In a suit between residents of the state, a Massachusetts court
granted a wife separate support and denied her husband a divorce.
The husband went to Nevada and sued for divorce there as soon as he
had been there the six weeks required by Nevada law. The wife
appeared personally and by counsel, filed a cross-complaint for
divorce, admitted the husband's Nevada residence, and participated
personally in the proceedings. After full opportunity to try the
jurisdictional issues, the Nevada court found that it had
jurisdiction and granted the wife a divorce, which was valid and
final under Nevada law. The husband then married again and returned
to Massachusetts, whereupon his ex-wife petitioned the
Massachusetts court to adjudge him in contempt for failing to make
payments for her separate support under its earlier decree. She
also moved that the support decree be modified so as to award her a
larger allowance. The husband defended on the ground of the Nevada
divorce. The Massachusetts court held the Nevada divorce void for
want of jurisdiction and increased the first wife's allowance for
separate support. Its opinion contained no intimation that, under
state law, the decree for separate support would survive if the
Nevada divorce were valid.
Held: by subjecting the Nevada decree to collateral
attack, the Massachusetts court denied it full faith and credit,
contrary to Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution and the Act of May 26,
1790, 28 U.S.C. § 687.
See Sherrer v. Sherrer, ante, p.
334 U. S. 343. Pp.
334 U. S.
379-384.
320 Mass. 295, 69 N.E.2d 93, reversed.
A Massachusetts probate court denied a divorce to a resident of
that state and granted separate support to his wife. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. 313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d
1017. He went to Nevada and sued for a divorce. His wife appeared
personally and filed a cross-complaint. The Nevada court found that
it had jurisdiction, and granted the wife a divorce. Upon the
husband's return to Massachusetts,
Page 334 U. S. 379
the wife petitioned the probate court there to adjudge him in
contempt for failure to make payments for her support under its
earlier decree. She also moved for an increase in her allowance
under the support decree. Upon proof of the Nevada divorce, the
probate court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed. 316 Mass. 423, 55 N.E.2d 702. After
hearings on the issue of domicile, the probate court held the
Nevada divorce void for want of jurisdiction and increased the
wife's allowance for support. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed. 320 Mass. 295, 69 N.E.2d 793. This Court
granted certiorari. 330 U.S. 814.
Reversed, p.
334 U. S.
384.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the companion case to
Sherrer v. Sherrer, ante,
p.
334 U. S. 3 43. We
granted certiorari to consider the contention of petitioner that
the courts of Massachusetts have failed to accord full faith and
credit to a decree of divorce rendered by a court of the
Nevada.
Petitioner, Martin v. B. Coe, and the respondent, Katherine C.
Coe, were married in New York in 1934, and thereafter resided as
husband and wife in Worcester, Massachusetts. [
Footnote 1] Discord developed between the parties,
and, on January 13, 1942, respondent filed a petition for separate
support in the Probate Court for the County of Worcester.
Petitioner answered and filed a libel for
Page 334 U. S. 380
divorce. Following a hearing, the petition for separate support
was granted, and the libel for divorce was dismissed. [
Footnote 2] The decree of the Probate
Court was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
on February 23, 1943. [
Footnote
3]
Petitioner left Worcester in May, 1942, and arrived in Reno,
Nevada, on June 10, accompanied by his secretary, one Dawn Allen,
and her mother. On July 24, 1942, petitioner, through his attorney,
instituted divorce proceedings by filing a complaint in the First
Judicial District Court of the Nevada. The complaint alleged that
petitioner was a
bona fide resident of the Nevada,
[
Footnote 4] and charged
respondent with desertion and extreme cruelty. Respondent received
notice of the proceedings while in Massachusetts. She arrived in
Nevada in August, 1942, and thereafter, through attorneys, filed an
answer to petitioner's complaint, together with a cross-complaint
for divorce alleging extreme cruelty on the part of petitioner as
grounds for her suit. Respondent's answer admitted as true the
allegations of petitioner's complaint relating to petitioner's
Nevada residence.
