With the consent of Congress under the Compact Clause of the
Federal Constitution, West Virginia and seven other States entered
into a Compact to control pollution in the Ohio River system. They
created a Commission consisting of representatives of each of the
eight States and the United States, and agreed to delegate certain
powers to it and to appropriate funds for its administrative
expenses. The West Virginia Legislature approved the Compact and
appropriated funds to defray West Virginia's share of the expenses.
In a mandamus proceeding to compel the State Auditor to issue a
warrant for payment of these expenses, the State Supreme Court
denied relief. It found that the state legislation constituted an
unlawful delegation of legislative power and violated the debt
limitation provision of Art. X, § 4 of the State Constitution.
Held:
1. This Court has final power to pass upon the meaning and
validity of compacts between states. P. 28.
2. An agreement entered into between states by those who alone
have political authority to speak for a state cannot be nullified
unilaterally, or given final meaning by any organ of one of the
contracting states. P.
341 U. S.
28.
3. This Court is free to examine determinations of law by state
courts where an interstate compact brings in issue the rights of
other states and the United States.
Kentucky v. Indiana,
281 U. S. 163;
Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S.
92. Pp.
341 U. S.
28-30.
4. The fact that the questions as to the Compact are before this
Court on a writ of certiorari, rather than by way of an original
action brought by a state, does not affect the power of this Court
to decide those questions. P.
341 U. S.
30.
5. West Virginia had authority under her Constitution to enter
into a Compact which involves only such delegation of power to an
interstate agency as the Ohio River Compact presents. Pp.
341 U. S.
30-32.
Page 341 U. S. 23
6. The obligation of the State under the Compact is not in
conflict with the debt limitation provision of Art. X, § 4 of the
State Constitution. P.
341 U. S.
32.
134 W.Va.___,
58
S.E.2d 766, reversed.
In a mandamus proceeding, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia held that state legislation authorizing the State's
participation in a Compact with other States violated the State
Constitution. 134 W.Va. ___,
58 S.E.2d
766. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 807.
Reversed
and remanded, p.
341 U. S.
32.
Page 341 U. S. 24
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
After extended negotiations eight States entered into a Compact
to control pollution in the Ohio River system.
See Ohio
River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, 54 Stat. 752. Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West
Virginia recognized that they were faced with one of the problems
of government that are defined by natural, rather than political
boundaries. Accordingly, they pledged themselves to cooperate in
maintaining waters in the Ohio River basin in a sanitary condition
through the administrative mechanism of the Ohio River Valley Water
Sanitation Commission, consisting of three members from each State
and three representing the United States.
The heart of the Compact is Article VI. This provides that
sewage discharged into boundary streams or streams flowing from one
State into another
"shall be so treated, within a time reasonable for the
construction of the necessary works, as to provide for
substantially complete removal of settleable solids, and the
removal of not less than forty-five percent (45%) of the total
suspended solids; provided that, in order to protect the public
health or to preserve the waters for other legitimate purposes, . .
. in specific instances, such higher degree of treatment shall be
used as may be determined to be necessary by the Commission after
investigation, due notice, and hearing."
Industrial wastes are to be treated "to such degree as may be
determined to be necessary by the Commission after investigation,
due notice and hearing." Sewage and industrial wastes discharged
into streams located wholly within the State are to be treated
"to that extent, if any, which may be necessary to maintain such
waters in a sanitary and satisfactory condition at least equal to
the condition of the waters of the interstate stream immediately
above the confluence. "
Page 341 U. S. 25
Article IX provides that the Commission may, after notice and
hearing, issue orders for compliance enforceable in the State and
federal courts. It further provides:
"No such order shall go into effect unless and until it receives
the assent of at least a majority of the commissioners from each of
not less than a majority of the signatory States, and no such order
upon a municipality, corporation, person, or entity in any State
shall go into effect unless and until it receives the assent of not
less than a majority of the commissioners from such state."
By Article X, the States also agree
"to appropriate for the salaries, office and other
administrative expenses, their proper proportion of the annual
budget as determined by the Commission and approved by the
Governors of the signatory States. . . ."
