Respondent was a member of the executive board of an association
which was under investigation by the Committee on Un-American
Activities of the House of Representatives. The Committee issued
subpoenas to each of the members of the executive board, demanding
that they produce in the committee room at a stated time certain of
the association's records which were in the custody of the
executive secretary of the association. The members of the
executive board, acting together, had power to direct the executive
secretary to produce the records and to remove her from office, but
they held no meeting to consider compliance with the subpoena. They
appeared in response to the subpoenas, but the records were not
produced. In identical prepared statements to the Committee, each
asserted that he did not individually have custody of the records,
and was therefore unable to comply with the subpoena. Asked whether
she personally would permit the Committee to see the books,
respondent answered: "I don't think it is pertinent to say what I
should do a week from now." She was indicted, tried, and convicted
for willful default under R.S. § 102, 2 U.S.C. § 192.
Held:
1. The question of the lack of a quorum of the Committee, raised
for the first time at the trial, and the question of the
admissibility of testimony given before the Committee at the trial
for willful default, are governed by the decision in
United
States v. Bryan, ante p.
339 U. S. 323. P.
339 U. S.
352.
2. The fact that respondent had no individual control over the
records was no defense. Pp.
339 U. S.
356-358.
(a) When one accepts an office of joint responsibility, in which
compliance with lawful orders requires joint action by the body of
which he is a member, he necessarily assumes an individual
responsibility to act, within the limits of his power, to bring
about compliance with such an order. Pp.
339 U. S.
356-357.
(b) The fact that the organization here involved was an
unincorporated association, rather than a corporation, is
immaterial. P.
339 U. S.
358.
3. After introducing evidence that the executive board had power
to produce the records and that it had not done so, the
Government
Page 339 U. S. 350
did not have the further burden of proving that each individual
member had not done that which was within his power to bring about
compliance with the Committee's order. Pp.
339 U. S.
358-364.
(a) The doctrine that it is not incumbent on the prosecution to
adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth
of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and
which, if untrue, could be readily disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence probably within the defendant's
possession or control is applicable here. Pp.
339 U. S.
360-361.
(b) In the absence of evidence that respondent made some effort
to bring about compliance with the subpoena or had some excuse for
failing to do so, the evidence adduced by the Government amply
sustained the conviction. P.
339 U. S.
364.
4. The subpoena was not defective by reason of the fact that it
was addressed not to the association by name, but to respondent as
a member of the executive board. Pp.
339 U. S.
353-354, n. 4.
84 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 174 F.2d 519, reversed.
Respondent was convicted of willful default under R.S. § 102, 2
U.S.C. § 192, for failure to comply with a subpoena of the
Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of
Representatives. The Court of Appeals reversed. 84 U.S.App.D.C.
388, 174 F.2d 519. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 846.
Reversed, p.
339 U. S.
365.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Fleischman is a member of the executive board of an
organization known as the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the association),
Page 339 U. S. 351
which, during 1945 and 1946, was under investigation by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. In furtherance of its
investigation, the Committee issued subpoenas on March 29, 1946, to
each of the members of the executive board and to Helen R. Bryan,
the executive secretary of the association, demanding that they
produce certain of the association's records in the Committee's
chamber on April 4, 1946. Fleischman and the other members of the
board appeared on that date in response to the subpoenas, but did
not produce the records. The Committee thereupon reported to the
House that the members of the executive board were in contempt of
that body. After debate, the House voted to direct the Speaker to
certify the Committee's report to the United States District
Attorney for legal action.
Respondent and the other members of the executive board were
jointly indicted for willful default under R.S. § 102, [
Footnote 1] but Fleischman was tried
separately from the others. Her defense, like that of Bryan,
[
Footnote 2] consisted in part
in the contention that she could not be guilty of willful default,
because a quorum of the Committee had not been present when she
appeared in response to the subpoena. The trial court withdrew that
issue from the jury, holding
"as a matter of law, that the Committee
Page 339 U. S. 352
on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives was a
validly constituted committee of Congress, and was at the time of
the defendant's appearance."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, one
judge dissenting, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 174 F.2d 519, on the ground
that presence of a quorum of the Committee at the time of
respondent's appearance was a material question of fact for the
jury. The court also divided on the question of whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the conviction, a majority holding
the evidence sufficient. We granted a writ of certiorari, 338 U.S.
846, to consider these important questions arising under R.S. §
102.
The quorum question is governed by our decision this day in
United States v. Bryan, ante, p.
339 U.
S. . Like Bryan, respondent testified before the
Committee on the return day of the subpoena without making any
suggestion of lack of a quorum. That issue was raised for the first
time at the trial, two years after her appearance before the
Committee, where she had given other reasons for her failure to
produce the documents. Under the circumstances disclosed by this
record, we think the defense of lack of quorum was not available to
her.
The question of the admissibility of her testimony before the
House Committee at her trial for willful default is likewise
governed by our decision in the
Bryan case, where we held
that R.S. § 859, 18 U.S.C. § 3486, cannot be read to prevent the
introduction of testimony of this kind at a trial for willful
default under R.S. § 102.
There remains the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict of guilt in this case. That evidence consisted
in part of the record of the Committee's unsuccessful efforts over
a period of four months to obtain the books and papers of the
association from its chairman and executive secretary, of which
there is
Page 339 U. S. 353
evidence of respondent's knowledge. [
Footnote 3] Other evidence introduced may reasonably be
taken to establish the following facts: following its unsuccessful
attempts to obtain the records from the chairman and executive
secretary, the Committee issued subpoenas to all sixteen members of
the executive board of the association, commanding them to appear
on April 4, 1946, in the Committee's chamber, there to produce the
records. The subpoena served on respondent was addressed to her as
"a member of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee." [
Footnote 4] The
board had power, its
Page 339 U. S. 354
members acting jointly, to direct Miss Bryan to produce the
records, to transfer custody of the documents to some other person,
or to remove her from office. [
Footnote 5] But during the interval between March 29, when
the subpoenas were
Page 339 U. S. 355
issued, and April 4, when its members appeared before the
Committee, no meeting of the executive board was held to discuss
compliance. A number of members of the board met in an attorney's
office in New York on April 2, when he gave to each a typewritten
statement to read to the Committee.
All of the members who had been subpoenaed appeared at the time
and place specified in the subpoenas. No one produced the records.
