brought from his cell for
questioning."
"On June 7, the day when a confession was finally obtained,
questioning began in the afternoon and continued for three hours.
Later that day, the officers who had been present during the
afternoon returned with others to resume the examination of
petitioner. Despite the fact that he was falsely told that other
suspects had 'opened up' on him, petitioner repeatedly denied
guilt. But finally at about eleven o'clock, petitioner stated that
he had killed the person for whose murder he was later
arraigned."
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S.
68,
338 U. S.
69-70:
"On Monday night, questioning began in earnest. At least five
officers worked in relays, relieving each other from time to time
to permit respite from the stifling heat of the cubicle in which
the interrogation was conducted. Throughout the evening, petitioner
denied that he had killed the Bennetts. On Tuesday, the questioning
continued under the same conditions from 1:30 in the afternoon
until past one the following morning, with only an hour's interval
at 5:30. On Wednesday afternoon, the Chief of the State
Constabulary, with half a dozen of his men, questioned petitioner
for about an hour, and the local authorities carried on the
interrogation for three and a half hours longer. At 6:30 that
evening, the examination resumed. Petitioner continued to deny
implication in the killings. The sheriff then threatened to arrest
petitioner's mother for handling stolen property. Petitioner
replied, 'Don't get my mother mixed up in it, and I will tell you
the truth.' Petitioner then stated in substance what appears in the
confession introduced at the trial. The session ended at
midnight."
"Petitioner was not informed of his rights under South Carolina
law, such as the right to secure a lawyer, the right to request a
preliminary hearing, or the right to remain silent. No preliminary
hearing was ever given, and his confession does not even contain
the usual statement that he was told that what he said might be
used against him. During the whole period of interrogation, he was
denied the benefit of consultation with family and friends and was
surrounded by as many as a dozen members of a dominant group in
positions of authority. It is relevant to note that Harris was an
illiterate."
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins,
concurring.
The State of Nebraska is the party that we have summoned to
answer for state action claimed to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. I begin, therefore, by considering just what Nebraska
itself has done that may be said to violate rights of the
petitioner.
Nebraska authorities were not pursuing Gallegos. They did not
know that murder had been done in that
Page 342 U. S. 69
State and were under no pressure to pin guilt on someone.
Gallegos, a Mexican illegally in this country, had been a transient
worker in Nebraska beet fields, and had with him a woman and two
children. The whence and whither of their comings and goings made
no impression on the community, and, when they disappeared, no one
asked how or why.
From Texas authorities, however, came word that a Mexican, held
there at request of the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service, had confessed to murdering his woman in
Nebraska and had told where the body was buried. Nebraska does not
charge murder on the basis of a confession without proof of the
corpus delicti, so the Nebraska officers -- from
information given by Gallegos in Texas -- found a grave and a
decomposed body ultimately identified as that of the woman who had
been living there with Gallegos without benefit of clergy. Only
after this discovery and identification were they in a position to
make a murder charge.
Gallegos was brought from Texas to Scotts Bluff County,
Nebraska. That was the first time he was in the custody of
Nebraska. There is not the slightest proof or suggestion by the
defendant or his counsel that Nebraska officials abused,
threatened, or unduly questioned him. On the contrary, he willingly
told how he beat his paramour to death in a fit of jealousy. The
only complaint against Nebraska is that it detained Gallegos an
unduly long time before arraignment. Even if it did, the delay was
after confession, and therefore could not have been for any
sinister purpose of coercing one, nor could the detention have been
the cause of confession. There is not, from any state action by
Nebraska, the slightest ground for inference that the confession to
its officials was not given voluntarily.
Upon the trial, however, the prosecution proved not only the
Nebraska confession, but also an earlier one made
Page 342 U. S. 70
in Texas. In connection with the latter, vague allegations are
made against the Texas officials. Perhaps the prosecution would
have been well advised not to have proved how the murder originally
came to light. But the prosecution chose to lay the whole matter
before the jury, and, had it failed to do so, it would no doubt
have been charged with some sinister purpose in its
suppression.
