Louisiana. A bill of complaint was filed in the District Court
of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana to set
aside a conveyance made by the complainant of certain lots of
ground in the City of New Orleans, and to be restored to the
possession of the same, alleging that the deed by which he,
conveyed them was given on a contract for the loan of money, and
that although in the form of a sale, it was given only as a pledge
for the repayment of the money, and calling for an account of the
rents and profits of the
property. The defendant demurred to the bill, and assigned for
cause that the complainant, in the bill, had not made such a case
as entitled him, in a court of the State of Louisiana, to any
discovery touching the matters contained in the bill, nor to any
relief in the district court. The ground of this demurrer was that
the District Court of the United States of Louisiana, had no power
to entertain proceedings and give relief in chancery.
The district court sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the
bill. The decree of the district court was reversed.
Provisions of the laws of the United States establishing the
courts of the United States in the District of Louisiana, and
regulating the practice in those courts.
By the provisions of the acts of Congress, Louisiana, when she
came into the union, had organized therein a district court of the
United States, having the same jurisdiction, except as to appeal
and writs of error, as the circuit courts of the United States in
other states, and the modes of proceeding in that court were
required to be according to the principles, rules, and usages which
belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished from courts of
common law.
And whether there were or not, in the several states, courts of
equity proceeding according to such principles and usages made no
difference according to the construction uniformly given by this
Court.
Congress has the power to establish circuit and district courts
in any and all the states of the union and to confer on them
equitable jurisdiction in cases coming within the Constitution. It
falls within the express words of the Constitution.
The provisions of the act of Congress of 1824, relative to the
practice of the courts of the United States in Louisiana, contain
the descriptive term "civil actions," which embraces cases at law
and in equity, and may be fairly construed as used in
contradistinction to criminal causes. They apply equally to cases
in equity, and if there are any laws in Louisiana directing the
mode of proceeding in equity causes, they are adopted by that act
and will govern the practice in the courts of the United
States.
If there are no equitable claims or rights cognizable in the
courts of the State of Louisiana, nor any courts of equity, and no
state laws regulating the practice in equity causes, the law of
1824 does not apply to a case of chancery jurisdiction, and the
District Court of Louisiana was bound to adopt the antecedent modes
of proceeding, authorized under the former acts of Congress.
Page 34 U. S. 633
If any part of a bill in chancery is good, and entitles the
complainant to relief or discovery, a demurrer to the whole bill
cannot be sustained.
It is an established and universal rule of pleading in chancery
that a defendant may meet a complainant's bill by several modes of
defense. He may demur, answer, and plead to different parts of the
bill, so that if a bill for a discovery contain proper matter for
the one, and not for the other, the defendant should answer the
proper and demur to the improper matter, and if he demurs to the
whole bill, the demurrer must be overruled.
On 25 July, 1832, the appellant, Edward Livingston, filed a bill
of complaint in the district court by his solicitors, stating that
on or about 25 July, 1822, being in want of money, he applied to
Benjamin Story and John A. Fort, of the City of New Orleans, who
agreed to lend to him the sum of $22,936, of which a part only was
paid in cash, part in a note of John A. Fort, and $8,000, parcel of
the said sum, was agreed to be afterwards paid to one John Rust for
the purpose and in the manner afterwards stated. To secure the
repayment of the money and interest at the rate of eighteen percent
per annum, he conveyed to Fort and Story certain property, with the
improvements on the same, situated on the Batture in New Orleans,
owned by him. When this property was so conveyed, Fort and Story
delivered to him a counterletter by which they agreed to reconvey
the property to him on the payment of $25,000 (being the sum
advanced and the interest) on 1 February then next, but if the same
was not paid on that day, the property should be sold, and after
paying the sum of $25,000 and the costs of sale, the residue should
be repaid to him. At the time of the sale, the whole property was
covered with an unfinished brick building, intended for fifteen
stores, and a contract had been made with John Rust to finish the
buildings for $8,000. Story agreed to pay the $8,000 to Rust, and
this was with the interest at eighteen percent on it, a part of the
$25,000 to be repaid on 1 February, 1823. The property was, at the
time of the loan, worth $60,000, and is now worth double the
sum.