Each of the sixteen members of the board, including respondent,
read or handed to the Committee the identically worded statements
prepared by the association's attorney. These statements read:
"I individually do not have possession, custody, or control over
any of the material requested in the subpoena which was served upon
me. The books, records, and correspondence of the Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee are in the possession, custody, and
control of Miss Helen R. Bryan, the executive secretary of our
organization, and she is the legal custodian of the material. Since
I do not have either in my possession, custody, or control the
books, records, and documents described in the subpoena, I am
unable to comply with your order to produce them."
Upon being questioned by the Committee as to whether she,
individually, would give her consent to production of the books,
respondent's answer was that that question
Page 339 U. S. 356
was "not pertinent;" that she would decide only at a meeting of
the board.
Respondent and the other members of the board were jointly
indicted on a charge that they
"appeared before the Congressional Committee in the City of
Washington, District of Columbia, on April 4, 1946, but failed to
produce the records called for in the subpoenas, as they had power
to do, and thereby willfully made default."
As we have pointed out, there is evidence to support the charge
that the records were under the joint control of the members of the
executive board, and that the individual members, acting together,
had power to produce them. It is contended, however, that
respondent (in this respect no different from any other member) had
no individual control over the records, and that there is thus no
evidence that the nonproduction of the records resulted from
anything she personally did or omitted to do.
It seems elementary that the only manner by which a duty
requiring the joint participation of several persons may be
performed is by a combination of individual performances. And
conversely, the failure to perform such a duty is the result of a
failure by some or all of the persons who have been ordered to act
together to discharge their responsibilities. This failure is not
necessarily the result of a conspiracy, which premises an agreement
of some kind. One may, either alone or in concert with others, fail
to perform his individual part of a task requiring joint
participation.
When one accepts an office of joint responsibility, whether on a
board of directors of a corporation, the governing board of a
municipality, or any other position in which compliance with lawful
orders requires joint action by a responsible body of which he is a
member, he necessarily assumes an individual responsibility to
act,
Page 339 U. S. 357
within the limits of his power to do so, to bring about
compliance with the order. It may be that the efforts of one member
of the board will avail nothing. If he does all he can, he will not
be punished because of the recalcitrance of others.
Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S. 624,
99 U. S. 627
(1879). But to hold that, because compliance with an order directed
to the directors of a corporation or other organization requires
common action by several persons, no one of them is individually
responsible for the failure of the organization to comply is
effectually to remove such organizations beyond the reach of
legislative and judicial commands. This Court and the state courts
which have considered the matter [
Footnote 6] have adopted a contrary view. In
Wilson v.
United States, 221 U. S. 361
(1911), Mr. Justice Hughes stated the proposition thus:
"A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those
who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs. If
they, apprised of the writ directed to the corporation, prevent
compliance
or fail to take appropriate action within their
power for the performance of the corporate duty, they, no less
than the corporation itself, are guilty of disobedience,
Page 339 U. S. 358
and may be punished for contempt."
Id. at
221 U. S. 376.
(Emphasis supplied.)
See also Commissioners v. Sellew,
supra. [
Footnote 7]
Nor is a distinction to be drawn on the ground that a
corporation was there involved, while the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee is an unincorporated association.
Brown v.
United States, 276 U. S. 134,
276 U. S.
141-142, makes it clear that a subpoena directed to an
unincorporated association and its officers is equally valid. If
the legislative committee had a right to demand the records, the
directing officers of the association are quite as responsible for
their production as if they were corporate officers.
Cf. United
States v. White, 322 U. S. 694
(1944). [
Footnote 8]
The question that remains is whether, after introducing evidence
that the board had power to produce the records, that it had not
done so, and that each member of the board had read the identical
statements quoted above
Page 339 U. S. 359
as his reason for noncompliance, the Government has the further
burden of proving that each individual member had not done that
which was within his power to bring about compliance with the
Committee's order. It may well be that respondent's prepared
statement before the Committee and her answers to the Committee's
questions are sufficient in themselves to satisfy that requirement.
For they indicate clearly that respondent had assumed no personal
duty to do anything. The prepared statement was, of course, a
patent evasion of the Committee's demands. While stating that each
member of the executive board
individually did not have
control over the records, it does not deny, as it could not, that
the members had power
jointly to comply with the
subpoenas. Since the subpoenas required that they act jointly --
the previous demands on the chairman and the executive secretary
individually having been of no avail -- the statement that the
members
individually had no power to comply is completely
irrelevant.
And when the Committee asked respondent whether she, personally,
would permit the Committee to have
Page 339 U. S. 360
access to the books, her answer again was an evasion. She said:
"I don't think it is pertinent to say what I should do a week from
now."
The difficulty with the position is that it is not for her nor
any other member of the board to say that she would make up her
mind next week. The return day of the subpoena had arrived. No one
so much as hinted that there had been no time to act. The members
had gathered in an attorney's office on April 2, when they received
their statements. There was evidence that some members had gathered
informally elsewhere to discuss the question of compliance. In
fact, all were present in the anteroom of the Committee's chamber
on the morning of April 4. If there had been the slightest bent
toward compliance, the opportunities were there. When respondent
appeared before the Committee, she was asked, in effect, as of that
time, whether she was a party to the joint refusal to produce the
records: "Would you now, right here now, give your consent to this
committee to [see the books and records]?" As one of the members of
the Committee stated to respondent: "That is the main thing, the
whole case." Her answer was no answer.
It may be argued, however, that respondent may have adopted the
position of the other members of the board only after she had tried
in good faith to bring about compliance with the subpoena. Or
perhaps she had been ill or necessarily out of town immediately
prior to April 4. Granting that these or other excuses for
nonaction may exist, must the Government negative each, or was the
burden on respondent to advance them as defensive matter?
We think that the circumstances of this case fairly bring into
play the familiar doctrine in criminal cases that
"it is not incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive
evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is
fairly indicated by established circumstances
Page 339 U. S. 361
and which, if untrue, could be readily disproved by the
production of documents or other evidence probably within the
defendant's possession or control."
Rossi v. United States, 289 U. S.
89,
289 U. S. 91-92
(1933), and authorities cited. The considerations that govern this
question have been well stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in discussing
a similar question -- the constitutionality of a statute which
shifted the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution to the
defendant. He said:
"The decisions are manifold that, within limits of reason and
fairness, the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in
criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in
substance these: that the state shall have proved enough to make it
just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved
with excuse or explanation, or at least that, upon a balancing of
convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of
the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without
subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression."
