1. Part-time service with the Volunteer Port Security Force of
the Coast Guard Reserve does not entitle one to veterans'
preference in federal employment under the Veterans' Preference Act
of 1944. Pp.
333 U. S.
412-423.
2. Those who served temporarily on a part-time basis with the
Volunteer Port Security Force are not "ex-servicemen" within the
meaning of § 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act. Pp.
333 U. S.
417-420.
3. The term "ex-servicemen" in the Veterans' Preference Act is
to be construed as embracing only those who performed military
service on full-time active duty with military pay and allowances,
and who thereby dislocated the fabric of their normal economic and
social life. Pp.
333 U. S.
421-422.
4. The provision of § 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act
establishing preference eligibility for unmarried widows of
ex-servicemen, even though these widows may have continued their
normal civilian employment during the war, does not require that
"ex-servicemen" be construed more broadly than above indicated. Pp.
333 U. S.
420-421.
Page 333 U. S. 412
5. One who, on the date when the Veterans' Preference Act became
law, had not disenrolled from the Volunteer Port Security Force
could not have acquired vested preference rights under § 18 of the
Act by virtue of a Civil Service Commission ruling extending
preference rights under prior laws to those who had served with the
Volunteer Port Security Force. Pp.
333 U. S.
422-423.
160 F.2d 915 reversed.
Respondents brought suits against members of the Civil Service
Commission to establish their status as preference eligibles in
federal employment. The District Court granted summary judgments in
their favor. 69 F. Supp. 54. The Court Appeals affirmed. 160 F.2d
915. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 754.
Reversed, p.
333 U. S.
423.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The problem here is whether temporary members of the Volunteer
Port Security Force of the Coast Guard Reserve are entitled to
veterans' preference in federal employment by virtue of the
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944. [
Footnote 1]
Pursuant to § 207 of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act
of 1941, [
Footnote 2]
approximately 70,000 persons were enrolled as temporary members of
the Coast Guard Reserve. The Reserve was a military organization
established
Page 333 U. S. 413
as a component part of the Coast Guard "to enable that service
to perform such extraordinary duties as may be necessitated by
emergency conditions." [
Footnote
3] The Coast Guard, in turn, was created as a military service,
and constitutes "a branch of the land and naval forces of the
United States." [
Footnote 4] On
November 1, 1941, the President directed that the Coast Guard
operate as part of the Navy subject to the orders of the Secretary
of the Navy. [
Footnote 5]
Of the various classifications of temporary members of the Coast
Guard Reserve, [
Footnote 6] the
largest was known as the Volunteer Port Security Force. Service
therein was purely voluntary, and was devoted to such activities as
the patrol and guarding of harbors, waterfronts, docks, bridges,
ships, and industrial shore establishments. The members of this
force took the oath of allegiance required of the regular members
of the Coast Guard. They were enrolled
"for the duration of the war, upon the completion of which you
will be disenrolled unless the period of your enrollment is sooner
terminated by Coast Guard authority. [
Footnote 7]"
In actual practice, however, the members were usually permitted
to leave the Force at any time by making a request to the
commanding officer of the unit to
Page 333 U. S. 414
which they were assigned. They were given a "Certificate of
Disenrollment" upon severance from the Force, honorable discharges
and mustering-out pay not being provided.
Members of the Volunteer Port Security Force were obligated to
be on active duty "only as directed by competent authority for a
minimum of 12 hours per week." [
Footnote 8] It does not appear that their active duty
exceeded that amount to any substantial degree. Because of the
small number of hours of service, most members were able to
continue their regular civilian employment with little or no
interference. They could not be transferred from the cities in
which they lived without their consent. Efforts were made by the
Coast Guard to assign the 12-hour weekly duty periods to fit the
convenience of the members. And many of them were disenrolled at
their own request upon representations that their duty assignments
conflicted with their civilian employment. They could also be
excused from duty if they found it temporarily inconvenient.