Story and Fort took possession of the property, and the
complainant went to New York on a visit, expecting the stores
to
Page 34 U. S. 634
be finished by his return, or that at least three of them would
be in a condition to let, he having received an offer of rent for
each of the three, which would have given a rate of interest equal
to a principal of $10,000 each for the three smallest stores.
The complainant states that, on his return to New Orleans, he
found little or nothing had been done to the stores; the $8,000 had
been paid to John Rust, and if the property had been sold in
February, it would not have produced anything like its value. He
therefore applied to Fort and Story for a further time to pay the
money borrowed, which they would not consent to, but on the
following conditions: that the property should be advertised for
sale on 2 June then next; that the sum due to them should be
increased from $25,000 to $27,500, which sum was composed first of
the said $25,000, secondly, of $1,500 for interest for the delay of
four months, at eighteen percent, thirdly, $800 for auctioneer's
commissions, of $50 for advertising, and of $200 arbitrarily added,
without any designation; of which a memorandum was given by the
said Fort and Story and is now ready to be produced, and that the
counterletter so executed, as aforesaid, to him by the said Fort
and Story should be annulled.
Being entirely at the mercy of Fort and Story, he was obliged to
consent to these terms in hope of relief when money should become
plenty; but on the contrary, the pressure became greater, and on 2
June, in order to obtain a delay of sixty days, he was forced to
consent to sign a paper by which it was agreed that the debt should
be augmented to the sum of $27,830.76, and that if the same was not
paid on 5 August, then the property should belong to the said Fort
and Story without any sale; but there was no clause by which he
should be discharged from the payment of the sum so borrowed; as
aforesaid, whereby he would have been liable to the payment of the
sum so advanced in case the property had fallen in value.
On 5 August above mentioned, the said Fort and Story demanded,
by a notary, the full sum of $27,830.76, which included the said
charge of $800 for auctioneer's fees for selling, although no sale
had been made,
Page 34 U. S. 635
and all the other illegal charges above stated, and on
nonpayment they protested for damages and interest on the sum,
thereby showing their intent to hold the complainant responsible
for the sum demanded, if the premises should, by any accident,
become insufficient in value to pay the same.
Fort and Story remained in possession of the said premises until
the death of the said John A. Fort, which took place some time in
the year 1828, and after his death, the said Benjamin Story took
the whole of the said property by some arrangement with the heirs
of John A. Fort, and is now and ever since has been in the sole
possession thereof, and the said John and Benjamin in the lifetime
of the said John, and the said Benjamin, after the death of the
said John, have received the rents and profits of the said property
to the amount at least of $60,000.
The bill states that the complainant is advised and believes he
has a right to ask and recover from the said Benjamin Story the
possession of the said property, and an account of the rents and
profits thereof, the conveyance of the same having been made on a
contract for the loan of money, and although in the form of a sale,
was in reality only a pledge for the repayment of the same; the act
by which the complainant agreed to dispense with the sale being
void and of no effect in law.
The bill concludes as follows:
"And your orator prays that if on said account it shall appear
that there is a balance due to him, as he hopes to be able to show
will be the case, that the said Benjamin Story may be decreed to
pay the same to him and to surrender the said property to him, and
that if any balance be found due from your orator, that the said
Benjamin Story may be decreed to deliver the said property to your
orator on his paying or tendering to him the said balance, and that
your orator may have such other relief as the nature of his case
may require, and that the said Benjamin Story in his own right, and
also as executor of the last will and testament of the said John A.
