At a time when he was a naturalized citizen of the United
States, a person was convicted of a conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917. Thereafter, in a denaturalization
proceeding, his citizenship was revoked and his certificate of
naturalization was canceled on the ground that he had procured it
by fraud. Thereafter, he was ordered deported under the Act of May
10, 1920, which provided for the deportation of "aliens who, since
August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted of any
violation or conspiracy to violate" the Espionage Act of 1917 and
who are found to be "undesirable residents" of the United
States.
Held: his deportation was authorized by the 1920 Act.
Pp.
338 U. S.
522-533.
(a) The Act of May 10, 1920, is not limited to aliens who never
have been naturalized, nor does it exempt persons whose
certificates of naturalization have been canceled for fraud in
procurement. P.
338 U. S.
528.
(b) Congress may validly provide for the deportation of aliens
on grounds of past misconduct. P.
338 U. S.
529.
(c) The Act of May 10, 1920, does not require that an alien
whose deportation it authorizes shall have had the status of an
alien at the time of the conviction on which the order of
deportation is based. Pp.
338 U. S.
529-531.
(d) There is nothing in the legislative history of the Act of
May 10, 1920, that suggests a congressional intent to distinguish
between aliens who never had been naturalized and those who had
obtained naturalization by fraud and lost it by court decree. Pp.
338 U. S.
531-533.
Page 338 U. S. 522
(e) The Act of May 10, 1920, is not rendered inapplicable to a
conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 by reason of the fact
that, in 1940, the penalty for violation of that Act was increased.
P. 533,
n 20.
167 F.2d 659, 171 F.2d 773, affirmed.
In No. 3, the District Court dismissed a writ of habeas corpus
in a proceeding challenging the validity of the relator's detention
under a deportation order. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 167 F.2d
659. An order of this Court denying certiorari, 335 U.S. 867, was
subsequently vacated, and certiorari was granted. 337 U.S. 955.
Affirmed, p.
338 U. S.
533.
In No. 82, the District Court dismissed a writ of habeas corpus
in a proceeding challenging the validity of the relator's detention
under a deportation order. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 171 F.2d
773. This Court granted certiorari. 337 U.S. 955.
Affirmed, p.
338 U. S.
533.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON, delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present the question of whether § 1 of the Act of
May 10, 1920, [
Footnote 1]
authorizes the deportation of an alien under the following
circumstances occurring since that Act took effect:
Page 338 U. S. 523
(1) The alien was naturalized; (2) while he was a naturalized
citizen, he was convicted of a conspiracy to violate the Espionage
Act of 1917; [
Footnote 2] (3)
thereafter, in a denaturalization proceeding, his citizenship was
revoked and his certificate of naturalization canceled on the
ground that he had procured it by fraud, and (4) the proper
authority, after the required hearings, found the alien to be an
undesirable resident of the United States and ordered him deported.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that the Act authorizes
such deportation.
No. 3 -- THE EICHENLAUB CASE
Richard Eichenlaub, the relator, was born in Germany in 1905,
and entered the United States from there in 1930. He was
naturalized as an American citizen in 1936, and has resided in the
United States continuously since his reentry in 1937, when he
returned from a visit to Germany. In 1941, on his plea of guilty in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, he was convicted of conspiring to act as an agent for a
foreign government without having been registered with the
Secretary of State. [
Footnote
3] He was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months and fined
$1,000. In 1944, with his consent, a judgment was entered in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
canceling his citizenship on the ground of fraud
Page 338 U. S. 524
in its procurement. [
Footnote
4] Deportation proceedings were then instituted against him,
[
Footnote 5] and, after a
hearing before an Immigration Inspector and a review by the Board
of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General, in 1945, ordered his
deportation. [
Footnote 6]
This proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus was then filed in
the court last named. After hearing, the writ was dismissed and the
dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. 167 F.2d 659. We denied certiorari. 335 U.S.