These members performed their duties without pay. In most cases,
however, they received an allowance for uniforms, and in some
instances they received food or subsistence allowance while on
active duty. Military status attached to them only during periods
when they were actually engaged on active duty or en route to and
from such duty. While on active duty, they wore their uniforms,
were subject to the usual Coast Guard discipline, and were vested
with the same authority as members of the regular Coast Guard of
similar rank.
Page 333 U. S. 415
At all times, the members of the Volunteer Port Security Force
remained subject to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
They were required to register, and were liable for induction into
the regular armed forces. In fact, many of them did enlist or were
drafted into those forces, thereby necessitating their
disenrollment as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. If
illness or disease occurred while on duty, they were accorded the
same hospital treatment as members of the regular Coast Guard. But
if they were injured or killed in the line of duty, they were
entitled only to the benefits prescribed by law for civilian
employees of the United States. Moreover, they were ineligible for
the benefits of National Service Life Insurance.
Respondent Cohen enrolled on April 13, 1944, as a member of the
Volunteer Port Security Force, and was assigned to duty with the
Captain of the Port, Washington, D.C. He performed his part-time
duties without compensation and without interruption to his regular
employment as a civilian economist in the War Department. He was
disenrolled on September 5, 1945, having served on active duty on
58 days for a total service of 398 hours. Respondent Hubickey was
enrolled in the Force on October 18, 1944, and was assigned to duty
with the Captain of the Port, Philadelphia, Pa. He too performed
his part-time duties without compensation and without interference
with his regular work as a civilian naval architect in the Navy
Department. On September 30, 1945, he was disenrolled, having
served on active duty on 32 days for a total service of 250
hours.
On April 4, 1944, before the passage of the Veterans' Preference
Act, the Civil Service Commission had ruled that the duties
performed by those enrolled in the Volunteer Port Security Force
entitled them to veterans' preference in federal employment under
the then existing
Page 333 U. S. 416
preference laws. [
Footnote
9] But, on November 4, 1944, after the enactment of the statute
in question and pursuant to a recommendation of the Acting
Secretary of the Navy, the Commission changed this ruling and
decided that such duties did not entitle one to veterans'
preference under the terms of the statute. [
Footnote 10]
The two respondents were denied veterans' preference in their
government employment in accordance with the Commission's second
ruling. Due to general reductions in force, respondent Cohen was
discharged from the War Department, and respondent Hubickey was
notified that he would be discharged from the Navy Department. They
then brought these actions to compel the members of the Commission
to classify them as preference eligibles; they also asked the court
to adjudge and declare them entitled to the status of preference
eligibles under the provisions of the Veterans' Preference Act. The
District Court granted summary judgments in their favor. 69 F.
Supp. 54. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
affirmed, one justice dissenting. 160 F.2d 915. We brought the
cases here on certiorari, the problem raised being one of
importance in the administration of the Veterans' Preference
Act.
Page 333 U. S. 417
The pertinent portion of the Veterans' Preference Act is to be
found near the end of § 2. That establishes preference in
government employment for
"those ex-servicemen and women who have served on active duty in
any branch of the armed forces of the United States, during any
war, . . . and have been separated therefrom under honorable
conditions."
Respondents claim that their service with the Volunteer Port
Security Force brings them squarely within this statutory
provision, hence entitling them to veterans' preference. It is
undisputed, of course, that they did serve part-time on active duty
in a branch of the armed forces of the United States during World
War II, and that they were separated therefrom under honorable
conditions. The crucial question is whether they thereby are
"ex-servicemen" within the meaning of this particular statute. On
that score, respondents urge that this term must be given its
ordinary and literal meaning, so as to refer to all those who
performed military service. [
Footnote 11] The length or continuity of active duty and
the presence or absence of compensation become immaterial from
respondents' point of view; the mere performance of some type of
military service is thought to be sufficient. Since respondents
concededly did perform military service while on intermittent
active duty with the Volunteer Port Security Force, the conclusion
is reached that they are "ex-servicemen" within the contemplation
of this statute. Resort to the legislative history and other
secondary sources is said to be unwarranted, so clear and obvious
is the meaning of that term.
