Petitioner, a man in his thirties, was tried and convicted in a
Pennsylvania state court for larceny, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for 2 1/2 to 5 years. He conducted his own defense,
appointment of counsel having been neither requested by petitioner
nor offered by the court. At the trial, considerable hearsay and
otherwise incompetent evidence prejudicial to petitioner was
admitted; the prosecuting witness, being recalled for further
cross-examination, was made a witness for petitioner, to the
latter's detriment; petitioner was prevented from proving a fact
clearly relevant to his defense, and the trial judge, advising
petitioner of his privilege against self-incrimination, made
reference in the presence of the jury to petitioner's criminal
record. Petitioner's subsequent application to the State Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming a denial of federal
constitutional right on his trial, was denied.
Held:
1. The federal question was adequately raised, and the case is
properly considered here on its merits. P.
337 U. S.
779.
(a) Reliance on the Sixth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment
in the habeas corpus petition was not fatal, since meticulousness
in procedural allegations is not essential in a habeas corpus
proceeding. P.
337 U. S.
779.
(b) It appears that habeas corpus was a proper method of testing
the constitutionality of the conviction, and that it was within the
original jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. P.
337 U. S.
779.
2. The facts of the case, particularly the occurrences at the
trial, sufficiently show that petitioner was handicapped by lack of
counsel to such an extent that he was denied a fair trial contrary
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
337 U. S.
774-778,
337 U. S.
780-782.
Reversed.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an original proceeding,
denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. This
Court granted certiorari, 335 U.S.
Page 337 U. S. 774
867, and appointed a member of the Bar of this Court to serve as
counsel for the petitioner. 335 U.S. 895.
Reversed and
remanded, p.
337 U. S.
782.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises the question whether, under the circumstances
of petitioner's trial for larceny in a state court without counsel,
Pennsylvania deprived him of a federal constitutional right
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Petitioner, a man in his thirties, was arrested in Pennsylvania
in 1947 for the larceny of certain clothing and other personal
effects allegedly belonging to one James Blades. Upon the return of
an indictment, he pleaded not guilty, was tried before a jury which
found him guilty, and was sentenced to a term of two and one-half
to five years in the penitentiary. The record shows neither a
request for counsel by the petitioner nor an offer of counsel by
the court. Petitioner conducted his own defense.
On May 24, 1948, Gibbs filed in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania a petition for habeas corpus in which he alleged his
arrest, trial, conviction, and sentence, and in which he also
stated that he "was denied counsel, and, through ignorance of law
and fact, was forced to act as his own counsel," and that he "was
denied his constitutional Rights as set forth in the Ten Original
Amendments, Article VI." Upon the issuance of a rule to show cause,
respondent answered, admitting the formal allegations
Page 337 U. S. 775
and the fact of trial and sentence, but alleging the following
concerning the denial of right to counsel:
"The transcript of the notes of testimony taken in the matter
does not disclose that the relator demanded counsel, nor requested
that counsel be appointed to represent him. . . . It is also
averred by way of answer that the relator's examination of
witnesses and questions asked during the course of the trial fully
disclosed his familiarity with legal process in the criminal
courts."
The answer also attached a transcript of the proceedings at the
trial and a transcript of petitioner's criminal record. It showed
eight convictions and nine acquittals, discharges, and no true
bills. On July 6, 1948, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied
the writ. As the allegations of the petition raised grave doubts as
to whether petitioner had been accorded due process in his trial,
we granted the motion for leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari. 335 U.S.
867
James Blades, the prosecuting witness, Mrs. Lafield, his mother,
Constable Fleming, the arresting officer, and James Silverstein, a
second-hand dealer, testified for the state. Briefly summarized,
their testimony tended to prove that petitioner came to Blades'
home on the morning of the alleged theft, looked in Blades' room,
where the stolen articles were in plain view, and, finding Blades
absent, departed. When Blades returned home that day, he noticed
that the articles were missing from his room, and, upon learning
from his mother that Gibbs had been there, he notified the police.
