1. The Supreme Court of California having based its denial of
certiorari on petitioner's failure to appeal from the Superior
Court's default judgment, this Court has no jurisdiction to review
the proceedings arising from the default judgment. P.
341 U. S.
492.
2. The California District Court of Appeal's denial of a writ of
prohibition in this case being rested on its decision of a federal
question, and not upon an independent state ground, this Court has
jurisdiction to review that judgment. P.
341 U. S.
492.
3. Since petitioner could have obtained review of the final
adjudication of the merits of this case by appealing from the
default judgment, and since the Supreme Court of California
apparently refrained from taking action because of the existence of
that remedy, this Court deems it advisable not to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction, and dismisses the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted. Pp.
341 U. S. 492-493.
Writ of certiorari, 340 U.S. 919, dismissed.
PER CURIAM.
After argument, we continued this cause to enable the petitioner
to apply for a certificate or other expression from the appropriate
California courts to show whether the judgments rested on adequate
and independent state grounds or whether decision of the federal
question was necessary to the judgments rendered.
340 U.
S. 622 (1951). Such expressions have been obtained.
Page 341 U. S. 492
The Supreme Court has informed us that its refusal to grant a
writ of certiorari from the default judgment entered by the
Superior Court was based upon petitioner's failure to utilize the
proper channel of review, namely, his failure to appeal from the
default judgment. Inasmuch as our jurisdiction to review state
court judgments extends only to final judgments rendered "by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had," 28
U.S.C. ยง 1257, we have no jurisdiction to review the proceedings
arising from the default judgment.
The District Court of Appeal has informed us that the decision
of the federal question was essential to its denial of the
application for writ of prohibition, and that its judgment did not
rest upon an independent state ground. The expression we have
received from the California Supreme Court is also susceptible of
the interpretation that its denial of a hearing from the judgment
of the District Court of Appeal was based upon an adequate state
ground. We do not consider the force of that statement, since it is
clear that the judgment properly before us is that of the District
Court of Appeal, which did decide the federal question.
See
American Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S.
19,
263 U. S. 20-21
(1923). We have jurisdiction over that judgment.
Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549,
331 U. S.
565-568 (1947);
Bandini Co. v. Superior Court,
284 U. S. 8 (1931),
and cases cited at
284 U. S. 14.
The presence of jurisdiction upon petition for writ of
certiorari does not, of course, determine the exercise of that
jurisdiction, for the issuance of the writ is discretionary. In
this case, petitioner could have obtained review of the final
adjudication of the merits by appealing from the default judgment.
The California Supreme Court has apparently refrained from taking
action because of the existence of that remedy. In these
circumstances, we think it advisable not to exercise our
jurisdiction. The
Page 341 U. S. 493
writ is therefore dismissed as improvidently granted.
Cf.
Loftus v. Illinois, 337 U.S. 935 (1949);
Phyle v.
Duffy, 334 U. S. 431
(1948);
Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.
S. 806 (1948).
Writ dismissed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON and
MR. JUSTICE CLARK dissent.