In our opinion, however, the term "ex-servicemen" has no single,
precise definition which permits us to read and
Page 333 U. S. 418
apply that term without help from the context in which it
appears and the purpose for which it was inserted in the statute.
Ex-servicemen are indeed those who have performed military service.
And they may include those who have served on active duty only
part-time and without compensation. But this designation may also
be confined to a more definite and narrow class of individuals who
performed military service, to those whose full time and efforts
were at the disposal of military authorities and whose compensation
included military pay and allowances. Such ex-servicemen are those
who completely disassociated themselves from their civilian status
and their civilian employment during the period of their military
service, suffering in many cases financial hardship and separation
from home and family. They formed the great bulk of the regular
armed forces during World War II. In the popular mind, they were
typified by the full-fledged soldier, sailor, marine, or coast
guardsman. Our problem, of course, is whether Congress used the
term "ex-servicemen" in the broad or narrow sense when it enacted
the Veterans' Preference Act. And the answer to that problem is to
be determined by an examination of the statutory scheme, rather
than by reliance upon dictionary definitions.
The Veterans' Preference Act was enacted in 1944 to aid in the
readjustment and rehabilitation of World War II veterans. It was
felt that the problems of these returning veterans were
particularly acute, and merited special consideration. Their normal
employment and mode of life had been seriously disrupted by their
service in the armed forces, and it was thought that they could not
be expected to resume their regular activities without reemployment
and rehabilitation aids. The Federal Government, in its capacity as
an employer, determined to
Page 333 U. S. 419
take the lead in such a program. [
Footnote 12] The Veterans' Preference Act was accordingly
adopted, creating special preference and protection for returning
veterans at every stage of federal employment.
Throughout the legislative reports and debates leading to the
birth of this statute is evident a consistent desire to help only
those who had sacrificed their normal pursuits and surroundings to
aid in the struggle to which this nation had dedicated itself.
[
Footnote 13] It was the
veterans or ex-servicemen who had been completely divorced from
their civilian employment by reason of their full-time service with
the armed forces who were the objects of
Page 333 U. S. 420
Congressional solicitude. Reemployment and rehabilitation were
considered to be necessary only as to them.
There is nothing to indicate that the legislative mind in this
instance was directed toward granting special benefits or rewards
to those who performed military service without interference with
their normal employment and mode of life. As to them, assistance in
reemployment and rehabilitation was thought unnecessary. Their
civilian employment status remained unchanged by reason of their
military service. And, since their civilian life was substantially
unaltered, there was no problem of aiding their readjustment back
to such a life. Indeed, to have given them preference rights solely
because of their part-time military service would have been
inconsistent with the professed aims of the statutory framers. Such
preference would have diluted the benefits conferred on those
ex-servicemen who had made full-scale sacrifices, and it would have
been inequitable to the many civilians who also had participated
voluntarily in essential war and defense activities but who had not
been directly connected with a branch of the armed forces.
It is true that § 2 of the Act establishes preference
eligibility for the unmarried widows of deceased ex-servicemen
despite the fact that these widows may have continued their normal
civilian employment during the war. But the preference rights
thereby granted are derivative in nature. They are conferred on the
widows because of the dislocation and severance from civil life
which their deceased husbands suffered while performing full-time
military duties, and in partial substitution for the loss in family
earning power occasioned by their husbands' deaths. Congress felt
that this was one way of expressing the moral obligation and the
debt of gratitude which this nation was thought to owe these
widows. Such a provision certainly affords no basis for widening
the concept of
Page 333 U. S. 421
"ex-servicemen" beyond that which we have indicated. The widows
of ex-servicemen are in a special category which cannot be
compared, in terms of sacrifice or need for reemployment and
rehabilitation, with any group of individuals who performed
part-time military duties. [
Footnote 14]
In the light of the very clear purpose which Congress had in
mind in adopting the Veterans' Preference Act, we are constrained
to define the term "ex-servicemen," for the purposes of this
particular statute, as relating only to those who performed
military service on full-time active duty with military pay and
allowances, thereby dislocating the fabric of their normal economic
and social life. [
Footnote
15] It thus becomes obvious that respondents' service
Page 333 U. S. 422
with the Volunteer Port Security Force of the Coast Guard
Reserve cannot qualify them as "ex-servicemen" entitled to
veterans' preference under this enactment. They continued their
normal civilian employment with the War Department and the Navy
Department during the war, employment which suffered as little as
possible from their military service; they served on active duty
for only relatively short periods each week and could be
disenrolled at their own request; they received no military pay and
very few allowances; they could not be transferred away from their
homes without their consent. They were therefore able to retain the
essential elements of their civilian life. As to them, there was no
problem of reemployment or rehabilitation caused by their military
service. They are not among the "ex-servicemen" whom Congress
desired to assist by means of the Veterans' Preference Act.
