In a habeas corpus proceeding brought by respondent in a Federal
District Court in 1948, the court found that, in 1931 respondent
was convicted of murder in an Indiana state court, sentenced to
life imprisonment, and immediately confined in a state prison; that
his timely appeal was prevented by the warden's suppression of his
appeal papers pursuant to prison rules; that he sought
unsuccessfully to have the state courts review his conviction by
coram nobis in 1937 and by habeas corpus in 1947, and
that, in 1946, his petition to the State Supreme Court for a
delayed appeal was denied. The District Court ordered respondent's
discharge, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The prevention of respondent's original timely appeal by the
warden's suppression of his appeal papers was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. Pp.
340 U. S.
207-208.
2. Even if
res judicata were applicable in habeas
corpus proceedings, the 1946 litigation in the State Supreme Court
was not
res judicata of the issues in the present case. P.
340 U. S.
208.
3. Respondent did not "waive" his right of appeal. Pp.
340 U. S.
208-209.
4. In the circumstances of this case, nothing short of an actual
appellate determination of the merits of the conviction will cure
the original denial of equal protection of the law. P.
340 U. S.
209.
5. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the District Court
are vacated, and the cause is remanded with directions to the
District Court to enter such orders as are appropriate to allow the
State a reasonable time in which to afford respondent the full
appellate review he would have received but for the suppression of
his appeal papers, in default whereof by the State, respondent
shall be discharged. Pp.
340 U. S.
209-210.
180 F.2d 212, judgment vacated.
Page 340 U. S. 207
In a habeas corpus proceeding seeking respondent's release from
imprisonment under sentence of a state court, the District Court
ordered respondent discharged. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 180
F.2d 212. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 849.
Judgments vacated and cause remanded, p.
340 U. S.
210.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent, Lawrence E. Cook, brought this habeas corpus
proceeding in the United States District Court in 1948. After
hearing evidence, the District Court found as follows: In 1931,
respondent was convicted of murder in an Indiana court, sentenced
to life imprisonment, and immediately confined in the state
penitentiary. Within the six-month period allowed for appeal as of
right by Indiana law, respondent prepared proper appeal papers. His
efforts to file the documents in the state supreme court, however,
were frustrated by the warden, acting pursuant to prison rules.
Subsequently, but after the six-month period had expired, the ban
on sending papers from the prison was lifted, and respondent
unsuccessfully sought to have the state courts review his
conviction by
coram nobis in 1937 [
Footnote 1] and by habeas corpus in 1945. [
Footnote 2]
Page 340 U. S. 208
In 1946, his petition to the Supreme Court of Indiana for a
delayed appeal was denied. [
Footnote 3] On these findings, the District Court held
that there had been a denial of equal protection of the law for
which the State provided no remedy, and ordered respondent's
discharge. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
180 F.2d 212.
In this Court, the State admits, as it must, that a
discriminatory denial of the statutory right of appeal is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.
S. 255. It contends, however, that the 1946 litigation
in the Supreme Court of Indiana established that the prison
authorities had not prevented a timely appeal by respondent, and
that the principle of
res judicata precluded a contrary
determination of this fact by the District Court. Even if the rule
of
res judicata were applicable in habeas corpus
proceedings,
but cf. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.
S. 101,
316 U. S. 105, it
would have no bearing in the present case. The Indiana court made
only one finding, and that pertained to a matter not now in
dispute. [
Footnote 4] Moreover,
so far as the suppression of respondent's original appeal papers is
concerned, the record before us strongly indicates that the finding
ascribed to the state supreme court could not have been made.
The State also contends that, despite the denial of equal
protection, respondent is no longer entitled to relief, because he
"waived" his right of appeal. The argument is that the ban on
sending papers from the prison suspended the statutory limitation
on the time for review, so that
Page 340 U. S. 209
respondent could have appealed within six months from the date
the restraint was removed in 1933. We cannot accept this view. In
1931, Indiana appellate jurisdiction apparently was conditioned on
a timely filing of the proper papers. [
Footnote 5] More recently, the rigid rule may have been
relaxed so as to provide discretionary delayed appeals for
convicted defendants. [
Footnote
6] But we find no indication either that there is any time
limitation on the taking of delayed appeals or that such appeals
will ever be heard as of right. The record shows that respondent's
delayed appeal was denied in 1946, apparently as a matter within
the state court's discretion. [
Footnote 7] Consequently, respondent has never had the
same review of the judgment against him as he would have had as of
right in 1931 but for the suppression of his papers. We therefore
agree with the Court of Appeals that, while the State's "waiver"
theory is ingenious, it is without merit. Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, nothing short of an actual appellate
determination of the merits of the conviction -- according to the
procedure prevailing in ordinary cases -- would cure the original
denial of equal protection of the law.
There remains the question of the disposition to be made of this
case. Fortunately, we are not confronted with the dilemma envisaged
by the having to
Page 340 U. S. 210
choose between ordering an absolute discharge of the prisoner
and denying him all relief. The District Court has power in a
habeas corpus proceeding to "dispose of the matter as law and
justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Fourteenth Amendment
precludes Indiana from keeping respondent imprisoned if it persists
in depriving him of the type of appeal generally afforded those
convicted of crime. On the other hand, justice does not require
Indiana to discharge respondent if such an appeal is granted and
reveals a trial record free from error. Now that this Court has
determined the federal constitutional question, Indiana may find it
possible to provide the appellate review to which respondent is
entitled. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the District
Court are vacated, and the case remanded. On remand, the District
Court should enter such orders as are appropriate to allow the
State a reasonable time in which to afford respondent the full
appellate review he would have received but for the suppression of
his papers, failing which he shall be discharged.
See Mabler v.
Eby, 264 U. S. 32,
264 U. S.
46.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See Cook v. State, 219 Ind. 234, 37 N.E.2d 63;
State ex rel. Cook v. Wickens, 222 Ind. 383, 53 N.E.2d
630.
[
Footnote 2]
State ex rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N.E.2d
25,
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 808.
[
Footnote 3]
This order is unreported. Certiorari to review the denial of the
petition for delayed appeal was sought here and denied.
Cook v.
Indiana, 330 U.S. 841.
[
Footnote 4]
The finding was that "the basic allegation of said petition,
to-wit: that [Cook's] counsel refused, without pay, to take an
appeal, is not true. . . ."
[
Footnote 5]
Dudley v. State, 200 Ind. 398, 161 N.E. 1;
Farlow
v. State, 196 Ind. 295, 142 N.E. 849;
Farrell v.
State, 85 Ind. 221;
Winsett v. State, 54 Ind. 437;
Lichtenfels v. State, 53 Ind. 161.
[
Footnote 6]
The Supreme Court of Indiana suggested in 1945 that this
respondent might be able to take a delayed appeal.
State ex
rel. Cook v. Howard, 223 Ind. 694, 64 N.E.2d 25.
Cf. also
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399;
State ex rel. White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d
129;
but cf. Johns v. State, 227 Ind. 737, 89 N.E.2d 281.
In 1947, Indiana enacted the more liberal rule into its statutory
law. Burns' Ind.Ann.Stat., 1942 Replacement Vol., (Cum.Supp. 1949)
§ 9-3305.
[
Footnote 7]
See note 3
supra; cf. Sweet v. State, 226 Ind. 566, 81 N.E.2d
679.
