Section 27 of the Probate Code of California, as construed by
the highest court of the State, prevents a California domiciliary
from making an unrestricted testamentary gift to the United States
of property, real or personal, located within the State, although
such a gift may be made to the State, its counties or municipal
corporations.
Held:
1. The construction of the section by the highest court of the
State is binding here, but the question of its validity under the
Federal Constitution is for this Court to determine. P.
339 U. S.
89.
2. The section, as construed, does not violate the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution. Pp.
339 U. S.
90-93.
(a) The power of the United States to receive testamentary gifts
does not preclude a State from denying a testator the right to will
his property to the United States.
United States v. Fox,
94 U. S. 315. Pp.
339 U. S.
90-93
(b) The Tenth Amendment reserves to the States the power to
determine the manner of testamentary transfer of a domiciliary's
property and the power to determine who may be made beneficiaries.
Pp.
339 U. S.
91-93.
(c) In the determination of the question here involved, no
distinction is to be drawn between realty and personalty. P.
339 U. S.
93.
3. The section, as construed, does not discriminate against the
United States in violation of the Federal Constitution. Pp.
339 U. S.
93-95.
(a) Decisions upholding the right of persons to sue in state
courts on federally created rights are not in point here. Pp.
339 U. S.
93-94.
(b) Assuming that the United States is protected by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the section is
nevertheless justified by the State's close relationship to its
residents and their property. P.
339 U. S.
95.
33 Cal. 2d
638,
647, 204 P.2d
330, 335, affirmed.
Page 339 U. S. 88
The Supreme Court of California held void under state law
certain testamentary gifts to the United States, and directed that
the property be distributed to the statutory heirs of each
decedent.
33 Cal. 2d
638,
647, 204 P.2d
330, 335. On appeal to this Court,
affirmed, p.
339 U. S.
95.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals involve the power of the California Supreme Court
to declare invalid testamentary dispositions to the United States
by two California residents. The bequest to the United States in
No. 171 included only personal property; in No. 188, the United
States was designated to receive both real property and United
States bonds. The situs of all the property is assumed to be
California. After appropriate procedural steps, the California
Supreme Court held void these testamentary gifts and directed that
they be distributed to the statutory heirs of each decedent.
[
Footnote 1] The two cases were
consolidated for argument below, and will be considered here in one
opinion.
Page 339 U. S. 89
The California court construed § 27 of the California Probate
Code [
Footnote 2] to prevent a
California domiciliary from making an unrestricted testamentary
gift to the United States, although such a gift may be made to
California, its counties, and municipal corporations. [
Footnote 3] The court arrived at this
interpretation despite the contention of the United States that it
would raise serious constitutional questions. The construction of
the California Code by the California Supreme Court is, of course,
binding on us. It leaves us, however, with the federal
constitutional questions that the United States urged the
California court to avoid.
Page 339 U. S. 90
In these appeals, the United States makes two contentions. It
urges that the California Code, as interpreted, violates the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, art. 6, cl. 2, in that it
infringes upon the "inherent sovereign power" of the United States
to receive testamentary gifts. Alternatively it argues that the
Code effects an unconstitutional discrimination against the
National Government, since a testamentary gift may be made by a
Californian to California, but may not be made to the United
States.
We have no doubt that the receipt of gifts, testamentary and
nontestamentary, is within the ambit of federal powers.
Uninterrupted usage from the foundation of the Government has
sanctioned it. The first question here therefore is whether the
power to receive testamentary gifts reaches so far as to forbid a
state to deny a testator the right to will his property to the
United States.
To answer this question affirmatively would require us to
overrule
United States v. Fox, 94 U. S.
315, decided at the 1876 Term by a unanimous Court and
frequently cited with approval. A devise of New York realty to the
United States had been held void by the Court of Appeals [
Footnote 4] under a New York statute
that declared land in New York could be devised only to natural
persons and such corporations as New York had expressly authorized
to take by devise. Although it was not specifically urged that the
Supremacy Clause precludes a state's interference with the power of
the United States to receive testamentary gifts, this point was
necessarily involved in the United States' argument that the New
York prohibition violated an essential attribute of national
sovereignty -- the right to acquire property by all methods known
to the law. In affirming, this Court held
Page 339 U. S. 91
that the power to control devises of property was in the State,
and that therefore a person must "devise his lands in that State
within the limitations of the statute or he cannot devise them at
all." [
Footnote 5]
In asking us to overrule the
Fox case, the United
States contends that, since it has the power to accept testamentary
gifts, the Supremacy Clause bars a state from stopping this stream
of federal revenue at its source. The argument is that every
authorized activity of the United States represents an exercise of
its governmental power, [
Footnote
6] and that therefore the power to receive property through a
will is a governmental power. Since a state cannot interpose "an
obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional
power," [
Footnote 7] the
Government argues a state cannot interfere with this power to
receive. This argument fails to recognize that the state acts upon
the power of its domiciliary to give, and not on the United States'
power to receive. As a legal concept, a transfer of property may be
looked upon as a single transaction or it may be separated into a
series of steps. The approach chosen may determine legal
consequences. [
Footnote 8]
Where powers flow so distinctly from different sources as do the
power to will and the power to receive, we think the validity of
each step is to be treated separately.
