A complaint in an action to recover damages under 8 U.S.C. §
47(3) alleged that the plaintiffs were members of a political club
which planned a meeting to adopt a resolution opposing the Marshall
Plan; that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their
rights as citizens of the United States peaceably to assemble and
to equal privileges and immunities under the laws of the United
States; that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, defendants
proceeded to plaintiffs' meeting place and, by threats and
violence, broke up the meeting, thus interfering with the right of
plaintiffs to petition the Government for redress of grievances,
and that defendants did not interfere or conspire to interfere with
meetings of other groups with whose opinions defendants agreed.
There was no averment that defendants were state officers or acted
under color of state law.
Held: The complaint did not state a cause of action
under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3). Pp.
341 U. S.
652-663.
(a) Assuming, without deciding, that the facts alleged show that
defendants deprived plaintiffs "of having and exercising" a federal
right, the facts alleged did not show that the conspiracy was "for
the purpose of depriving [them] of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," and
therefore, in this case, a cause of action under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3)
was not stated. Pp.
341 U. S.
660-663.
(b) Section 47(3) does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to
deprive one of rights unless it is a deprivation of equality, of
"equal protection of the law," or of "equal privileges and
immunities under the law." Pp.
341 U. S.
660-661.
(c) The fact that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting
but did not interfere with the meetings of those who shared
defendants' views is not inequality before the law unless there is
some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or
sanctuary for doing so. P.
341 U. S. 661.
(d) Although plaintiffs' rights were invaded, disregarded, and
lawlessly violated, neither their rights nor their equality of
rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or
impaired. Pp.
341 U. S.
661-662.
183 F.2d 308, reversed.
Page 341 U. S. 652
In an action brought by respondents against petitioners to
recover damages under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3), the District Court
dismissed the complaint.
80 F. Supp.
501. The Court of Appeals reversed. 183 F.2d 308. This Court
granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 809.
Reversed, p.
341 U. S.
663.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This controversy arises under 8 U.S.C. § 47(3), which provides
civil remedies for certain conspiracies. [
Footnote 1] A motion to dismiss the amended complaint
raises the issue of its sufficiency and, of course, requires us to
accept its well pleaded facts as the hypothesis for decision.
Page 341 U. S. 653
Its essential allegations are that plaintiffs are citizens of
the United States, residents of California, and members or officers
of a voluntary association or political club organized for the
purpose of participating in the election of officers of the United
States, petitioning the national government for redress of
grievances, and engaging in public meetings for the discussion of
national public issues. It planned a public meeting for November
14, 1947, on the subject, "The Cominform and the Marshall Plan," at
which it was intended to adopt a resolution opposing said Marshall
Plan, to be forwarded, by way of a petition for the redress of
grievances, to appropriate federal officials.
The conspiracy charged as being within the Act is that
defendants, with knowledge of the meeting and its purposes,
Page 341 U. S. 654
entered into an agreement to deprive the plaintiffs,
"as citizens of the United States, of privileges and immunities,
as citizens of the United States, of the rights peaceably to
assemble for the purpose of discussing and communicating upon
national public issues. . . ."
And further,
"to deprive the plaintiffs as well as the members of said club,
as citizens of the United States, of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws of the United States. . . ."
This is amplified by allegations that defendants knew of many
public meetings in the locality at which resolutions were adopted
by groups with whose opinions defendants agreed, and with which
defendants did not interfere or conspire to interfere.
"With respect to the meeting aforesaid on November 14, 1947,
however, the defendants conspired to interfere with said meeting
for the reason that the defendants opposed the views of the
plaintiff. . . . ."
In the effort to bring the case within the statute, the pleader
also alleged that defendants conspired "to go in disguise upon the
highways," and that they did in fact go in disguise "consisting of
the unlawful and unauthorized wearing of caps of the American
Legion." The District Court disposed of this part of the complaint
by holding that wearing such headgear did not constitute the
disguise or concealment of identity contemplated by the Act.
Plaintiffs thereupon abandoned that part of the complaint, and do
not here rely upon it to support their claims.
The complaint then separately sets out the overt acts of injury
and damage relied upon to meet the requirements of the Act. To
carry out the conspiracy, it is alleged, defendants proceeded to
the meeting place and, by force and threats of force, did assault
and intimidate plaintiffs and those present at the meeting, and
thereby broke up the meeting, thus interfering with the right of
the plaintiffs to petition the Government for
Page 341 U. S. 655
redress of grievances. Both compensatory and punitive damages
are demanded.
