An employer and a labor organization entered into a closed shop
agreement which was valid under the National Labor Relations Act
and under state law. The agreement, which the employer had entered
into in good faith, was of indefinite duration, and had been in
effect more than four years. Pursuant to the agreement, upon the
demand of the labor organization and in good faith, the employer
discharged certain employees whom the labor organization had
expelled from membership on account of their activity in behalf of
a rival labor organization. The National Labor Relations Board
thereupon found that the employer had violated §§ 8(1) and 8(3) of
the Act, and ordered the discharged employees restored to their
former positions without loss of seniority and pay.
Held: The order of the Board was not authorized by the
Act, and was not entitled to enforcement. Pp.
338 U. S.
356-365.
(a) The application of the so-called
Rutland Court
doctrine, embodying a policy of the Labor Board, is rejected, since
the Board cannot ignore the plain provisions of a valid contract
made in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the statute
and reform it to conform to the Board's idea of correct policy. Pp.
338 U. S.
362-364.
(b)
Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U.
S. 248, distinguished. Pp.
338 U. S.
364-365.
171 F.2d 956, reversed.
An order of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 N.L.R.B.
1202, requiring petitioner to restore certain discharged employees
to their former positions without loss of seniority and pay, was
granted enforcement by the Court of Appeals. 171 F.2d 956. This
Court granted certiorari. 337 U.S. 913.
Reversed, p.
338 U. S.
365.
Page 338 U. S. 356
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question we have here is whether a closed shop contract,
entered into and performed in good faith, and valid in the state
where made, protects an employer from a charge of unfair labor
practices under the National Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote 1]
Petitioner was found by the National Labor Relations Board to
have violated §§ 8(1) and 8(3) of the Act. [
Footnote 2] On petition for review and cross-petition
of the Board for enforcement of its order, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit entered a decree enforcing the Board's order.
[
Footnote 3] We granted
certiorari limited to the question of the construction of § 8(3) of
the Act in relation to this case, [
Footnote 4]
i.e., to examine the applicability of
the so-called
Rutland Court doctrine, [
Footnote 5] here applied by the Board.
Page 338 U. S. 357
The doctrine has been approved in the Second, [
Footnote 6] Third, [
Footnote 7] and Ninth [
Footnote 8] Circuits, but disapproved in the Seventh
Circuit. [
Footnote 9]
At the period of time in question in 1945, petitioner company
was engaged in producing glycerin for war purposes. Petitioner has
no record of anti-union or anti-organizational activities. Its
employees were first organized and represented in 1936 by a union
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. In 1938, the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, affiliated
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, became the
representative of petitioner's employees. On July 9, 1941, the CIO
entered into a collective bargaining contract with petitioner which
contained a closed shop provision in these words:
"Section 3. The Employer agrees that, when new employees are to
be hired to do any work covered by Section One (1), they shall be
hired through the offices of the Union, provided that the Union
shall be able to furnish competent workers for work required. In
the event the union is unable to furnish competent workers, the
Employer may hire from outside sources, provided that employees so
hired shall make application for membership in the Union within
fifteen(15) days of their employment. The employees covered by this
agreement shall be members
Page 338 U. S. 358
in good standing of the Union, and the Employer shall employ no
workers other than members of the Union subject to conditions
herein above prescribed. In the hiring of new help (for the
warehouses), they shall be hired through the offices of the
Warehouse Union, Local 1-6, I.L.W.U."
This contract was entered into in good faith by the parties, and
served as a foundation for amicable labor relations for over four
years. It was of indefinite duration. On July 24, 1945, the CIO and
petitioner entered into a supplemental agreement that their
contract of July 9, 1941, "shall remain in full force and effect"
pending approval of certain agreed-upon items, other than the
closed shop provision, by the War Labor Board. In the instant
proceedings, the closed shop contract, as extended by the
supplemental agreement, was found by the National Labor Relations
Board to have been made in compliance with the proviso of § 8(3) of
the Act. [
Footnote 10]
On July 26, 1945, shortly after the making of the supplemental
agreement, open agitation for a change of bargaining representative
began. On July 31, an unauthorized strike occurred which was
participated in by a
Page 338 U. S. 359
substantial majority of the employees and lasted two and
one-half days, although the CIO had pledged its membership not to
strike during war-time. A group of employees formed an independent
organization which later sought to affiliate with the A.F. of L.