867. However, when the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Willumeit case, now before us, on the authority of this
case, but called attention to the added impression which had been
made upon it by the argument in favor of Willumeit on the point
above stated, we vacated our denial of certiorari in this case and
granted certiorari in both. 337 U.S. 955.
No. 82 -- THE WILUMEIT CASE
In 1905, Otto A. Willumeit, the relator, was born in Lorraine,
which at that time was a part of Germany,
Page 338 U. S. 525
but, at the time of his arrest for deportation, had become a
part of France. He entered the United States from there in 1925. In
1931, he was naturalized, and he has resided in the United States
continuously since his reentry in 1941 after a visit to Mexico. In
1942, on his plea of guilty in the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut, he was convicted of having conspired
to violate that portion of the Espionage Act of 1917 which made it
a crime to transmit to an agent of a foreign country information
relating to the national defense of this country, with intent or
reason to believe that such information would be used to the injury
of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.
[
Footnote 7] He was sentenced
to imprisonment for five years. In 1944, with his consent, a
judgment was entered in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois canceling his citizenship on the
ground of fraud in its procurement. [
Footnote 8] Deportation proceedings were then instituted
against him, and, after a hearing before an Immigration Inspector
and a review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney
General, in 1947, ordered his deportation. [
Footnote 9]
Page 338 U. S. 526
This proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
and, after a hearing, the writ was dismissed. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal on
the authority of its decision in the
Eichenlaub case.
[
Footnote 10] 171 F.2d
773.
Page 338 U. S. 527
Because of the importance of the issue to American citizenship,
we granted certiorari. 337 U.S. 955.
The proper scope of the Act of 1920 as applied to these cases is
found in the ordinary meaning of its words. The material provisions
of the Act are as follows:
". . . That aliens of the following classes . . . shall, upon
the warrant of the [Attorney General], be taken into his custody
and deported . . . if the [Attorney General], [
Footnote 11] after hearing, finds that such
aliens are undesirable residents of the United States, to-wit:"
"
* * * *"
"(2) All aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may
hereafter be convicted of any violation or conspiracy to violate
any of the following Acts or parts of Acts, the judgment on such
conviction having become final, namely: "
"(a) [The Espionage Act of 1917, as amended]. [
Footnote 12] "
Page 338 U. S. 528
The above words require that all persons to be deported under
this Act shall be "aliens." [
Footnote 13] They do not limit its scope to aliens who
never have been naturalized. They do not exempt those who have
secured certificates of naturalization, but then have lost them by
court order on the ground of fraud in their procurement. They do
not suggest that such persons are not as clearly "aliens" as they
were before their fraudulent naturalization. [
Footnote 14]
Page 338 U. S. 529
There is no question as to the power of Congress to enact a
statute to deport aliens because of past misconduct. [
Footnote 15] That is what Congress
did in the Act of 1920, and there is no occasion to restrict its
language so as to narrow its plain meaning.
The one substantial issue is whether the Act requires that the
relators not only must have been "aliens" at the times when they
were ordered deported, but that they must also have had that status
at the times when they were convicted of designated offenses
against the national security. The Government suggests that one
route to a conclusion on this issue is to hold that the relators,
as a matter of law, were "aliens" when so convicted. The basis it
suggests for so holding is that the judicial annulment of the
relators' naturalizations on the ground of fraud in their
procurement deprived them of their naturalizations
ab
initio. Rosenberg v. United States, 60 F.2d 475. They
thus would be returned to their status as aliens as of the date of
their respective naturalizations. Accordingly, they would come
within the scope of the Act of 1920, even if that Act were held to
require that all offenders subject to deportation under it also
must have had an alien status when convicted of the designated
offenses.
