Although the union here involved was not certified or recognized
as the representative of the employees of a certain mill engaged in
interstate commerce, its agents picketed the mill with the object
of securing recognition of the union as the collective bargaining
representative of the mill's employees. In the course of their
picketing, the agents sought to influence two men in charge of a
truck of a neutral customer to refuse, in the course of their
employment, to go to the mill for an order of goods, and they threw
rocks at the truck when it proceeded to the mill by a detour.
Held: such action did not violate the "secondary
boycott" provisions of § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. Pp.
341 U. S.
666-674.
(a) The union's picketing and its encouragement of the men on
the truck did not amount to such an inducement or encouragement to
"concerted" activities as the section proscribes. Pp.
341 U. S.
670-671.
(b) It is the object of union encouragement that is proscribed
by § 8(b)(4), rather than the means adopted to make it felt, and
violence on the picket line is not material in this case, since the
complaint was not based upon that violence as such, and did not
rely upon § 8(b)(1)(A). P.
341 U. S. 672.
(c) Congress did not seek by § 8(b)(4) to interfere with
ordinary strikes. Pp.
341 U. S.
672-673.
(d) By § 13, Congress has made it clear that § 8(b)(4), and all
other parts of the Act which otherwise might be read so as to
interfere with, impede or diminish a union's traditional right to
strike, may be so read only if such interference, impediment, or
diminution is "specifically provided for" in the Act. P.
341 U. S.
673.
183 F.2d 21 reversed.
The National Labor Relations Board dismissed a complaint of an
alleged violation of § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended by the Labor
Page 341 U. S. 666
Management Relations Act, 1947. 84 N.L.R.B. 360. The Court of
Appeals set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 183 F.2d 21. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S.
902.
Reversed, p.
341 U. S. 674.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a union violated § 8(b)(4) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151, as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, [
Footnote 1] under the following
circumstances:
Page 341 U. S. 667
although not certified or recognized as the representative of
the employees of a certain mill engaged in interstate commerce, the
agents of the union picketed the mill with the object of securing
recognition of the union as the collective bargaining
representative of the mill employees. In the course of their
picketing, the agents sought to influence, or, in the language of
the statute, they "encouraged," two men in charge of a truck of a
neutral customer of the mill to refuse, in the course of their
employment, to go to the mill for an order of goods. For the
reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that such conduct did not
violate § 8(b)(4).
This case was heard here with No. 393,
Labor Board v. Denver
Building and Construction Trades Council, post, p.
341 U. S. 675; No.
108,
Page 341 U. S. 668
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor
Board, post, p.
341 U. S. 694, and
No. 85,
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor
Board, post, p.
341 U. S. 707. Its
facts, however, distinguish it from those cases.
This review is confined to the single incident described in the
complaint issued by the Acting Regional Director of the National
Labor Relations Board against the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local
201, A.F.L., herein called the union. The complaint originally was
based upon four charges made against the union by several rice
mills engaged in interstate commerce near the center of the
Louisiana rice industry. The mills included the International Rice
Milling Company, Inc., which gives its name to this proceeding, and
the Kaplan Rice Mills, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, which
operated the mill at Kaplan, Louisiana, where the incident now
before us occurred. The complaint charged that the union or its
agents, by their conduct toward two employees of a neutral customer
of the Kaplan Rice Mills, engaged in an unfair labor practice
contrary to § 8(b)(4). The Board, with one member not
participating, adopted the findings and conclusions of its trial
examiner as to the facts, but disagreed with his recommendation
that those facts constituted a violation of § 8(b)(4)(A) or (B).
The Board dismissed the complaint, but attached the trial
examiner's intermediate report to its decision. 84 N.L.R.B. 360.
The Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal and remanded the case
for further proceedings. 183 F.2d 21. We granted certiorari because
of the importance of the principle involved and because of the
conflicting views of several circuits as to the meaning of §
8(b)(4). 340 U.S. 902. [
Footnote
2]
Page 341 U. S. 669
The findings adopted by the Board show that the incident before
us occurred at the union's picket line near the Kaplan Mill in
October, 1947. The pickets generally carried signs, one being "This
job is unfair to" the union. The goal of the pickets was
recognition of the union as the collective bargaining
representative of the mill employees, but none of those employees
took part in the picketing. Late one afternoon, two employees of
The Sales and Service House, which was a customer of the mill, came
in a truck to the Kaplan Mill to obtain rice or bran for their
employer. The union had no grievance against the customer, and the
latter was a neutral in the dispute between the union and the mill.