Fort, or in any other manner representing the estate of the said
John A. Fort, may be summoned to answer this bill, your orator
averring that he is a citizen of the State of New York and that the
said Benjamin Story is a citizen of the State of Louisiana, now
residing in New Orleans. "
Page 34 U. S. 636
Upon this bill a subpoena was issued directed to the marshal,
commanding him to summon Benjamin Story to appear at the district
court on the 3d Monday in February, 1834, "to answer a bill
exhibited against him in the said court, together with certain
interrogatories therewith filed by the complainants."
A subpoena was also issued in the same terms, directed to
Benjamin Story executor of John A. Fort.
On 17 February, 1834, Benjamin Story came into court and by his
solicitor, L. Pierce, Esq. filed the following demurrer.
"The defendant by protestation not confessing all or any of the
matters and things in the complainant's bill to be true in such
manner and form as the same are therein set forth and alleged, does
demur to the said bill, and for cause of demurrer shows that the
complainant has not by his said bill, made such a case as entitles
him, in a court of equity in this state, to any discovery from this
defendant, touching the matters contained in the said bill, or any
or either of such matters, nor entitles the said complainant to any
relief in this court, touching any of the matters therein
complained of. And for further cause of demurrer to said bill, he
shows that by complainant's own showing, in the said bill, that the
heir of John A. Fort, who is therein named, is a necessary party to
the said bill, as much as it is therein stated that all the matters
of which he complains, were transacted with this defendant, and
John A. Fort, whose widow, the present Mrs. Luzenbourg, is the sole
heir and residuary legatee, but yet the said complainant hath not
made her party to the said bill, wherefore as before, and for all
the above causes, and for divers other good causes of demurrer
appearing in the said bill, this defendant does demur thereto, and
he prays the judgment of this honorable court whether he shall be
compelled to make any further and other answer to the said bill,
and he humbly prays to be dismissed from hence, with his reasonable
costs in this behalf sustained."
On 20 May, 1834, the district court, by a decree, sustained the
demurrer, and ordered the bill of the complainant to be
dismissed.
The complainant prosecuted this appeal.
Page 34 U. S. 652
MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant, Edward Livingston, filed his bill of complaint in
the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, against the appellee, Benjamin Story to set aside a
conveyance made by him, of certain lots of land in the City of New
Orleans and to be restored to the possession of said lots, alleging
that the deed was given on a contract for the loan of money.
Although in the form of a sale, it was in reality a pledge for the
repayment of the money loaned, and calling for an account of the
rents and profits of the property.
To this bill the defendant demurred, and the court sustained the
demurrer and dismissed the complainant's bill, and the cause comes
into this Court on appeal.
It will be enough for the purpose of disposing of the questions
which have been made in this case to state only some of the leading
facts which are set forth and stated in the bill.
The bill alleges that on or about 25 July, 1832, the defendant
and John A. Fort loaned to him, the complainant, the sum of
$22,936, to secure the payment of which, with interest at the rate
of eighteen percent per annum, he conveyed to them a lot of ground
in New Orleans, with the
Page 34 U. S. 653
buildings and improvements thereon. That a counterletter or
instrument was at the same time executed by the other parties, by
which they stipulated to reconvey the property on certain
conditions. That the lot was covered with fifteen stores in an
unfinished state, and the object of the loan was to complete them.
The property is stated to have been worth at that time $60,000, and
is now worth double that sum. That the complainant, soon after the
said transaction, left New Orleans, where he then resided, on a
visit to the State of New York, expecting that during his absence
some of the stores would have been finished, or in a state to let.
That on his return, he found that Story and Fort had paid $8,000 to
a contractor, who had failed to finish the buildings, the rent of
each of the three smallest of which would be the interest of
$10,000 a year when finished. A further time was requested for the
payment of the money, which Story and Fort would not agree to, but
upon condition that the property should be advertised for sale on a
certain day named; that the sum due should be increased from
$25,000 to $27,000, which sum was made up by adding to the $25,000
the following sums; $1,500 for interest for the delay of four
months at eighteen percent; $800 for auctioneer's commissions; $50
for advertising, and $200 arbitrarily added without any
designation, and that he, the complainant, should annul the
counterletter given to him by Story and Fort.
