1. Convicted in an Illinois circuit court and sentenced to
prison, petitioner applied to the same court for habeas corpus,
claiming denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. His
petition was denied without a hearing on the ground that it was
"insufficient in law and substance." On review here, the State
Attorney General conceded that the petition raised substantial
federal questions; argued that habeas corpus was not an appropriate
remedy under state law when the petition was denied; but admitted
that it probably is an appropriate remedy under "announcements"
contained in subsequent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court,
though other Illinois trial courts have continued to deny habeas
corpus on procedural grounds.
Held: the order denying habeas corpus is vacated, and
the cause is remanded for consideration of the present
applicability of that remedy in the light of the State Supreme
Court's "announcement" in
People v. Lofts, 400 Ill. 432,
81 N.E.2d 495, and other relevant Illinois decisions. Pp.
337 U. S.
236-240.
(a) More than a question of state procedure is involved when a
state court of last resort closes the door to any consideration of
a claim of denial of a federal right. P.
337 U. S.
238.
(b) The doctrine that federal courts will not grant habeas
corpus to prisoners under judgments of state courts until all state
remedies have been exhausted,
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.
S. 114, presupposes the existence of some adequate
remedy under state law. Pp.
337 U. S.
238-239.
Page 337 U. S. 236
2. The orders in seven other cases in which Illinois courts had
denied habeas corpus without hearings are likewise vacated and
remanded for similar consideration. P.
337 U. S.
240.
Orders vacated, and causes remanded.
In No. 50, an Illinois trial court denied without a hearing a
petition for habeas corpus raising substantial questions under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court granted
certiorari. 334 U.S. 810. It also granted certiorari in No. 760
(336 U.S. 966), and now grants certiorari in the six other cases.
Orders vacated, and causes remanded, p.
337 U. S.
240.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are once again faced with the recurring problem of
determining what, if any, is the appropriate post-trial procedure
in Illinois by which claims of infringement of federal rights may
be raised.
See Woods v.
Nierstheimer,
Page 337 U. S. 237
328 U. S. 211;
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561;
Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U. S. 804. In
1946, petitioner pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with
having committed burglary and larceny, and was sentenced to five to
seven years imprisonment. A year later, he filed a petition for a
writ or habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Randolph County,
Illinois, the sentencing court, containing allegations which, if
true, raise substantial questions under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Attorney General of Illinois concedes
that petitioner is entitled to a hearing into the truth or falsity
of the charges. The court to which the petit on for a writ of
habeas corpus was directed denied the petition without holding a
hearing, however, for the reason that it "is insufficient in law
and substance." We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari,
334 U.S. 810, to consider the question thus presented.
The Attorney General explains the circuit court's denial of the
petition for the writ as based upon state procedural grounds: that
habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy for the relief of
denials of due process. He contends, however, that, while the
circuit court was correct in its interpretation of Illinois law
when it denied the petition, certain statements in the Illinois
Supreme Court's opinions in
People v. Loftus, 400 Ill.
432, 81 N.E.2d 495;
People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 174, 79
N.E.2d 200, and
People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437, 78 N.E.2d
514, all of which were handed down subsequent to the circuit
court's denial of relief, strongly indicate that habeas corpus
would now be the appropriate Illinois procedure in a case such as
the one before us. His contention is, in other words, that, while
the petition for habeas corpus was properly denied when acted upon
below, the decisions just cited probably broaden the scope of
habeas corpus in Illinois, so that a denial of a hearing would be
erroneous if the petition were again presented to the circuit
court.
Page 337 U. S. 238
The situation is further complicated, however, by the fact that
many circuit courts, whose decision upon habeas corpus are
unreviewable by the state supreme court under Illinois law, have
continued to deny petitions for habeas corpus on procedural grounds
since the supreme court's "announcement" in
People v. Loftus,
supra. The Attorney General's position concerning these
denials, as we understand it, is that these decisions may be wrong,
depending upon whether his interpretation of the
Loftus
"announcement" is the correct one, but that, whether right or
wrong, they are decisions solely upon a question of Illinois
procedural law, and thus do not warrant invocation of the
jurisdiction of this Court.
