An employee of a shoreside contractor engaged by a shipowner to
repair a ship moored in navigable waters was injured aboard the
ship while engaged in making repairs. His injuries did not result
from a collision. Alleging that they were caused by the shipowner's
negligence and the unseaworthiness of the ship, he sued the
shipowner for damages. Claiming that the contractor's negligence
had contributed to the injuries, the shipowner brought in the
contractor as a third-party defendant and urged that it be required
to make contribution.
Held: The contribution proceedings against the
contractor should be dismissed. Pp.
342 U. S.
283-287.
(a) There is no established right to contribution between joint
tortfeasors in such non-collision maritime injury cases. P.
342 U. S.
284.
(b) Since Congress has enacted much legislation in the field of
maritime injuries and has not approved such a rule of contribution
between joint tortfeasors, it would be inappropriate for this Court
to do so. Pp.
342 U. S.
285-287.
187 F.2d 403, reversed and remanded.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Reversed and
remanded, p.
342 U. S.
287.
Page 342 U. S. 283
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Halcyon Lines [
Footnote 1]
hired the Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corporation [
Footnote 2] to make repairs on
Halcyon's ship, which was moored in navigable waters. Salvador
Baccile, an employee of Haenn, was injured aboard ship while
engaged in making these repairs. Alleging that his injuries were
caused by Halcyon's negligence and the unseaworthiness of its
vessel, he brought this action for damages against Halcyon in the
United States District Court. On the ground that Haenn's negligence
had contributed to the injuries, Halcyon brought Haenn in as a
third-party defendant. By agreement of all parties, a $65,000
judgment was rendered for Baccile and paid by Halcyon. Despite
Haenn's protest, the district judge allowed the introduction of
evidence tending to show the relative degree of fault of the two
parties. On this evidence, the jury returned a special verdict
finding Haenn 75% and Halcyon 25% responsible. The district judge
refused to follow this jury determination, and entered judgment in
accordance with his conclusion that there was a general rule
governing maritime torts such as this under which each joint
tortfeasor must pay half the damages.
Baccile v. Halcyon
Lines, 89 F. Supp.
765. The Court of Appeals agreed that a right of contribution
existed in this case, but held that it could not exceed the amount
Haenn would have been compelled to pay Baccile had he elected to
claim compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq.
187 F.2d 403. We granted certiorari because of the conflicting
views taken by the circuits as to
Page 342 U. S. 284
the existence of and the extent to which contribution can be
obtained in cases such as this. [
Footnote 3] 342 U.S. 809.
Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is
established admiralty doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers shall
share equally the damages sustained by each, as well as personal
injury and property damage inflicted on innocent third parties.
This maritime rule is of ancient origin, and has been applied in
many cases, [
Footnote 4] but
this Court has never expressly applied it to non-collision cases.
[
Footnote 5] Halcyon now urges
us to extend it to non-collision cases and to allow a contribution
here based upon the relative degree of fault of Halcyon and Haenn
as found by the jury. Haenn urges us to hold that there is no right
of contribution, or, in the alternative, that the right be based
upon an equal division of all damages. Both parties claim that the
decision below limiting an employer's liability for contribution to
those uncertain amounts recoverable under the Harbor Workers' Act
is impractical and undesirable.
Page 342 U. S. 285
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common law
jurisdiction have generally held that they cannot, on their own
initiative, create an enforceable right of contribution as between
joint tortfeasors. [
Footnote 6]
This judicial attitude has provoked protest on the ground that it
is inequitable to compel one tortfeasor to bear the entire burden
of a loss which has been caused in part by the negligence of
someone else. [
Footnote 7]
Others have defended the policy of common law courts in refusing to
fashion rules of contribution. [
Footnote 8] To some extent, courts exercising jurisdiction
in maritime affairs have felt freer than common law courts in
fashioning rules, [
Footnote 9]
and we would feel free to do so here if wholly convinced that it
would best serve the ends of justice.
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion
new judicial rules of contribution, and that the solution of this
problem should await congressional action. Congress has already
enacted much legislation in the area of maritime personal injuries.
[
Footnote 10] For example,
under the Harbor Workers' Act, Congress has made fault unimportant
in determining the employer's responsibility to his employee;
Congress has made further inroads on
Page 342 U. S. 286
traditional court law by abolition of the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk and by the creation
of a statutory schedule of compensation. The Harbor Workers' Act,
in turn, must be integrated with other acts such as the Jones Act,
41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat.