"That the complainant, being entirely at the mercy of the said
Story and Fort, consented to these terms in hopes of being able to
relieve himself before the day fixed for the sale of his property,
but being disappointed, he was on that day, in order to obtain a
delay of sixty days, forced to consent to sign a paper, by which it
was agreed that the debt should be augmented to the sum of $27,830,
and that if the same was not paid at the expiration of the sixty
days, the property should belong to the said Fort and Story without
any sale. The bill contains some other allegations of hardship and
oppression, and alleges that the rents and profits of the property
received by Fort and Story in the life time of Fort, and by Story
since the death of Fort, amount, at least, to $60,000. The bill
then prays that the said Benjamin Story may be cited to appeal to
the bill of complaint, and answer the interrogatories therein
propounded. "
Page 34 U. S. 654
The defendant in the court below demurs to the whole bill, and
for cause shows that the complainant has not by his said bill made
such a case as entitles him, in a court of equity in this state, to
any discovery from this defendant, touching the matters contained
in the said bill, or any or either of such matters; nor to entitle
the said complainant to any relief in this Court, touching any of
the matters therein complained of. The want of proper parties is
also assigned for cause of demurrer.
The court below did not notice the want of parties, but
sustained the demurrer on the other causes assigned.
The argument addressed to this Court has been confined
principally to the general question whether the District Court of
the United States in Louisiana, has equity powers, and, if so, what
are the modes of proceeding in the exercise of such powers. The
great earnestness with which this power has been denied at the bar
to the district court, may make it proper briefly to state the
origin of the district court of that state, and the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the laws of the United States. When the
Constitution was adopted, and the courts of the union organized,
and their jurisdiction distributed, Louisiana formed no part of
this union. It is not reasonable, therefore, to conclude that any
phraseology has been adopted with a view to the peculiar local
system of laws in that state. She was admitted into the union in
the year 1812, and, by the act of Congress, passed for that
purpose, 4 Laws U.S. 402, it is declared, that there shall be
established a district court, to consist of one judge, to be called
the district judge, who shall, in all things, have and exercise the
same jurisdiction and powers, which, by the act, the title whereof
is in this section recited, were given to the district judge of the
Territory of Orleans. By the act here referred to for the
jurisdiction and powers of the court, 3 Laws U.S. 606, a district
court is established, to consist of one judge; and it declares that
he shall, in all things, have and exercise the same jurisdiction
and powers which are by law given to, or may be exercised, by the
judge of the Kentucky District. And, by the Judiciary Act of 1789,
2 Laws U.S. 60, it is declared, that the District Court in Kentucky
shall, besides the jurisdiction given to other district courts,
have jurisdiction of all other causes, except of appeals
Page 34 U. S. 655
and writs of error, hereinafter made cognizable in a circuit
court, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit
court. And such manner of proceeding is pointed out by the Process
Act of 1792, 2 Laws U.S. 299, which declares that the modes of
proceeding in suits of common law, shall be the same as are now
used in the said courts respectively, in pursuance of the act
entitled, "an act to regulate process in the courts of the United
States;"
viz., the same as are now used and allowed in the
supreme courts of the respective states, 2 Laws U.S. 72; and in
suits of equity, and those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to
courts of equity, and courts of admiralty respectively, as
contradistinguished from courts of common law; subject to such
alteration by the courts as may be thought expedient, &c.
From this view of the acts of Congress, it will be seen that
prior to the act of 1824, which will be noticed hereafter,
Louisiana, when she came into the union, had organized therein a
district court of the United States, having the same jurisdiction,
except as to appeals and writs of error, as the circuit courts of
the United States, in the other states. And that in the modes of
proceeding, that court was required to proceed according to the
principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity, as
contradistinguished from courts of common law. And whether there
were or not, in the several states, courts of equity proceeding
according to such principles and usages, made no difference,
according to the construction uniformly adopted by this Court.