There was much propagandizing among the employees, and warnings
were issued by the CIO that its members would be disciplined for
rival union activity, and would, if disciplined, be discharged from
their jobs under the closed shop contract with petitioner.
Altogether, some 37 employees were suspended and expelled by the
CIO for their activities in behalf of the A.F. of L. union during
the fight between the two unions for control and because of their
participation in the strike contrary to CIO policy. These suspended
and expelled employees were discharged by petitioner, with the
advice of counsel, upon demand by the CIO. The ground of the demand
was that they were no longer "members in good standing" of the CIO,
as required by the closed shop contract. Petitioner knew, as the
Board found, that the discharge of these employees was demanded by
the CIO because of their rival union activity.
On October 16, the CIO won an election held by the Board to
determine the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees,
and the open hostilities were substantially concluded. [
Footnote 11]
Petitioner was charged with violation of § 8(1) and § 8(3) of
the Act, and found guilty thereof by the Board for having carried
out the terms of the closed shop contract
Page 338 U. S. 360
at the request of the bargaining representative. The Board
ordered petitioner to restore the employees discharged at the
request of the CIO to their former positions without loss of
seniority and pay. It is this order which the Court of Appeals
decreed should be enforced, and that is here for review.
There is no question but that the discharges had the effect of
interfering with the employees' right, given by § 7 of the Act, to
self-organization and to collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing. Nor is there any question
but that the discharges had the effect of discriminating, contrary
to the prohibition of § 8(3), in the tenure of the employees. It is
petitioner's contention that such interference and discrimination
are taken out of the category of unfair labor practices where the
employees are discharged in good faith, pursuant to an employer's
obligations under a valid closed shop contract entered into in good
faith with the authorized representative of the employees, as
permitted by the proviso contained in § 8(3) of the Act. [
Footnote 12] The Board admits that
petitioner's contention is supported by the proviso in § 8(3), but
says that a contract of indefinite duration such as the one in the
instant case is subject to the doctrine of
Rutland Court
Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587, 46 N.L.R.B. 1040. In the
Rutland Court case, the Board determined that an employer
is not permitted to discharge employees pursuant to a closed shop
contract, even though the contract is valid under the proviso to §
8(3), when, to the employer's knowledge, the discharge is requested
by the union for the purpose of eliminating employees who have
sought to change bargaining representatives at a period when it is
appropriate for the employees to seek a redetermination of
representatives. The reason for this holding by the Board will be
presently discussed. The
Page 338 U. S. 361
doctrine, as applied to the facts in this case, is stated in the
Board's brief as follows:
"The Board found the closed shop agreement to have been validly
entered into in conformity with the proviso to Section 8(3) of the
Act. The Board concluded, however, that, by virtue of the
indefinite term of the contract, which had run for more than four
years, the employees undertook to oust the CIO as their bargaining
representative at a period during which it was appropriate to seek
a redetermination of representatives."
The Board contends that therefore the contract no longer
protected petitioner.
We take it from this conclusion of the Board that there is no
dispute as to the validity of the closed shop contract as far as
the Act is concerned. In
Algoma P. & V. Co. v. Wisconsin
Empl. Rel. Bd., 336 U. S. 301, it
was held that nothing in the Act precludes a state from prohibiting
closed shop contracts in whole or in part. We therefore also look
to the law of the state where the closed shop contract was made,
here, California, to determine its validity. We think it is clear,
and do not understand the Board to contend otherwise, that the
closed shop contract was valid under California law.
Shafer v.