He and Constable Fleming found some of the missing articles in a
pawnshop, and found the petitioner in a taproom wearing Blades' hat
and watch. Later, Blades' wallet was found in the jail cell in
which petitioner was incarcerated. Silverstein, the second-hand
dealer in the pawnshop, testified that Gibbs had brought the
missing clothing in and had sold them to him.
Page 337 U. S. 776
Petitioner, by means of cross-examination, sought to establish
that the articles had been taken, and some of them sold, pursuant
to an understanding between him and Blades.
Several events occurring at the trial are pertinent to
petitioner's claim that failure to appoint counsel violated the
federal Constitution. (1) Considerable inadmissible hearsay and
otherwise incompetent evidence was allowed to go in without
objection by Gibbs. [
Footnote
1] (2) When petitioner recalled the prosecuting witness Blades
for further cross-examination, the trial judge accepted the
prosecutor's suggestion and made Blades the petitioner's witness
for the purpose of the unfavorable testimony then elicited.
[
Footnote 2] Thus, he made this
testimony binding on the
Page 337 U. S. 777
petitioner, although the Pennsylvania rule would seem to be that
an adverse witness can be so examined and yet remain the witness of
the opposing party. [
Footnote
3] (3) Although, as we have already noted, petitioner attempted
to defend himself on the ground that he took and sold the articles
pursuant to an agreement with the prosecuting witness, he was
prevented from proving a fact clearly relevant to that defense,
[
Footnote 4]
i.e.,
that Blades had previously made a baseless criminal charge against
him under similar circumstances. [
Footnote 5] (4) The trial judge also advised petitioner,
in the presence of the jury, so far as the record shows, as to his
opportunity to avail himself of the privilege against
self-incrimination which was his under Pennsylvania law. In doing
so, he made reference to possible past convictions. [
Footnote 6] So to require him to claim his
constitutional
Page 337 U. S. 778
safeguard in the presence of the jury was, petitioner claims, a
violation of Pennsylvania law.
Cf. Philadelphia v. Cline,
158 Pa.Super. 179, 185, 44 A.2d 610;
Commonwealth v.
Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 A. 828. Respondent does not claim
otherwise. The information given by the judge as to past
convictions could have been given by a lawyer to the petitioner
beyond the jury's hearing. (5) Finally, when sentencing petitioner,
the judge used language which, it is claimed, evinced a hostile and
thoroughly unjudicial attitude. [
Footnote 7]
Page 337 U. S. 779
Two procedural points require but brief attention. The federal
question was adequately if inartistically raised in the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. We consider insignificant under these
circumstances the fact that petitioner cited the Sixth, rather than
the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution. [
Footnote 8] Meticulous insistence upon regularity
in procedural allegations is foreign to the purpose of habeas
corpus. [
Footnote 9] The state
does not contest the propriety of a considerations of the case on
its merits. [
Footnote 10]
Thus, it apparently concedes that habeas corpus was a proper method
of testing the constitutionality of the conviction, and that it was
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. [
Footnote
11]
Page 337 U. S. 780
Since it is clear that a failure to request counsel does not
constitute a waiver when the defendant does not know of his right
to counsel,
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.
S. 437, we proceed to the merits. We consider this case
on the theory upheld in
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.
S. 455, that the Constitution does not guarantee to
every person charged with a serious crime in a state court the
right to the assistance of counsel regardless of the circumstances.
Betts v. Brady rejected the contention that the Fourteenth
Amendment automatically afforded such protection. In so doing,
however, it did not, of course, hold or intimate that counsel was
never required in noncapital cases in state courts in order to
satisfy the necessity for basic fairness which is formulated in
that Amendment.
