Under § 13(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, the one-year period of limitation on the filing
of claims for compensation for disability begins to run on the date
of the injury, and not on some subsequent date when disability
occurs. Pp.
342 U. S.
197-200.
187 F.2d 987 affirmed.
The District Court vacated certain awards of compensation under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 92 F.
Supp. 898. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 187 F.2d 987. This Court
granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 847.
Affirmed, p.
342 U. S.
200.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
These four cases present the same question, namely, the
construction and application of the statute of limitations
provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 44 Stat. 1424, § 13(a), 33 U.S.C. § 913(a), which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
"The right to compensation for disability under this Act shall
be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after
the injury. . . . "
Page 342 U. S. 198
The claims here involved were filed from eighteen to twenty-four
months from the dates the employees were injured. The Deputy
Commissioner held that the claims were nevertheless timely, since
they had been filed within one year after the claimants had become
disabled because of their injuries. The District Court vacated the
awards, 92 F. Supp. 898, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the
ground that the claims were barred because not "filed within one
year after the injury," 187 F.2d 987, 990. We granted certiorari,
342 U.S. 847, because of a conflict between circuits, [
Footnote 1] identical to the present
conflict between the holdings of the Deputy Commissioner and the
Court of Appeals, as to the construction to be given the
limitations provision. This same question was before us in 1940 in
Kobilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F.2d 667,
aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 309 U.S. 619.
Petitioners contend that the word "injury," as used in the
statute, should be construed to mean "disability." This contention
is premised on petitioners' conclusion that § 6(a) of the Act,
which provides that "No compensation shall be allowed for the first
seven days of the disability," [
Footnote 2] ("disability" is elsewhere defined in the Act
as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the
employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any
other employment") [
Footnote 3]
and § 19(a), which provides that "a claim . . . may be filed . . .
at any time after the first seven days of disability following any
injury," [
Footnote 4] operate
to prevent the filing of a claim before seven days of disability
have occurred. Since, as was
Page 342 U. S. 199
the case of each of the claimants here, an injured employee may
fail to accrue seven days' "disability" within a year after his
injury, petitioners argue that such an employee will be barred from
filing his claim before his right to file it arises, if "injury" is
construed to mean "injury." Thus, petitioners conclude that the
limitation should not be made to run until the injury becomes
compensable,
i.e., after seven days' "disability."
But the right to recover for disability is one thing, and the
right to file a claim is another. It has long been the practice of
the Deputy Commissioner to permit filing to avoid the running of
the one-year limitation period here involved. A proper
interpretation of §§ 6(a) and 19(a) does not prohibit the filing of
a claim before the accrual of seven days' disability. Each of the
claimants here was immediately aware of his injury, received
medical treatment, and suffered continuous pain. We are not here
dealing with a latent injury or an occupational disease.
We are not free, under the guise of construction, to amend the
statute by inserting therein before the word "injury" the word
"compensable" so as to make "injury" read as if it were
"disability." Congress knew the difference between "disability" and
"injury," and used the words advisedly. This view is especially
compelling when it is noted that the two words are used in the same
sentence of the limitations provision; therein, "disability" is
related to the right to compensation, while "injury" is related to
the period within which the claim must be filed. Furthermore,
Congress defined both "disability" and "injury" in the Act,
[
Footnote 5] and its awareness
of the difference is
Page 342 U. S. 200
apparent throughout. Thus, we think that, when Congress used
"disability" and "injury" in the same sentence, making each word
applicable to a different thing, it did not intend the carefully
distinguished and separately defined words to mean the same thing.
Congress meant what it said when it limited recovery to one year
from date of injury, and "injury" does not mean "disability."
We are aware that this is a humanitarian act, and that it should
be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes; but that does
not give us the power to rewrite the statute of limitations at
will, and make what was intended to be a limitation no limitation
at all. Petitioners' construction would have the effect of
extending the limitation indefinitely if a claim for disability had
not been filed; the provision would then be one of extension,
rather than limitation. While it might be desirable for the statute
to provide as petitioners contend, the power to change the statute
is with Congress, not us.
The judgments are
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The conflict is between the instant decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Great American
Indemnity Co. v. Britton, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 179 F.2d 60.
[
Footnote 2]
44 Stat. 1426, 33 U.S.C. § 906(a).
[
Footnote 3]
44 Stat. 1425, 33 U.S.C. § 902(10).
[
Footnote 4]
44 Stat. 1435, 33 U.S.C. § 919(a).
[
Footnote 5]
"SEC. 2. When used in this Act --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) The term 'injury' means accidental injury or death arising
out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational
disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or
as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury,
and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person
directed against an employee because of his employment."
"
* * * *"
"(10) 'Disability' means incapacity because of injury to earn
the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in
the same or any other employment."
44 Stat. 1424-1425, 33 U.S.C. § 902(2, 10).
MR. JUSTICE BURTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS concur, dissenting.
The Court's computation of the period allowed for filing claims
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is so
opposed to the beneficial purpose of the Act that it is not
justified in the absence of a more express basis for it. The
purpose of the Act is to provide
Page 342 U. S. 201
compensation for the disability or death of employees in certain
maritime employments when caused by injuries arising out of and in
the course of their employment. The Court now restricts the
beneficial effect of the Act by its computation of the period
allowed an employee for filing his claim under the Act. The Court
computes it from the date of the employee's accident, rather than
from that of his right to compensation. One year after his
accident, the employee is thus barred from claiming compensation
for any disability later resulting from it unless, within that
year, he has filed a claim for compensation -- although, during the
year, he has suffered no disability, and has acquired no right to
compensation under the Act.