Registered Pharmacists Union Local 1172, 16 Cal. 2d
379, 106 P.2d 403;
Park & Tilford Import Corp. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local
848, 27 Cal. 2d
599, 165 P.2d 891;
James v. Marinship
Corp., 25 Cal. 2d
721, 155 P.2d 329;
In the Marinship case, supra, 25
Cal. 2d at 736, 155 P.2d at 338, the California Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that a union may expel persons who "have
interests inimical to the union" because of "the right of the union
to reject or expel persons who refuse to abide by any reasonable
regulation or lawful policy adopted by the union."
See also
Davis v. International Alliance of Stage
Employees, 60 Cal. App. 2d
713, 715, 141 P.2d 486, 488, where it is stated that,
Page 338 U. S. 362
under California law,
"An organization has the natural right of self-preservation, and
may with propriety expel members who show their disloyalty by
joining a rival organization."
The contract was valid under the Act and under state law.
The claimed impotency of the contract as a defense here rests
not upon any provision of the Act of Congress or of state law or
the terms of the contract, but upon a policy declared by the Board.
That policy has for its avowed purpose the solution of what the
Board conceives to be an anomalous situation, in that § 7
guarantees employees the right to select freely their
representative for collective bargaining, while the proviso to §
8(3) permits a closed shop contract with inherent possibilities for
invasion of the right guaranteed by § 7. The solution arrived at in
the
Rutland Court case, and urged here, is that the Board
may not give full effect to the proviso of § 8(3), because to do so
would permit circumvention of § 7. We turn to this contention.
One of the oldest techniques in the art of collective bargaining
is the closed shop. [
Footnote
13] It protects the integrity of the union, and provides
stability to labor relations. To achieve stability of labor
relations was the primary objective of Congress in enacting the
National Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote 14] Congress knew that a closed shop would
interfere with freedom of employees to organize in another
union,
Page 338 U. S. 363
and would, if used, lead inevitably to discrimination in tenure
of employment. [
Footnote 15]
Nevertheless, with full realization that there was a limitation by
the proviso of § 8(3) upon the freedom of § 7, Congress inserted
the proviso of § 8(3). It is not necessary for us to justify the
policy of Congress. It is enough that we find it in the statute.
That policy cannot be defeated by the Board's policy, which would
make an unfair labor practice out of that which is authorized by
the Act. The Board cannot ignore the plain provisions of a valid
contract made in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the
statute, and reform it to conform to the Board's idea of correct
policy. To sustain the Board's contention would be to permit the
Board, under the guise of administration, to put limitations in the
statute not placed there by Congress. In reality, whatever
interference or discrimination was present here came not from the
employer, but from fellow-employees of the dischargees. Shorn of
embellishment, the Board's policy makes interference and
discrimination by fellow-employees an unfair labor practice of the
employer. Yet the legislative history conclusively shows that
Congress, by rejecting the proposed Tydings amendment to the Act,
refused to word § 7 so as to hamper coercion of employees by fellow
employees. [
Footnote 16] The
emasculation of the contract
Page 338 U. S. 364
pressed for by the Board in order to achieve that which Congress
refused to enact into law cannot be sustained.
It must be remembered that this is a contest primarily between
labor unions for control. It is quite reasonable to suppose that
Congress thought it conducive to stability of labor relations that
parties be required to live up to a valid closed shop contract made
voluntarily with the recognized bargaining representative,
regardless of internal disruptions growing out of agitation for a
change in bargaining representative. In the instant case, the
employees exercised their right to choose their bargaining
representative. The representative bound them to a valid contract.
The contract was lived under for four years, and was subsisting at
the period of time in question. It was made and carried out in good
faith by petitioner, who cannot be held guilty of an unfair labor
practice by administrative amendment of the statute. We reject the
application of the so-called
Rutland Court doctrine.
Nothing that this Court said in
Wallace Corp. v. Labor
Board, 323 U. S. 248,
supports the Board's position here. In that case, this Court
said:
"It was as much a deprivation of the rights of these minority
employees for the company discriminatorily to discharge them in
collaboration with Independent as it would have been had the
company done it alone. To permit it to do so by indirection,
through the medium of a 'union' of its own creation, would be to
sanction a readily contrived mechanism for evasion of the Act."