The United States would have no semblance of a claim here were
it not for wills probated under California law. The
Fox
case is only one of a long line of cases which have consistently
held that part of the residue of sovereignty retained by the
states, a residue insured by the Tenth
Page 339 U. S. 92
Amendment, [
Footnote 9] is
the power to determine the manner of testamentary transfer of a
domiciliary's property and the power to determine who may be made
beneficiaries. [
Footnote 10]
It would be anomalous to hold that, because of an amorphous
doctrine of national sovereignty, federal constitutional law
reached into a California statute and made impotent that state's
restrictions on the designation of beneficiaries
The United States' argument leads to the conclusion that no
obstruction whatever may be put in the way of the United States'
power to receive by will. Thus, the United States could claim
rights under the will of a testator whom the state had declared
incompetent, or under a will that had not been witnessed and
attested according to the laws of the state. The United States
could take to the complete exclusion of a surviving spouse,
notwithstanding the state law.
The case of
United States v. Perkins, 163 U.
S. 625, makes clear that obstacles may be put by states
to the passage of property by will to the United States. There, the
New York Court of Appeals had upheld the application of the New
York inheritance tax to personalty bequeathed the United States.
Although there is no doubt that, where the United States acts in
its sovereign capacity, it is free from state taxes on that
activity, [
Footnote 11] this
Court, in affirming, said:
"Certainly, if it be true that the right of testamentary
disposition is purely statutory, the state has a right
Page 339 U. S. 93
to require a contribution to the public treasury before the
bequest shall take effect. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"We think that it follows from this that the act in question is
not open to the objection that it is an attempt to tax the property
of the United States, since the tax is imposed upon the legacy
before it reaches the hands of the government. The legacy becomes
the property of the United States only after it has suffered a
diminution to the amount of the tax, and it is only upon this
condition that the legislature assents to a bequest of it.
[
Footnote 12]"
We shall not overrule the
Fox case, and, of course, we
find no distinction between realty and personalty. Within broad
limits, the state has power to say what is devisable and to whom it
may be given. We may assume with the United States that the state's
power over testamentary gifts is not absolute, [
Footnote 13] but we find nothing in the
Supremacy Clause which prohibits the state from preventing its
domiciliary from willing property to the Federal Government.
[
Footnote 14]
The alternative contention is that § 27 of the Probate Code, as
interpreted, discriminates against the United States in violation
of the Constitution. The argument is that, even if the Supremacy
Clause would not be violated
Page 339 U. S. 94
if the statute provided that no governmental body could be made
the beneficiary of a California will, there is a violation of the
Supremacy Clause when the United States is treated less
advantageously than California. Apparently the capacity of the
United States to receive gifts is analogized to the right of a
person to sue on a federal cause of action in a state court.
Reliance is placed on the cases which have held that federal rights
must be enforced by the courts of a state when "ordinary
jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the
occasion." [
Footnote 15]
Thus, urges appellant, since state courts may not discriminate in
the availability of judicial relief between state created rights
and federally created rights, no more can a state discriminate
between California and the United States as beneficiaries under
wills.
When a state refuses to hear pleas based on federally created
rights while it takes cognizance of those created by state law,
there may be invalid discrimination because by the Supremacy Clause
federal laws are made laws of the state. [
Footnote 16] Therefore, to allow a suit based on state
law and to refuse one based on federal law could "discriminate"
without any reason for the classification. [
Footnote 17] But the United States' capacity to
receive, even though called a "right" or a "power," is not a "law
of the state." As we have shown in the earlier discussion, that
capacity cannot be magically transformed into something that must
be enforced. The cases upholding the rights of persons to sue are
not in point.