It is averred that the cause of action arises under the statute
cited and under the Constitution of the United States. But
apparently the draftsman was scrupulously cautious not to allege
that it arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, or that defendants
had conspired to deprive plaintiffs of rights secured by that
Amendment, thus seeking to avoid the effect of earlier decisions of
this Court in Fourteenth Amendment cases.
The complaint makes no claim that the conspiracy or the overt
acts involved any action by state officials, or that defendants
even pretended to act under color of state law. It is not shown
that defendants had or claimed any protection or immunity from the
law of the State, or that they in fact enjoyed such because of any
act or omission by state authorities. Indeed, the trial court found
that the acts alleged are punishable under the laws of California
relating to disturbance of the peace, assault, and trespass, and
are also civilly actionable. [
Footnote 2]
Page 341 U. S. 656
The District Judge held that the statute does not and cannot
constitutionally afford redress for invasions of civil rights at
the hands of individuals, but can only be applied to injuries to
civil rights by persons acting pursuant to or under color of state
law. [
Footnote 3] In reversing
the District Court's dismissal of the complaint, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held otherwise, one judge dissenting.
[
Footnote 4] The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Love v. Chandler, 124
F.2d 785, has ruled in accord with the District Judge and the
dissenting Court of Appeals Judge here. [
Footnote 5] To resolve the conflict, we granted
certiorari. [
Footnote 6]
This statutory provision has long been dormant. It was
introduced into the federal statutes by the Act of April 20, 1871,
entitled
"An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.
[
Footnote 7]"
The Act was among the last of the reconstruction legislation to
be based on the "conquered province" theory which prevailed in
Congress for a period following the Civil War. This statute,
without separability provisions, established the civil liability
with which we are here concerned, as well as other civil
liabilities, together with parallel criminal liabilities. It also
provided that unlawful combinations and conspiracies named in the
Act might be deemed rebellions, and authorized the President to
employ the militia to suppress them. The President was also
authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
It prohibited any person from being a federal grand or
Page 341 U. S. 657
petit juror in any case arising under the Act unless he took and
subscribed an oath in open court "that he has never, directly or
indirectly, counseled, advised, or voluntarily aided any such
combination or conspiracy." Heavy penalties and liabilities were
laid upon any person who, with knowledge of such conspiracies,
aided them or failed to do what he could to suppress them.
The Act, popularly known as the Ku Klux Act, was passed by a
partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere. It was preceded by
spirited debate which pointed out its grave character and
susceptibility to abuse, and its defects were soon realized when
its execution brought about a severe reaction. [
Footnote 8]
The provision establishing criminal conspiracies in language
indistinguishable from that used to describe civil conspiracies
came to judgment in
United States v. Harris, 106 U.
S. 629. [
Footnote 9]
It was held unconstitutional. This decision was in harmony with
that of other important decisions during that period [
Footnote 10] by a Court every member
of
Page 341 U. S. 658
which had been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes,
Garfield or Arthur -- all indoctrinated in the cause which produced
the Fourteenth Amendment, but convinced that it was not to be used
to centralize power so as to upset the federal system.
While we have not been in agreement as to the interpretation and
application of some of the post-Civil War legislation, [
Footnote 11] the Court recently
unanimously declared, through THE CHIEF JUSTICE:
"Since the decision of this Court in the
Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), the principle
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.
That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful. [
Footnote 12]"
And MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting, has quoted with approval
from the
Cruikshank case,
"'The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes
it . . . add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the
Constitution against another.' 92 U.S. at pp.
92 U. S.
554-555."
And
"'The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see
that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment
guarantees, but no more. The power of the national government is
limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.'"
He summed up: "The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual
against
state action, not against wrongs done by
individuals. . . ." [
Footnote 13]
Page 341 U. S. 659
It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of
this Act, it raises constitutional problems of the first magnitude
that, in the light of history, are not without difficulty. These
would include issues as to congressional power under and apart from
the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the
content of rights derived from national, as distinguished from
state, citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in
its application to those two classes of rights. The latter question
was long ago decided adversely to the plaintiffs.
Baldwin v.
Franks, 120 U. S. 678.
Before we embark upon such a constitutional inquiry, it is
necessary to satisfy ourselves that the attempt to allege a cause
of action within the purview of the statute has been
successful.
The section under which this action is brought falls into two
divisions. The forepart defines conspiracies that may become the
basis of liability, and the latter portion defines overt acts
necessary to consummate the conspiracy as an actionable wrong.
While a mere unlawful agreement or conspiracy may be made a federal
crime, as it was at common law, [
Footnote 14] this statute does not make the mere
agreement or understanding for concerted action which constitutes
the forbidden conspiracy an actionable wrong unless it matures into
some action that inflicts injury. That, we think, is the
significance of the second division of the section.
