Private agreements to exclude persons of designated race or
color from the use or occupancy of real estate for residential
purposes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment for state courts to enforce them.
Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U. S. 323,
distinguished. Pp.
334 U. S.
8-23.
(a) Such private agreements, standing alone, do not violate any
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
334 U. S.
12-13.
(b) The actions of state courts and judicial officers in their
official capacities are actions of the states within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
334 U. S.
14-18.
(c) In granting judicial enforcement of such private agreements
in these cases, the states acted to deny petitioners the equal
protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
334 U. S.
18-23.
(d) The fact that state courts stand ready to enforce
restrictive covenants excluding white persons from the ownership or
occupancy of property covered by them does not prevent the
enforcement of covenants excluding colored persons from
constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws, since the
rights created by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are guaranteed to
the individual. Pp.
334 U. S.
21-22.
Page 334 U. S. 2
(e) Denial of access to the courts to enforce such restrictive
covenants does not deny equal protection of the laws to the parties
to such agreements. P.
334 U. S. 22.
355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679, and 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638,
reversed.
No. 72. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a judgment of a
state trial court denying enforcement of a private agreement
restricting the use or occupancy of certain real estate to persons
of the Caucasian race. 355 Mo. 814,198 S.W.2d 679. This Court
granted certiorari. 331 U.S. 803.
Reversed, p.
334 U. S. 23.
No. 87. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed a judgment of a
state trial court enjoining violation of a private agreement
restricting the use or occupancy of certain real estate to persons
of the Caucasian race. 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638. This Court
granted certiorari. 331 U.S. 804.
Reversed, p.
334 U. S. 23.
Page 334 U. S. 4
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present for our consideration questions relating to
the validity of court enforcement of private agreements, generally
described as restrictive covenants, which have as their purpose the
exclusion of persons of designated race or color from the ownership
or occupancy of real property. Basic constitutional issues of
obvious importance have been raised.
The first of these cases comes to this Court on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Missouri. On February 16, 1911, thirty out of
a total of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of
Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in the city of
St. Louis, signed an agreement, which was subsequently recorded,
providing in part:
". . . the said property is hereby restricted to the use and
occupancy for the term of Fifty (50) years from this date, so that
it shall be a condition all the time and whether recited and
referred to as [
sic] not in subsequent conveyances and
shall attach to the land as a condition precedent to the sale of
the same, that hereafter no part of said property or any
Page 334 U. S. 5
portion thereof shall be, for said term of Fifty-years, occupied
by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby
to restrict the use of said property for said period of time
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said
property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or
Mongolian Race."
The entire district described in the agreement included
fifty-seven parcels of land. The thirty owners who signed the
agreement held title to forty-seven parcels, including the
particular parcel involved in this case. At the time the agreement
was signed, five of the parcels in the district were owned by
Negroes. One of those had been occupied by Negro families since
1882, nearly thirty years before the restrictive agreement was
executed. The trial court found that owners of seven out of nine
homes on the south side of Labadie Avenue, within the restricted
district and "in the immediate vicinity" of the premises in
question, had failed to sign the restrictive agreement in 1911. At
the time this action was brought, four of the premises were
occupied by Negroes, and had been so occupied for periods ranging
from twenty-three to sixty-three years. A fifth parcel had been
occupied by Negroes until a year before this suit was
instituted.
On August 11, 1945, pursuant to a contract of sale, petitioners
Shelley, who are Negroes, for valuable consideration received from
one Fitzgerald a warranty deed to the parcel in question. [
Footnote 1] The trial court found that
petitioners had no actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement at
the time of the purchase.