The Act does not call for or justify such a frustrating
interpretation. Section 13(a) does not say that an employee's claim
must be filed within one year after the "accident." It says that
his claim must be filed "within one year after the injury." 44
Stat. 1432, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a). The Act deals only with disabling
injuries, and provides compensation only for the loss of earning
power or death resulting from them. If it is recognized that the
word "injury" in § 13(a) means a disabling or compensable injury, a
natural result flows from it. So interpreted, the section requires
only that a claim for compensation must be filed within one year
after a right to compensation first arises.
That the Act is concerned solely with compensation for
disability or death appears on its face. Compensation is not
payable to an employee merely because he has been in an accident in
the course of his employment, nor even because he has suffered
physical damage from that accident. The Act allows compensation
only when the employee also has suffered a resulting loss of
earning power.
The Act expressly limits "injuries" to those of a certain origin
by stating that they must arise out of and in the
Page 342 U. S. 202
course of the employee's employment. [
Footnote 2/1] It allows compensation only for resulting
disability or death. [
Footnote 2/2]
It defines the required disability as a diminution of earning
power. [
Footnote 2/3]
Section 13(a), which limits the period for filing claims under
the Act, has a reasonable effect if it is read as concerned only
with compensable injuries. [
Footnote
2/4] On the other hand, to interpret § 13(a) as cutting off the
period for filing claims one year after the date of the accident is
to
Page 342 U. S. 203
measure the period from a date bearing no certain relation to
the time when a right to compensation arises. If an employee's
injury causes him no diminution of earning power within one year
after the accident, he is entitled to no compensation within that
year. Yet, under the Court's interpretation of § 13(a), he will be
barred also from claiming compensation for subsequently resulting
disabilities unless, within that first year following his accident,
he has filed a claim for compensation. The instant cases show how
readily such situations may arise.
The legislative history of § 13(a) is consistent with the
petitioners' interpretation. [
Footnote
2/5] Their interpretation also has had judicial support from
the appellate courts of the District of Columbia Circuit and of the
Third Circuit.
See Great American Indemnity Co. v.
Britton, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 179 F.2d 60;
Potomac Electric
Power Co. v. Cardillo, 71 App.D.C. 163, 107 F.2d 962;
Di
Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Norton, 93 F.2d 119.
Before the enactment of this Compensation Act by Congress,
several states had interpreted "injury" in comparable provisions of
their Compensation Acts to mean "compensable injury," rather than
"accident."
Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 96 Conn.
414, 114 A. 92;
Guderian
Page 342 U. S. 204
v. Sterling S. & R. Co., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546;
Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428, 123 A. 514.
Cf.
Hornbrook-Price Co. v. Stewart, 66 Ind.App. 400, 118 N.E. 315;
In re McCaskey, 65 Ind.App. 349, 117 N.E. 268.
Contra:
Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., 200 Mich.192, 166 N.W. 1013.
To determine when the one-year period for filing claims begins,
it is necessary to determine the date when the employee's injury
resulted in a diminution of his earning power. That date is not
necessarily coincident with that of the first physical damage to
the employee or the first reduction in the rate of wages actually
paid him. In the instant cases, the respective Deputy Commissioners
expressly found that each claim was filed within one year after the
employee's disability occurred, although none of the claims was
filed within one year after the accident in question. These
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record taken
as a whole.
See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc.,
340 U. S. 504.
Accordingly, I would hold each of the claims timely, and would
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals with directions to
remand the cases to the District Court for dismissal of the several
complaints.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"SEC. 2. When used in this Act --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) The term 'injury' means accidental injury or death arising
out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational
disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or
as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury,
and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person
directed against an employee because of his employment."
44 Stat. 1424-1425, 33 U.S.C. § 902(2).
[
Footnote 2/2]
"SEC. 3.(a) Compensation shall be payable under this Act in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and
if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.
. . ."
44 Stat. 1426, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).
[
Footnote 2/3]
"SEC. 2. When used in this Act --"
"
* * * *"
"(10) 'Disability' means incapacity because of injury to earn
the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in
the same or any other employment."
44 Stat. 1424-1425, 33 U.S.C. § 902(10).
[
Footnote 2/4]
"SEC. 13. (a) The right to compensation for disability under
this Act shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within
one year after the injury, and the right to compensation for death
shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year
after the death, except that, if payment of compensation has been
made without an award on account of such injury or death a claim
may be filed within one year after the date of the last payment. .
. ."
44 Stat. 1432, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The provisions in the bill which became § 13 of the Compensation
Act (S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; 67 Cong.Rec. 4119) were
amended so as to reduce the time limit for filing claims from two
years to one year and so as to substitute the word "injury" in
place of the word "accident" as the starting point of the period. A
like substitution of "injury" for "accident" was made in several
other places and a provision for compensation for disability or
death resulting from occupational disease was added. These changes
emphasize the impropriety of now reading "injury" as meaning
"accident." In the case of an occupational disease, it is
especially restrictive of an employee's rights to limit his filing
period to one year from some date of early contact constituting the
"accident," rather than from the date of his first compensable
diminution of earning power due to the disease.