"
* * * *"
". . . For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that
the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister
significance . . . or, if this at times be lacking, there must be,
in any event, a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and
opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general
prohibition is applicable to everyone who is unable to bring
himself within the range of an exception. Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol.
1, § 79.
* The
Page 339 U. S. 362
list is not exhaustive. Other instances may have arisen or may
develop in the future where the balance of convenience can be
redressed without oppression to the defendant through the same
procedural expedient. The decisive considerations are too variable,
too much distinctions of degree, too dependent in last analysis
upon a common sense estimate of fairness or of facilities of proof,
to be crowded into a formula. Once can do no more than adumbrate
them; sharper definition must await the specific case as it
arises."
Morrison v. California, 291 U. S.
82,
291 U. S. 88-91
(1934). [
Footnote 9]
In this situation, manifestly, the prosecution is under a
serious practical handicap if it must prove the negative
proposition -- that respondent did not or had no good reason for
failing to try to comply with the subpoena insofar as she was able.
The possibilities of time and
Page 339 U. S. 363
circumstance are of such wide range as to defy inclusive
rebuttal. On the other hand, the burden of the affirmative was not
an oppressive one for respondent to undertake; the relevant facts
are peculiarly within her knowledge. She was called upon merely to
introduce evidence as to what steps she took after receiving the
subpoena, or, if she took no action, any evidence tending to excuse
her omission. Respondent does not lose the presumption of innocence
that surrounds the defendant in a criminal prosecution. That
presumption continues to operate until overcome by proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and is not to be confused with burden of
proof, which is a rule affecting merely the time and manner of
proof.
See 1 Wharton, Evidence (11th Ed.) §§ 199-204.
[
Footnote 10]
Page 339 U. S. 364
Even though we assume, therefore, contrary to the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from respondent's statements before the
Committee, that she may have made some effort to bring about
compliance with the subpoena, or had some excuse for failing to do
so, we think that, under the circumstances here presented, the
burden was upon her to present evidence to sustain such a defense.
And, in the absence of such evidence, we conclude that the evidence
adduced by the Government amply sustains the conviction. Respondent
is no more or less guilty than any other member of the board. If
she can escape prosecution by remaining quiescent, so can all the
others. If hers is a valid defense, then all that the directors of
a corporation need do when they and the corporation are served with
subpoenas is to refrain from discussing compliance with the order.
No one need make any attempt to comply, for none of them
"individually" has control over the action -- or nonaction -- of
the corporation. A stratagem so transparent does not cast a shadow
of substance. [
Footnote
11]
Page 339 U. S. 365
It should be emphasized that we are not dealing with the duties
of witnesses summoned by one committee, but with the obligations
owed by persons summoned by authority of the Senate or House of
Representatives to appear before any person or group designated by
that authority. Reforms in the practices and procedures of certain
committees are vigorously demanded by persons both within and
without Congress. We would not be understood in this case as
expressing either approval or disapproval of those practices. But
the remedy, if any is needed, is certainly not to destroy the
effective operation of all committees, which is the necessary
result if they cannot compel the disclosure of facts. A subpoena is
a sterile document if its orders may be flouted with impunity.
Respondent advances a number of contentions which were not
passed upon by the Court of Appeals. We do not decide them at this
time. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
* The Court's footnote reads:
"Instances of the application of this principle can be cited in
profusion. The cases that follow are typical examples:
King v.
Turner, 5 Maule & Sel. 206, where a defendant having game
in his possession in violation of a statute whereby possession was
generally a crime, was held to have the burden of proving his
special qualifications (
cf. Yee Hem v. United States,
268 U. S.
178,
supra; also
Spieres v. Parker, 1
T.R. 144, per Lord Mansfield);
Fleming v. People, 27 N.Y.
329, a prosecution for bigamy, where, on proof that the defendant
had contracted a second marriage during the lifetime of his first
wife, the burden was laid upon him to prove exceptional
circumstances that would have made the marriage lawful, and finally
such cases as
Potter v. Deyo, 19 Wend. 361, 363, and
United States v. Turner, 266 F. 248 (typical of a host of
others) where a defendant has been subjected to the burden of
producing a license or a permit for a business or profession that
would otherwise be illegal.
Cf. United States v. Hayward,
26 Fed.Cas. 240;
Board of Comm'rs v. Merchant, 103 N.Y.
143, 8 N.E. 484."
[
Footnote 1]
11 Stat. 155, as amended, R.S. § 102, 2 U.S.C. § 192.
"Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the
authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House,
or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of
either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable
by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and
imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more
than twelve months."
[
Footnote 2]
See United States v. Bryan, ante, p.
339 U. S. 323.
[
Footnote 3]
This evidence consisted of a resolution passed by the executive
board on December 14, 1945, condemning the Committee's
investigation and directing Miss Bryan to consult with an attorney
with a view toward protecting the records from the Committee, and
the minutes of a meeting of February 11, 1946 at which the
executive board voted to instruct Dr. Barsky not to produce the
records before the Committee, as he had been ordered to do. While
respondent did not participate in either of these actions, her
knowledge of the Committee's efforts to obtain the records and the
board's previous actions with respect thereto was shown by evidence
of her attendance of a board meeting in March, 1946, when Dr.
Barsky reported concerning his appearance before the Committee on
February 13, and the association's attorney was present and talked
to the board about its legal position in the matter.
[
Footnote 4]
The subpoena served on Mrs. Fleischman read as follows:
"
BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE"
"
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"
"To the Sergeant-at-Arms, or His Special Messenger: "
"You are hereby commanded to summon Mrs. Ernestina G.
Fleischman, 'Voice of Fighting Spain,' 1 Columbus Avenue, New York
City, a member of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee, to be and appear before the Un-American
Activities Committee of the House of Representatives of the United
States, of which the Honorable John S. Wood is chairman, and to
bring with you all books, ledgers, records, and papers relating to
the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or subcommittee
thereof, together with all correspondence and memoranda of
communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign
countries. The said books, papers and records demanded herein are
for the period from January 1, 1945 up to and including the date of
this subpoena, in their chamber in the city of Washington, on April
4, 1946 at the hour of 10 a.m., then and there to testify touching
matters of inquiry committed to said Committee, and [she] is not to
depart without leave of said committee."