Page 334 U. S. 6
On October 9, 1945, respondents, as owners of other property
subject to the terms of the restrictive covenant, brought suit in
the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis praying that petitioners
Shelley be restrained from taking possession of the property and
that judgment be entered divesting title out of petitioners Shelley
and revesting title in the immediate grantor or in such other
person as the court should direct. The trial court denied the
requested relief on the ground that the restrictive agreement, upon
which respondents based their action, had never become final and
complete because it was the intention of the parties to that
agreement that it was not to become effective until signed by all
property owners in the district, and signatures of all the owners
had never been obtained.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, sitting en banc, reversed and
directed the trial court to grant the relief for which respondents
had prayed. That court held the agreement effective and concluded
that enforcement of its provisions violated no rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the Federal Constitution. [
Footnote 2] At the time the court rendered its
decision, petitioners were occupying the property in question.
The second of the cases under consideration comes to this Court
from the Supreme Court of Michigan. The circumstances presented do
not differ materially from the Missouri case. In June, 1934, one
Ferguson and his wife, who then owned the property located in the
city of Detroit which is involved in this case, executed a contract
providing in part:
"This property shall not be used or occupied by any person or
persons except those of the Caucasian race. "
Page 334 U. S. 7
"It is further agreed that this restriction shall not be
effective unless at least eighty percent of the property fronting
on both sides of the street in the block where our land is located
is subjected to this or a similar restriction."
The agreement provided that the restrictions were to remain in
effect until January 1, 1960. The contract was subsequently
recorded, and similar agreements were executed with respect to
eighty percent of the lots in the block in which the property in
question is situated.
By deed dated November 30, 1944, petitioners, who were found by
the trial court to be Negroes, acquired title to the property, and
thereupon entered into its occupancy. On January 30, 1945,
respondents, as owners of property subject to the terms of the
restrictive agreement, brought suit against petitioners in the
Circuit Court of Wayne County. After a hearing, the court entered a
decree directing petitioners to move from the property within
ninety days. Petitioners were further enjoined and restrained from
using or occupying the premises in the future. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, deciding adversely to
petitioners' contentions that they had been denied rights protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 3]
Petitioners have placed primary reliance on their contentions,
first raised in the state courts, that judicial enforcement of the
restrictive agreements in these cases has violated rights
guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution and Acts of Congress passed pursuant to that
Amendment. [
Footnote 4]
Specifically,
Page 334 U. S. 8
petitioners urge that they have been denied the equal protection
of the laws, deprived of property without due process of law, and
have been denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States. We pass to a consideration of those issues.
I
Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive
covenants based on race or color is a question which this Court has
not heretofore been called upon to consider. Only two cases have
been decided by this Court which in any way have involved the
enforcement of such agreements. The first of these was the case of
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323
(1926). There, suit was brought in the courts of the District of
Columbia to enjoin a threatened violation of certain restrictive
covenants relating to lands situated in the city of Washington.
Relief was granted, and the case was brought here on appeal. It is
apparent that that case, which had originated in the federal courts
and involved the enforcement of covenants on land located in the
District of Columbia, could present no issues under the Fourteenth
Amendment, for that Amendment, by its terms, applies only to the
States. Nor was the question of the validity of court enforcement
of the restrictive covenants under the Fifth Amendment properly
before the Court, as the opinion of this Court specifically
recognizes. [
Footnote 5] The
only constitutional issue which the appellants had raised in the
lower courts, and hence the only constitutional issue
Page 334 U. S. 9
before this Court on appeal, was the validity of the covenant
agreements as such. This Court concluded that, since the
inhibitions of the constitutional provisions invoked apply only to
governmental action, as contrasted to action of private
individuals, there was no showing that the covenants, which were
simply agreements between private property owners, were invalid.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial
question. Nothing in the opinion of this Court, therefore, may
properly be regarded as an adjudication on the merits of the
constitutional issues presented by these cases, which raise the
question of the validity not of the private agreements as such, but
of the judicial enforcement of those agreements.