The present controversy arose because of conflicting views
between officials of West Virginia regarding the responsibility of
West Virginia under the Compact.
The Legislature of that State ratified and approved the Compact
on March 11, 1939. W.Va. Acts 1939, c. 38. Congress gave its
consent on July 11, 1940, 54 Stat. 752, and, upon adoption by all
the signatory States, the Compact was formally executed by the
Governor of West Virginia on June 30, 1948. At its 1949 session,
the West Virginia Legislature appropriated $12,250 as the State's
contribution to the expenses of the Commission for the fiscal year
beginning July 1, 1949. W.Va. Acts 1949, c. 9, Item 93. Respondent
Sims, the auditor of the State, refused to issue a warrant upon its
treasury for payment of this appropriation. To compel him to issue
it, the West Virginia Commissioners to the Compact Commission and
the members of the West Virginia State Water Commission instituted
this original mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia. The court denied relief on the merits, 134 W.Va.
-- , 58 S.E. 766, and we brought the case here,
Page 341 U. S. 26
340 U.S. 807, because questions of obviously important public
interest are raised.
The West Virginia court found that the "sole question" before it
was the validity of the Act of 1939 approving West Virginia's
adherence to the Compact. It found that Act invalid in that (1) the
Compact was deemed to delegate West Virginia's police power to
other States and to the Federal Government, and (2) it was deemed
to bind future legislatures to make appropriations for the
continued activities of the Sanitation Commission, and thus to
violate Art. X, § 4 of the West Virginia Constitution.
Briefs filed on behalf of the United States and other States, as
amici, invite the Court to consider far-reaching issues
relating to the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution.
Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The United States urges that the Compact be so
read as to allow any signatory State to withdraw from its
obligations at any time. Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Kentucky, and New York contend that the Compact Clause precludes
any State from limiting its power to enter into a compact to which
Congress has consented. We must not be tempted by these inviting
vistas. We need not go beyond the issues on which the West Virginia
court found the Compact not binding on that State. That these are
issues which give this Court jurisdiction to review the State court
proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, needs no discussion after
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn,
310 U. S. 419,
310 U. S.
427.
Control of pollution in interstate streams might, on occasion,
be an appropriate subject for national legislation.
Compare
Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508.
But, with prescience, the Framers left the States free to settle
regional controversies in diverse ways. Solution of the problem
underlying this case may be attempted directly by the affected
States through contentious litigation before this Court.
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208,
200 U. S. 200 U.S.
496;
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.
S. 296. Adjudication
Page 341 U. S. 27
here of conflicting State interests affecting stream pollution
does not rest upon the law of a particular State. This Court
decides such controversies according to "principles it must have
power to declare."
Missouri v. Illinois, supra, at
200 U. S. 519.
But the delicacy of interstate relationships and the inherent
limitations upon this Court's ability to deal with multifarious
local problems have naturally led to exacting standards of judicial
intervention and have inhibited the formulation of a code for
dealing with such controversies. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it:
"Before this court ought to intervene, the case should be of
serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the principle to
be applied should be one which the court is prepared deliberately
to maintain against all considerations on the other side."
Missouri v. Illinois, supra, at
200 U. S.
521.
Indeed, so awkward and unsatisfactory is the available litigious
solution for these problems that this Court deemed in appropriate
to emphasize the practical constitutional alternative provided by
the Compact Clause. Experience led us to suggest that a problem
such as that involved here is
"more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by
conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of
the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any
court, however constituted."
New York v. New Jersey, supra, at
256 U. S. 313.
The suggestion has had fruitful response.
The growing interdependence of regional interests, calling for
regional adjustments, has brought extensive use of compacts. A
compact is more than a supple device for dealing with interests
confined within a region. That it is also a means of safeguarding
the national interest is well illustrated in the Compact now under
review. Not only was congressional consent required, as for all
compacts; direct participation by the Federal Government was
provided
Page 341 U. S. 28
in the President's appointment of three members of the Compact
Commission. Art. IV; Art. XI, § 3.