The provision with reference to the overt act will bear
repeating, with emphasis supplied:
". . . [I]n any case of
conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause
to be done,
any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another
Page 341 U. S. 660
is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages. . . ."
In the light of the dictum in
United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
92 U. S. 552,
we assume, without deciding, that the facts pleaded show that
defendants did deprive plaintiffs "of having and exercising" a
federal right which, provided the defendants were engaged in a
"conspiracy set forth in this section," would bring the case within
the Act.
The "conspiracy" required is differently stated from the
required overt act, and we think the difference is not accidental,
but significant. Its essentials, with emphasis supplied, are that
two or more persons must conspire (1) for the purpose of
depriving any person or class of persons of the
equal
protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and
immunities under the law; or (2) for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities from giving or securing to
all persons the equal protection of the laws; or (3) to prevent by
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen entitled to vote from
giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner toward election of
an elector for President or a member of Congress; or (4) to injure
any citizen in person or property on account of such support or
advocacy. There is no claim that any allegation brings this case
within the provisions that we have numbered (2), (3), and (4), so
we may eliminate any consideration of those categories. The
complaint is within the statute only if it alleges a conspiracy of
the first described class. It is apparent that this part of the Act
defines conspiracies of a very limited character. They must, we
repeat, be "for the purpose of
depriving . . . of the
equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges
and immunities under the laws." (Italics supplied.)
Page 341 U. S. 661
Passing the argument, fully developed in the
Civil Rights
Cases, that an individual or group of individuals not in
office cannot
deprive anybody of constitutional rights,
though they may invade or violate those rights, it is clear that
this statute does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to deprive one
of rights, unless it is a deprivation of equality, of "equal
protection of the law," or of "equal privileges and immunities
under the law." That accords with the purpose of the Act to put the
lately freed Negro on an equal footing before the law with his
former master. The Act apparently deemed that adequate, and went no
further.
What we have here is not a conspiracy to affect in any way these
plaintiffs' equality of protection by the law, or their equality of
privileges and immunities under the law. There is not the slightest
allegation that defendants were conscious of or trying to influence
the law, or were endeavoring to obstruct or interfere with it. The
only inequality suggested is that the defendants broke up
plaintiffs' meeting and did not break up meetings of others with
whose sentiments they agreed. To be sure, this is not equal injury,
but it is no more a deprivation of "equal protection" or of "equal
privileges and immunities" than it would be for one to assault one
neighbor without assaulting them all, or to libel some persons
without mention of others. Such private discrimination is not
inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation of the
law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so.
Plaintiffs' rights were certainly invaded, disregarded, and
lawlessly violated, but neither their rights nor their equality of
rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or
impaired. Their rights
under the laws and to
protection of the laws remain untouched, and equal to the
rights of every other Californian, and may be vindicated in the
same way and with the same effect as
Page 341 U. S. 662
those of any other citizen who suffers violence at the hands of
a mob.
We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be
of such magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
laws. Indeed, the post Civil War Ku Klux Klan, against which this
Act was fashioned, may have, or may reasonably have been thought to
have, done so. It is estimated to have had a membership of around
550,000, and thus to have included "nearly the entire adult male
white population of the South." [
Footnote 15] It may well be that a conspiracy, so
far-flung and embracing such numbers, with a purpose to dominate
and set at naught the "carpetbag" and "scalawag" governments of the
day, was able effectively to deprive Negroes of their legal rights
and to close all avenues of redress or vindication, in view of the
then disparity of position, education and opportunity between them
and those who made up the Ku Klux Klan. We do not know. But here
nothing of that sort appears. We have a case of a lawless political
brawl, precipitated by a handful of while citizens against other
white citizens. California courts are open to plaintiffs, and its
laws offer redress for their injury and vindication for their
rights.
We say nothing of the power of Congress to authorize such civil
actions as respondents have commenced or otherwise to redress such
grievances as they assert. We think that Congress has not, in the
narrow class of conspiracies defined by this statute, included the
conspiracy charged here. We therefore reach no constitutional
questions. The facts alleged fall short of a conspiracy to alter,
impair, or deny equality of rights under the law, though they do
show a lawless invasion of rights for which
Page 341 U. S. 663
there are remedies in the law of California. It is not for this
Court to compete with Congress or attempt to replace it as the
Nation's lawmaking body.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
17 Stat. 13, 8 U.S.C. § 47(3) reads:
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more
persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support
or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election
of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or
Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators."