The second of the cases involving racial restrictive covenants
was
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32
(1940). In that case, petitioners, white property owners, were
enjoined by the state courts from violating the terms of a
restrictive agreement. The state Supreme Court had held petitioners
bound by an earlier judicial determination, in litigation in which
petitioners were not parties, upholding the validity of the
restrictive agreement, although, in fact, the agreement had not
been signed by the number of owners necessary to make it effective
under state law. This Court reversed the judgment of the state
Supreme Court upon the ground that petitioners had been denied due
process of law in being held estopped to challenge the validity of
the agreement on the theory, accepted by the state court, that the
earlier litigation, in which petitioners did not participate, was
in the nature of a class suit. In arriving at its result, this
Court did not reach the issues presented by the cases now under
consideration.
It is well, at the outset, to scrutinize the terms of the
restrictive agreements involved in these cases. In the Missouri
case, the covenant declares that no part of the
Page 334 U. S. 10
affected property shall be
"occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being
intended hereby to restrict the use of said property . . . against
the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property
for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian
Race."
Not only does the restriction seek to proscribe use and
occupancy of the affected properties by members of the excluded
class, but, as construed by the Missouri courts, the agreement
requires that title of any person who uses his property in
violation of the restriction shall be divested. The restriction of
the covenant in the Michigan case seeks to bar occupancy by persons
of the excluded class. It provides that "This property shall not be
used or occupied by any person or persons except those of the
Caucasian race."
It should be observed that these covenants do not seek to
proscribe any particular use of the affected properties. Use of the
properties for residential occupancy, as such, is not forbidden.
The restrictions of these agreements, rather, are directed toward a
designated class of persons and seek to determine who may and who
may not own or make use of the properties for residential purposes.
The excluded class is defined wholly in terms of race or color;
"simply that, and nothing more." [
Footnote 6]
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded
by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to
the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee. [
Footnote 7] Thus,
Page 334 U. S. 11
§ 1978 of the Revised Statutes, derived from § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which was enacted by Congress while the
Fourteenth Amendment was also under consideration, [
Footnote 8] provides:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property. [
Footnote
9]"
This Court has given specific recognition to the same principle.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60
(1917).
It is likewise clear that restrictions on the right of occupancy
of the sort sought to be created by the private agreements in these
cases could not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance. We do not
understand respondents to urge the contrary. In the case of
Buchanan v. Warley, supra, a unanimous Court declared
unconstitutional the provisions of a city ordinance which denied to
colored persons the right to occupy houses in blocks in which the
greater number of houses were occupied by white persons, and
imposed similar restrictions on white persons with respect to
blocks in which the greater number of houses were occupied by
colored persons. During the course of the opinion in that case,
this Court stated:
"The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in
furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored
man to acquire
Page 334 U. S. 12
property without state legislation discriminating against him
solely because of color. [
Footnote 10]"
In
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 68
(1927), a unanimous court, on the authority of
Buchanan v.
Warley, supra, declared invalid an ordinance which forbade any
Negro to establish a home on any property in a white community or
any white person to establish a home in a Negro community,
"except on the written consent of a majority of the persons of
the opposite race inhabiting such community or portion of the City
to be affected."
The precise question before this Court in both the
Buchanan and
Harmon cases involved the rights of
white sellers to dispose of their properties free from restrictions
as to potential purchasers based on considerations of race or
color. But that such legislation is also offensive to the rights of
those desiring to acquire and occupy property and barred on grounds
of race or color is clear not only from the language of the opinion
in
Buchanan v. Warley, supra, but from this Court's
disposition of the case of
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.
S. 704 (1930). There, a Negro, barred from the occupancy
of certain property by the terms of an ordinance similar to that,
in the
Buchanan case, sought injunctive relief in the
federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance on the
grounds that its provisions violated the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such relief was granted, and this Court affirmed,
finding the citation of
Buchanan v. Warley, supra, and
Harmon v. Tyler, supra, sufficient to support its
judgment. [
Footnote 11]
But the present cases, unlike those just discussed, do not
involve action by state legislatures or city councils.