But a compact is, after all, a legal document. Though the
circumstances of its drafting are likely to assure great care and
deliberation, all avoidance of disputes as to scope and meaning is
not within human gift. Just as this Court has power to settle
disputes between States where there is no compact, it must have
final power to pass upon the meaning and validity of compacts. It
requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion that an
agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who alone
have political authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally
nullified, or given final meaning by an organ of one of the
contracting States. A State cannot be its own ultimate judge in a
controversy with a sister State. To determine the nature and scope
of obligations as between States, whether they arise through the
legislative means of compact or the "federal common law" governing
interstate controversies,
Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92,
304 U. S. 110,
is the function and duty of the Supreme Court of the Nation. Of
course, every deference will be shown to what the highest court of
a State deems to be the law and policy of its State, particularly
when recondite or unique features of local law are urged. Deference
is one thing; submission to a State's own determination of whether
it has undertaken an obligation, what that obligation is, and
whether it conflicts with a disability of the State to undertake it
is quite another.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of the West Virginia is, for
exclusively State purposes, the ultimate tribunal in construing the
meaning of her Constitution. Two prior decisions of this Court make
clear, however, that we are free to examine determinations of law
by State courts in the limited field where a compact brings in
issue the rights of other States and the United States.
Page 341 U. S. 29
Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163,
dealt with a compact to build a bridge across the Ohio River. In an
original action brought before this Court, Indiana defended on the
ground that she should not be compelled to perform until the
Indiana courts decided, in a pending case, whether her officials
had been authorized to enter into the compact. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, speaking for a unanimous Court, dismissed the argument:
"Where the States themselves are before this Court for the
determination of a controversy between them, neither can determine
their rights
inter sese, and this Court must pass upon
every question essential to such a determination, although local
legislation and questions of state authorization may be involved.
Virginia
v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39,
78 U. S.
56;
200 U. S. 220 U.S. 1,
220 U. S.
28. A decision in the present instance by the state
court would not determine the controversy here."
281 U.S. at
281 U. S.
176-177.
In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice could hardly
avoid analogizing the situation to that where a question is raised
whether a State has impaired the obligation of a contract.
"It has frequently been held that, when a question is suitably
raised whether the law of a State has impaired the obligation of a
contract in violation of the constitutional provision, this Court
must determine for itself whether a contract exists, what are its
obligations, and whether they have been impaired by the legislation
of the State. While this Court always examines with appropriate
respect the decisions of state courts bearing upon such questions,
such decisions do not detract from the responsibility of this Court
in reaching its own conclusions as to the contract, its obligations
and impair ment, for otherwise the constitutional guaranty could
not properly be enforced.
Larson v. South Dakota,
278 U. S.
429,
278 U. S. 433, and cases
there cited."
281 U.S. at
281 U. S. 176.
And see Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S.
95,
303 U. S.
100.
Page 341 U. S. 30
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
supra, is the second of these cases. It also makes clear, if
authority be needed, that the fact the compact questions reach us
on a writ of certiorari, rather than by way of an original action
brought by a State, does not affect the power of this Court. In the
Hinderlider case, an action was brought in the Colorado
courts to enjoin performance of a compact between Colorado and New
Mexico concerning water rights in the La Plata River. The State
court held that the compact was invalid because it affected
appropriation rights guaranteed by the Colorado State Constitution.
101 Colo. 73, 70 P.2d 849;
see also 93 Colo. 128, 25 P.2d
187. Mr. Justice Brandeis, likewise speaking for a unanimous Court,
held that the relative claims of New Mexico and Colorado citizens
could be determined by compact and reversed the decision of the
State court.
The issue in the
Hinderlider case was whether the
Colorado Legislature had authority, under the State Constitution,
to enter into a compact which affected the water rights of her
citizens. The issue before us is whether the West Virginia
Legislature had authority, under her Constitution, to enter into a
compact which involves delegation of power to an interstate agency
and an agreement to appropriate funds for the administrative
expenses of the agency.