One other matter remains. Respondents claim, and the Court of
Appeals held, that they acquired vested preference rights under §
18 of the Act. In pertinent part, § 18 provides that
"this Act shall not be construed to take away from any
preference eligible any rights heretofore granted to, or possessed
by, him under any existing law, Executive order, civil service rule
or regulation, of any department of the Government or officer
thereof."
It is said that the Civil Service Commission's ruling of April
4, 1944, extending preference rights under the then existing laws
to those who had performed service with the
Page 333 U. S. 423
Volunteer Port Security Force, gave respondents vested rights
which were preserved by § 18 when the Veterans' Preference Act was
subsequently enacted.
This contention is without substance. Veterans' preference
rights, by their very nature, do not accrue until one has become a
veteran through separation from the armed forces. On June 27, 1944,
when the Veterans' Preference Act became law, neither of the
respondents had as yet disenrolled from the Volunteer Port Security
Force. In fact, respondent Hubickey had not even enrolled by that
date. Thus, they could not be classed as veterans or ex-servicemen,
whatever definition be given those terms, on June 27, 1944, and
they could not have earned any veterans' preference rights prior to
that date. The Commission's ruling of April 4, 1944, did no more
than inform respondents that they would be entitled to veterans'
preference upon disenrollment, provided such ruling was lawful and
still in effect. It did not purport to give them preference rights
as of April 4, 1944, or to cause those rights to accrue before
disenrollment. Since they did not possess and had not been granted
any such rights under prior law, respondents were completely
unaffected by the provisions of § 18. That section was primarily
designed to perpetuate preferences granted earlier to veterans who
had served in the armed forces during peacetime and who were then
in government employment or on civil service registers. [
Footnote 16] Respondents were
obviously not veterans of that type.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents.
* Together with No. 131,
Mitchell et al., Members of the
Civil Service Commission v. Hubicey, also on certiorari to the
same Court.
[
Footnote 1]
58 Stat. 387, 5 U.S.C. § 851.
[
Footnote 2]
55 Stat. 9, 12, as amended, 14 U.S.C. Supp. V, § 307.
[
Footnote 3]
§ 201 of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 1941, 55
Stat. 9, 11, as amended, 14 U.S.C. Supp. V., § 301.
[
Footnote 4]
55 Stat. 585, 14 U.S.C. § 1.
[
Footnote 5]
Executive Order No. 8929, 6 Fed.Reg. 5581.
[
Footnote 6]
The other classifications were: (1) Full-time active duty with
military pay and allowances; (2) Pilots without pay and allowances
other than for uniforms, but paid by their own companies; (3)
Officers of Great Lakes vessels without pay and allowances other
than for uniforms, but paid by their own companies; (4) Coast Guard
police without pay and allowances; (5) Civil Service employees of
the Coast Guard enrolled for full-time active duty without pay
other than compensation for their civilian positions.
[
Footnote 7]
From the form entitled "Temporary Member of Coast Guard
Reserve-Enrollment and Active Duty Assignment."
[
Footnote 8]
Ibid. It also appears from this form that those
mentioned in classifications (2) and (5) in
footnote 6 supra, were subject to call at all
times. Apparently the other classifications, including the
Volunteer Port Security Force, were not subject to such a call.