Page 334 U. S. 13
Here, the particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in
which the restrictions are to operate are determined, in the first
instance, by the terms of agreements among private individuals.
Participation of the State consists in the enforcement of the
restrictions so defined. The crucial issue with which we are here
confronted is whether this distinction removes these cases from the
operation of the prohibitory provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Since the decision of this Court in the
Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883),
the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law
that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of
the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. [
Footnote 12]
We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements,
standing alone, cannot be regarded as violative of any rights
guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as
the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary
adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been
no action by the State, and the provisions of the Amendment have
not been violated.
Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, supra.
But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes
of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by
state courts of the restrictive
Page 334 U. S. 14
terms of the agreements. The respondents urge that judicial
enforcement of private agreements does not amount to state action,
or, in any event, the participation of the State is so attenuated
in character as not to amount to state action within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it is suggested, even if the
States in these cases may be deemed to have acted in the
constitutional sense, their action did not deprive petitioners of
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We move to a
consideration of these matters.
II
That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their
official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition which has
long been established by decisions of this Court. That principle
was given expression in the earliest cases involving the
construction of the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313,
100 U. S. 318
(1880), this Court stated:
"It is doubtless true that a State may act through different
agencies, either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities, and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to all
action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether
it be action by one of these agencies or by another."
In
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
100 U. S. 347
(1880), the Court observed: "A State acts by its legislative, its
executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other
way." In the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.
3,
109 U. S. 11, 17
(1883), this Court pointed out that the Amendment makes void "State
action of every kind" which is inconsistent with the guaranties
therein contained, and extends to manifestations of "State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive
proceedings." Language to like effect is employed
Page 334 U. S. 15
no less than eighteen times during the course of that opinion.
[
Footnote 13]
Similar expressions, giving specific recognition to the fact
that judicial action is to be regarded as action of the State for
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, are to be found in
numerous cases which have been more recently decided. In
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78,
211 U. S. 90-91
(1908), the Court said: "The judicial act of the highest court of
the State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is
the act of the State." In
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673,
281 U. S. 680
(1930), the Court, through Mr. Justice Brandeis, stated:
"The federal guaranty of due process extends to state action
through its judicial as well as through its legislative, executive
or administrative branch of government."
Further examples of such declarations in the opinions of this
Court are not lacking. [
Footnote
14]
One of the earliest applications of the prohibitions contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment to action of state
Page 334 U. S. 16
judicial officials occurred in cases in which Negroes had been
excluded from jury service in criminal prosecutions by reason of
their race or color. These cases demonstrate, also, the early
recognition by this Court that state action in violation of the
Amendment's provisions is equally repugnant to the constitutional
commands whether directed by state statute or taken by a judicial
official in the absence of statute. Thus, in
Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303
(1880), this Court declared invalid a state statute restricting
jury service to white persons as amounting to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to the colored defendant in that case. In
the same volume of the reports, the Court in
Ex parte Virginia,
supra, held that a similar discrimination imposed by the
action of a state judge denied rights protected by the Amendment,
despite the fact that the language of the state statute relating to
jury service contained no such restrictions.
The action of state courts in imposing penalties or depriving
parties of other substantive rights without providing adequate
notice and opportunity to defend has, of course, long been regarded
as a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,
supra. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1878). [
Footnote
15]
In numerous eases, this Court has reversed criminal convictions
in state courts for failure of those courts to provide the
essential ingredients of a fair hearing. Thus, it has been held
that convictions obtained in state courts under the domination of a
mob are void.
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S.
86 (1923).
