1. Upon the facts of this case, laches was not a defense to
petitioner's suit in admiralty against respondent to recover
damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained while a
passenger on respondent's steamship, although an action at law was
barred by the local statute of limitations. Pp.
342 U. S.
30-32.
(a) Although the question of laches is one primarily addressed
to the discretion of the trial court, it should not be determined
merely by a reference to, and a mechanical application of, the
statute of limitations; the equities of the parties must also be
considered. Pp.
342 U. S.
30-31.
(b) Where there has been no inexcusable delay in seeking a
remedy, and where no prejudice to the defendant has ensued from the
mere passage of time, relief should not be denied on the ground of
laches. P.
342 U. S.
31.
2. Public Law 172, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 63 Stat. 444, 28
U.S.C. § 2680(m), which excluded claims against the Panama Railroad
Company from the provisions of the Tort Claims Act, is not to be
interpreted as summarily cutting off the remedy of all who had sued
the United States for torts which had been committed by the company
during the year preceding its enactment, but as permitting
outstanding claims upon which suit had been instituted against the
United States to be enforced by prompt proceedings directly against
the company. Pp.
342 U. S.
31-32.
185 F.2d 730, reversed.
Petitioner's suit in admiralty against respondent was dismissed
by the District Court on the ground of laches. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. 185 F.2d 730. This Court granted certiorari. 341 U.S.
934.
Reversed, p.
342 U. S. 32.
Page 342 U. S. 30
PER CURIAM.
This suit in admiralty, a libel
in personam brought in
the District Court for the Canal Zone, is petitioner's third
attempt to secure damages for injuries alleged to have been
sustained on December 3, 1947, while a passenger on board
respondent's steamship Panama.
Petitioner instituted her first action against the respondent on
April 10, 1948. This complaint was dismissed October 7, 1948, after
the company successfully maintained that petitioner's only remedy
was to sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act;
that respondent, whose entire stock is owned by the United States,
was a "federal agency" within the meaning of that Act. [
Footnote 1]
An action against the United States filed on November 29, 1948
-- still within the one-year period of limitation -- was dismissed
by the District Court before reaching trial on the merits after
Congress had amended, on July 16, 1949, the Federal Tort Claims
Act, excluding from its coverage "Any claim arising from the
activities of the Panama Railroad Company." [
Footnote 2]
Five days later, on October 19, 1949, petitioner commenced the
present suit. Respondent pleaded laches on the theory that, since
the one-year Canal Zone statute of limitations [
Footnote 3] now barred any action at law, laches
should bar any remedy in admiralty. The District Court sustained
this defense, and entered judgment for the respondent. The Court of
Appeals affirmed on that ground, 185 F.2d 730. We granted
certiorari, 341 U.S. 934.
Though the existence of laches is a question primarily addressed
to the discretion of the trial court, the matter
Page 342 U. S. 31
should not be determined merely by a reference to, and a
mechanical application of, the statute of limitations. The equities
of the parties must be considered as well. Where there has been no
inexcusable delay in seeking a remedy, and where no prejudice to
the defendant has ensued from the mere passage of time, there
should be no bar to relief.
The Key City,
14 Wall. 653 (1872);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert,
250 U. S. 483
(1919);
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392 (1946);
see McGrath v. Panama R. Co.,
298 F. 303, 304 (1924).
Petitioner has diligently sought redress in this case. Twice
within the year following her injuries, she brought suit. The
second action abated through an Act of Congress, and not through
any fault of her own. There is no showing that respondent's
position has suffered from the fact that the claim has not yet
proceeded to trial on its merits.
Respondent contends that, in any event, the decision below must
be affirmed because the petitioner at no time has had a cause of
action against the company. It contends that, at the time of the
injury, the United States, and not the company, was liable, and
that Public Law 172, which now renders the company amenable to
suit, should not operate retroactively to transfer the preexisting
liability of the Government to the respondent.
We must reject this view. The company was subject to suit before
passage of the Tort Claims Act,
Panama R. Co. v. Minnix,
1922, 282 F. 47, and its inclusion within the scope of that Act
meant only that the United States was responsible in damages for
its torts. Without interval, from the time of respondent's
incorporation until July 16, 1949, those injured through fault of
the company were never left without means of redress. Respondent
would now have us attribute to Congress the intent to create an
inequitable hiatus. Despite the fact that the stated "purpose" of
Public Law 172 was simply
Page 342 U. S. 32
to "exclude claims against the . . . Company from the
provisions" of the Tort Claims Act, [
Footnote 4] respondent would have us hold that Congress
meant to cut off, summarily, the remedy of all who had sued the
United States for torts which had been committed by the Panama
Railroad Company during the year preceding enactment of Public Law
172.
In our view, the amendment permitted outstanding claims upon
which suit had been instituted against the United States to be
enforced by prompt proceedings directly against the company. The
petitioner followed this course. This interpretation would seem to
be sustained by the statement of the company's president when he
endorsed the passage of Public Law 172, securing the exclusion of
respondent from the Tort Claims Act, at which time he said that
though the Act embraced "claims against the Panama Railroad
Company," its provisions were not well designed to expedite the
redress of such injuries, and that Congress should enact Public Law
172 "to continue unimpaired . . . the amenability of the Company to
suit in the ordinary course." [
Footnote 5]
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause
is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679.
[
Footnote 2]
Public Law 172, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 63 Stat. 444, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(m).
[
Footnote 3]
Canal Zone Code, 1934, Tit. 4, § 87(3).
[
Footnote 4]
H.R.Rep.No.830, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep.No.167,
Id.
[
Footnote 5]
H.R.Rep. No.830,
supra, 3, 4; S.Rep. No.167,
supra, 3, 4.