In the case of
Robinson v.
Campbell, 3 Wheat. 222, it is said that in some
states in the union, no court of chancery exists to administer
equitable relief. In some of the states, courts of law recognize
and enforce in suits at law all equitable claims and rights which a
court of equity would recognize and enforce, and in others all
relief is denied, and such equitable claims and rights are to be
considered as mere nullities at law, and a construction, therefore,
that would adopt the state practice in all its extent would at once
extinguish in such states the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
That the acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at
common law and in equity, and that to effectuate the purposes of
the
Page 34 U. S. 656
legislature, the remedies in the courts of the United States are
to be at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of
the state courts, but according to the principles of common law and
equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we
derive our knowledge of those principles. So also in the case of
United States v.
Howland, 4 Wheat. 114, the bill was filed on the
equity side of the Circuit Court of the United States in
Massachusetts, in which state there was no court of chancery, and
in answer to this objection, the Court says:
"As the courts of the union have a chancery jurisdiction in
every state, and the Judiciary Act confers the same chancery powers
on all, and gives the same rule of decision, its jurisdiction in
Massachusetts must be the same as in other states."
That Congress has the power to establish circuit and district
courts in any and all the states, and confer on them equitable
jurisdiction in cases coming within the Constitution cannot admit
of a doubt. It falls within the express words of the
Constitution.
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from
time to time, ordain and establish."
Article 3. And that the power to ordain and establish carries
with it the power to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding
in such courts admits of as little doubt. And indeed upon no other
ground can the appellee in this case claim the benefit of the act
of 1824. Sessions Laws 56. The very title of that act is to
regulate the mode of practice in the courts of the United States in
the District of Louisiana, and it professes no more than to
regulate the practice. It declares that the mode of proceeding in
civil causes in the courts of the United States that now are or
hereafter may be established in the State of Louisiana shall be
conformable to the laws directing the mode of proceeding in the
district courts of said state. And power is given to the judge of
the United States court to make, by rule, such provisions as are
necessary to adapt the laws of procedure in the state court, to the
organization of the courts of the United States, so as to avoid any
discrepancy, if any such should exist, between such state laws and
the laws of the United States. The descriptive terms here used,
"civil actions," are broad enough to embrace cases at
Page 34 U. S. 657
law and in equity, and may very fairly be construed, as used in
contradistinction to criminal causes. There are no restrictive or
explanatory words employed, limiting the terms to actions at law.
They apply equally to cases in equity, and if there are any laws in
Louisiana directing the mode of procedure in equity causes, they
are adopted by the act of 1824, and will govern the practice in the
courts of the United States. But the question arises what is to be
done if there are no equity state courts, nor any laws regulating
the practice in equity causes. This question would seem to be
answered by the cases already referred to, of
Robinson v.
Campbell and
United States v. Howland. And also by
the case of
Parsons v.
Bedford, 3 Pet. 444. In the latter case, the Court
said
"That the course of proceeding under the state law of Louisiana
could not, of itself, have any intrinsic force or obligation in the
courts of the United States organized in that state, except so far
as the act of 1824 adopted the state practice; that no absolute
repeal was intended of the antecedent modes of proceeding
authorized in the courts of the United States under the former acts
of Congress."
If, then, as has been asserted at the bar, there are no
equitable claims or rights recognized in that state, nor any courts
of equity, nor state laws regulating the practice in equity causes,
the law of 1824 does not apply to the case now before this Court,
and the district court was bound to adopt the antecedent mode of
proceeding authorized under the former acts of Congress; otherwise,
as is said in the case of
Robinson v. Campbell, the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction would be extinguished in that
state, because no equitable claims or rights which a court of
equity would enforce are there recognized. And there being no court
of equity in that state does not prevent the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States according to the
doctrine of this Court in the case of the
United States v.