Of course, we do not review decisions which rest upon adequate
nonfederal grounds, and, of course, Illinois may choose the
procedure it deems appropriate for the vindication of federal
rights.
Loftus v. Illinois, supra. But it is not simply a
question of state procedure when a state court of last resort
closes the door to any consideration of a claim of denial of a
federal right. And that is the effect of the denials of habeas
corpus in a number of cases now before this Court, for in none of
the cases does the Attorney General suggest that either of the
other two Illinois post-trial remedies, writ of error and
coram
nobis, is appropriate. Unless habeas corpus is available,
therefore, we are led to believe that Illinois offers no post-trial
remedy in cases of this kind. The doctrine of exhaustion of state
remedies, to which this Court has required the scrupulous adherence
of all federal courts,
see Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.
S. 114, [
Footnote 1]
and cases
Page 337 U. S. 239
cited, presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists. We
recognize the difficulties with which the Illinois Supreme Court is
faced in adapting available state procedures to the requirement
that prisoners be given some clearly defined method by which they
may raise claims of denial of federal rights. Nevertheless, that
requirement must be met. If there is now no post-trial procedure by
which federal rights may be vindicated in Illinois, we wish to be
advised of that fact upon remand of this case.
Seven other petitions for certiorari which raise substantial
questions under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
are now before this Court following denials of habeas corpus by
Illinois circuit courts or the Criminal Court of Cook County. In
none of these cases was a hearing held or the petitioner permitted
to submit proof of the truth of his allegations. In three
instances, the denial of habeas corpus occurred prior to the
supreme court's "announcement" in
People v. Loftus, supra,
as was true in the case of Young. A similar disposition of these
petitions is therefore required.
Four petitions for certiorari involve denials of habeas corpus
subsequent to the
Loftus "announcement." It may well be
that these decisions represent the opinion of four Illinois circuit
judges that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy under
Illinois law despite the
Loftus opinion. Out of an
abundance of caution, we have concluded, however, that these cases
should also be remanded
Page 337 U. S. 240
to the state courts, since it is possible that the
Loftus "announcement" was not brought to their attention,
or its possible significance pointed out. As in the other cases, we
wish to be advised, if a hearing is again denied, whether the court
is of the opinion that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy
in Illinois in cases raising questions under the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, the order denying the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in No. 50,
Young v. Ragen, is vacated, and the
cause remanded for consideration of the present applicability of
habeas corpus in the light of the supreme court's "announcement" in
People v. Loftus, supra, and other relevant Illinois
decisions. The petitions for certiorari in No. 47, Misc.,
Evans
v. Nierstheimer; in No. 106, Misc.,
Willis v. Ragen;
in No. 109, Misc.,
Thompson v. Ragen; in No. 184, Misc.,
Lewis v. Ragen; in No. 372, Misc.,
Sherman v.
Ragen, and in No. 374, Misc.,
Banks v. Nierstheimer,
are granted. The orders denying petitions for writs of habeas
corpus in these cases, together with that in No. 265, Misc.,
Smith v. Ragen, [
Footnote
2] are vacated, and the causes remanded for similar
consideration.
Orders will be entered accordingly.
* Together with No. 47, Misc.,
Evans v. Nierstheimer,
on certiorari to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois;
No. 106, Misc.,
Willis v. Ragen; No. 109, Misc.,
Thompson v. Ragen; No. 184, Misc.,
Lewis v.
Ragen, and No. 372, Misc.,
Sherman v. Ragen, all on
certiorari to the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois; No. 265,
Misc.,
Smith v. Ragen, and No. 374, Misc.,
Banks v.
Nierstheimer, both on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Will
County, Illinois.
[
Footnote 1]
Existing law as declared by
Ex parte Hawk was made a
part of the statute by the new Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. ยง 2254,
which provides:
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available state corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner."
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise,
by any available procedure, the question presented."
[
Footnote 2]
Certiorari granted, 336 U.S. 966.