1. In actions brought by the Administrator under § 205(e) of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to recover damages from sellers
who sold commodities at over-ceiling prices, which actions were
pending when price controls were terminated, the substitution of
the United States (rather than the Administrator's successor) as
the party plaintiff was authorized by Executive Orders Nos. 9841
and 9842. Pp.
341 U. S. 2-4.
2. Such authorization was within the power of the President. Pp.
341 U. S. 4-5.
183 F.2d 453, reversed.
Orders of the District Court dismissing the actions in these
cases as abated were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 183 F.2d
453. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 895.
Reversed, p.
341 U. S. 5.
Page 341 U. S. 2
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as
amended, authorized the Price Administrator, under certain
circumstances, to institute damage actions against sellers of
commodities who charged more than prescribed ceiling prices.
[
Footnote 1] Pursuant to this
section, the consolidated cases now before us were brought in the
District Court by the Administrator in his own name "for and on
behalf of the United States," and were properly ending there on
April 23, 1947. [
Footnote 2] On
that day, the President, in connection with the termination of
price controls, promulgated Executive Orders Nos. 9841 and 9842:
[
Footnote 3] No. 9841, among
other things, transferred various price administration functions to
the Secretary of Commerce; No. 9842, so far as here material,
authorized the Attorney General to conduct certain §205(e)
litigation "in the name of the United States or otherwise as
permitted by law. . . ." In view of these orders, the Attorney
General promptly moved to substitute the United States as party
plaintiff in the present proceedings. Although the district judge
granted the motion, he dismissed the complaints in 1950 on the
ground that there had been an
Page 341 U. S. 3
improper substitution because the suits could not be maintained
in the name of the United States. [
Footnote 4] The Court of Appeals affirmed. 183 F.2d 453.
It held that the President, in his Executive Orders, did not intend
to authorize conduct of § 205(e) actions in the name of the United
States. A belief that the President had no power to do so led the
court to this conclusion. To resolve the conflict between the
decision and those from other circuits, [
Footnote 5] we granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 895.
We hold that it was error to construe the Executive Orders as
not allowing maintenance of these suits in the name of the United
States. It is true that Order No. 9841, which transferred various
OPA functions to the Secretary of Commerce, empowered the Secretary
to
"institute, maintain, or defend
in his own name civil
proceedings in any court . . . relating to the matters transferred
to him, including any such proceedings pending on the effective
date of the transfer. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) [
Footnote
6] But this provision demonstrates no purpose to
Page 341 U. S. 4
vest exclusive power in the Secretary to maintain all § 205(e)
enforcement actions. By its express terms, it is made subject to
Executive Order 9842, [
Footnote
7] which directs the Attorney General to "coordinate, conduct,
initiate, maintain or defend" litigation against violators of price
control "in the name of the United States or otherwise as permitted
by law. . . ." [
Footnote 8] All
interested government agencies have construed the two orders
together as authorizing the Attorney General to carry on § 205(e)
enforcement cases, and to do so in the name of the United States.
The Emergency Court of Appeals and other courts of appeal have
taken the same view. [
Footnote
9] We believe that such a reading of the orders is the most
reasonable construction of the language employed.
The substitution of the United States in these cases therefore
was proper unless, as the Court of Appeals thought, the President
lacked power to authorize it. The view below was that § 205(e) of
the Price Control Act permitted enforcement suits to be brought
only in the name of the Price Administrator, or, when the bulk of
his duties were transferred to the Secretary of Commerce, in the
name of the latter. Such a conclusion, however, is certainly not
compelled by the section, which provides
Page 341 U. S. 5
merely for the bringing of actions by "the Administrator . . .
on behalf of the United States. . . ." There can be no question but
that the President, as a step in the winding-up process, had power
to transfer any or all of the price administration functions to the
Attorney General.
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber
Co., 331 U. S. 111,
331 U. S.
113-119. Accordingly, Executive Order 9842 could
lawfully delegate the control and direction of the present actions
to that official. Moreover, nothing in § 205(e) prevents the
Attorney General, who is customarily charged with representing the
Government's interests in court, from following his normal
procedure of maintaining enforcement suits in the name of the
United States itself. [
Footnote
10] No unfairness to the defendants will result. Regardless of
captions, the issues in these cases could not change, and the real
party in interest plaintiff has always been the same.
Cf.
United States v. Remund, 330 U. S. 539,
330 U. S.
542-543. The handling of this litigation in the name of
the United States is a fair and orderly method for carrying out the
congressional mandate to wind up the OPA affairs. These cases
should not have been dismissed. [
Footnote 11]
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
56 Stat. 33, as amended 58 Stat. 640, 50 U.S.C. App. §
925(e):
"If . . . the buyer either fails to institute an action . . .
within thirty days from the date of the occurrence of the violation
or is not entitled for any reason to bring the action, the
Administrator may institute such action on behalf of the United
States. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Actually, one of these six consolidated actions was instituted
"for and on behalf of the United States" in the name of Philip B.
Fleming, Administrator of the Office of Temporary Controls after he
had become the successor to the Price Administrator. On April 23,
1947, all six suits were properly pending in Fleming's name.
See Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co.,
331 U. S. 111,
331 U. S.
113-119. The manner in which he became the successor of
the Price Administrator is detailed by the Court of Appeals in its
opinion below.
United States v. Allied Oil Corp., 183 F.2d
453.
[
Footnote 3]
12 Fed.Reg. 2645, 2646.
[
Footnote 4]
The ruling was that the Secretary of Commerce was the real party
in interest plaintiff and that the actions had abated for failure
to substitute the Secretary within six months as required by Rule
25(d), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
[
Footnote 5]
Fleming v. Goodwin, 165 F.2d 334;
United States v.
Koike, 164 F.2d 155;
Northwestern Lbr. & Shingle Co.
v. United States, 170 F.2d 692.
[
Footnote 6]
Executive Order No. 9841, § 402 provides:
"Functions under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as
amended, transferred under the provisions of this order shall be
deemed to include authority on the part of each officer to whom
such functions are transferred hereunder to institute, maintain, or
defend in his own name civil proceedings in any court (including
the Emergency Court of Appeals), relating to the matters
transferred to him, including any such proceedings pending on the
effective date of the transfer of any such function under this
order. The provisions of this paragraph shall be subject to the
provisions of the Executive order entitled 'Conduct of Certain
Litigation Arising under Wartime Legislation,' (Order No. 9842)
issued on the date of this order. . . ."
[
Footnote 7]
See Executive Order No. 9841, § 402,
note 6 supra.
[
Footnote 8]
Executive Order No. 9842 provides:
"1. The Attorney General is authorized and directed, in the name
of the United States or otherwise as permitted by law, to
coordinate, conduct, initiate, maintain or defend:"
"
* * * *"
"(b) Litigation against violators of regulations, schedules or
orders relating to maximum prices pertaining to any commodity which
has been removed from price control. . . ."
Price controls had been lifted on the commodities involved in
the present actions prior to the promulgation of Executive Orders
Nos. 9841 and 9842.
[
Footnote 9]
Hal-Mar Dress Co. v. Clark, 165 F.2d 222 and cases
cited
note 5
supra.
[
Footnote 10]
Cf. United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19,
332 U. S. 27-28;
United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.
S. 273,
125 U. S.
279.
[
Footnote 11]
Respondents have contended in their brief that, by virtue of 28
U.S.C. § 2105, the orders of the District Court dismissing these
actions as abated were not subject to review. This contention is
untenable in view of the recent decision in
Snyder v.
Buck, 340 U. S. 15,
340 U. S.
21-22.