Even if we should assume that Texas officials coerced this
confession, they were not acting at the request of Nebraska, nor in
any sense as her agent. Before we could reverse the conviction, we
would have to decide a question not heretofore answered in any
decision that I recall, namely, whether Nebraska, merely by
admitting a coerced foreign confession in evidence, would deny due
process. Insofar as the reason for exclusion is to prevent
convictions on coerced confessions, which are shown by legal
experience to be intrinsically unreliable, I should suppose that
any defect in its origin would inhere in the confession wherever
offered. Insofar, however, as the reason for exclusion is to deter
states from attempting coercion in order to bring about
convictions, the reason would hardly apply to a case where a state
of confession sought no conviction and the state of conviction did
not seek the confession. But here, there is no need to resolve such
difficult questions in affirming the conviction, for I find no
coercion such as would require exclusion of this confession, even
if Nebraska be held to answer for the conduct of every official
involved.
Gallegos was taken into custody by the Texas authorities at the
request of the United States immigration service. They had probable
cause to believe he was illegally in the country, as indeed he was,
and I should not suppose his detention was illegal. The defendant
himself does not claim that he was beaten, unduly questioned, or
threatened, except that he was told he might be shipped
Page 342 U. S. 71
back to Mexico and turned over to the Mexican authorities -- a
statement which, if made, was patently true.
It should be borne in mind that the detaining officers did not
know of this murder except that the immigration officials
apparently had some information that the woman in the case had
disappeared. The Texas authorities were not under pressure to solve
a local murder. It is not even clear that they accused Gallegos of
murder, and certainly they had no theory of a crime which they were
trying to support by obtaining a confession.
But "[t]he guilty flee when no man pursueth." For three days,
Gallegos refused to tell his name. But when he finally revealed his
identity, he went on and told all. He may have been of the
impression that the authorities who were holding him knew more than
they did. Only the fact that he was in custody, the fear that his
deeds were known, and the weight of the crime on his conscience can
be said to have coerced this confession.
This defendant's trial appears to have been scrupulously fair
and dispassionate. The jury and the Nebraska courts appear to have
weighed all of the claims of Gallegos fairly and found, what I do
not see how they could avoid finding, that the confessions were
voluntary within the meaning of the law. These are not confessions
obtained to fit the facts known to the officials. It is a case
where the officials were directed to facts that fitted details of
the confession. Nor is it a case where the confession was altered
or embellished in a prolonged process of examination. The story
first given to the authorities in Texas is substantially identical
with that recited to the Nebraska authorities in greater
detail.
Indeed, no contention is brought to this Court that the
confessions were in fact, coerced or involuntary. The reason no
such contention is made is that capable and zealous counsel cannot
support them on this record. But the contention is that both
confessions should be made inadmissible
Page 342 U. S. 72
in evidence because we should convert the so-called
McNabb rule, a rule of evidence for federal courts, into a
constitutional limitation upon the States.
McNabb v. United
States, 318 U. S. 332. The
claim, and the only claim, is that, because Gallegos was not
arraigned by Texas immediately after arrest and again by Nebraska
immediately after arrival in that State, each detention was
illegal, and the confessions, even if made without abuse or threat
of it, but as a result of questioning during this detention, are
inadmissible in evidence. The only "question presented" by the
petition to this Court reads:
"Are confessions of an accused obtained from him during a
prolonged period of unlawful detention before he was brought before
a magistrate and before a counsel was appointed to assist him,
admissible in evidence?"
Every one of the three specifications of error urged in
petitioner's brief is based on "twenty-five days of unlawful
detention," and on that alone.