That a legislature may delegate to an administrative body the
power to make rules and decide particular cases is one of the
axioms of modern government. The West Virginia court does not
challenge the general proposition, but objects to the delegation
here involved because it is to a body outside the State, and
because its Legislature may not be free at any time, to withdraw
the power delegated. We are not here concerned, and so need not
deal, with specific language in a State constitution requiring that
the State settle its problems with other States without delegating
power to an interstate agency. What
Page 341 U. S. 31
is involved is the conventional grant of legislative power. We
find nothing in that to indicate that West Virginia may not solve a
problem such as the control of river pollution by compact and by
the delegation, if such it be, necessary to effectuate such
solution by compact. If this Court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, were to enter a decree requiring West Virginia to
abate pollution of interstate streams, that decree would bind the
State. The West Virginia Legislature would have no part in
determining the State's obligation. The State Legislature could not
alter it; it could not disregard it, as West Virginia on another
occasion so creditably recognized. The obligation would be fixed by
this Court on the basis of a master's report. Here, the State has
bound itself to control pollution by the more effective means of an
agreement with other States. The Compact involves a reasonable and
carefully limited delegation of power to an interstate agency.
Nothing in its Constitution suggests that, in dealing with the
problem dealt with by the Compact, West Virginia must wait for the
answer to be dictated by this Court after harassing and
unsatisfactory litigation.
What Mr. Justice Brandeis said of the Colorado court decision in
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
supra, applies to the decision of the West Virginia court:
"It ignores the history and order of development of the two
means provided by the Constitution for adjusting interstate
controversies. The compact -- the legislative means -- adapts to
our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power of
independent sovereign nations. Adjustment by compact without a
judicial or
quasi-judicial determination of existing
rights had been practiced in the Colonies, was practiced by the
States before the adoption of the Constitution, and had been
extensively practiced in the United States for nearly half a
century before this Court first applied the judicial means in
settling the boundary dispute in
Page 341 U. S. 32
Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657,
37 U. S.
723-725."
304 U.S. at
304 U. S.
104.
The State court also held that the Compact is in conflict with
Art. X, § 4, of the State Constitution, and for that reason is not
binding on West Virginia. This section provides:
"No debt shall be contracted by this State, except to meet
casual deficits in the revenue, to redeem a previous liability of
the State, to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or defend the
State in time of war; but the payment of any liability other than
that, for the ordinary expenses of the State, shall be equally
distributed over a period of at least twenty years."
The Compact was evidently drawn with great care to meet the
problem of debt limitation in light of this section and similar
restrictive provisions in the constitutions of other States.
Although, under Art. X of the Compact, the States agree to
appropriate funds for administrative expenses, the annual budget
must be approved by the Governors of the signatory States. In
addition, Article V provides:
"The Commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind
prior to the making of appropriations adequate to meet the same;
nor shall the Commission pledge the credit of any of the signatory
States, except by and with the authority of the legislature
thereof."
In view of these provisions, we conclude that the obligation of
the State under the Compact is not in conflict with Art. X, § 4 of
the State constitution.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE REED, concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but disagree with the
assertion of power by this Court to interpret the meaning of the
West Virginia Constitution. This Court
Page 341 U. S. 33
must accept the State court's interpretation of its own
Constitution unless it is prepared to say that the interpretation
is a palpable evasion to avoid a federal rule. [
Footnote 1]
There is no problem concerning the binding effect upon this
Court of state court interpretation of state law under the Compact
Clause such as there is under the clause against impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. [
Footnote
2] Under the latter clause, this Court, in order to determine
whether the subsequent state law, constitutional or statutory,
impairs the federal prohibition against impairment of contracts,
has asserted power to construe for itself the disputed agreement,
to decide whether it is a contract, and to interpret the subsequent
state statute to decide whether it impairs that contract. [
Footnote 3] Even then, we accept state
court conclusions unless "manifestly wrong." [
Footnote 4] Examination here, under the Contract
Clause, is to enforce the federal provision against impairment, and
is made only to decide whether under the Contract Clause there is a
contract and whether it is impaired. [
Footnote 5] This Court thus adjudges whether state action
has violated the Federal Contract Clause. It does not decide the
meaning of a state statute as applied to a state appropriation.