[
Footnote 9]
Circular Letter No. 4145 to Regional Directors and Division
Chiefs of the Commission. This provided that active duty performed
by temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve, whether full-time,
part-time, or intermittently, either with or without pay, including
Government employees enrolled without pay other than the
compensation of their civilian positions, constituted active duty,
as distinguished from training duty, and entitled the member
performing such duty to preference benefits under the then existing
preference laws.
[
Footnote 10]
Departmental Circular No. 508 to to Heads of Departments and
Independent Establishments. This modified the earlier ruling and
provided that only those temporary Coast Guard Reservists
performing full-time duty with pay and allowances at shore stations
or aboard Coast Guard vessels were entitled to preference under the
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.
[
Footnote 11]
Respondents point out that the word "serviceman" is defined as
"one who has performed military service." Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2d Ed. (1942).
[
Footnote 12]
"I believe that the Federal Government, functioning in its
capacity as an employer, should take the lead in assuring those who
are in the armed services that, when they return, special
consideration will be given to them in their efforts to obtain
employment. It is absolutely impossible to take millions of our
young men out of their normal pursuits for the purpose of fighting
to preserve the Nation, and then expect them to resume their normal
activities without having any special consideration shown
them."
"The problems of readjustment will be difficult for all of us.
They will be particularly difficult for those who have spent months
and even years at the battle fronts all over the world. Surely a
grateful nation will want to express its gratitude in deeds, as
well as in words."
Letter from the President to Rep. Ramspeck, quoted in H.R. Rep.
No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5.
[
Footnote 13]
H.R. Rep. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; S.Rep. No. 907, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess.; 90 Cong.Rec. 3501-3507. The House report stated
(p. 3):
"Private employers and corporations, as well as State, county,
and municipal governments, have been urged, through the selective
service law and otherwise, to afford reemployment to veterans when
they leave the armed forces. Your committee feels that the Federal
Government should set the pace, and that this proposal is an
essential part of the reemployment and rehabilitation program."
The Senate report stated (p. 1):
"The committee believes that, in view of the fact that members
of the armed forces rapidly are being returned to civilian life,
the bill should be enacted without delay."
[
Footnote 14]
The same observations apply to the provision in § 2 giving
veterans' preference to the wives of ex-servicemen who have a
service-connected disability and who themselves have been unable to
qualify for any civil service appointment.
See also Public
Law 396, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., approved Jan.19, 1948, extending
veterans' preference benefits to the widowed mothers of deceased or
permanently and totally disabled ex-servicemen. H.R. Rep. No. 697,
80th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No. 480, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 15]
The view we take of this matter coincides with that expressed by
the supporters of H.R. 1389, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. That bill
proposed to change § 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act by providing
that
"'active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United
States' shall mean active full-time duty with military pay and
allowances in any branch of the armed forces during any campaign or
expedition (for which a campaign badge has been authorized)."
Hearings were held before the House Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service. The bill was unanimously reported out by the
committee, H.R. Rep. No. 465, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., and was
adopted by voice vote by the House of Representatives, 93 Cong.Rec.
7315-7318. A unanimous Senate Committee on Civil Service also
reported the bill favorably, S.Rep. No. 396, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
but the Senate adjourned without considering the bill.
The proponents of the bill and the two committees considered it
as a clarification of the original Congressional intent as to the
meaning of "ex-servicemen." It was stated that the country owes a
debt of gratitude to the temporary Coast Guard Reservists,
"but they are not to be classed as ex-servicemen, who were
actually uprooted from their civilian occupations and subjected to
the rigors of full-time military training and combat. It is to the
latter group that Congress intended to provide employment
preference in Government service."
93 Cong.Rec. 7315. The need for clarification of § 2 was said to
be the confusion created by the lower court decisions in the
instant cases.
[
Footnote 16]
See S.Rep. No. 907, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; H.R.
Rep. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. The Veterans' Preference
Act does not grant benefits to future peacetime veterans.