In our opinion, it is not necessary, for the purposes of these
cases, to give a retroactive effect to the denaturalization
Page 338 U. S. 530
orders. A simpler and equally complete solution lies in the view
that the Act does not require that the offenders reached by it must
have had the status of aliens at the time they were convicted. As
the Act does not state that necessity, it is applicable to all such
offenders, including those denaturalized before or after their
convictions as well as those who never have been naturalized. The
convictions of the relators for designated offenses are important
conditions precedent to their being found to be undesirable
residents. Their status as aliens is a necessary further condition
of their deportability. When both conditions are met, and, after
hearing, the Attorney General finds them to be undesirable
residents of the United States, the Act is satisfied.
The statutory language which says that "aliens who since August
1, 1914,
have been or may hereafter be convicted, . . . "
(emphasis supplied) [
Footnote
16] refers to the requirement that the deportations be
applicable to all persons who had been convicted of certain
enumerated offenses since about the beginning of World War I
(August 1, 1914), whether those convictions were had before or
after May 10, 1920. The crimes listed were not crimes in which
convictions depended upon the citizenship, or lack of citizenship,
of their perpetrators. In fact, they were crimes against the
national security, so that their commission by naturalized citizens
might well be regarded by Congress as more reprehensible than their
commission by aliens who never had been naturalized.
The recognized purpose of the Act was deportation. It is
difficult to imagine a reason which would have made it natural or
appropriate for Congress to authorize the Attorney General to pass
upon the undesirability and deportability of an alien, never
naturalized, who had been convicted of espionage, but would
prohibit the Attorney
Page 338 U. S. 531
General from passing upon the undesirability and deportability
of aliens, such as the relators in the instant cases, who had
procured certificates of naturalization before their convictions of
espionage, but later had been deprived of those certificates on the
ground of fraud in their procurement. If there were to be a
distinction made in favor of any aliens because they were at one
time naturalized citizens, the logical time at which that status
would be important would be the time of the commission of the
crimes, rather than the purely fortuitous time of their conviction
of those crimes. Not even such a distinction finds support in the
statute.
The failure of Congress to give expression to the distinction,
here urged by the relators, between aliens who never have been
naturalized and those who have been denaturalized, was not due to
unfamiliarity with such matters. In 1920, Congress must have been
familiar with the status of aliens denaturalized under § 15 of the
Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 601,
see 8 U.S.C. § 736,
[
Footnote 17] or expatriated
under § 2 of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228,
see 8 U.S.C. § 801. It had had experience with the
deportation of undesirable aliens under § 19 of the Immigration Act
of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 889,
see 8 U.S.C. § 155, as
well as under other wartime Acts and Proclamations. There Acts did
not distinguish between aliens who never had been naturalized and
those who had obtained naturalization by
Page 338 U. S. 532
fraud only to lose it by court decree. If the Act of 1920 had
been intended to initiate the distinction here urged by the
relators, it is likely that the change would have been made by
express provision for it. We find nothing in its legislative
history that suggests a congressional intent to distinguish between
two such groups of undesirable criminals.
The Congressional Committee Reports demonstrate that, while this
statute was framed in general language and has remained in effect
for 30 years, its enactment originally was occasioned by a desire
to deport some or all of about 500 aliens who were then interned as
dangerous enemy aliens and who might be found, after hearings, to
be undesirable residents, and also to deport some or all of about
150 other aliens who, during World War I, had been convicted of
violations of the Espionage Act or other national security
measures, and who might be found, after hearings, to be undesirable
residents. [
Footnote 18] It
is hardly conceivable that, under those circumstances, Congress,
without expressly saying so, intended to prevent the Secretary of
Labor (or his successor, the Attorney General) from deporting alien
offenders merely because they had received their respective
convictions at times when they held certificates of naturalization,
later canceled for fraud. To do so would permit the denaturalized
aliens to set up a canceled fraudulent status as a defense, and
successfully to claim benefits and advantages under it. [
Footnote 19] Congress, in 1920,
evidently wanted to provide a means by which to free the United
States of residents who (1) had been or thereafter were convicted
of certain offenses against the security of the United
Page 338 U. S. 533
States, (2) had been or thereafter were found, after hearing, to
be undesirable residents of the United States, and (3) being aliens
were subject to deportation. Congress said just that.