Under the Compact Clause, however, the federal questions are the
execution, validity, and meaning of federally approved state
compacts. [
Footnote 6] The
interpretation of the meaning of the compact controls over a
state's application of its own law through the Supremacy Clause,
and not by any implied federal power to construe state law.
Page 341 U. S. 34
West Virginia adjudges her execution of the compact is invalid
as a delegation of state police power and as a creation of debt
beyond her constitutional powers. Since the Constitution provided
the compact for adjusting interstate relations, compacts may be
enforced despite otherwise valid state restrictions on state
action.
This, I think, was the basis of our holding in
Hinderlider
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S.
92. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that compact
invalid because it was an executive abandonment by Colorado of a
citizen's previously acquired water rights, 304 U.S. at
304 U. S. 104
and
304 U. S. 108.
But we concluded:
"Whether the apportionment of the water of an interstate stream
be made by compact between the upper and lower States with the
consent of Congress or by a decree of this Court, the apportionment
is binding upon the citizens of each State and all water claimants,
even where the State had granted the water rights before it entered
into the compact."
304 U.S. at
304 U. S. 106.
For that conclusion, reliance was placed upon
Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657,
37 U. S. 725,
where this Court, speaking of compacts, said:
"By this surrender of the power which, before the adoption of
the constitution was vested in every state, of settling these
contested boundaries, as in the plenitude of their sovereignty they
might, they could settle them neither by war, or in peace, by
treaty, compact, or agreement, without the permission of the new
legislative power which the states brought into existence by their
respective and several grants in conventions of the people. If
Congress consented, then the states were in this respect restored
to their original inherent sovereignty; such consent being the sole
limitation imposed by the Constitution, when
Page 341 U. S. 35
given, left the states as they were before . . . , whereby their
compacts became of binding force, and finally settled the boundary
between them, operating with the same effect as a treaty between
sovereign powers."
I would uphold the validity of the compact and reverse the
judgment of West Virginia refusing mandamus, with direction to that
court to enter a judgment not inconsistent with an opinion based
upon the Supremacy Clause.
[
Footnote 1]
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
248 U. S. 67.
[
Footnote 2]
U.S.Constitution, Art. I, § 10.
[
Footnote 3]
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.
S. 364,
271 U. S. 380;
John P. King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.
S. 100,
277 U. S. 114;
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434,
285 U. S.
441.
[
Footnote 4]
Hale v. State Board, 302 U. S. 95,
302 U. S.
101.
[
Footnote 5]
Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582,
282 U. S.
597.
[
Footnote 6]
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn,
310 U. S. 419,
310 U. S. 428,
where it is said, "Hence, we address ourselves to the language of
the Compact."
And see the last paragraph of that
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
West Virginia officials induced sister States to contract with
her and Congress to consent to the Compact. She now attempts to
read herself out of this interstate Compact by reading into her
Constitution a limitation upon the powers of her Governor and
Legislature to contract.
West Virginia, for internal affairs, is free to interpret her
own Constitution as she will. But if the compact system is to have
vitality and integrity, she may not raise an issue of
ultra
vires, decide it, and release herself from an interstate
obligation. The legal consequences which flow from the formal
participation in a compact consented to by Congress is a federal
question for this Court.
West Virginia points to no provision of her Constitution which
we can say was clear notice or fair warning to Congress or other
States of any defect in her authority to enter into this Compact.
It is a power inherent in sovereignty limited only to the extent
that congressional consent is required.
Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657,
37 U. S. 725;
Poole v. Fleeger's
Lessee, 11 Pet. 185,
36 U. S. 209.
Whatever she now says her Constitution means, she may not apply
retroactively that interpretation to place an unforeseeable
construction upon what the other States to this Compact were
entitled to believe was a fully authorized act.
Page 341 U. S. 36
Estoppel is not often to be invoked against a government. But
West Virginia assumed a contractual obligation with equals by
permission of another government that is sovereign in the field.
After Congress and sister States had been induced to alter their
positions and bind themselves to terms of a covenant, West Virginia
should be estopped from repudiating her act. For this reason, I
consider that whatever interpretation she may put on the
generalities of her Constitution, she is bound by the Compact, and,
on that basis, I concur in the judgment.