1112, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790, the Limited Liability Act, R.S. § 4281,
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 181
et seq., and the Harter Act,
27 Stat. 445, 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195. Many groups of persons with
varying interests are vitally concerned with the proper functioning
and administration of all these Acts as an integrated whole. We
think that legislative consideration and action can best bring
about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related interests of
these groups. The legislative process is peculiarly adapted to
determine which of the many possible solutions to this problem
would be most beneficial in the long run. A legislative inquiry
might show that neither carriers, shippers, employees, nor casualty
insurance companies desire such a change to be made. The record
before us is silent as to the wishes of employees, carriers, and
shippers; it only shows that the Halcyon Line is in favor of such a
change in order to relieve itself of a part of its burden in this
particular lawsuit. Apparently insurance companies are opposed to
such a change. [
Footnote 11]
Should a legislative inquiry convince Congress that a right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors is desirable, there would
still be much doubt as to whether application of the rule or the
amount of contribution should be limited by the Harbor Workers'
Act, [
Footnote 12] or should
be based on an equal division
Page 342 U. S. 287
of damages, or should be relatively apportioned in accordance
with the degree of fault of the parties.
In view of the foregoing, and because Congress, while acting in
the field, has stopped short of approving the rule of contribution
here urged, we think it would be inappropriate for us to do so. The
judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the
contribution proceedings against Haenn.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON would reverse with
directions to the District Court to allow contributions equal to
fifty percent of the judgment recovered by Baccile against
Halcyon.
* Together with No.197,
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp. v. Halcyon Lines et al., also on certiorari to the same
court.
[
Footnote 1]
Halcyon Lines refers to Halcyon Lines and Vinke & Co., two
corporate joint owners and operators of the ship here involved.
Halcyon is petitioner in No. 62 and the respondent in No.197.
[
Footnote 2]
Haenn is the petitioner in No.197 and the respondent in No.
62.
[
Footnote 3]
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Matthews,
182 F.2d 322;
United States v. Rothschild International
Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181.
See also Slattery v. Marra
Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134;
Spaulding v. Parry Navigation
Co., 187 F.2d 257;
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87
U.S.App.D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811.
[
Footnote 4]
The
North Star, 106 U. S. 17,
106 U. S. 21,
traces the doctrine back to the Rules of Oleron and the laws of
Wisbuy.
See also The
Washington, 9 Wall. 513;
The Alabama,
92 U. S. 695;
The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302;
The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540,
173 U. S.
551-555.
[
Footnote 5]
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.
S. 446, recognized that some lower federal courts had
applied the equal division rule of contribution in non-collision
cases. The opinion in that case implied that, on remand and under
certain contingencies, the district court would "be free to adjudge
the responsibility of the parties" in accordance with the
contribution rule announced by the lower federal courts. That
statement was only incidental as compared to the important
questions there decided, and cannot be taken as foreclosing a full
consideration and determination of the issue which is now directly
presented and crucial to our decision.
[
Footnote 6]
Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., 196 U. S. 217,
196 U. S. 224.
And see cases collected in 3 A.L.R. Digest, pp. 864-866,
and in Prosser on Torts (1941), p. 1113.
[
Footnote 7]
See e.g., Gregory, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 1170.
[
Footnote 8]
George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 75
U.S.App.D.C. 187, 191, 126 F.2d 219, 223, dissenting opinion.
See also James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A
Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 1156.
[
Footnote 9]
Swift & Co. v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
339 U. S. 684,
339 U. S. 690,
691.
Compare 88 U. S. 21
Wall. 558.
[
Footnote 10]
See, e.g., The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. §
688, the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790,
and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44
Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq.
[
Footnote 11]
Gregory,
supra, n
7, p. 1177. James,
supra, n 8, pp. 1179-1180.
[
Footnote 12]
Section 5 of the Act provides that
"The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of
such injury or death. . . ."
Haenn argues that this section provides the employer's exclusive
liability, thereby preventing a third party from having any right
of contribution against an employer under the Act in cases where
the joint negligence of a third party and the employer injure an
employee covered by the Act. We find it unnecessary to decide this
question, which is treated by the cases cited in
n 3,
supra.