We have given consideration to such other points as were raised
by the relators, but we find that they do not affect the result.
[
Footnote 20]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is
therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.
* Together with No. 82,
United States ex rel. Willumeit v.
Shaughnessy, Acting District Director, Immigration and
Naturalization, also on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
41 Stat. 593,
see 8 U.S.C. § 157.
[
Footnote 2]
Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217.
[
Footnote 3]
This was under § 37 of the general conspiracy statute, 35 Stat.
1096, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 88, now 18 U.S.C. § 371, and under § 3
of Title VIII of the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 226, 22 U.S.C.
§ 233, as amended by § 6 of the Act of March 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 80,
22 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 601, now 18 U.S.C. § 951. Several other
defendants stood trial in this proceeding, and were convicted both
on this and on a general espionage count. Their conviction was
affirmed on this count, but reversed on the other.
United
States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813.
[
Footnote 4]
Under § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1158-1160,
8 U.S.C. § 738.
[
Footnote 5]
Under § 1 of the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593-594, 8 U.S.C.
§ 157.
[
Footnote 6]
Under the 1940 Reorganization Plan No. V, 54 Stat. 1238, the
functions and powers of the Secretary of Labor under the Act of May
10, 1920, were transferred to the Attorney General. The warrant of
deportation recited that the relator had been "found to be a member
of the undesirable classes of alien residents enumerated . . . " in
the Act of May 10, 1920. While the administrative file is not in
the printed record, it was used in argument in the Court of
Appeals, and is on file here. The Board of Immigration Appeals, at
page 5 of its opinion, found as a fact that "the respondent is an
undesirable resident of the United States." The Court of Appeals,
at 167 F.2d 660, properly recognized this additional matter in the
record as justifying its acceptance of the less specific finding
recited in the warrant of deportation, and as distinguishing this
case from
Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32,
264 U. S. 42-46,
on that point.
[
Footnote 7]
This conviction was under §§ 2 and 4 of Title I of the act of
June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 218-219, 50 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 32 and 34,
now 18 U.S.C. §§ 794 and 2388.
[
Footnote 8]
See note 4
supra. In this record, the final decree of
denaturalization is set forth in full. Among other things, it
states that the order admitting the relator to citizenship
"is hereby vacated, annulled and set aside, and that the
certificate of citizenship . . . is hereby canceled and declared
null and void, . . . and the defendant Otto Albert Willumeit is
hereby forever restrained and enjoined from setting up or claiming
any rights or privileges, benefits or advantages whatsoever under
said order, . . . or the certificate of citizenship issued by
virtue of said order."
[
Footnote 9]
The order was based not only upon § 1 of the Act of May 10,
1920, 41 Stat. 593-594, 8 U.S.C. § 157, the applicability of which
in turn was based upon the relator's conviction of a violation of
the Espionage Act of 1917, but also upon §§ 13 and 14 of the
Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 161-162, as affected by 46 Stat.
581, 50 Stat. 165, the 1940 Reorganization Plan No. V, 54 Stat.
1238, and 60 Stat. 975, 8 U.S.C. §§ 213 and 214, having to do with
relator's reentry into the United States from Mexico in 1941. The
Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to pass on this alleged
ground for deportation in view of its conclusion as to the other
ground. 171 F.2d at 775. We concur for the same reason.
As in the
Eichenlaub case, the warrant of deportation
apparently stated that it was based on the fact that the relator
"had been found to be a member of the undesirable classes of alien
residents. . . ." While the warrant is not printed in the record,
the findings of the Commissioner of Immigration and of the Board of
Immigration Appeals are printed in full. Each contains an express
finding that the relator "is an undesirable resident of the United
States." Each states reasons for so concluding.