And see Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309
(1915). Convictions obtained by
Page 334 U. S. 17
coerced confessions, [
Footnote 16] by the use of perjured testimony known by
the prosecution to be such, [
Footnote 17] or without the effective assistance of
counsel, [
Footnote 18] have
also been held to be exertions of state authority in conflict with
the fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the examples of state judicial action which have been held
by this Court to violate the Amendment's commands are not
restricted to situations in which the judicial proceedings were
found in some manner to be procedurally unfair. It has been
recognized that the action of state courts in enforcing a
substantive common law rule formulated by those courts, may result
in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
even though the judicial proceedings in such cases may have been in
complete accord with the most rigorous conceptions of procedural
due process. [
Footnote 19]
Thus, in
American Federation of Labor v. Swing,
312 U. S. 321
(1941), enforcement by state courts of the common law policy of the
State, which resulted in the restraining of peaceful picketing, was
held to be state action of the sort prohibited by the Amendment's
guaranties of freedom of discussion. [
Footnote 20] In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296
Page 334 U. S. 18
(1940), a conviction in a state court of the common law crime of
breach of the peace was, under the circumstances of the case, found
to be a violation of the Amendment's commands relating to freedom
of religion. In
Bridges v. California, 314 U.
S. 252 (1941), enforcement of the state's common law
rule relating to contempts by publication was held to be state
action inconsistent with the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [
Footnote 21]
And cf. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U. S. 226
(1897).
The short of the matter is that, from the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment until the present, it has been the
consistent ruling of this Court that the action of the States to
which the Amendment has reference includes action of state courts
and state judicial officials. Although, in construing the terms of
the Fourteenth Amendment, differences have from time to time been
expressed as to whether particular types of state action may be
said to offend the Amendment's prohibitory provisions, it has never
been suggested that state court action is immunized from the
operation of those provisions simply because the act is that of the
judicial branch of the state government.
III
Against this background of judicial construction, extending over
a period of some three-quarters of a century, we are called upon to
consider whether enforcement by state courts of the restrictive
agreements in these cases may be deemed to be the acts of those
States, and, if so, whether that action has denied these
petitioners the equal protection of the laws which the Amendment
was intended to insure.
Page 334 U. S. 19
We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases
in the full and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts
disclose that petitioners were willing purchasers of properties
upon which they desired to establish homes. The owners of the
properties were willing sellers, and contracts of sale were
accordingly consummated. It is clear that, but for the active
intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of
state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the
properties in question without restraint.
These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States
have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free
to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are
cases in which the States have made available to such individuals
the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in
premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to
acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell. The difference
between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive
covenants is the difference to petitioners between being denied
rights of property available to other members of the community and
being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal
footing.
The enforcement of the restrictive agreements by the state
courts in these cases was directed pursuant to the common law
policy of the States as formulated by those courts in earlier
decisions. [
Footnote 22] In
the Missouri case, enforcement of the covenant was directed in the
first instance by the highest court of the State after the trial
court had determined the agreement to be invalid for
Page 334 U. S. 20
want of the requisite number of signatures. In the Michigan
case, the order of enforcement by the trial court was affirmed by
the highest state court. [
Footnote 23] The judicial action in each case bears the
clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the State. We have noted that
previous decisions of this Court have established the proposition
that judicial action is not immunized from the operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to the
state's common law policy. [
Footnote 24] Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply
because the particular pattern of discrimination, which the State
has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private
agreement. State action, as that phrase is understood for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state
power in all forms. And when the effect of that action is to deny
rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
the obligation of this Court to enforce the constitutional
commands.
We hold that, in granting judicial enforcement of the
restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied
petitioners the equal protection of the laws, and that, therefore,
the action of the state courts cannot stand. We have noted that
freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of
property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be
effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That such
discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear. Because of the
race or color of these petitioners, they have been denied rights of
ownership or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other
citizens of different race or
Page 334 U. S. 21
color. [
Footnote 25] The
Fourteenth Amendment declares
"that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race,
for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color. [
Footnote 26]"
Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, at
100 U. S. 307.
Only recently, this Court had occasion to declare that a state law
which denied equal enjoyment of property rights to a designated
class of citizens of specified race and ancestry was not a
legitimate exercise of the state's police power, but violated the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws.