Let us see what this would mean as applied to Texas. Texas made
the arrest at the request of the immigration authorities, and it is
not denied that they had probable cause to believe he was an alien
who had entered the country illegally. But, for three days, he
would not tell his name. I should not suppose the authorities were
obliged to release an obvious alien so charged before they could
learn his identity. Then he disclosed the murder. But the murder
did not take place in Texas. That State obviously could not arraign
him for it. Was it obliged to turn loose a confessed murderer
because the murder occurred outside of their jurisdiction? It does
not seem to me that to hold such a person without arraignment under
these circumstances denies due process, unless due process
prohibits society from taking common sense steps to solve a
murder.
Page 342 U. S. 73
But it is complained that Nebraska held him too long (just how
long is too long we never are told) without arraignment. As I have
pointed out, Nebraska knew nothing of the murder, and had to
conduct an investigation before it could make a properly supported
charge of murder. Certainly due process does not require that
charges be placed hurriedly and recklessly. Scotts Bluff County is
a rural county with less than forty thousand inhabitants, more than
half of whom are concentrated in two towns, the largest of which
has a population of only twelve thousand. The small prosecuting
staff that such a county would maintain cannot be expected to move
with the speed of the Federal Government, with its many thousand
agents and countless attorneys, or with the speed of big city
police forces. What was there to hurry about? Gallegos had already
confessed, and he was not prejudiced by the delay. The authorities
took their time drawing papers and getting proof of the
corpus
delicti in order. There seems to have been no passion or
revenge at work in the case. A small prosecuting office in a town
where life is leisurely made a simple effort to go about its duty
with convenient speed.
Even if, as some members of the Court ardently desire, the
McNabb rule were ever to be converted into a
constitutional limitation upon the States, the facts in this case
would afford a poor foundation for it. I concur in the
affirmance.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
Americans justly complain when their fellow citizens in certain
European countries are pounced upon at will by state police, held
in jail
incommunicado, and later convicted of crime on
confessions obtained during such incarceration.
Page 342 U. S. 74
Yet in part
* upon just such a
confession, this Court today affirms Nebraska's conviction of a
citizen of Mexico who can neither read nor understand English.
The record shows the following facts without any dispute at all:
while working in a field in El Paso County, Texas, on September 19,
1949, the petitioner was arrested by a local deputy sheriff without
a warrant. The excuse given for the arrest was that immigration
officers had requested it. No charge was ever filed against
petitioner in any Texas state court, nor was any warrant sworn out
against him during the eight days he was kept in the Texas jail.
His detention was
incommunicado except for repeated
questioning by the deputies. Part of the time, petitioner was kept
in an 8' x 8' cell with no windows, a cell which a Texas deputy
testifying in this case referred to as the "dark room," or the
"punishment room," although petitioner was a "docile prisoner" and
did all he was told to do by the officers. It was during this
incarceration of eight days that the petitioner gave a confession
used to convict him in this case. As is usual in this type of case,
the deputies say that the confession was wholly "voluntary;"
petitioner says that it was due to fear engendered by his
incarceration and the actions of the deputies. Even if the
officers' story should happen to be correct, I believe the
Constitution forbids the use of confessions obtained by the kind of
secret inquisition these deputies conducted.
There are countries where arbitrary arrests like this, followed
by secret imprisonment and systematic questioning
Page 342 U. S. 75
until confessions are obtained, are still recognized and
permissible legal procedures.
See "The Trap Closes" by
Robert A. Vogeler with Leigh White, The Saturday Evening
Post November 3, 1951, p. 36
et seq. My own
belief is that only by departure from the Constitution as properly
interpreted can America tolerate such practices.
See Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143,
322 U. S.
154-155;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.
S. 227;
Bram v. United States, 168 U.
S. 532,
168 U. S. 556,
168 U. S.
562-563. I would reverse this judgment.
* During petitioner's trial, an alleged confession made in
Texas, an alleged confession made in Nebraska, and a plea of guilty
entered in a Nebraska court were introduced in evidence against
him. His conviction should be reversed if any one of these three
items of evidence was secured in violation of due process of law
which the Federal Constitution guarantees. For this reason, I
consider the Texas confession only.