[
Footnote 10]
The return to the writ of habeas corpus in this case states
that, in addition to issuing the above-described warrant of
deportation, the Attorney General ordered the relator interned in
1945 as a dangerous alien enemy and, in 1946, ordered the relator
removed from this country for that reason. That proceeding derives
its authority from the Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat.
577, as it appears in R.S. 4067, as affected by 40 Stat. 531, and
Presidential Proclamation No. 2655 of July 14, 1945, 3 C.F.R. 1945
Supp. 29, 59 Stat., Pt. 2, 870,
see 50 U.S.C. § 21. It
thus raises questions as to the "enemy" status of an alien born in
Lorraine, which at the time of his birth was a part of Germany, but
at the time of his arrest was a part of France. While the
Government refers to this Act in its argument in interpreting the
Act of May 10, 1920, as
in pari materia, it does not press
this arrest as a separate ground for dismissal of the writ of
habeas corpus.
See United States ex rel. Zeller v.
Watkins, 167 F.2d 279;
United States ex rel. Gregoire v.
Watkins, 164 F.2d 137;
United States ex rel. D'Esquiva v.
Uhl, 137 F.2d 903;
United States ex rel. Umecker v.
McCoy, 54 F. Supp.
679. The court below did not find it necessary to pass on this
issue, 171 F.2d at 775, nor do we.
[
Footnote 11]
See note 6
supra.
[
Footnote 12]
The first paragraphs of the Act of May 10, 1920, are, in full,
as follows:
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
aliens of the following classes, in addition to those for whose
expulsion from the United States provision is made in the existing
law, shall, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken
into his custody and deported in the manner provided in sections 19
and 20 of the Act of February 5, 1917, entitled 'An Act to regulate
the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the
United States,' if the Secretary of Labor, after hearing, finds
that such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States,
to-wit:"
"
* * * *"
"(1) All aliens who are now interned under section 4067 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States and the proclamations issued
by the President in pursuant of said section under date of April 6,
1917, November 16, 1917, December 11, 1917, and April 19, 1918,
respectively."
"(2) All aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may
hereafter be convicted of any violation or conspiracy to violate
any of the following Acts or parts of Acts, the judgment on such
conviction having become final, namely:"
"(a) An Act entitled 'An Act to punish acts of interference with
the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of
the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the
criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes,'
approved June 15, 1917, or the amendment thereof approved May 16,
1918. . . ."
41 Stat. 593-594,
see 8 U.S.C. § 157.
The subsequent subdivisions (2)(b) to (h), inclusive, refer to
the Explosives Act, 40 Stat. 385; Act Restricting Foreign Travel,
40 Stat. 559; Act Punishing Injury to War Material, 40 Stat. 533;
Army Emergency Increase Act, 40 Stat. 80, 884, 955; Act Punishing
Threats Against the President, 39 Stat. 919; Trading with the Enemy
Act, 40 Stat. 411, and the Seditions Conspiracy Section of the
Penal Code, 35 Stat. 1088.
[
Footnote 13]
The word "alien" is not defined in the Act. It is, however,
defined in closely related statutes. The Immigration Act of
February 5, 1917, provides: "the word
alien,` wherever used in
this Act, shall include any person not a native-born or naturalized
citizen of the United States. . . ." 39 Stat. 874, see 8
U.S.C. § 173. The Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, provides: "The
term `alien' includes any individual not a native-born or
naturalized citizen of the United States. . . ." 43 Stat. 168,
see 8 U.S.C. § 224. These definitions are in effect today.
In Title 8 of the United States Code, they are included in, and are
made to apply to, the entire chapter on Immigration, and that
chapter includes, as § 157, the Act of May 10, 1920.
[
Footnote 14]
While the Act also makes no express distinction between its
applicability to aliens who never have been naturalized and to
those who have been naturalized, but have lost their naturalized
citizenship by lawful and voluntary expatriation,
see 8
U.S.C. §§ 800-810, the possibility of such a distinction is not
before us in the instant cases. The required finding by the
Attorney General, after hearing, that any alien who is to be
deported is an undesirable resident of the United States prevents
the automatic deportation of anyone under this Act without such a
hearing and finding.