"Herein fail not, and make return of this summons. . . ."
It is now suggested that this subpoena is defective because
addressed not to the association by name, but to respondent as a
member of the executive board of the association, and
Wilson v.
United States, 221 U. S. 361
(1911), and
Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S.
624 (1879), are distinguished on that ground. We can
think of no clearer way of notifying respondent that she was
required to perform her duty as a member of the governing board of
the association than to serve an individual subpoena upon her,
addressed to her in her official capacity as a member of the
executive board, and calling for the production of papers which she
knew were under the control of the executive board. This subpoena
makes explicit what is merely implicit in subpoenas addressed to an
organization by name and served on individual directors, as was
done in the
Wilson case.
[
Footnote 5]
Mrs. Fleischman's testimony concerning the powers and authority
of the executive board was as follows:
"The CHAIRMAN: There isn't any other authority higher than the
executive board?"
"Mrs. FLEISCHMAN: No."
"The CHAIRMAN: And on all matters of policy, direction of the
activities of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, the
executive board is the highest authority?"
"Mrs. FLEISCHMAN: Yes."
"The CHAIRMAN: Now, as a member of that board -- you say you are
a member now?"
"Mrs. FLEISCHMAN: Yes."
"The CHAIRMAN: As a member of that board, are you willing, so
far as you personally are concerned, as a member of that board are
you now willing to permit this committee of Congress to see those
books and records called for in that subpoena?"
"Mrs. FLEISCHMAN: I don't know what I would do.
It would
require a meeting of the board."
(Emphasis supplied.)
There was also testimony that the board had power to transfer
custody of the records from Bryan to some other person, and that,
in fact, the vote at the February 11 meeting had been on that very
question.
[
Footnote 6]
For applications of this principle in the analogous situation
presented by noncompliance with a mandamus,
see State ex rel.
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. City of Live Oak, 126 Fla. 132, 170 So.
608 (1936);
Littlefield v. Town of Adel, 151 Ga. 684, 108
S.E. 56 (1921);
Smith v. Lott, 156 Ga. 590, 119 S.E. 400
(1923);
McCulloch v. State, 174 Ind. 525, 92 N.E. 543
(1910);
Middle States Utilities Co. v. City of Osceola,
231 Iowa 462, 1 N.W.2d 643 (1942);
Kentucky Culvert Mfg. Co. v.
Elliott County Fiscal Court, 239 Ky. 797, 40 S.W.2d 375
(1931);
State v. Minneapolis Street R. Co., 154 Minn. 401,
191 N.W. 1004 (1923);
Heather v. City of Palmyra, 317 Mo.
1320, 298 S.W. 750 (1927);
Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 287
Pa. 150, 134 A. 478 (1926);
Butler County v. Pittsburgh, H., B.
& N.C. R. Co., 298 Pa. 347, 148 A. 504 (1929).
[
Footnote 7]
It is suggested that the
Wilson case is distinguishable
because it may be inferred from the fact that, according to
Government counsel, the Government had been after the records "in
one way or another" for nearly a month that the subpoenas
duces
tecum served upon the directors had been supplemented by oral
orders. There is not one word in the
Wilson record that
supports such an inference. On the contrary, the grand jury's
presentment was not for failure to obey any oral commands, but "for
failure to obey a certain subpoena issued out of this Court, dated
October 28, 1910."
Vide the following:
"The COURT: What is the presentment precisely?"
"Mr. WISE (Government Counsel): The Grand Jury presents that the
corporation is in contempt of this court in not obeying the
subpoena, that these gentlemen are in contempt of Court in that
they have known and had actual notice of the subpoenas issued to
the corporation requiring it to produce these books, and, in
defiance of this court and of its process, have failed to take any
action to have their corporation comply with the process. . .
."
[
Footnote 8]
The argument that respondent was tried and convicted upon a
theory different from that, upon which the evidence is here found
sufficient to sustain the conviction is refuted by the record,
which is full of discussion concerning the import of the
Wilson case. The following is representative:
"Mr. ROGGE (counsel for respondent): . . . Let's look at the
Wilson case again, which the Court of Appeals passed on
[in
Barsky v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 167 F.2d
241, 251]. It says if your members have the right to direct the
corporation and fail to take appropriate action; in order to be
free of guilt here, did Ernestina have to be a propagandist and go
to the board members and say before taking action --"
"The COURT (interposing): When she takes on the responsibility
of an executive board member, certain responsibilities flow along
with that, when she does it."
"Mr. ROGGE: She is a member of the executive board. The evidence
has shown that. . . . The record also shows that what you get down
to is that Ernestina, in order not to be guilty here, had to see to
it that some sort of an affirmative action was taken, and I do not
think that is required even under the
Wilson case."
[
Footnote 9]
See also Williams v. United States, 78 U.S.App.D.C.
147, 138 F.2d 81 (1943). In
Tot v. United States,
319 U. S. 463
(1943), this Court refused to uphold a federal statute creating a
presumption that firearms found in the possession of one who has
previously been convicted of a crime of violence were received by
him in interstate or foreign commerce after July 30, 1938, on the
ground that the presumption is "inconsistent with any argument
drawn from experience."
Id. at
319 U. S.
468.
[
Footnote 10]
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that such a burden
ordinarily is cast upon members of the governing boards of
corporations and associations which have not complied with court
orders, when they are brought into court on contempt charges. In
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361
(1911), where Wilson, the president of the corporation, had custody
of the books and had removed them to his home, the corporation and
five of its directors were served with subpoenas to produce. The
directors appeared in court and were not held in contempt, although
they did not produce the books, because, as this Court noted in its
opinion:
"On behalf of the directors before the court, it was stated that
they had made efforts to obtain the books for production before the
grand jury, but that Wilson had declined to surrender them. They
presented the minutes of a meeting of the board of directors held
on that day at which these directors, [
i.e. those who had
been served with subpoenas] constituting a majority of the board,
had passed a resolution demanding of Wilson the possession of the
letterpress copy books called for by the subpoena 'for the
production of the same before the Federal grand jury.'"