Howland, which arose in the State of Massachusetts, where
there are no equity state courts. We have not been referred to any
state law of Louisiana establishing any state practice in equity
cases, nor to any rules adopted by the district judge in relation
to such practice, and we have some reason to conclude that no such
rules exist. For in a record now before
Page 34 U. S. 658
us from that court, in the case of
Hiriart v.
Ballon, we find a set of rules purporting to have
been adopted by the Court on 14 December, 1829, with the following
caption:
"General rules for the government of the United States Court in
the Eastern District of Louisiana in civil cases or suits at law,
as contradistinguished from admiralty and equity cases, an criminal
prosecutions, made in pursuance of the seventeenth section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and of the first section of the Act of
Congress of 26 May, 1824, entitled 'an act to regulate the mode of
practice in the courts of the United States for the District of
Louisiana.'"
And all other rules are annulled, and these rules relate to
suits at law and in admiralty only, and not to suits in equity.
From which it is reasonable to infer that the district judge did
not consider the act of 1824 as extending to suits in equity, and
if so, it is very certain that the demurrer ought to have been
overruled. For, according to the ordinary mode of proceeding in
courts of equity, the matters stated in the bill are abundantly
sufficient to entitle the complainant both to a discovery and
relief, and by the demurrer, everything well set forth and which
was necessary to support the demand in the bill must be taken to be
true. 1 Ves.Sr. 426; 1 Ves.Jr. 289. And if any part of the bill is
good and entitles the complainant either to relief or discovery, a
demurrer to the whole bill cannot be sustained. It is an
established and universal rule of pleading in chancery that a
defendant may meet a complainant's bill by several modes of
defense. He may demur, answer, and plead to different parts of a
bill. So that if a bill for discovery and relief contains proper
matter for the one, and not for the other, the defendant should
answer the proper and demur to the improper matter. But if he
demurs to the whole bill, the demurrer must be overruled. 5
Johns.Chan. 186; 1 Johns.Ca. 433.
But if we test this bill by any law of Louisiana which has been
shown at the bar or that has fallen under our observation, the
demurrer cannot be sustained. The objection founded on the alleged
want of proper parties because the heir and
Page 34 U. S. 659
residuary legatee of John A. Fort is not made a party, is not
well founded. The bill states that in the year 1828, after the
death of Fort, the defendant, Benjamin Story took the whole of the
property, by some arrangement with the heirs of Fort, and that he
ever since has been, and is now, in the sole possession thereof,
and has received the rents and profits of the same. This fact the
demurrer admits. Whereby Benjamin Story became the sole party in
interest.
The causes of demurrer assigned are general; that the
complainant has not, by his bill, made such a case as entitles him,
in a court of equity in that state, either to a discovery or
relief. In the argument at the bar, there has been no attempt to
point out in what respect the bill is defective, either in form or
substance, as to the discovery; if it is to be governed by the
ordinary rules of pleading in a court of chancery. And if the
objection rests upon the want of the right in the complainant to
call upon the defendant for any discovery at all, the objection is
not sustained even by the laws of Louisiana. But on the contrary,
it is expressly provided by a law of that state that when any
plaintiff shall wish to obtain a discovery from the defendant on
oath, such plaintiff may insert in his petition pertinent
interrogatories, and may call upon the defendant to answer them on
oath, and that the defendant shall distinctly answer to such
interrogatories, provided they do not tend to charge him with any
crime or offense against any penal law, neither of which has been
pretended in this case. 2 Martin's Dig. 158.
Nor has it been attempted to point out in what respect the bill
of complaint is defective, either in form or substance, as to the
matters of relief prayed. In this respect also, the bill according
to the ordinary course of proceeding in a court of chancery is
unobjectionable, and indeed would be amply sufficient in the state
courts under the law of Louisiana, which declares that all suits in
the supreme court shall be commenced by petition, addressed to the
court, which shall state the names of the parties, their places of
residence, and the cause of action, with the necessary
circumstances of places and dates, and shall conclude with a prayer
for relief adapted to the circumstances of the case. 2 Martin's
Dig. 148. These are the
Page 34 U. S. 660
essential requisites in an ordinary bill in chancery. It can
certainly not be pretended that it is any objection in the case
before us that the bill filed is called a "bill of complaint"
instead of a "petition."