Oyama v.
California, 332 U. S. 633
(1948). Nor may the discriminations imposed by the state courts in
these cases be justified as proper exertions of state police power.
[
Footnote 27]
Cf.
Buchanan v. Warley, supra.
Respondents urge, however, that, since the state courts stand
ready to enforce restrictive covenants excluding white persons from
the ownership or occupancy of property covered by such agreements,
enforcement of covenants excluding colored persons may not be
deemed a denial of equal protection of the laws to the colored
persons who are thereby affected. [
Footnote 28] This contention does
Page 334 U. S. 22
not bear scrutiny. The parties have directed our attention to no
case in which a court, state or federal, has been called upon to
enforce a covenant excluding members of the white majority from
ownership or occupancy of real property on grounds of race or
color. But there are more fundamental considerations. The rights
created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by
its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are
personal rights. [
Footnote
29] It is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners to say
that the courts may also be induced to deny white persons rights of
ownership and occupancy on grounds of race or color. Equal
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities.
Nor do we find merit in the suggestion that property owners who
are parties to these agreements are denied equal protection of the
laws if denied access to the courts to enforce the terms of
restrictive covenants and to assert property rights which the state
courts have held to be created by such agreements. The Constitution
confers upon no individual the right to demand action by the State
which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to
other individuals. And it would appear beyond question that the
power of the State to create and enforce property interests must be
exercised within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.
S. 501 (1946).
The problem of defining the scope of the restrictions which the
Federal Constitution imposes upon exertions of power by the States
has given rise to many of the most persistent and fundamental
issues which this Court has been called upon to consider. That
problem was foremost in the minds of the framers of the
Constitution,
Page 334 U. S. 23
and, since that early day, has arisen in a multitude of forms.
The task of determining whether the action of a State offends
constitutional provisions is one which may not be undertaken
lightly. Where, however, it is clear that the action of the State
violates the terms of the fundamental charter, it is the obligation
of this Court so to declare.
The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became
a part of the Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else
the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of
primary concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment
of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those
rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States based
on considerations of race or color. Seventy-five years ago, this
Court announced that the provisions of the Amendment are to be
construed with this fundamental purpose in mind. [
Footnote 30] Upon full consideration, we
have concluded that, in these cases, the States have acted to deny
petitioners the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Having so decided, we find it unnecessary to
consider whether petitioners have also been deprived of property
without due process of law or denied privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Missouri and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan must be
reversed.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE
took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
* Together with No. 87,
McGhee et al. v. Sipes et al.,
on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
[
Footnote 1]
The trial court found that title to the property which
petitioners Shelley sought to purchase was held by one Bishop, a
real estate dealer, who placed the property in the name of
Josephine Fitzgerald. Bishop, who acted as agent for petitioners in
the purchase, concealed the fact of his ownership.
[
Footnote 2]
Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679
(1946).
[
Footnote 3]
Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638
(1947).
[
Footnote 4]
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
[
Footnote 5]
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323,
271 U. S.
330-331 (1926).
[
Footnote 6]
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60,
245 U. S. 73
(1917).
[
Footnote 7]
Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
83 U. S. 70,
83 U. S. 81
(1873).
See Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
[
Footnote 8]
In
Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633, 640 (1948), the section of the Civil Rights Act
herein considered is described as the federal statute, "enacted
before the Fourteenth Amendment but vindicated by it." The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was reenacted in § 18 of the Act of May 31,
1870, subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16
Stat. 144.
[
Footnote 9]
14 Stat. 27, 8 U.S.C. § 42.
[
Footnote 10]
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60,
245 U. S. 79
(1917).
[
Footnote 11]
Courts of Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Virginia have also declared similar statutes invalid as being
in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Glover v.
Atlanta, 148 Ga. 285, 96 S.E. 562 (1918);
Jackson v.
State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918);
Clinard v.
Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940);
Allen v.
Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421,
52 P.2d 1054
(1936);
Liberty Annex Corp. v. Dallas, 289 S.W. 1067
(Tex.Civ.App. 1927);
Irvine v. Clifton Forge, 124 Va. 781,
97 S.E. 310 (1918).
[
Footnote 12]
And see United States v. Harris, 106 U.
S. 629 (1883);
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U. S. 542
(1876).
[
Footnote 13]
Among the phrases appearing in the opinion are the following:
"the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers
executive or judicial"; "State laws and State proceedings"; "State
law . . . or some State action through its officers or agents";
"State laws and acts done under State authority"; "State laws, or
State action of some kind"; "such laws as the States may adopt or
enforce"; "such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or
take"; "State legislation or action"; "State law or State
authority."
[
Footnote 14]
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370,
103 U. S. 397
(1881);
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34,
154 U. S. 45
(1894);
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U. S. 226,
166 U. S.
233-235 (1897);
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.
S. 409,
167 U. S.
417-418 (1897);
Carter v. Texas, 177 U.
S. 442,
177 U. S. 447
(1900);
Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316,
200 U. S. 319
(1906);
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co.,
207 U. S. 20,
207 U. S. 35-36
(1907);
Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 278,
227 U. S.
286-287 (1913);
Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Cheek, 259 U. S. 530,
259 U. S. 548
(1922);
American Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky,
273 U. S. 269,
273 U. S. 274
(1927);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.
S. 103,
294 U. S.
112-113 (1935);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S.
32,
311 U. S. 41
(1940).
[
Footnote 15]
And see Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.
S. 270,
224 U. S.
281-282 (1912);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S.
32 (1940).
[
Footnote 16]
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278
(1936);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.
S. 227 (1940);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S. 143
(1944);
Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.
S. 742 (1948).
[
Footnote 17]
See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.
S. 103 (1935);
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.
S. 213 (1942).
[
Footnote 18]
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45
(1932);
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.
S. 471 (1945);
Tomkins v. Missouri,
323 U. S. 485
(1945);
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.
S. 663 (1947).
[
Footnote 19]
In applying the rule of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64
(1938), it is clear that the common law rules enunciated by state
courts in judicial opinions are to be regarded as a part of the law
of the State.
[
Footnote 20]
And see Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.
S. 769 (1942);
Cafeteria Employees Union v.
Angelos, 320 U. S. 293
(1943).
[
Footnote 21]
And see Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.
S. 331 (1946);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.
S. 367 (1947).
[
Footnote 22]
See Swain v. Maxwell, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S.W.2d. 80
(1916);
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217
(1918).
See also Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188
N.W. 330 (1922).
Cf. Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206
N.W. 532 (1925).
[
Footnote 23]
Cf. Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 2
(1913);
Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co.,
207 U. S. 20
(1907).
[
Footnote 24]
Bridges v. California, 314 U.
S. 252 (1941);
American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U. S. 321
(1941).
[
Footnote 25]
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356 (1886);
Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303
(1880);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33
(1915).
[
Footnote 26]
Restrictive agreements of the sort involved in these cases have
been used to exclude other than Negroes from the ownership or
occupancy of real property. We are informed that such agreements
have been directed against Indians, Jews, Chinese, Japanese,
Mexicans, Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos, among
others.
[
Footnote 27]
See Bridges v. California, 314 U.
S. 252,
314 U. S. 261
(1941);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296,
310 U. S.
307-308 (1940).
[
Footnote 28]
It should be observed that the restrictions relating to
residential occupancy contained in ordinances involved in the
Buchanan, Harmon and
Deans cases, cited
supra, and declared by this Court to be inconsistent with
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied equally to
white persons and Negroes.
[
Footnote 29]
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe R. Co.,
235 U. S. 151,
235 U. S.
161-162 (1914);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337
(1938);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633 (1948).
[
Footnote 30]
Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
83 U. S. 81
(1873);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.
S. 303 (1880).
See Flack, The Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.