323 U.S. at
323 U. S.
256.
There, the independent union was found to be a company-supported
union, and the employer was found guilty of an unfair labor
practice for supporting it. While the proviso to § 8(3) permits a
closed shop contract, it does not permit one made with a union
"established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this
Act as
Page 338 U. S. 365
an unfair labor practice." So the Court concluded in the
Wallace Corp. case that:
"The Board therefore is authorized by the Act to order
disestablishment of such unions and to order an employer to
renounce such contracts."
323 U.S. at
323 U. S. 251.
Thus, the
Wallace Corp. case does not deal with the scope
of protection afforded an employer by a valid closed shop contract,
because there was not and could not have been a valid closed shop
contract in that case.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed with directions
to the Board to dismiss the complaint.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON dissent. In their
opinion, the adjustment between § 7 and § 8(3) made by the National
Labor Relations Board is permissible. The use of the closed shop
privilege to interfere with the free exercise of the laborers'
choice does not seem to them to be within the purpose of the Labor
Act.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
49 Stat. 449
et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 151
et
seq.
[
Footnote 2]
Matter of Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company, 70 N.L.R.B.
1202.
[
Footnote 3]
171 F.2d 956.
[
Footnote 4]
337 U.S. 913.
[
Footnote 5]
Matter of Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587,
46 N.L.R.B. 1040.
[
Footnote 6]
Labor Board v. Geraldine Novelty Co., 173 F.2d 14;
Colonie Fibre Co. v. Labor Board, 163 F.2d 65;
Labor
Board v. American White Cross Laboratories, 160 F.2d 75.
[
Footnote 7]
Labor Board v. Public Service Transport, 177 F.2d
119.
[
Footnote 8]
Labor Board v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 171 F.2d
956;
Local 2880 v. Labor Board, 158 F.2d 365,
cert.
granted, 331 U.S. 798,
cert. denied on motion of
petitioner, 332 U.S. 845.
[
Footnote 9]
Aluminum Co. of America v. Labor Board, 159 F.2d 523;
Lewis Meier & Co. v. Labor Board, 21 L.R.R.M. 2093
(Nov. 1947).
[
Footnote 10]
"SEC. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
--"
"
* * * *"
"(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization:
Provided, That
nothing in this Act, . . . or in any code or agreement approved or
prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require
as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in
section 9(a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made."
49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(3).
[
Footnote 11]
This election was thereafter set aside by the Board, upon
objections filed by the A.F. of L., on the ground that the
employer's discharge of employees at the request of the CIO
prevented the result of the election from being truly
representative of the employees' wishes.
[
Footnote 12]
Supra, n 10.
[
Footnote 13]
See Peterson, American Labor Unions, p. 1 (1945). Rev.
Jerome L. Toner, in The Closed Shop in the American Labor Movement,
published under auspices of The Catholic University of America,
Studies in Economics, vol. 5, 1941, traces the principle of the
closed shop to the English guild system, the forerunner of the
American union movement, p. 16
et seq. In America, the
desire of workers for closed shop conditions antedates the American
Revolution, and even unionism.
Id. at 22, 58
et
seq.
[
Footnote 14]
49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151; S.Rep. No.573, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1935); H.R.Rep.Nos.969, 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1935); H.R.Rep. No.1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935).
[
Footnote 15]
See statement of Senator Wagner: Hearings before Senate
Committee on Education and Labor on S.195, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 47
(1935); Statement of Mr. Millis,
id. at 179-180, and the
Senate and House Reports accompanying the bill: S.Rep. No.573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935); H.R.Rep. No.1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
15-17 (1935).
[
Footnote 16]
During consideration of the bill on the Senate floor, Senator
Tydings proposed to amend it by adding to § 7 the words, "free from
coercion or intimidation from any source." In the debate which
followed, it became clear that the amendment would deal with
"employee against employee" relations, while the bill was designed
to deal only with employee-employer relations, and the amendment
was defeated.
See 79 Cong.Rec. 7653-7658, 7675.