The sufficiency of the objections therefore must turn upon the
general question whether the District Court of Louisiana has, by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, the same equity
powers as a circuit court of the United States has in the other
states of the union, and we think it has been already shown that it
has, but that, according to the provisions of the act of 1824, the
mode of proceeding in the exercise of such powers, must be
conformably to the laws directing the mode of practice in the
district courts of that state, if any such exist, and according to
such rules as may be established by the judge of the district court
under the authority of the act of 1824. And if no such laws and
rules applicable to the case exist in the State of Louisiana, then
such equity powers must be exercised according to the principles,
rules and usages of the circuit courts of the United States, as
regulated and prescribed for the circuit courts in the other states
of the union.
The decree of the district court must, accordingly, be
Reversed and the cause sent back for further
proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN.
The inferior courts of the United States can only exercise
jurisdiction under the laws of Congress, and a general law giving
equity jurisdiction will apply as well to the courts of the United
States in Louisiana, as in any other state in the union. The same
may be said as to a general law regulating the exercise of a common
law jurisdiction.
But, as it regards the courts of the United States in Louisiana,
Congress has made an exception from the general law, by the act of
1824. This act provides,
"That the mode of proceeding in civil causes in the courts of
the United States, that now are, or hereafter may be established in
the State of Louisiana, shall be conformable to the laws directing
the mode of practice in the district Court of the said state,
provided that the judge of any such court of the United States may
alter the times limited or allowed for different proceedings in the
state
Page 34 U. S. 661
courts, and make, by rule, such other provisions as may be
necessary to adapt the said laws of procedure to the organization
of such court of the United States, and to avoid any discrepancy,
if any such should exist, between such state laws and the laws of
the United States."
The proceedings in the state courts of Louisiana are conformable
to the civil law, and the same course of proceeding under the above
law, has been adopted in the district court of the United States in
that state, and by the judgment of this Court, this course of
practice has been sustained.
The above act applies to all civil causes, and, of course,
embraces all causes both at common law and in chancery, and its
provisions apply as forcibly to an equitable jurisdiction, as to
one exercised in accordance with the rules of the common law. The
peculiar mode of procedure under the Louisiana practice, preserves,
substantially, the same forms in affording a remedy in all cases.
And whether the ground of action be in the principles of the common
law, or in the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction, by this mode
of proceeding an adequate remedy is given.
In "an act further to regulate process in the courts of the
United States," passed in 1828, and which provides for "proceedings
in equity, according to the principles, rules and usages which
belong to courts of equity," &c., it is declared that its
provisions shall not be extended to any court of the United States
in Louisiana.
No stronger legislative provision could have been adopted to
show that Congress did not consider that the "principles, rules and
usages which belong to courts of equity" were in force in that
state. And this view was, in my opinion, correct, as the law of
1824 had made the federal court practice in Louisiana an exception
to the general law on the subject.
If the principles, rules, and usages which belong to courts of
equity, are to be regarded in the District Court of Louisiana, the
same principle must adopt, in the same court, the rules and usages
which belong to courts of common law. But the latter have been
abrogated by the act of 1824, agreeably to the decision of this
Court, and it appears to me, this decision must equally apply to
the former. If the act of 1824 be
Page 34 U. S. 662
regarded, it must regulate the mode of proceeding in all civil
causes, as contradistinguished from criminal ones.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel, on consideration
whereof it is ordered decreed by this Court that the decree of the
said district court in this cause be and the same is hereby
reversed, and that this cause be and the same is hereby remanded to
the said district court for further proceedings to be had therein,
according to law and justice, and in conformity to the opinion and
decree of this Court.