There have been made to this Court without avail arguments based
on the long practice as to counsel in state courts to convince us
that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may refuse to furnish
counsel even when needed by the accused in serious felonies other
than capital. Our decisions have been that, where the ignorance,
youth, or other incapacity of the defendant made a trial without
counsel unfair, the defendant is deprived of his liberty contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 12] Counsel necessary for his adequate defense
would be lacking.
Respondent argues that to hold to such precedents leaves the
state prosecuting authorities uncertain as to whether to offer
counsel to all accused who are without adequate funds and under
serious charges in state courts. We cannot offer a panacea for the
difficulty. Such an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
would be an unwarranted federal intrusion into state control of
Page 337 U. S. 781
its criminal procedure. The due process clause is not
susceptible to reduction to a mathematical formula. [
Footnote 13]
Furthermore, the fair conduct of a trial depends largely on the
wisdom and understanding of the trial judge. He knows the
essentials of a fair trial. The primary duty falls on him to
determine the accused's need of counsel at arraignment and during
trial. He may guide a defendant without a lawyer past the errors
that make trials unfair.
Cf. Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
supra. Failure to protect properly the rights of one accused
of serious offenses is unusual. Obviously a fair trial test
necessitates an appraisal before and during the trial of the facts
of each case to determine whether the need for counsel is so great
that the deprivation of the right to counsel works a fundamental
unfairness. The recent discussion of the problem in
Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, supra, makes further elaboration unnecessary. We
think that the facts of this case, particularly the events
occurring at the trial, reveal, in the light of that opinion and
the precedents there cited, that petitioner was handicapped by lack
of counsel to such an extent that his constitutional right to a
fair trial was denied. This case is of the type referred to in
Betts v. Brady, supra, at
316 U. S. 473,
as lacking fundamental fairness because neither counsel nor
adequate judicial guidance or protection was furnished at the
trial.
A defendant who pleads not guilty and elects to go to trial is
usually more in need of the assistance of a lawyer than is one who
pleads guilty. The record in this case evidences petitioner's
helplessness, without counsel and without more assistance from the
judge, in defending himself against this charge of larceny. We take
no note of the tone of the comments at the time of the
Page 337 U. S. 782
sentence. The trial was over. The questionable issues allowed to
pass unnoticed as to procedure, evidence, privilege, and
instructions detailed in the first part of this opinion demonstrate
to us that petitioner did not have a trial that measures up to the
test of fairness prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur in the judgment
of the Court. They think that
Betts v. Brady should be
overruled. If that case is to be followed, however, they agree with
the Court's opinion insofar as it holds that petitioner is entitled
to relief under the
Betts v. Brady doctrine.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE concur in the
result.
[
Footnote 1]
"
Blades: Then she [witness' mother] tells me about his
[petitioner's] being there."
"
Constable Fleming: I got a telephone call from the
Chief of Police, Mr. Miller, to go up to Mrs. Lafield's to
investigate a robbery that occurred there. . . . I asked Jim where
was the suitcase. He said, the suitcase was by the bed. . . ."
"I went to three pawnshops, and they gave me a description of
Edward Gibbs. . . ."
The District Attorney's unsworn offer of proof concerning the
missing articles was as follows:
"Mr. Johnson: I want to offer into evidence the wallet, the
watch, which were identified and found -- the watch was found in
the possession of the defendant. This wallet, containing the papers
of Mr. Blades, which was found in the jail cell that had been
occupied by the defendant."
"The Court: What about the radio?"
"Mr. Johnson: It has been recovered and returned to the
owner."
[
Footnote 2]
"The Defendant: May I call the prosecutor [Blades] back on the
stand?"
"Mr. Johnson: He desires to call the prosecutor as his
witness."
In his charge to the jury, the judge said with reference to this
episode:
"As he has presented no evidence of his own, except having
called Mr. Blades and certain questions were asked Mr. Blades and
certain answers made; that is the only evidence he presented."
[
Footnote 3]
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361, 362-363, 110 A.
