In the circumstances of this case, the cause is continued for an
appropriate period to enable this Court to be advised without
ambiguity whether the state supreme court intended to rest its
judgment herein on an adequate independent state ground or whether
decision of the claim of denial of federal constitutional right was
necessary to the judgment rendered. Pp.
334 U. S.
804-806.
Petitioner, by an original writ of error in the state supreme
court, challenged the validity of four judgments of conviction in a
circuit court of the State. The state supreme court affirmed the
judgments. 395 Ill. 479, 70 N.E.2d 573. This Court granted
certiorari. 333 U.S. 831. Cause continued, pp.
334 U. S.
805-806.
PER CURIAM.
By way of an original writ of error in the Supreme Court of
Illinois, petitioner challenged the validity of four convictions in
circuit court of that State. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the judgments, 395 Ill. 479, 70 N.E.2d 573. We brought the case
here, 333 U.S. 831, because of a serious claim that petitioner was
denied the assistance of counsel under circumstances which
constitute a disregard of the safeguards to which he was entitled
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Illinois Supreme Court disposed of this claim on the basis
of the requirements of Illinois law. If the Illinois
Page 334 U. S. 805
decision was an adjudication of the rights to which the
petitioner was entitled under the Due Process Clause, we would be
constrained to hold that he had brought himself within our
governing decisions. In his oral argument here, however, the
Attorney General of the State insisted that the circumstances on
which petitioner relies in claiming denial of a right under the
United States Constitution were not properly before the Supreme
Court of Illinois on the Illinois writ of error, but must be
pursued in Illinois by habeas corpus. The Attorney General relies
for his view of the local law upon two recent opinions of the
Illinois Supreme Court,
People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437, 78
N.E.2d 514, and
People v. Shoffner, 79 N.E.2d 200. Both
these opinions certainly recognize that the right to counsel of
indigent accused may, under relevant circumstances, be part of the
due process which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
If, as a matter of local procedure, Illinois chooses to allow a
federal rights, such as the present record presents, to be
vindicated by habeas corpus in its Illinois scope, but does not
make available the Illinois writ of error, that is for Illinois to
say, and not for us to deny.
Even though our reading of the record and of Illinois law might
give us a different understanding, we have had too great difficulty
in ascertaining what is the appropriate Illinois procedure for
raising claims of infringement of federal rights to reject the
Attorney General's submission regarding Illinois procedural law.
See, e.g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.
S. 561. If the Attorney General is correct and
petitioner sought to raise even a valid federal claim by way of an
unavailable Illinois remedy, we have, of course, a judgment that
rests on a nonfederal ground, calling for dismissal of our writ. In
this state of uncertainty, we follow our precedent in
Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117.
See also Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431.
Accordingly, we shall continue this cause for an appropriate
period to enable us to be advised without ambiguity
Page 334 U. S. 806
whether the Illinois Supreme Court intended to rest the judgment
herein on an adequate independent State ground or whether decision
of the claim under the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to the
judgment rendered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS are of the opinion
that the judgment should be reversed.