[
Footnote 15]
Mabler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32;
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276,
259 U. S. 280;
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585;
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698,
149 U. S.
730.
[
Footnote 16]
See note 12
supra.
[
Footnote 17]
"The practice of filing proceedings to cancel certificates of
naturalization became widespread immediately after The 1906 Act
went into effect. In the fiscal year 1907, there were eighty-six
certificates canceled; in 1908, there were four hundred and
fifty-seven, and in 1909, nine hundred and twenty-one. During the
thirty years following the effective date of the 1906 Act, more
than twelve thousand certificates of naturalization were canceled
on the ground of fraud or on the ground that the order and
certificate of naturalization were illegally procured."
Cable, Loss of Citizenship 4-5 (1943).
[
Footnote 18]
See H.R.Rep. No.143 and S.Rep. No.283, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess., 58 Cong.Rec. 3362-3376 (1919);
Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U. S. 160,
335 U. S.
167-168, note 12,
335 U. S.
179-181.
[
Footnote 19]
Compare the injunction included in the final decree of
denaturalization quoted in
note
8 supra.
[
Footnote 20]
Among these is the claim in the
Eichenlaub case that
the Act of 1920 does not apply to his conviction under the
Espionage Act of 1917 because, in substance, the penalty for its
violation had been increased in 1940. This contention is without
merit.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
JACKSON join, dissenting.
In light of the attitude with which the doom of deportation has
heretofore been viewed by this Court in the case of those whose
lives have been intimately tied to this country, I deem it my duty
not to squeeze the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593, as amended, 8
U.S.C. § 157, so as to yield every possible hardship of which its
words are susceptible.
See Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U. S. 276,
259 U. S.
284-285;
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.
S. 388,
332 U. S. 391;
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6,
333 U. S. 10;
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135,
326 U. S. 147;
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.
S. 211,
329 U. S. 222,
note 8;
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.
S. 601,
335 U. S. 612,
modified, 336 U.S. 942. Because we have been mindful of
the fact that such deportation may result "in loss of both property
and life; or of all that makes life worth living," this Court
concluded
Page 338 U. S. 534
that due process of law requires judicial determination when a
claim of citizenship is made in a deportation proceeding, while,
upon entry or reentry, the same claim may be determined
administratively. It took into account the great difference "in
security of judicial over administrative action."
Ng Fung Ho v.
White, supra, at
259 U. S.
284-285. I am aware of the fact that we are dealing here
with a person whose citizenship has been taken from him. I
maintain, however, that the rigorous statute permitting deportation
of an "alien" should be read to apply only to one who was an alien
when convicted, and should not be made to apply to persons in the
position of these petitioners.
Since such construction is not unreasonable, due regard for
consequences demands that the statute be so read. Where, as here, a
statute permits either of two constructions without violence to
language, the construction which leads to hardship should be
rejected in favor of the permissible construction consonant with
humane considerations. The Act of May 10, 1920, provides that "All
aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be
convicted" of certain offenses shall be deported upon a finding
that they are "undesirable residents of the United States." Since
neither of the petitioners herein was found to "have been"
convicted of any offense before passage of the Act, they come, it
is urged, within the alternative prerequisite. But the statute, in
terms, refers to aliens "who . . . may hereafter be convicted," not
persons who are citizens when convicted and later transformed into
aliens by the process of denaturalization. And this view of the
statute is reinforced by the legislative history, as well as by
considerations relating to the impact of the Court's decision upon
various other congressional enactments not now before us.