The pickets formed a line across the road and walked toward the
truck. When the truck stopped, the pickets told its occupants there
was a strike on and that the truck would have to go back. Those on
the truck agreed, went back to the highway and stopped. There, one
got out and went to the mill across the street. At that time, a
vice-president of the Kaplan Mill came out and asked whether the
truck was on its way to the mill and whether its occupants wanted
to get the order they came for. The man on the truck explained that
he was not the driver, and that he would have to see the driver. On
the driver's return, the truck proceeded,
Page 341 U. S. 670
with the vice-president, to the mill by a short detour. The
pickets ran toward the truck and threw stones at it. The truck
entered the mill, but the findings do not disclose whether the
articles sought there were obtained. The Board adopted the finding
that
"the stopping of the Sales House truck drivers and the use of
force in connection with the stoppage were within the 'scope of the
employment' of the pickets as agents of the respondent [union], and
that such activities are attributable to the respondent."
84 N.L.R.B. 360, 372.
The most that can be concluded from the foregoing to establish a
violation of § 8(b)(4) is that the union, in the course of
picketing the Kaplan Mill, did encourage two employees of a neutral
customer to turn back from an intended trip to the mill, and thus
to refuse, in the course of their employment, to transport articles
or perform certain services for their employer. We may assume,
without the necessity of adopting the Board's findings to that
effect, that the objects of such conduct on the part of the union
and its agents were (1) to force Kaplan's customer to cease
handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in products of the
mill, or to cease doing business with Kaplan at that time and
place, and (2) to add to the pressure on Kaplan to recognize the
union as the bargaining representative of the mill employees.
A sufficient answer to this claimed violation of the section is
that the union's picketing and its encouragement of the men on the
truck did not amount to such an inducement or encouragement to
"concerted" activity as the section proscribes. While each case
must be considered in the light of its surrounding circumstances,
yet the applicable proscriptions of § 8(b)(4) are expressly limited
to the inducement or encouragement of concerted
Page 341 U. S. 671
conduct by the employees of the neutral employer. [
Footnote 3] That language contemplates
inducement or encouragement to some concert of action greater than
is evidenced by the pickets' request to a driver of a single truck
to discontinue a pending trip to a picketed mill. There was no
attempt by the union to induce any action by the employees of the
neutral customer which would be more widespread than that already
described. There were no inducements or encouragements applied
elsewhere than on the picket line. The limitation of the complaint
to an incident in the geographically restricted area near the mill
is significant, although not necessarily conclusive. The picketing
was directed at the Kaplan employees and at their employer in a
manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that, in itself, was
not proscribed by § 8(b)(4). Insofar as the union's efforts were
directed beyond that and toward the employees of anyone other than
Kaplan, there is no suggestion that the union sought concerted
conduct by such other employees. Such efforts also fall short of
the proscriptions in § 8(b)(4). In this case, therefore, we need
not determine the specific objects toward which a union's
encouragement of concerted conduct must be directed in order to
amount to an unfair labor practice under subsection (A) or (B) of §
8(b)(4). A union's inducements or encouragements reaching
individual employees of neutral employers only as they happen to
approach the picketed place of business generally are not aimed at
concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such
employees. Generally, therefore, such actions do not come within
the proscription of § 8(b)(4), and they do not here.
Page 341 U. S. 672
In the instant case, the violence on the picket line is not
material. The complaint was not based upon that violence, as such.
To reach it, the complaint more properly would have relied upon §
8(b)(1)(A), [
Footnote 4] or
would have addressed itself to local authorities. The substitution
of violent coercion in place of peaceful persuasion would not, in
itself, bring the complained-of conduct into conflict with §
8(b)(4). It is the object of union encouragement that is proscribed
by that section, rather than the means adopted to make it felt.
[
Footnote 5]
That Congress did not seek, by § 8(b)(4), to interfere with the
ordinary strike has been indicated recently by this Court.
[
Footnote 6] This is emphasized
in § 13 as follows:
Page 341 U. S. 673
"Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 163.
By § 13, Congress has made it clear that § 8(b)(4), and all
other parts of the Act which otherwise might be read so as to
interfere with, impede or diminish the union's traditional right to
strike, may be so read only if such interference, impediment or
diminution is "specifically provided for" in the Act. [
Footnote 7] No such specific provision
in § 8(b)(4) reaches the incident here. The material legislative
history supports this view. [
Footnote 8]
Page 341 U. S. 674
On the single issue before us, we sustain the action of the
Board and the judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is
reversed.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 8. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents --"
"
* * * *"
"(4) to engage in, or,
to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or
to perform any services, where an
object thereof is: (A)
forcing or requiring any
employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization or
any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to
cease doing business with any other person; (B)
forcing or
requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9; (C) forcing or
requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization as the representative of his employees if
another labor organization has been certified as the representative
of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (D) forcing or
requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a
particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class, rather than to employees in another labor organization or in
another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to
conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the
bargaining representative for employees performing such work:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b)
shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to
enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own
employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a
strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees
whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act. . .