Id. at
221 U. S. 371.
Again, in contrasting Wilson's actions with those of the directors,
the Court stated:
"The appellant did not attempt to assert any right on [the
corporation's] part; his conduct was in antagonism to the
corporation, so far as its attitude is shown. A majority of the
directors, not including the appellant, appeared before the court
and urged their solicitude to comply with the writ. They presented
their formal action, taken at a meeting of the board, in which they
demanded of the appellant the delivery of the books for production
before the grand jury."
Id. at
221 U. S. 376.
In considering this practice, it should be noted that, in criminal
contempts, as in criminal cases, the presumption of innocence
obtains; proof of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.
S. 418,
221 U. S. 444
(1911);
United States v. Goldman, 277 U.
S. 229,
277 U. S.
235-236 (1928);
Michaelson v. United States,
266 U. S. 42,
266 U. S. 67
(1924).
[
Footnote 11]
The proposition that one who tries but fails to obtain
compliance with a subpoena requiring the joint action of several
persons has made a useless and "empty gesture" which should not be
compelled by the courts overlooks the fact that, if enough members
of the governing body make the attempt required by the subpoenas,
their joint effort will ordinarily be successful. In the
Wilson case itself, the difference between imprisonment of
the directors for contempt and their acquittal was their "empty
gesture" of calling upon Wilson to produce the records.
See note 10
supra.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs,
dissenting.
The Court holds that there is sufficient evidence in this record
to support the conviction of respondent Fleischman under R.S. §
102. I cannot agree. Whether the evidence is sufficient depends
primarily on what conduct is made criminal by R.S. § 102 and what
action is required
Page 339 U. S. 366
by a subpoena
duces tecum. My views on these questions
differ so drastically from those of the Court that I shall present
them, and the conclusions which they dictate, before turning to the
Court's opinion.
I. R.S. § 102 provides:
"Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the
authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to
produce papers . . . willfully makes default, . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor."
This criminal statute is limited, by its terms, to just two
types of congressional orders: (1) a subpoena to give testimony,
and (2) a subpoena to produce papers. The latter type of order is
involved here.
Refusal to comply with a subpoena to produce papers can be
punished only if the witness has power to produce. It is a complete
defense for him to show that the papers are not in his possession
or under his control. For a subpoena
duces tecum does not
require a witness
"to sue and labor in order to obtain the possession of any
instrument from another for the purpose of its production
afterwards by himself. . . ."
Munroe v. United States, 216 F. 107, 111-112, quoting
Lord Ellenborough's opinion in
Amey v. Long, 9 East 473,
483;
see the general discussion in Notes, L.R.A.1915B,
980-985; 32 Am.St.Rep. 648. A command to produce is not a command
to get others to produce or assist in producing. Of course,
Congress, like a court, has broad powers to supplement its subpoena
with other commands requiring the witness to take specific
affirmative steps reasonably calculated to remove obstacles to
production. But even though disobedience of such supplementary
orders can be punished at the bar of Congress as contempt,
Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125, it
does not come within the limited scope of R.S. § 102. Only by
importing the broad contempt powers of Congress into this criminal
statute can this Court say that
Page 339 U. S. 367
it does. I cannot agree to such cavalier expansion of any
criminal provision.
Prosecution under R.S. § 102 is thus limited to a range far
narrower than is a proceeding for contempt, either in court or at
the bar of Congress. And even under the notoriously broad contempt
power, punishment is justifiable only when a person has failed to
comply with an order specifying precisely what he must do, and when
he has power himself to do what is ordered. [
Footnote 2/1] Certainly no less precise standard should
be established in prosecutions for violation of a criminal statute.
Cf. Pierce v. United States, 314 U.
S. 306,
314 U. S.
310-311.
Viewed in this light, the evidence in this case unmistakably
falls short of proving that Fleischman disobeyed the subpoena or
violated the statute. The Government did succeed in establishing
that she had received the subpoena, knew approximately what
documents she was required to produce, and yet failed to produce
them. But an essential ingredient of the offense -- that she had
power to produce those records on April 4 -- remains completely
unsubstantiated. [
Footnote 2/2] The
Government does not contend that Fleischman had power to produce
except by acting jointly with other members of the board. And, for
the reasons stated above, the subpoena addressed to Fleischman as
an individual board member imposed on her no duty to prod others to
produce, or to initiate joint action aimed at production. [
Footnote 2/3]
Page 339 U. S. 368
Because of the limited scope of R.S. § 102 and the complete
absence of proof that Fleischman had power to produce the
subpoenaed documents, her conviction of the crime created by that
statute should be set aside.
II. The Court does not dispute that the evidence is insufficient
to uphold Fleischman's conviction under the established principles
outlined above. Rather it constructs a novel legal theory which,
however plausible on the surface, will not stand detailed
analysis.
The chain of reasoning on which its legal theory hangs appears
to be this: Fleischman and other members of the executive board
were served with separate subpoenas ordering each to produce papers
of the association on April 4; Bryan, the executive secretary, had
possession of the papers; the individual subpoenas imposed on each
board member a personal duty to do all each could to bring about
joint action that would cause production; had Fleischman performed
her individual part of this joint task, she might have prevailed on
the board to pass a resolution which might have forced Bryan to
produce; Fleischman failed to show that she had done all she could
to bring about that result; therefore Fleischman was properly
convicted of the crime of willfully disobeying the subpoena
addressed to her as an individual member of the board.
In this intricate chain, certain crucial links are entirely
missing and others are far too weak to sustain a criminal
conviction:
A. The foundation of the Court's theory is that a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to an individual board member,
Page 339 U. S. 369
includes the command that he do "all he can" to bring about
joint board action to produce the subpoenaed papers. [
Footnote 2/4] This doctrine expands the
scope of the subpoena
duces tecum far beyond its
traditional boundaries, which are outlined in
339 U.
S. supra. No precedent for such an expansion
can be found in the two cases relied on by the Court.
Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S.