This paragraph should be read in the context of other paragraphs
of the same section, and note should also be taken of 8 U.S.C. §
43, which reads:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
[
Footnote 2]
The opinion of District Judge Yankwich for this cites in his
notes,
80 F. Supp.
501, 510:
"39. Cal.Penal Code, Section 415 (disturbance of the peace of
neighborhood or person) Section 403 (disturbance of public
meetings)."
"40. Cal.Penal Code, Section 602(j) (illegal entry for the
purpose of injuring property or property rights or interfering or
obstructing lawful business of another)."
"41. Cal.Penal Code, Sections 240, 241 (assault); sections 242,
243 (battery). Among the corresponding civil sections relating to
civil remedies are California Civil Code, Section 43 (guarantee
against personal bodily harm or restraint); Government Code,
Section 241 (defining as citizens all persons born or residing
within the state); California Code of Civil Procedure, Section
338(3) (section 338(2)) (action for trespass to real property may
be brought within three years); section 340(3) (action for assault
and battery may be brought within one year). And, for the state
civil rights provisions,
see California Civil Code,
Sections 51-54."
[
Footnote 3]
80 F. Supp.
501, 510.
[
Footnote 4]
183 F.2d 308.
[
Footnote 5]
Other recent cases involving the statute are
Viles v.
Symes, 129 F.2d 828;
Robeson v.
Fanelli, 94 F. Supp.
62, and
Ferrer v. Fronton Exhibition Co., 188 F.2d
954.
[
Footnote 6]
340 U.S. 809.
[
Footnote 7]
17 Stat. 13.
[
Footnote 8]
The background of this Act, the nature of the debates which
preceded its passage, and the reaction it produced are set forth in
Bowers, The Tragic Era 340-348.
[
Footnote 9]
R.S. § 5519, under which the prosecution was brought,
provided:
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or
go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, and person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such
State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; each of such
persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment,
with or without hard labor, not less than six months nor more than
six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
[
Footnote 10]
Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36;
United States v.
Reese, 92 U. S. 214;
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S.
542;
In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.
3.
[
Footnote 11]
Screws v. United States, 325 U. S.
91.
[
Footnote 12]
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1,
334 U. S. 13.
[
Footnote 13]
United States v. Williams, 341 U. S.
70,
341 U. S.
92.
[
Footnote 14]
Nash v. United States, 229 U.
S. 373,
229 U. S. 378;
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.
S. 150,
310 U. S.
252.
[
Footnote 15]
8 Encyc.Soc.Sci., 606, 607.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS concur, dissenting.
I cannot agree that the respondents in their complaint have
failed to state a cause of action under R.S. § 1980(3), 8 U.S.C. §
47(3).
The right alleged to have been violated is the right to petition
the Federal Government for a redress of grievances. This right is
expressly recognized by the First Amendment, and this Court has
said that
"The very idea of a government republican in form implies a
right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a
redress of grievances."
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S.
542,
92 U. S. 552,
and see In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.
S. 532,
158 U. S. 535.
The source of the right in this case is not the Fourteenth
Amendment. The complaint alleges that petitioners "knowingly" did
not interfere with the "many public meetings" whose objectives they
agreed with, but that they did conspire to break up respondents'
meeting because petitioners were opposed to respondents' views,
which were expected to be there expressed. Such conduct does not
differ materially from the specific conspiracies which the Court
recognizes that the statute was intended to reach.
The language of the statute refutes the suggestion that action
under color of state law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of
action which it recognizes. R.S. § 1980(3) speaks of "two or more
persons in any State or Territory" conspiring. That clause is not
limited to state
Page 341 U. S. 664
officials. Still more obviously, where the section speaks of
persons going "in disguise on the highway . . . for the purpose of
depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws," it certainly does not limit its reference
to actions of that kind by state officials. When Congress, at this
period, did intend to limit comparable civil rights legislation to
action under color of state law, it said so in unmistakable terms.
In fact, R.S. § 1980(3) originally was § 2 of the Act of April 20,
1871, and § 1 of that same Act said
"That any person who,
under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject
. . . any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution of the United States, shall . . . be liable to the
party injured. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) 17 Stat. 13.
Congress certainly has the power to create a federal cause of
action in favor of persons injured by private individuals through
the abridgment of federally created constitutional rights. It seems
to me that Congress has done just this in R.S. § 1980(3). This is
not inconsistent with the principle underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment. That amendment prohibits the respective states from
making laws abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States or denying to any person within the jurisdiction
of a state the equal protection of the laws. Cases holding that
those clauses are directed only at state action are not authority
for the contention that Congress may not pass laws supporting
rights which exist apart from the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.