Page 338 U. S. 535
The Committee reports [
Footnote
2/1] and congressional debate [
Footnote 2/2] make plain that Congress was principally
concerned with the status of about 500 persons who had been
interned by the President during the First World War as dangerous
alien enemies, and about 150 aliens who had been convicted under
various so-called war statutes. Congress could not have been
unaware that naturalized citizens may lose their citizenship; yet
nowhere in the legislative history to we find the remotest hint
that Congress had also such denaturalized citizens in mind. On the
contrary, the debates contain ample evidence that Congress had in
mind only persons convicted when aliens. [
Footnote 2/3]
The Court's decision has serious implications with respect to
citizens denaturalized for reasons not involving moral blame,
[
Footnote 2/4] and who have, while
citizens, committed one of a variety of acts not involving moral
obliquity and
Page 338 U. S. 536
certainly not endangering the security of the country, but which
nevertheless are covered by other statutory provisions in language
similar to that, before us. [
Footnote
2/5] Thus, discriminations would, as a matter of policy, have
to be drawn if this general problem were consciously faced by
policymakers. They are not within the power of this Court to draw.
If and when Congress gives the matter
Page 338 U. S. 537
thought, it may well draw distinctions between one who was an
alien and one who was naturalized at the time of conviction, based
on the manner in which citizenship was lost, the type of offense
committed, and the lapse of time between conviction and
denaturalization. These serious differentiations should not be
disregarded by giving a ruthlessly undiscriminating construction to
the statute before us not required by what Congress has
written.
[
Footnote 2/1]
H.R.Rep. No.143, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); S.Rep. No.283,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
[
Footnote 2/2]
58 Cong.Rec. 3361-3377.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Representative Gard:
"I assume that everybody will agree with that, that, if an alien
is tried, is afforded a fair trial and is convicted, then he is a
proper subject for deportation."
58 Cong.Rec. 3371.
Representative Robsion, discussing wealthy aliens:
"We permitted them to live here and granted them practically all
of the rights of the American citizen. They rewarded our
hospitality by joining with our enemies in an effort to destroy us.
As they were not citizens, they were not required to take up arms
in defense of the country in which they had grown rich."
58 Cong.Rec. 3374.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Citizenship is lost by any person "Voting in a political
election in a foreign state." 8 U.S.C. § 801(e). Bills are now
before Congress to restore citizenship to the approximately 4,000
Americans who voted in recent Italian elections.
See H.R.
6616 and 6617, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R.Rep. No.1469, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); 96 Cong.Rec. App. 117 (January 9, 1950).
See also 8 U.S.C. §§ 801(c) and (d), 804;
Battaglino
v. Marshall, 172 F.2d 979,
cert. denied, 338 U.S.
829. As to denaturalization based on fraud in the procurement of
citizenship,
see Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U. S. 665.
[
Footnote 2/5]
E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 156a, provides for the deportation of
any alien, with exceptions not here pertinent, "who, after February
18, 1931, shall be convicted for violation of or conspiracy to
violate" any federal or State narcotics law. In
United States
v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250,
this Court held that conviction under the Federal Anti-Narcotic Act
can be had without the usual requirement of
scienter.
Even convictions under laws related to the national security
involve varying degrees of culpability. This is demonstrated by the
remarks of the prosecuting attorney to the District Court
concerning Dr. Willumeit, the relator in No. 82, when his sentence
was being considered:
"It has been our belief, after having gone into this thing
pretty thoroughly with him [the relator], that he was more or less
caught in it without perhaps intending to go as far as the others
went."
"
* * * *"
". . . I have a feeling, your Honor, that Dr. Willumeit can be
restored to decent citizenship in this country. I think he has
something that he can give to America."
"
* * * *"
". . . I would say that the Government would view a lenient
sentence as a just sentence under all the circumstances. We think
something can be done with this man. We do not think he is a bad
man at heart, your Honor. We think he is probably a good man who
got in with bad company, and got in with this trouble."
"
* * * *"
"I say to your Honor I am not his lawyer. I am supposed to be
hard with him, I guess, if I believe in it. But, in this case, I do
not feel that this man is a bad actor. I think there is a place for
Dr. Willumeit in America in time, and he may become a most useful
citizen."