158;
Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 476, 37 A.
521.
[
Footnote 4]
Commonwealth v. Farrel, 187 Pa. 408, 423-424, 41 A.
382;
see 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) ยง 950.
[
Footnote 5]
"Q. Last fall, last year, didn't you wreck your own automobile
and enter a complaint that I stole your car and wrecked it?"
"Mr. Johnson: Objected to."
"The Court: Objection sustained. It has nothing to do with this
case."
"The Defendant: All right."
[
Footnote 6]
"The Court: Now then, Gibbs, you may, if you want to, take the
stand and say anything you want to say, but I warn you -- if you
do, if you have any record of any prior conviction, any felonies or
any misdemeanors in the nature of what we call
crimen
falsi, the commonwealth may offer the record of any
convictions you may have had. I am warning you in advance. You may,
however, take the stand and testify, or you may refuse to take the
stand, and, if you do refuse to take the stand, the Commonwealth
and the court may not comment unfavorably about your failure to
take the stand and testify. I want to warn you fully before you do
take the stand."
"Do you want to take the stand?"
"The Defendant: No, I don't have anything to say in court."
[
Footnote 7]
"By the Court: "
"Q. Gibbs, do you have anything to say before we impose
sentence?"
"A. No, I guess not."
"Q. How long have you been in jail?"
"A. Two months and a half."
"Q. What is the matter with you; why can't you keep out of
trouble?"
"A. I don't know, sir."
"Q. You don't know why you can't do it? What do you do, get
drunk or something, or are you just ornery?"
"Mr. Johnson: Don't you think this man would be better if he
were sent to the Eastern Penitentiary?"
"By the Court:"
"Q. Do you realize you can be put away for the rest of your
life?"
"A. (No answer.)"
"The Court: It is a wonder the district attorney doesn't indict
you for it. You can be indicted."
"Mr. Johnson: If he comes back again, I will take it as my
personal job to indict him."
"The Court: In 1928, you were found guilty of burglary, larceny,
receiving stolen goods, before Judge Fronefield -- one to two
years, county jail. In 1931, plead guilty to larceny -- $100 fine
and costs, one to two years, Judge MacDade. 1932, found guilty of
larceny and receiving stolen goods, $50 fine and costs, six months
to three years in county jail, Judge Morrow. That is three. 1934
larceny, found guilty, $100 fine and costs, six months to three
years in county jail; sentenced to one year in county jail for
violation of parole; Judge Fronefield. That is four. 1937,
receiving stolen goods, $10 fine and costs, one to three years
county jail, sentence suspended by Judge MacDade. That is five.
1938, larceny; found guilty, one and half to three years county
jail, Judge Crichton. I don't believe there is anyone you missed up
to now. You were before me a year ago. No, just last March. You
beat that, not guilty. Now, here you are the seventh time."
"All I can do is give him two and a half to five years, if you
don't want to indict these fourth offenders."
"
Sentence"
"On No. 417 September Sessions 1947, the sentence of the court
is that you undergo imprisonment in the Eastern State Penitentiary
at solitary confinement and hard labor for two and a half to five
years and stand committed until this sentence be complied with. If
I could give you life, I would do it."
"Take him away."
[
Footnote 8]
Cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.
S. 266,
334 U. S. 292,
and cases there cited.
[
Footnote 9]
Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485,
323 U. S.
487.
[
Footnote 10]
Respondent's brief states:
"The issue now to be determined is whether he was properly
charged with the offense, tried, convicted and sentenced, under the
laws of the Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States,
more particularly the portion of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .
."
[
Footnote 11]
See Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41,
24 A.2d 1;
Commonwealth ex rel. Penland v. Ashe, 341 Pa.
337, 19 A.2d 464.
[
Footnote 12]
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.
S. 437,
335 U. S.
441.
[
Footnote 13]
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455;
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640,
333 U. S. 676;
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736,
334 U. S.
739.