1. A defendant in a criminal prosecution in a state court who
testified that he had not in fact confessed is not thereby
precluded from raising the issue that an alleged confession offered
as evidence was coerced and that a conviction obtained by the use
thereof denied him due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Pp.
332 U. S.
742-746.
2. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
invalidates a state court conviction grounded in whole or in part
upon a confession which is the product of other than reasoned and
voluntary choice. P.
332 U. S.
745.
3. Foreclosing the right to complain of the use of an allegedly
coerced confession because of inconsistent testimony as to the
confession would itself be a denial of due process of law. Pp.
332 U. S.
745-746.
201 Miss. 423, 30 So. 2d 74, reversed.
Petitioner's conviction in a criminal prosecution in a state
court, claimed to have denied his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, was affirmed by the State Supreme Court. 201 Miss. 423,
30 So. 2d 74. This Court granted certiorari. 331 U.S. 795.
Reversed, p.
332 U. S.
746.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a question of procedure under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Does a defendant in a
Page 332 U. S. 743
state criminal proceeding lose the right to contend that a
confession was coerced because of his testimony that the confession
was in fact never made?
Petitioner, a 17-year-old Negro, was indicted by a grand jury in
Mississippi on a charge of assault with intent to ravish a female
of previous chaste character. During the course of the trial, the
state offered the testimony of two city detectives as to an alleged
oral confession obtained by them from petitioner. Objection was
made that this confession had been secured as the result of duress,
threats, and violence inflicted upon petitioner by two unidentified
police officers several hours prior to the confession. The jury
retired, and a preliminary hearing was held before the trial judge
as to the voluntariness of this confession. After various witnesses
appeared, including the petitioner himself, the judge concluded
that the confession was voluntary and that the testimony in
relation thereto was admissible. This testimony proved to be the
crucial element leading to the jury's conviction of petitioner. His
sentence was fixed at 18 years in prison.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal,
rejecting petitioner's contention that the introduction of the
testimony in question contravened his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. It stated that the conduct of the two unidentified
officers alleged to have struck and threatened petitioner was, if
true, indefensible and warranted condemnation. But it felt that
"the issue of fact, as well as credibility, was for the trial judge
upon such preliminary qualification, and we are not willing to
disturb his conclusion." 29 So. 2d 211, 212. This constitutional
contention was treated quite differently by the court on the filing
of a suggestion of error. It found that petitioner's testimony at
the preliminary hearing that he had been threatened prior to making
the
Page 332 U. S. 744
confession was entirely undisputed in the record. But it also
found that petitioner had steadfastly testified, both at the
preliminary hearing and at the trial on the merits before the jury,
that he did not in fact admit to the city detectives that he had
committed the crime. The court then stated:
"If the accused had not denied having made any confession at
all, we would feel constrained to reverse the conviction herein
because of the fact that his testimony as to the threat made to him
during the forenoon by the plain clothes men is wholly undisputed,
the jailer not having been asked about this threat, and having
testified only that he was not struck by anyone in his presence
after his arrest for this crime. But we think that one accused of
crime cannot be heard to say that he did not make a confession at
all, and at the same time contend that an alleged confession was
made under the inducement of fear."
30 So. 2d 74, 75. The suggestion of error was accordingly
overruled.
The incomplete record before us precludes our determination of
whether petitioner did deny in the trial court that he had
confessed the crime. [
Footnote
1] But, assuming that he did so testify, we cannot agree with
the court below that he was thereby estopped from asserting his
constitutional right to due process of law. The important fact is
that the oral confession was introduced, admitted, and used as
evidence of petitioner's guilt. Not
Page 332 U. S. 745
only may this confession have been influential in inducing the
jury's verdict, but it formed an essential part of the evidentiary
basis of the conviction now under review. His alleged denial of the
confession went only to the original issue of whether he actually
made the confession -- an issue that is no longer open. That
question was, at most, a disputed one; but the jury resolved the
matter against petitioner, and, like the court below, we accept
that determination. The sole concern now is with the validity of
the conviction based upon the use of the oral confession.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a
state court conviction grounded in whole or in part upon a
confession which is the product of other than reasoned and
voluntary choice. [
Footnote 2]
A conviction resulting from such use of a coerced confession,
however, is no less void because the accused testified at some
point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed,
voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly
legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted principles
of due process. And, since our constitutional system permits a
conviction to be sanctioned only if in conformity with those
principles, inconsistent testimony as to the confession should not
and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due process issue
in an appropriate manner.
White v. Texas, 310 U.
S. 530,
310 U. S.
531-532. Indeed, such a foreclosure of the right to
complain
"of a
Page 332 U. S. 746
wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere
pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence wholly
void,"
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278,
297 U. S. 286,
would itself be a denial of due process of law.
The judgment below must be reversed. Since the Mississippi
Supreme Court upheld the conviction solely because it thought
petitioner was not entitled to raise the constitutional issue, we
remand the case to that court so that it may definitively express
its views on that issue.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The transcript of the trial on the merits is not before us. At
the preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, the
transcript of which is before us, petitioner stated in regard to
the alleged confession: "I don't know what all he asked and all I
said, but I didn't admit I did it." He also denied having confessed
various details of the crime. Such testimony, however, might be
construed as nothing more than a layman's inexact way of stating
that his answers did not amount to a voluntary confession. But, in
the absence of the complete record, we express no opinion on the
matter.
[
Footnote 2]
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227;
Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629;
White v. Texas,
309 U.S. 631;
310 U. S. 310 U.S.
530;
Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544;
Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 547;
Lisenba v. California,
314 U. S. 219;
Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143;
327 U. S. 327 U.S.
274;
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596;
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401;
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596.
See, in general, Boskey and Pickering, "Federal
Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 266,
282-295.