At the hearing in the divorce proceedings, petitioner and
respondent appeared personally. Both parties were represented by
counsel. Petitioner testified that he had come to Nevada with the
intention of making that State
Page 334 U. S. 381
his home, and that such was his present intention. Respondent
gave testimony with respect to specific acts of cruelty, but raised
no question in relation to petitioner's domicile. On September 19,
1942, the Nevada court, after finding that it had "jurisdiction of
the plaintiff and defendant and of the subject matter involved,"
[
Footnote 5] entered a decree
granting respondent a divorce as prayed for in her cross-complaint.
[
Footnote 6] Neither party
challenged the decree by appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.
[
Footnote 7]
Following the entry of the divorce decree, petitioner and Dawn
Allen were married in Nevada. Shortly thereafter, they returned to
Worcester, Massachusetts, as husband and wife. In May or June,
1943, they left Massachusetts for Nevada, where they remained until
August of that year.
On May 22, 1943, respondent filed a petition in the Probate
Court for the County of Worcester, praying that petitioner be
adjudged in contempt of court for failing to abide by the terms of
the decree for separate support which had been entered by the
Massachusetts court in the previous year. [
Footnote 8] Subsequently, respondent also moved that
the decree for separate support be modified so as
Page 334 U. S. 382
to award her a larger allowance. Petitioner in his answer denied
that the decree for separate support was still in effect, and set
up the Nevada divorce decree as a bar to respondent's action.
In the hearings which followed, petitioner introduced in
evidence an exemplified copy of the Nevada court proceeding. The
presiding judge refused to allow the introduction of evidence
placing in issue petitioner's Nevada domicile, and thereby the
jurisdiction of the Nevada court, on the ground that permitting
such collateral attack was not consistent with the requirements of
full faith and credit. Petitioner's motion to dismiss the action
was, accordingly, allowed.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed on appeal,
holding that the Probate Court had erred in excluding the evidence
placing in issue petitioner's Nevada domicile and the jurisdiction
of the Nevada court. [
Footnote
9] In conformity with that judgment, the Probate Court held an
extended hearing on those questions. [
Footnote 10] The court concluded that petitioner went to
Nevada to seek a divorce; that neither petitioner nor respondent
had a
bona fide residence in that State; that the Nevada
court did not have jurisdiction of either party, and that the
divorce was in violation of the provisions of the applicable
Page 334 U. S. 383
Massachusetts statute. [
Footnote 11] The Probate Court dismissed petitioner's
motion for revocation of the decree for separate support, and
modified that decree so as to award respondent a substantially
larger allowance. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
the order of the Probate Court dismissing petitioner's motion to
revoke the decree for separate support on the ground that the
evidence supported the conclusion that petitioner was never
domiciled in Nevada, and that the Nevada courts lacked jurisdiction
to enter the decree of divorce. The order of the Probate Court
modifying the decree for separate support was reversed, apparently
for further hearings on petitioner's financial condition. [
Footnote 12] There is no suggestion
in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court that petitioner, under
state law, could be held to the obligations imposed by the decree
for separate support if it be conceded that the Nevada decree of
divorce is valid. [
Footnote
13]
It is clear that the decree of divorce in question is valid and
final in the State in which it was rendered, and, under the law of
Nevada, may not be subjected to the collateral attack permitted in
this case in the Massachusetts courts. [
Footnote 14] Respondent does not urge the
contrary.
Page 334 U. S. 384
Nor has it been suggested that the proceedings before the Nevada
court were in any degree violative of the requirements of
procedural due process, or that respondent was denied a full
opportunity to contest the issue of petitioner's Nevada
domicile.
It is abundantly clear that respondent participated in the
Nevada divorce proceedings. She appeared personally, and gave
testimony at the hearing. Through her attorneys, she filed
pleadings in answer to petitioner's complaint, and successfully
invoked the jurisdiction of the Nevada court to obtain the decree
of divorce which she subsequently subjected to attack as invalid in
the Massachusetts courts.