Page 339 U. S. 95
In a sense, of course, the United States is being treated
differently from California, and differences and distinctions in a
state's treatment of persons are frequently claimed to be
discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection and Privileges
and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. But such
differences and distinctions, even when applied to persons clearly
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, are not, in themselves,
unconstitutional. It is only when the variations are arbitrary and
without reasonable legal basis that an unconstitutional
discrimination occurs. A long line of decisions has molded this
judicial concept. [
Footnote
18] Thus, although we should make the somewhat dubious
assumption that the United States must receive equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no constitutional
violation. California's decision to permit only itself and its
subordinate municipalities to be unlimited governmental
beneficiaries under the wills of its domiciliaries is based on a
permissible distinction. It is justified by reason of the state's
close relationship with its residents and their property. [
Footnote 19] A state may by statute
properly prefer itself in this way, just as states have always
preferred themselves in escheat.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
* Together with No. 188,
United States v. Gayetty et
al., also on appeal from the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
In re Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal. 2d
638, 204 P.2d 330;
In re Estate of
Sanborn, 33 Cal. 2d
647, 204 P.2d 335.
[
Footnote 2]
Probate Code of California, § 27:
"
Who may take by will. A testamentary disposition may
be made to the state, to counties, to municipal corporations, to
natural persons capable by law of taking the property, to
unincorporated religious, benevolent or fraternal societies or
associations or lodges or branches thereof, and to corporations
formed for religious, scientific, literary, or solely educational
or hospital or sanatorium purposes, or primarily for the public
preservation of forests and natural scenery, or to maintain public
libraries, museums or art galleries, or for similar public
purposes. No other corporation can take under a will, unless
expressly authorized by statute."
[
Footnote 3]
One judge dissented on the authority of
In re Estate of
Hendrix, 77 Cal. App. 2d
647, 651-653, 176 P.2d 398, 400-402. The Hendrix will
bequeathed property to the United States Veterans' Administration
for the aid, comfort and assistance of disabled veterans. The
California District Court of Appeal, 77 Cal. App. 2d at 651, 176
P.2d 400, declared that this was really a bequest to the United
States, a corporation, and that its agency, the designated
beneficiary, was expressly authorized by California Probate Code §
27 to take property under a will. Thus, the bequest was valid. In
its opinion in the present case, the Supreme Court held that this
language had been unnecessary to the decision, and refused to
extend it to the gifts now under consideration. It thought that the
Hendrix gift was good as one for charitable purposes to a legally
constituted institution. The Supreme Court thought a gift to the
United States "without qualification as to administration or
purpose," 33 Cal. 2d 646, 204 P.2d 335, did not come under the
classifications of associations or corporations in § 27.
[
Footnote 4]
Matter of Will of Fox, 52 N.Y. 530.
[
Footnote 5]
United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315,
94 U. S.
321.
[
Footnote 6]
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.
S. 466,
306 U. S. 477;
Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S.
21,
308 U. S. 32;
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co.,
314 U. S. 95,
314 U. S.
102.
[
Footnote 7]
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.
S. 324,
301 U. S.
331-332.
[
Footnote 8]
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465.
[
Footnote 9]
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.
S. 716,
282 U. S. 733;
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100,
312 U. S.
123.
[
Footnote 10]
Mager v.
Grima, 8 How. 490,
49 U. S.
493-494;
United States v. Fox, 94 U. S.
315,
94 U. S. 321;
United States v. Perkins, 163 U.
S. 625,
163 U. S.
627-628;
Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.
S. 115,
178 U. S. 137;
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525,
250 U. S. 536;
Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188,
305 U. S. 193;
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556,
314 U. S. 562;
Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U. S.
36,
321 U. S.
48.
[
Footnote 11]
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.
S. 441.
[
Footnote 12]
United States v. Perkins, 163 U.
S. 625,
163 U. S. 628,
163 U. S.
630.
[
Footnote 13]
Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503.
Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633.
[
Footnote 14]
As was pointed out in the
Fox case, our determination
does not affect the right of the United States to acquire property
by purchase or eminent domain in the face of a prohibitory statute
of the state.
Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S.
367. An authorized declaration of taking or a
requisition will put realty or personalty at the disposal of the
United States for "just compensation." It may tax testamentary
transfers. Its powers will not suffer.
[
Footnote 15]
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 56;
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.
S. 377;
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. R. Co.,
292 U. S. 230.
[
Footnote 16]
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130,
93 U. S. 136;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, 223 U. S. 57.
[
Footnote 17]
McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. R. Co., supra,
292 U. S. 234;
cf. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., supra.
[
Footnote 18]
E.g., City and County of Denver v. New York Trust Co.,
229 U. S. 123;
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.
S. 342;
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.
S. 465;
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.
S. 525;
New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New
York, 303 U. S. 573;
Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S.
80.
[
Footnote 19]
Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U.
S. 553;
cf. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 333 U. S. 541,
333 U. S.
551.