624, merely approved issuance of a writ of mandamus to a
county commission ordering specific action on a specific date as
specifically required by Kansas statutes. Such is the traditional
function of mandamus. Seldom has a judicial order been more
explicit. In sharp contrast to Fleischman, the commissioners were
not required to hazard the least guess as to what action would
satisfy the judicial mandate. Both the mandate and the applicable
state statutes told them precisely what to do. [
Footnote 2/5]
Nor does the opinion in
Wilson v. United States,
221 U. S. 361,
support today's holding that an order to produce papers requires a
person, without further orders, to take action getting others to
produce. The Court relies on a dictum that corporate officials can
be required to take "appropriate action" to secure performance of a
corporate duty. Even the dictum, however, must be read in the
context of that case. Wilson, the president of a corporation to
which a subpoena was addressed, had actual custody of the
subpoenaed records. Appearing before the grand jury with several
corporation directors, he refused
Page 339 U. S. 370
to produce. The directors denied power to make him do so. In the
resulting contempt proceedings, the prosecuting attorney complained
that the Government had been after the records "in one way or
another before this same grand jury for nearly a month." He
emphasized that many of the directors had frequently appeared
before the grand jury, and indeed had spent the entire preceding
day there. [
Footnote 2/6] In view
of the frequent and prolonged appearances of the directors before
the grand jury, even a passing acquaintance with how a grand jury
operates would make it inconceivable that "one way or another" did
not include oral orders to take action aimed at forcing Wilson to
turn over the records. Whether such orders were specific enough to
justify holding the directors in contempt, or whether failure to
take any action would justify punishment for violation of the
subpoena itself without first ordering the directors to take
specific steps, became immaterial when the directors passed a
resolution ordering Wilson to produce. The directors were found
innocent, and the only issues before this Court involved Wilson's
guilt. Read in this context, the dictum on which the Court relies
affords no support whatever for its conclusion here that a
subpoena, of itself, imposes the amorphous duty of "appropriate
action" to get others to produce. Moreover, citation of the
Sellew case as authority for the dictum clearly indicates
that the "appropriate action" would have to be designated and
commanded by specific orders. Nothing in the
Wilson
opinion can fairly be interpreted as supplanting, or even casting
doubt on, the traditional rule that failure to take action required
by an order can be punished only
Page 339 U. S. 371
if the action is clearly, specifically, and unequivocally
commanded by that order. [
Footnote
2/7]
Apparently the only reason given for discarding this rule is the
Court's statement that failure to construe an individual subpoena
as requiring joint action by members of a board would "remove such
organizations beyond the reach of legislative and judicial
commands." That fear is without foundation. A custodian willfully
failing to produce records can be prosecuted under R.S. § 102. And,
under 18 U.S.C. § 2, any one "aiding or abetting" her also becomes
a principal in that offense, and is similarly subject to R.S. §
102. Moreover, a conspiracy to prevent production would certainly
provide grounds for conviction. Thus, there is no question that
Fleischman's conviction could be sustained if there had been
sufficient evidence that she actually aided or encouraged the
custodian's refusal to produce, or conspired to accomplish that
result. [
Footnote 2/8] And in the
rare instance where these sanctions
Page 339 U. S. 372
seem unlikely to secure compliance, Congress can always fall
back upon its arsenal of supplementary orders enforced by
congressional contempt proceedings: [
Footnote 2/9] officers with authority to call a board
meeting can be ordered to do so, and board members can be ordered
to vote for resolutions calculated to foster production. It can be
safely presumed that any organization capable of escaping this
barrage would not be brought into line by today's expansion of R.S.
§ 102. A subpoena is not made "sterile" by holding that it commands
only what it says it commands.
In fact, the Court's new doctrine creates a danger far more
genuine than what it allegedly avoids. While, in contempt
proceedings, a witness in doubt as to just what action is demanded
can be given more precise orders before a tribunal decides to
punish him for noncompliance, no such flexibility exists in
criminal prosecutions under R.S. § 102. As applied to such
prosecutions, the sweeping requirement that a witness not having
custody or control of subpoenaed documents must do "all he can" to
secure their production places him in an unfair dilemma. Caution
dictates that he "sue and labor" to obtain the papers, however
great and however useless the effort and expense. On the other
hand, common sense counsels that he make such practical efforts as
would satisfy a reasonable jury -- and not until the jury has
spoken will he know whether he guessed right.
Not even after today's opinion can Fleischman -- or, for that
matter, anyone else -- know precisely what steps were
Page 339 U. S. 373
required of her to encourage production of documents which she
herself could not produce. [
Footnote
2/10]
B. Even if the theory on which this Court upholds Fleischman's
conviction were tenable, it is, as might be expected from its
novelty, completely different from the theory on which the case was
tried. An essential element in the trial judge's charge was his
instruction that the jury could find Fleischman guilty only if it
found that she had "acted in concert with other members of the
executive board" to prevent production. But the Court, without even
attempting to support her conviction on this theory, substitutes a
theory involving completely different problems of proof and
evidence. [
Footnote 2/11] The
issue of whether Fleischman had failed to attempt to persuade
others to produce was not being tried, and there was no reason for
her to introduce evidence concerning it. The question on review is
not whether the record as a whole exudes a general impression of
guilt, but whether the evidence supports a finding of guilt of the
issues presented to the jury by the trial judge's charge,
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.
S. 607,
326 U. S. 614.
This Court should heed its mandates forbidding state appellate
courts to uphold convictions on any theory materially different
from that, on which the case was presented to the jury.
See
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196,
333 U. S.
201-202.
Page 339 U. S. 374
C. The Court relies heavily on statements made by Fleischman
before the congressional committee. But these statements are
expressly made inadmissible by 18 U.S.C. § 3486, which provides
that no testimony given by a witness before any committee of either
house
"shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against
him in any Court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed in
giving such testimony."
See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.
S. 323,
339 U. S.
346.
Nor does Fleischman's testimony, even if admissible, support the
inferences drawn from it by this Court. Weighty significance is
attached to her refusal to say how she would vote on the question
of production if a board meeting were held. Suffice it to say that
no meeting had been held following her receipt of the subpoena, no
future meeting had any relevance whatever to the past offense with
which she was charged, and the subpoena did not order her to take
action at a board meeting anyway.
See 339 U.
S. @
Equally unwarranted is the inference drawn by the Court from the
fact that Fleischman and other board members read the same
statement denying individual possession or control over the
subpoenaed documents. The Court refers to this statement, prepared
by a lawyer, as a "patent evasion" of the committee's order. On the
contrary, I regard the denial of individual power to produce as a
complete and adequate response to the individual subpoenas. And
surely, although the Committee would not permit counsel for
witnesses to enter the committee room, witnesses have always been
entitled to get advice from a qualified lawyer and present a
statement prepared by him without having inferences of guilt drawn
from that fact.
D. Power to produce is an essential ingredient of any offense
under R.S. § 102, and the indictment necessarily
Page 339 U. S. 375
alleged that "each and all" of the board members had such power.