Thus, here, as in the
Sherrer case, the decree of
divorce is one which was entered after proceedings in which there
was participation by both plaintiff and defendant and in which both
parties were given full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional
issues. It is a decree not susceptible to collateral attack in the
courts of the State in which it was rendered. In the
Sherrer case, we concluded that the requirements of full
faith and credit preclude the courts of a sister State from
subjecting such a decree to collateral attack by readjudicating the
existence of jurisdictional facts. That principle is no less
applicable where, as here, the party initiating the collateral
attack is the party in whose favor the decree was entered. For
reasons stated at length in the
Sherrer case, we hold that
the Massachusetts courts erred in permitting the Nevada divorce
decree to be subjected to attack on the ground that petitioner was
not domiciled in Nevada at the time the decree was entered.
Reversed.
[For dissenting opinion of FRANKFURTER, J., concurred in by
MURPHY, J.,
see ante, p.
334 U. S.
356.]
[
Footnote 1]
It appears that, after October, 1940, petitioner maintained an
apartment in New York City. The Massachusetts courts found that
petitioner did not thereby lose his Massachusetts domicile.
[
Footnote 2]
By the terms of the decree of separate support entered on March
25, 1942, petitioner was ordered to pay to respondent the sum of
$35 each week.
[
Footnote 3]
313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943).
[
Footnote 4]
The first allegation of petitioner's complaint stated:
"That plaintiff, for more than six weeks last past and
immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, has been
continuously and now is a
bona fide resident of, and,
during all of said period of time, has had and now has his
residence within the Nevada, and has been physically, corporally,
and actually present in said State during all of the aforesaid
period of time."
[
Footnote 5]
The Nevada courts recognize domicile of one of the parties as a
prerequisite to divorce jurisdiction,
Latterner v.
Latterner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 P. 194 (1929). Power to decree
divorces in appropriate cases is conferred upon the District Courts
by Nevada statute. Nev.Comp.Laws, § 9460.
[
Footnote 6]
Incorporated into the decree was a written agreement whereby
petitioner was to pay respondent the sum of $7,500 plus $35 per
week so long as she should remain single. Pursuant to this
agreement, petitioner paid the sum of $7,500 at the time the decree
was entered.
[
Footnote 7]
Appeals lie to the Nevada Supreme Court in divorce cases.
See, e.g., Afriat v. Afriat, 61 Nev. 321, 117 P.2d 83
(1941).
[
Footnote 8]
Apparently upon advice of counsel, petitioner had failed to pay
any of the weekly installments required under the decree for
separate support or under the agreement incorporated into the
divorce decree after the date of the divorce decree.
[
Footnote 9]
316 Mass. 423, 55 N.E.2d 702 (1944).
[
Footnote 10]
Petitioner testified that, since his arrival in Nevada in June,
1942, he had been domiciled in that State. He stated that he went
to Nevada to help his asthma and to take advantage of the liberal
tax laws, and that he intended to reside in Nevada whether or not
he obtained a divorce. He testified further that, following his
marriage with Dawn Allen, he went to Worcester, Massachusetts, for
the purpose of disposing of two houses which he owned. He
subsequently returned to Nevada in May, 1943. Petitioner stated
that, shortly after his return to Nevada, he learned that
respondent had instituted contempt proceedings in the Massachusetts
Probate Court, and, upon advice of counsel, went to Massachusetts
in August, 1943, to defend the action.
[
Footnote 11]
Mass.Gen.Laws (Ter. ed.), c. 208, § 39, provides:
"A divorce decreed in another jurisdiction according to the laws
thereof by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both the
parties shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth, but, if
an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another jurisdiction
to obtain a divorce for a cause occurring here while the parties
resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize a divorce by
the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no
force or effect in this commonwealth."
[
Footnote 12]
320 Mass. 295, 69 N . E.2d 793 (1946).
[
Footnote 13]
See Rosa v. Rosa, 296 Mass. 271, 5 N.E.2d 417 (1936);
Cohen v. Cohen, 319 Mass. 31, 64 N.E.2d 689 (1946).
Cf. Estin v. Estin, post, p.
334 U. S. 541;
Kreiger v. Kreiger, post, p.
334 U. S. 555.
[
Footnote 14]
Confer v. District Court, 49 Nev. 18, 234 P. 688, 236
P. 1097 (1925).
And see Chamblin v. Chamblin, 55 Nev. 146,
27 P.2d 1061 (1934);
Calvert v. Callert, 61 Nev. 168, 122
P.2d 426 (1942).