."
(Emphasis supplied.) 61 Stat. 140-142, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) §
158(b)(4).
The above provisions, together with those of § 303, 61 Stat.
158, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 187, have been referred to by Congress
and the courts as the "secondary boycott sections" of the Act.
[
Footnote 2]
While the complaint charged no unfair labor practice on the part
of the union in its relations with employees of the Kaplan Mill, it
did charge that the union also violated § 8(b)(4)(A) by its conduct
in inducing and encouraging employees of two neutral railroads to
engage in a concerted refusal, in the course of their employment,
to transport or otherwise handle articles shipped to or from some
of the respective mills, including the Kaplan Mill. Not only did
the encouragement of concerted action which was alleged in that
charge differ substantially from the conduct which is before us,
but the Board found that the railroad employees were not employees
within the meaning of § 8(b)(4). 84 N.L.R.B. 360. The Court of
Appeals held to the contrary, and remanded the charge for further
proceedings. 183 F.2d 21, 24-26. The Board, however, does not seek
a review of that order.
[
Footnote 3]
It is not charged here that the union or its agents themselves
engaged in a strike or concerted activity for an object proscribed
by § 8(b)(4).
[
Footnote 4]
"SEC. 8. . . ."
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents --"
"
* * * *"
"(1) to restrain or coerce(A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7: . . . ."
61 Stat. 140-141, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 158(b)(1)(A).
"SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities. . . ."
61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 157.
[
Footnote 5]
". . . The Labor Management Relations Act declared it to be an
unfair labor practice for a union to induce or engage in a strike
or concerted refusal to work where an object thereof is any of
certain enumerated ones. § 8(b)(4). . . . While the Federal Board
is empowered to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose is
one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has been given no power
to forbid one because its method is illegal -- even if the
illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to
persons or destruction of property."
International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.
S. 245,
336 U. S.
253.
[
Footnote 6]
In this Act, "Congress safeguarded the exercise by employees of
concerted activities' and expressly recognized the right to
strike." International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.
S. 454, 339 U. S. 457;
see also Amalgamated Assn. of Employees v. Wisconsin
Board, 340 U. S. 383,
340 U. S. 389,
340 U. S. 404;
United Electrical & Machine Workers, 85 N.L.R.B. 417,
418; Oil Workers International Union, 84 N.L.R.B. 315,
318-320.
[
Footnote 7]
See also the protection given to the right to engage in
concerted activities by § 7 of the Act,
note 4 supra. As to both §§ 13 and 7,
see
International Union v. Wisconsin Board, supra, at
336 U. S.
258-264.
The character of the problem of reconciliation of the right to
strike with the limitations expressed in § 8(b)(4) is not unlike
that which confronted the Court in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local
Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797,
325 U. S.
806:
"The result of all this is that we have two declared
congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to
reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business
economy, the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to
better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining.
We must determine here how far Congress intended activities under
one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the
other."
[
Footnote 8]
Senator Taft, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, and floor manager for the bill in the Senate,
said:
"So far as the bill is concerned, we have proceeded on the
theory that there is a right to strike and that labor peace must be
based on free collective bargaining. We have done nothing to outlaw
strikes for basic wages, hours, and working conditions after proper
opportunity for mediation."
93 Cong.Rec. 3835. Similar statements by Senator Taft appear at
93 Cong.Rec. 3838, 4198, 4867, 6446, 7537. Several other members of
the Committee expressed like views: Senator Ellender at 93
Cong.Rec. 4131-4132; Senator Ball at 4834, 4838, 7529-7530; Senator
Aiken at 4860, and Senator Morse at 4864, 4871-4873.
See also "the primary strike for recognition (without a
Board certification) is not proscribed." S.Rep. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. 1) 22,
and see H.R.Rep. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43.
In discussing the effect of § 8(b)(4), and in showing its
application only to circumstances other than those involved in this
case, Senator Taft said further:
"The Senator will find a great many decisions . . . which hold
that, under the common law, a secondary boycott is unlawful. . . .
[U]nder the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became
impossible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of a
strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common law. All
this provision of the bill [§ 8(b)(4)] does is to reverse the
effect of the law as to secondary boycotts."
93 Cong.Rec. 4198.