Thus, proof of Fleischman's power to produce the subpoenaed papers
is undeniably vital to the Court's theory of the case.
The only evidence tending to show power in the board itself to
produce is that it had authority over the policies and activities
of the association, and had power to suspend Bryan at any regular
board meeting. [
Footnote 2/12]
Assuming that the board could have ordered Bryan to produce under
threat of suspension, the
Wilson case demonstrates that
prospective obedience to such a potential board order cannot
accurately be inferred merely from the supremacy of a board. And
this record is barren of any evidence to support a finding that
Bryan would have complied on April 4th with a board order.
Equally important under the Court's theory is the question of
Fleischman's own power to bring about production. The Court holds
that membership on the board gave her one-eighteenth of the board's
official "power," which it considers enough to support conviction.
But her fraction of official "power" could be exercised only at an
official meeting. There is no showing that any meeting was held
between March 29 and April 4, or that Fleischman had power to call
such a meeting. [
Footnote 2/13]
And I do not understand
Page 339 U. S. 376
the Court to say that the "power to produce" which Fleischman
criminally failed to exercise was solely some imagined personal
ability, unconnected with her official capacity, to attempt to
cajole the chairman into calling a meeting or ordering
production.
Upon a showing merely that the board controlled the "policies
and activities" of the association and that she was a board member,
the Court imposes on Fleischman the burden of disproving the
crucial allegation of "power to produce" by establishing that she
had done "all she could" to bring about production. In effect, it
has set up a presumption that every board member automatically has
such power, and has saddled Fleischman with the burden of proving
her innocence by showing that the presumption should not apply to
her. [
Footnote 2/14] In the
absence of some showing that she had authority to call or an
opportunity to vote at an official board meeting, or at least had
substantial influence over other board members, this is every bit
as arbitrary as the presumption rejected in
Tot
v.
Page 339 U. S. 377
United States, 319 U. S. 463.
[
Footnote 2/15] That case
directly bars use of such a device to shift the burden of proof,
however convenient it would be for the prosecutor. And, without
that device, the Government's case was clearly insufficient to
support the verdict.
The time-honored rule, that the Government is required to prove
every essential ingredient of an offense it charges, provides a
safeguard essential to preservation of individual liberty against
governmental oppression. It should not be sacrificed in order to
sustain the conviction of a single defendant whose guilt the
Government has plainly failed to prove.
If the Court's theory merely had any one of the above flaws, its
chain of reasoning would break. With all four, it collapses. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.
Anyone who "willfully makes default" in obeying a valid subpoena
to produce records before a committee of Congress has, ever since
1857, been guilty of a federal
Page 339 U. S. 378
offense. Act of January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155; R.S. § 102, as
amended by Joint Resolution of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 942, now 2
U.S.C. § 192. This was the offense for which respondent was
prosecuted. The trial court thus put to the jury the theory of the
prosecution:
"If you find that the members of the executive board, directly
or indirectly, had custody or dominion and control over the records
subpoenaed and could have produced the records called for, but
willfully failed and refused to do so, and that the defendant
Fleischman acted in concert with other members of the executive
board, either throughout or at any point, to prevent the committee
from getting the subpoenaed records, then you may find the
defendant Fleischman guilty, if you find that the other elements
hereinafter set out have been proved by the United States beyond a
reasonable doubt."
The only "other element" that bears on the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence was the court's explanation that the
requirement that the default be made "willfully" means that the
default must be "deliberate and intentional."
The indictment against respondent also had a count charging her
and others with conspiring to make willful default of congressional
subpoenas. It is inappropriate to consider whether the evidence
would have been sufficient to bring respondent within the expansive
range of a conspiracy charge, or whether evidence that could have
been admitted under such a charge, but was not admissible in this
trial, would have sufficed to prove guilt. For its own good
reasons, the Government dismissed the conspiracy charge against
Fleischman. A careful study of the record compels the conclusion
that Edgerton, J., conveyed fairly and in balance all that the
Government
Page 339 U. S. 379
proved against respondent on the charge on which she was
tried:
"Appellant testified without contradiction that she could not
produce the records because they were not in her possession or
control. She refused to express either willingness or unwillingness
that they be produced.[8] Even this refusal did not occur until she
was questioned by members of the Congressional Committee on April
4. The records were in possession of one Bryan, subject to control
by an Executive Board of about 18 members, of whom appellant was
one. Long before April 4, Bryan, directed by other members of the
Board but not by the appellant, had determined not to produce the
records. There is no evidence that appellant ratified or approved
the action of the other members of the Board. The government says,
'In taking part in a combined action to withhold records from a
Congressional Committee, the appellant acted at her own peril.' But
I have not been able to find any evidence, and no evidence has been
pointed out, that the appellant
Page 339 U. S. 380
took part in a combined action to withhold records. It has been
suggested that she might have asked the Board, or Bryan, to produce
the records. But there is no evidence that, if she had asked them,
they would have complied. There is no evidence that the
nonproduction of the records in the committee room resulted either
from anything the appellant did or from anything she omitted to
do."
"[8]"
" The Chairman: Mrs. Fleischman; I am going to ask you now for
your personal permission. I am requesting you personally to permit
this committee of Congress to have access to those books. Will you
give it to us or not? So far as you are able to do, will you give
it to us?"
" Mrs. Fleischman: That is expressing my opinion, Mr. Chairman.
I cannot say what the board will do."
" The Chairman: I am not asking what the board will do. I am
asking what you will do."
" Mrs. Fleischman: I do not know, because the thing comes to the
board to discuss, and I don't think it is pertinent to say what I
should do a week from now. It is a special meeting."
"I know of nothing else in the record that comes nearer than
this to supporting an inference that appellant refused to produce
the records or expressed unwillingness to produce them."
84 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 390, 174 F.2d 519, 521.
The respondent was summoned to produce papers before a
congressional committee, and did not produce them. For this
nonaction she was prosecuted as a person who "willfully makes
default" in not producing the papers. I believe in giving penal
statutes a scope their words would receive "in everyday speech."
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S.
25,
283 U. S. 26,
and see Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337,
279 U. S. 339.
If language in a criminal statute is to be read with the normal
meaning of English speech, "willfully makes default" surely conveys
the thought of a substantial tie between the nonproduction of
papers and the nonaction to which it is attributed. This record is
barren of the proof which, under our system of punitive justice,
would have warranted a jury to find that respondent was actively or
passively responsible for the nonproduction of the papers she was
asked to produce.
