Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), incorporated in the revision of the
Judicial Code effective September 1, 1948, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is made applicable to actions under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Ex parte Collett,
ante, p.
337 U. S. 55. Pp.
337 U. S.
75-78.
Motion denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a Federal District Court in which an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act had been brought
transferred it to a District Court in another District. Petitioner
moved in this Court for leave to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari or a writ of mandamus or any appropriate relief. The
case was assigned for hearing on the motion. 335 U.S. 897.
Motion denied, p.
337
U. S. 78.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON, delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This litigation has a rather involved history. In 1946, while in
the employ of respondent railroad, petitioner
Page 337 U. S. 76
was seriously injured in an accident at Big Spring, Texas.
Petitioner promptly brought suit under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act [
Footnote 1] in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. That court dismissed the action on the ground that the
railroad could not properly be served in that district.
72 F. Supp.
635 (1947). Petitioner appealed from this dismissal, and, some
days after taking the appeal, instituted an action in the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas. An answer was filed in
the latter action, and a number of depositions were taken.
In March, 1948, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the railroad was subject to service in New York. 166 F.2d 788.
Thereupon petitioner moved to dismiss his Texas action. When the
district court refused to dismiss, petitioner appealed and also
applied for a writ of prohibition to the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. That court declined to issue the writ. 167 F.2d 471
(1948). In No. 275, petitioner requests this Court to issue a writ
of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals action. And, in No.
119 Misc., we are asked to issue a writ of prohibition directing
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas not to
proceed with the trial. We are advised that counsel have arranged
that further progress of the Texas trial shall be held in abeyance
pending our decision. We are this day denying those petitions;
see 337 U.S. 912.
When the New York cause was returned to the district court,
after we had denied the railroad's petition for certiorari to
review the court of appeals' determination that it might be sued
there, 335 U.S. 814 (1948), petitioner moved for a preference in
the order of trial. The court below, the United States District
Court for the Southern
Page 337 U. S. 77
District of New York, denied this motion. Respondent filed a
cross-motion for an order transferring the action to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. This
motion was granted. The order of transfer relies on the authority
of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), [
Footnote
2] and cites
Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.
Co., 79 F. Supp.
821 (1948), and
Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.
Co., 80 F. Supp.
745 (1948). To nullify this order, petitioner moved this Court
for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari or a writ of
mandamus or any appropriate relief. We assigned the case for
hearing on the motion for leave to file.
Ex parte Collett,
335 U.S. 897 (1948).
In support of his motion, petitioner, urges that the general
purposes of the 1948 revision of Title 28 by the Congress indicate
no intention to "emasculate" the right to choose venue afforded
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act; that "any civil
action," as used in § 1404(a) of the Code, refers only to civil
actions specified in the Venue Chapter of Title 28, §§ 1391-1406,
inclusive, and that the court below "ignored the known temper of
legislative opinion" as revealed chiefly by Congressional action on
the Jennings Bill.
We fail to see anything in these contentions which can
distinguish this case from
Ex parte Collett, decided this
day,
ante, p.
337 U. S. 55. In
that opinion, we have demonstrated that the venue provisions of § 6
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act are one thing, and the
transfer provisions of § 1404(a) of the present Judicial Code
another, that "any civil action" means what it says, and that
Congress was fully informed as to the significance
Page 337 U. S. 78
of § 1404(a). For these reasons, we conclude that the District
Court for the Southern District of New York acted within its
statutory authority. The motion must be
Denied.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent for the
reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in
United States v. National City Lines, 337 U. S.
78.
[
Footnote 1]
35 Stat. 65, as amended by 36 Stat. 291, and 53 Stat. 1404, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-59.
[
Footnote 2]
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
This provision became effective Sept. 1, 1948. Act of June 25,
1948, 62 Stat. 869, 992, § 38.