This conclusion does not imply the slightest relaxation of the
duty of obedience to the lawful commands of congressional
committees in exercising their power of testimonial compulsion.
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135. But
regard for that power does not call for the slightest relaxation of
the requirements of our criminal process. A penal statute must not
be applied beyond its terms, and the crime defined by it and
charged in an indictment must be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Page 339 U. S. 381
It may well be that the House committee should have asked
respondent to try to have convened a meeting of the executive board
with a view to asking the custodian of the records to produce them.
Such a procedure is suggested by what was done in
Wilson v.
United States, 221 U. S. 361,
221 U. S.
370-371. Had respondent refused she would have subjected
herself to a contempt proceeding for disobedience of a command of
the committee. But this is not such a proceeding. As to the offense
for which she was prosecuted, I agree with Judge Edgerton that an
acquittal should have been directed.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The two components of this general principle and their
application to this case are discussed in II(A) and II(D)
infra.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court's attempt to offset this deficiency is discussed in
339 U. S.
@
[
Footnote 2/3]
Whether joint action would have been required by a subpoena
addressed to the board is completely irrelevant for the reasons set
out in
339
U.S. 349fn2/4|>note 4
infra. It should be noted,
however, that an order to the board as an entity necessarily
implies joint action; one addressed to an individual member does
not. Moreover, the former is sufficiently specific if it tells the
board exactly what to do; the latter must tell the individual what
to do. In either case, the recipient must have power to do what is
ordered before punishment is justified.
[
Footnote 2/4]
While a subpoena was also addressed to the board as an entity,
there is utterly no evidence that Fleischman ever knew of it.
Therefore, like the Court, we treat the case as if no board
subpoena had ever been issued.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The string of mandamus cases cited in
note 6 of the Court's opinion are equally inapplicable for
the same general reason No case cited supports the Court's
position.
[
Footnote 2/6]
It should be noted that the directors appeared in response to a
subpoena addressed to the corporation. Unlike Fleischman, they were
not subpoenaed individually.
See 339
U.S. 349fn2/3|>note 3
supra.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See, e.g., McFarland v. United States, 295 F. 648,
650:
"Certainly, before one may be punished for contempt for
violating a court order, the terms of such order should be clear
and specific, and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of
those to whom it is addressed."
See also Berry v. Midtown Service Corp., 104 F.2d 107,
111, and
Labor Board v. New York Merchandise Co., 134 F.2d
949, 952. In the latter case, the court, in an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand, characterizes as "cardinal" the rule that "no one
shall be punished for the disobedience of an order which does not
definitely prescribe what he is to do." For application of the same
general rule to contempt proceedings for enforcement of a court
decree,
see Terminal R. Assn. v. United States,
266 U. S. 17,
266 U. S.
29.
[
Footnote 2/8]
One count of the indictment actually charged Fleischman and
other members of the board with conspiracy. That count was
dismissed. As for Fleischman's guilt as an "aider and abettor,"
that question was submitted to the jury by the trial judge's
charge. In affirming, this Court does not even suggest that there
was evidence to show that Fleischman had ever aided or encouraged
Bryan or anyone else. That Fleischman's conviction cannot be upheld
under existing doctrines does not establish the inadequacy of those
doctrines for any purpose except convicting one whose guilt as
charged has not been proven.
[
Footnote 2/9]
See 339 U. S.
@
[
Footnote 2/10]
There is not the slightest indication that anything Fleischman
could have done even had a prospect of fostering compliance with
the subpoena.
See 339 U. S. @
Apparently Fleischman's conviction is being upheld because she
failed to make some undefined empty gesture.
[
Footnote 2/11]
The Court attempts to justify its change of theories by quoting
from a bench argument between Fleischman's attorney and the trial
judge. Such an argument cannot alter the theory on which the case
was submitted to the jury by the judge's charge.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Even this evidence comes primarily from Fleischman's testimony
before the congressional committee, and should therefore be held
inadmissible.
See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.
S. 323,
339 U. S.
346.
[
Footnote 2/13]
The Court intimates that Fleischman could have called a meeting
when members of the board were gathered in an attorney's office on
April 2d or an informal gathering of members elsewhere. It should
be noted that the prosecutor labored valiantly at the trial to
establish that Fleischman visited the attorney's office or attended
some informal meeting. He failed completely in this effort. Despite
repeated questions to several witnesses, not one response was
evoked indicating that Fleischman ever saw or communicated with a
single board member during the interval between the time she was
subpoenaed and the time the members met in the anteroom of the
committee. As for the suggestion that Fleischman might have called
a meeting in the anteroom of the Committee's chambers, it is
strange doctrine to assert that the Committee's command that all
members appear was enough to require automatically that each member
call a meeting. If that was what the Committee wanted, it could
have ordered a meeting itself.
In any event, "opportunity" to call a meeting cannot be equated
with official "power" to call a meeting. There is no evidence even
intimating that she had such authority.
[
Footnote 2/14]
This theory sharply contrasts with the established principle
that corporate and association officials, like other persons, can
be held guilty only for their own crime, and not for the crimes of
their associates in which there is no proof that they participated.
Any contrary doctrine is a startling innovation in the laws of this
country.
See Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States,
330 U. S. 395,
330 U. S.
406-407.
See also cases collected in Notes, 33
A.L.R. 787; 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 333; 8 Ann.Cas. 383.
[
Footnote 2/15]
See note 9 of the
Court's opinion
Under the
Tot rule, the minimum justification for such
a presumption would be general experience that the most
insignificant member of a board has power, if she "does all she
can," to secure board production of documents held by its
custodian. Experience not only fails to support this premise; as
anyone familiar with the loose-jointed structure of nonprofit
associations should know, most members or most boards are wholly
subordinate to the executive secretary and the chairman. This is
one of the "many significant respects" in which such associations
obviously differ from business corporations.
See United States
v. White, 322 U. S. 694,
322 U. S. 697.
Not a single line in
Rossi v. United States, 289 U. S.
89, or
Morrison v. California, 291 U. S.
82, supports the "presumption" retroactively created
here. As a basis of "power to produce," mere board membership is no
substitute for possession, custody or control.